信任视角下社会资本的界定、测度与验证
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摘要
作为社会科学研究领域一个新的研究范式,社会资本理论强调信任、规范和网络等非正式制度因素对经济行为的影响,其研究结果对传统社会科学,特别是经济学造成重大的影响甚至冲击。但囿于传统的理论视角、方法论和数学工具,关于社会资本的研究分歧众多、莫衷一是,从而使得社会资本理论本身及其应用受到很大的质疑和限制。社会资本概念处于界定难、测度难、验证难的尴尬困境之中。
本文认为社会资本理论所处的困境在于社会资本范畴本身没有找到它在人性中的内在根源,社会资本范畴的人性根源也不能在西方古典或新古典经济学的传统个人理性中去寻找,而只能采取整体、系统的世界观和方法论,综合人的所有行为方式的内在联系,探寻出社会资本范畴的人性根源在于人的同情心。而同情心既是人类集体理性和情感理性的基础,又是人类集体理性和情感理性的产物。
将社会资本理论应用于家族企业的研究目前虽然还比较少,但已经取得了很好的结果。本文借助于以往的研究结果,一方面来作为对社会资本理论的测度和验证方法,另一方面也希望本文的研究也能对家族企业研究起到一定的助益作用。
本研究主体分为四部分：
在第一部分(第三章)中：我们一方面用博弈论典型性地模拟了中国的历史演进,得出了中国人的信任方式的内在人性根源：同情心。另一方面,也用博弈论模拟了欧洲社会和印度社会的起始博弈,指出在这两种起始博弈模型的长期作用下人类社会的同情心将逐渐衰亡。本文还特别指出古典、新古典经济学中的个人理性其实是先行者优势博弈模型长期训练之下造就的古典欧洲人的理性范畴,这一理性范畴其实是不全面的。
在第二部分(第四章)中：根据前文的理论和收集的中国上市家族企业的数据,应用数学逻辑的推导方法,大致估算了家族企业法人的社会资本。
在第三部分(第五章)中：根据前文的理论和数据,应用计量模型,验证了法人社会资本和企业经营绩效的关系,并就法人社会资本影响家族企业经营绩效的内在机制做了探讨。
在第四部分(第六章和第七章)中：分别阐述了本文的社会学结论和经济学结论。特别是第七章的数学演算部分阐明并演示了本文创新的博弈演算方法,这一方法实际上应用于全文的博弈演算之中。
本研究的结论：
(1)趋利避害的本能只是人性的动物性基础,在此基础之上,人性的塑造和演进主要取决于人类之间相互进行的博弈。而且趋利和避害是两个不同维度、不能通约的概念,因此对人性的阐述和研究必须主要依靠博弈论。而把人性简化到只有趋利一维、只有利己一种倾向的个体理性的理念,其实只是在先行者优势博弈模型下才是正确的。在别的博弈模型之中,利他倾向也是一种理性。
(2)社会资本不是产生于人的个体理性之中,而是产生于人的集体理性、情感理性和道德理性之中,但却反过来对人的个体理性选择有所裨益的社会情感和经验积累。它的内在人性根源在于人的同情心。
(3)由于社会资本的隐性特征,个人的社会资本往往难以测度,但在具有“三公”原则的股票市场上市的企业法人的社会资本可以进行测度。并可以通过家族企业法人的社会资本倒推家族企业法人代表的社会资本。
本研究的创新点主要有以下几点：
(1)研究视角的创新：本文从人类功利层面的生产方式行为、情感层面的交往方式行为和精神层面的思维方式行为入手,分析了人类的工具理性、情感理性和道德理性,指出了社会资本的内在人性根源在于人的同情心。
(2)方法论的创新：本文将博弈论引进社会学和历史学的研究,以期有利于社会学和历史学的科学化和精确化。同时,本文还创新了博弈论的演算方法,以期有利于经济学的进一步科学化和精确化。
(3)观点的创新；见前文结论。
As a new paradigm in the research of social science field, the theory of social capital emphasizes the influence of unofficial system factors such as trust, regulation, social networks and others on economic behavior. Its result had significant impact on the traditional social sciences, especially economics. However, the theory of social capital and its application have been challenged and limited due to many divergences in the studies resulting from traditional theoretical perspective, methodology and mathematical tool. The concept of social capital has been in deep trouble of definition, measure and verification.
The text thinks the trouble in the theory of social capital lies in the fact that the internal source of social capital category in humanity has not been found. The source couldn't been found in traditional individual reason of western classic or new classic economics. Combined with the internal relation of all person manner, the whole systematic world outlook and methodology could only been used to mouse out that the souce of social capital category lies in human sympathy. Sympathy is both the base and the production of human group reason and emotional reason.
The application of the theory of social capital to the research on family enterprises is less at present, but the good results have been got. In the paper, the results are adopted to serve as the means of measure and verification to the theory of social capital. On the other hand, the results from the paper will be beneficial to the reasearch of family enterprises.
The main body of reasearch can be divided 4 parts:
Part1 (Chapter 3):With the game theory to simulate the evolutiong of Chinese history typically, it is concluded that the internal human source of Chinese trust method is symthy. On the other hand, to simulate the initiative game of Europe and Indian society with the game theory, it is pointed out that the sympthy will gradually decline under the long-term action of this two model of game. In particular, it is mentioned the individaul reason in classic and new classic economics is a reason category builded under the long-term effects of superior game model by precursors so the category isn't comperhensive in fact.
Part 2 (Chapter 4):According to the theory above mentioned and the data of Chinese listed family enterprises, the social capital of legal entities is estimated by derivation of mathematical logic.
Part 3 (Chapter 5):According to the theory and data above, the relationship of the social capital and the enterprise performance of legal entities is verified and the internal mechanism of the influence of the social captial on family enterprise perfomance is discussed with metrological model.
Part 4 (Chapter 6 and 7):The conclusion of sociology and economics is drawn. In particular, a innovative calculation method of game is expounded and demonstrated in the part of mathematical operations in Chapter 7. In fact, the method is applied to the whole-length calulation.
The conclusions of the research are as follows:
Firstly, human nature shaping and progressing depends largely on the game among human beings each other based on the instinct of seeking advantage and avoiding disaster which is only animal basis in humanity. Seeking advantage and avoiding disaster are two concepts without same dimension and common measure so that the discusion and reasearch on the human nature must mainly depend on the game theory. The view that the human nature is reduced to have one dimension of avoiding disaster or benefitting oneself is right only under the surperior game model of precursors. On the other game model, the trend of benifitting others is also one kind of reason.
Secondly, social capital did not grow out of human individual reason, but resulted from human group reason, emotion reason and moral reason. Conversely, it influence individual reason to select the favorable social emotion and experience. Its internal source of human nature lies in sympathy.
Thirdly, it is difficult to estimate the individual social capital due to recessive character of social capital. But the social capital of legal person of the enterprise listed on stock market with impartial, fair and open principle can be estimated and the legal representive's social capital of family enterprise can be retracted.
The main innovations in the reasearch are as bellow:
The innovation in perspective:beginning with the behaviors such as the mode of production from human utility level, the mode of interaction from emotion level and the mode of thingking from spirit level, the paper analysed human tool reason, emotion reason and moral reason to point out that the social capital source of internal human nature lies in sympathy.
The innovation in methodology:the game theroy is introducted into the reasearch on sociology and history to help make them more scientific and accurate.
The innovation in viewpoint:being stated above.
本文认为社会资本理论所处的困境在于社会资本范畴本身没有找到它在人性中的内在根源,社会资本范畴的人性根源也不能在西方古典或新古典经济学的传统个人理性中去寻找,而只能采取整体、系统的世界观和方法论,综合人的所有行为方式的内在联系,探寻出社会资本范畴的人性根源在于人的同情心。而同情心既是人类集体理性和情感理性的基础,又是人类集体理性和情感理性的产物。
将社会资本理论应用于家族企业的研究目前虽然还比较少,但已经取得了很好的结果。本文借助于以往的研究结果,一方面来作为对社会资本理论的测度和验证方法,另一方面也希望本文的研究也能对家族企业研究起到一定的助益作用。
本研究主体分为四部分：
在第一部分(第三章)中：我们一方面用博弈论典型性地模拟了中国的历史演进,得出了中国人的信任方式的内在人性根源：同情心。另一方面,也用博弈论模拟了欧洲社会和印度社会的起始博弈,指出在这两种起始博弈模型的长期作用下人类社会的同情心将逐渐衰亡。本文还特别指出古典、新古典经济学中的个人理性其实是先行者优势博弈模型长期训练之下造就的古典欧洲人的理性范畴,这一理性范畴其实是不全面的。
在第二部分(第四章)中：根据前文的理论和收集的中国上市家族企业的数据,应用数学逻辑的推导方法,大致估算了家族企业法人的社会资本。
在第三部分(第五章)中：根据前文的理论和数据,应用计量模型,验证了法人社会资本和企业经营绩效的关系,并就法人社会资本影响家族企业经营绩效的内在机制做了探讨。
在第四部分(第六章和第七章)中：分别阐述了本文的社会学结论和经济学结论。特别是第七章的数学演算部分阐明并演示了本文创新的博弈演算方法,这一方法实际上应用于全文的博弈演算之中。
本研究的结论：
(1)趋利避害的本能只是人性的动物性基础,在此基础之上,人性的塑造和演进主要取决于人类之间相互进行的博弈。而且趋利和避害是两个不同维度、不能通约的概念,因此对人性的阐述和研究必须主要依靠博弈论。而把人性简化到只有趋利一维、只有利己一种倾向的个体理性的理念,其实只是在先行者优势博弈模型下才是正确的。在别的博弈模型之中,利他倾向也是一种理性。
(2)社会资本不是产生于人的个体理性之中,而是产生于人的集体理性、情感理性和道德理性之中,但却反过来对人的个体理性选择有所裨益的社会情感和经验积累。它的内在人性根源在于人的同情心。
(3)由于社会资本的隐性特征,个人的社会资本往往难以测度,但在具有“三公”原则的股票市场上市的企业法人的社会资本可以进行测度。并可以通过家族企业法人的社会资本倒推家族企业法人代表的社会资本。
本研究的创新点主要有以下几点：
(1)研究视角的创新：本文从人类功利层面的生产方式行为、情感层面的交往方式行为和精神层面的思维方式行为入手,分析了人类的工具理性、情感理性和道德理性,指出了社会资本的内在人性根源在于人的同情心。
(2)方法论的创新：本文将博弈论引进社会学和历史学的研究,以期有利于社会学和历史学的科学化和精确化。同时,本文还创新了博弈论的演算方法,以期有利于经济学的进一步科学化和精确化。
(3)观点的创新；见前文结论。
As a new paradigm in the research of social science field, the theory of social capital emphasizes the influence of unofficial system factors such as trust, regulation, social networks and others on economic behavior. Its result had significant impact on the traditional social sciences, especially economics. However, the theory of social capital and its application have been challenged and limited due to many divergences in the studies resulting from traditional theoretical perspective, methodology and mathematical tool. The concept of social capital has been in deep trouble of definition, measure and verification.
The text thinks the trouble in the theory of social capital lies in the fact that the internal source of social capital category in humanity has not been found. The source couldn't been found in traditional individual reason of western classic or new classic economics. Combined with the internal relation of all person manner, the whole systematic world outlook and methodology could only been used to mouse out that the souce of social capital category lies in human sympathy. Sympathy is both the base and the production of human group reason and emotional reason.
The application of the theory of social capital to the research on family enterprises is less at present, but the good results have been got. In the paper, the results are adopted to serve as the means of measure and verification to the theory of social capital. On the other hand, the results from the paper will be beneficial to the reasearch of family enterprises.
The main body of reasearch can be divided 4 parts:
Part1 (Chapter 3):With the game theory to simulate the evolutiong of Chinese history typically, it is concluded that the internal human source of Chinese trust method is symthy. On the other hand, to simulate the initiative game of Europe and Indian society with the game theory, it is pointed out that the sympthy will gradually decline under the long-term action of this two model of game. In particular, it is mentioned the individaul reason in classic and new classic economics is a reason category builded under the long-term effects of superior game model by precursors so the category isn't comperhensive in fact.
Part 2 (Chapter 4):According to the theory above mentioned and the data of Chinese listed family enterprises, the social capital of legal entities is estimated by derivation of mathematical logic.
Part 3 (Chapter 5):According to the theory and data above, the relationship of the social capital and the enterprise performance of legal entities is verified and the internal mechanism of the influence of the social captial on family enterprise perfomance is discussed with metrological model.
Part 4 (Chapter 6 and 7):The conclusion of sociology and economics is drawn. In particular, a innovative calculation method of game is expounded and demonstrated in the part of mathematical operations in Chapter 7. In fact, the method is applied to the whole-length calulation.
The conclusions of the research are as follows:
Firstly, human nature shaping and progressing depends largely on the game among human beings each other based on the instinct of seeking advantage and avoiding disaster which is only animal basis in humanity. Seeking advantage and avoiding disaster are two concepts without same dimension and common measure so that the discusion and reasearch on the human nature must mainly depend on the game theory. The view that the human nature is reduced to have one dimension of avoiding disaster or benefitting oneself is right only under the surperior game model of precursors. On the other game model, the trend of benifitting others is also one kind of reason.
Secondly, social capital did not grow out of human individual reason, but resulted from human group reason, emotion reason and moral reason. Conversely, it influence individual reason to select the favorable social emotion and experience. Its internal source of human nature lies in sympathy.
Thirdly, it is difficult to estimate the individual social capital due to recessive character of social capital. But the social capital of legal person of the enterprise listed on stock market with impartial, fair and open principle can be estimated and the legal representive's social capital of family enterprise can be retracted.
The main innovations in the reasearch are as bellow:
The innovation in perspective:beginning with the behaviors such as the mode of production from human utility level, the mode of interaction from emotion level and the mode of thingking from spirit level, the paper analysed human tool reason, emotion reason and moral reason to point out that the social capital source of internal human nature lies in sympathy.
The innovation in methodology:the game theroy is introducted into the reasearch on sociology and history to help make them more scientific and accurate.
The innovation in viewpoint:being stated above.
引文
1肯尼思.阿罗(1999)和罗伯特.索洛(1999)对“社会资本,,概念批评的很重要的一个原因就是其难以测度。
1参见第匕章《数学演算与经济学结论》中对博弈运算法则的说明。
2也可以近似地看做是王阳明的“良知”
1贞观、开元的短暂盛世仍然无法掩饰唐朝伦理道德水平的下降
1笔者认为：宽容产生信仟,原罪感其实并不利于信任。鲁迅在《狂人口记》里以“我也吃过人”的描写
1乔良：金融危机的本质是美国不受监管。http://hi.baidu.com/bdyanj/blog/item/6d1365518ae4552342a75b9d.html
2潘忠岐：《从“随势”到“谋势”——有关中国进一步和平发展的战略思考》,载《世界经济与政治》,2010年第2期,第4-18页。
1司马迁：《史记》,北京：中华书局2006年版,第332页。
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1参见第匕章《数学演算与经济学结论》中对博弈运算法则的说明。
2也可以近似地看做是王阳明的“良知”
1贞观、开元的短暂盛世仍然无法掩饰唐朝伦理道德水平的下降
1笔者认为：宽容产生信仟,原罪感其实并不利于信任。鲁迅在《狂人口记》里以“我也吃过人”的描写
1乔良：金融危机的本质是美国不受监管。http://hi.baidu.com/bdyanj/blog/item/6d1365518ae4552342a75b9d.html
2潘忠岐：《从“随势”到“谋势”——有关中国进一步和平发展的战略思考》,载《世界经济与政治》,2010年第2期,第4-18页。
1司马迁：《史记》,北京：中华书局2006年版,第332页。
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