中国农业上市公司资本结构研究
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摘要
农业在我国处于基础地位,农业产业化经营是推进农业现代化的重要途径,而农业上市公司则是带动农业现代化的龙头企业。基于农业上市公司的视角,在其成长过程中,一个不得不面对的问题是农业上市公司绩效低下、治理水平不高。而绩效的提高和治理水平的改善都脱离不了与资本结构的关系。探讨农业上市公司资本结构的决定因素,分析资本结构与公司绩效和公司治理之间的关系,并进一步提出农业上市公司资本结构的优化措施,这对于改善农业上市公司绩效、改进其治理水平从而发挥其龙头作用具有重要的意义。
论文根据资本结构代理成本理论和不对称信息条件下的优序融资理论,规范分析和实证分析相结合,运用描述性统计的方法分析农业上市公司资本结构的现状,采用Kruskal-Wallis非参数检验及Tamhane's T2法对不同行业间资本结构的差异进行检验,使用列联表行列独立性卡方检验的方法寻找影响资本结构的因素,通过面板数据模型的构建分析农业上市公司绩效对资本结构的影响,采用回归分析方法探讨农业上市公司资本结构对绩效的作用,运用逻辑演绎的方法考查资本结构与公司治理的关系,并利用统计归类的方法探讨了对资本结构优化起保障作用的财务预警模型在农业上市公司中的修正应用。经过系统、深入的分析,得出结论如下:
农业上市公司和所有上市公司一样,资产负债率呈长期上升趋势。农业上市公司无论是上市的数量还是发行股票筹资的金额,在我国各行业的上市公司中均处于较低水平,股票市场的支农力度与农业的基础地位极不相称。从负债的期限结构看,农业上市公司流动负债占总资产的比重明显高于非流动负债的比重,其债务筹资风险总体上要高于所有上市公司的平均水平。检验结果表明资本结构的显著性差异较广泛地存在于多个行业之间。从融资结构来看,不能证明农业上市公司具有股权融资偏好,借款才是农业上市公司最主要的融资方式。
使用列联表行列独立性卡方检验的方法对盈利、规模、成长性、非债务税盾以及资产担保价值等因素进行实证检验,结果显示影响农业上市公司资本结构的主要因素是总资产规模。
实证分析的结果表明农业上市公司的长期负债比率与当期、滞后一期及滞后两期的净资产收益率均没什么关系,总负债率和流动负债比率与当期的净资产收益率之间呈现出负相关关系。使用回归分析法分析资本结构对公司绩效的影响时,若使用线性模型分析,发现一些年份农业上市公司的净资产收益率与资产负债率之间存在显著的负线性关系;如果采用二次曲线模型进行分析,发现在一些年份农业上市公司的资产负债率与净资产收益率之间存在显著的二次曲线关系,可以使用极值定理求出这些年份的最佳资产负债率;若采用逐步回归法进行多重线性回归分析,各年份引入的影响净资产收益率的解释变量并不完全相同,相比较而言,流动负债比率这一变量被引入的次数最多。
股权分置改革以来,农业上市公司流通股比例快速上升,第一大股东持股比例总体下降,但股权集中度依然较高。农业上市公司一股独大的状况加深了股东之间的利益冲突,并凸显公司的代理问题。农业上市公司股权激励不到位,并且董事会、监事会监控经理人的意图没有很好实现。农业上市公司债权资本对高管人员的激励作用以及破产约束作用没有有效发挥,流动负债占总负债的比重过高显示缺乏债权人治理。
农业上市公司资本结构优化应以股东财富最大化为目标。为优化资本结构,农业上市公司需要强化理财意识,提高公司的绩效,还需要防范风险,适度负债,并需要优化公司的治理结构。
Agriculture has the fundamental status in China. Agricultural industrialization is the important way boosting agriculture modernization. The agricultural listed companies are the lead of agriculture modernization. View based on the agricultural listed companies, a problem have to face is the worse performance and governance power. The improvement of performance and governance level can not divorce from capital structure. It has important meaning for improving the performance and governance level of agricultural listed companies to discuss the determination factor of capital structure, to analysis the relation between capital structure and performance or corporate governance, and to discuss the countermeasures for the capital structure optimization of agricultural listed companies.
The theory bases of this article are the agency costs theory and the pecking order theory. This article combines the normative method with positive method. It analyzes the current status of capital structure of agricultural listed companies by descriptive statistics method. It tests the difference between agricultural listed companies and other industries’listed companies by the method of Kruskal-Wallis and Tamhane's T2. It finds the influence factors of capital structure by cross-tabulation method. It analyzes the affect of performance to capital structure by panel data model and discusses the effect of capital structure to performance by regression method. It examines the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance by method of logic. It discusses the corrected apply of financial risk warning model which has ensure function to optimize capital structure by the method of statistics classifying.
The main conclusions are as follows:
The debt-asset ratio of agricultural listed companies rises steadily for a long time. It is lower than the other industries whether the listed quantities or the raised money of agricultural listed companies. The current liability to asset ratio of agricultural listed companies is more than the non-current liability to asset ratio and it determines that the financing risk of agricultural listed companies is more than the average of all listed companies. It is found that the non-current liability to asset ratio of agricultural listed companies stay in the middle of twelve industries’, while the current liability to asset ratio at the bottom. The test result shows that the notable difference in capital structure exists widely in different industries. The frame of financing can not prove that the listed agricultural companies have the preference of stock issue. Loan financing is the mostly main mode of financing.
The influence of yield, scale, growth, non-liability tax shield and asset secured value are tested by cross-tabulation method. The main factor influence the capital structure of agricultural listed companies is the scale of assets.
The effect of empirical analysis shows that there is no proof of the relation of long-term liability asset ratio to the rate of return on common stockholders' equity in the current period, and to the rate which has a time lag of one period or two periods. Liability asset ratio has a negative correlation to the rate of return on common stockholders' equity as well as the current liability asset ratio. Regression method is used to analyze the influence of capital structure to corporate performance. It shows that the rate of return on common stockholders' equity has significantly negative correlation to the liability asset ratio in some years if use the linear model. It is discovered that there is significantly quadratic correlation between liability asset ratio and the rate of return on common stockholders' equity in some years when the quadratic model is used. So the optimal capital structure can be found according as extremum theorem in these years. If the stepwise model is used, the analysis effect reveals that the explanatory variables of the rate of return on common stockholders' equity are incompletely same in every year while the current liability asset ratio is imported the most frequently.
The tradable share proportion of agricultural listed companies has increased quickly after reform of non-tradable shares. The share proportion of the largest shareholder as a whole is falling but the equity ownership concentration still keeps high. The status that one share dominates exclusively makes the interest conflict of stockholders deeper. There are faults in the executive ownership incentives of agricultural listed companies. The intentions of directorate and supervisory board to supervise handlers are not realized goodly. The debt ownership capital of agricultural listed companies has not brought the function of inspiriment and bankruptcy restriction into play. The high proportion of current liability to total liability means that loaner governance is absent.
The object of capital structure optimization of agricultural listed companies is shareholder wealth maximization. It is necessary to strengthen the financing consciousness, improve the corporate performance, keep the risk away, get into debt within measure, and optimize the corporate governance structure to optimize the capital structure of agricultural listed companies.
论文根据资本结构代理成本理论和不对称信息条件下的优序融资理论,规范分析和实证分析相结合,运用描述性统计的方法分析农业上市公司资本结构的现状,采用Kruskal-Wallis非参数检验及Tamhane's T2法对不同行业间资本结构的差异进行检验,使用列联表行列独立性卡方检验的方法寻找影响资本结构的因素,通过面板数据模型的构建分析农业上市公司绩效对资本结构的影响,采用回归分析方法探讨农业上市公司资本结构对绩效的作用,运用逻辑演绎的方法考查资本结构与公司治理的关系,并利用统计归类的方法探讨了对资本结构优化起保障作用的财务预警模型在农业上市公司中的修正应用。经过系统、深入的分析,得出结论如下:
农业上市公司和所有上市公司一样,资产负债率呈长期上升趋势。农业上市公司无论是上市的数量还是发行股票筹资的金额,在我国各行业的上市公司中均处于较低水平,股票市场的支农力度与农业的基础地位极不相称。从负债的期限结构看,农业上市公司流动负债占总资产的比重明显高于非流动负债的比重,其债务筹资风险总体上要高于所有上市公司的平均水平。检验结果表明资本结构的显著性差异较广泛地存在于多个行业之间。从融资结构来看,不能证明农业上市公司具有股权融资偏好,借款才是农业上市公司最主要的融资方式。
使用列联表行列独立性卡方检验的方法对盈利、规模、成长性、非债务税盾以及资产担保价值等因素进行实证检验,结果显示影响农业上市公司资本结构的主要因素是总资产规模。
实证分析的结果表明农业上市公司的长期负债比率与当期、滞后一期及滞后两期的净资产收益率均没什么关系,总负债率和流动负债比率与当期的净资产收益率之间呈现出负相关关系。使用回归分析法分析资本结构对公司绩效的影响时,若使用线性模型分析,发现一些年份农业上市公司的净资产收益率与资产负债率之间存在显著的负线性关系;如果采用二次曲线模型进行分析,发现在一些年份农业上市公司的资产负债率与净资产收益率之间存在显著的二次曲线关系,可以使用极值定理求出这些年份的最佳资产负债率;若采用逐步回归法进行多重线性回归分析,各年份引入的影响净资产收益率的解释变量并不完全相同,相比较而言,流动负债比率这一变量被引入的次数最多。
股权分置改革以来,农业上市公司流通股比例快速上升,第一大股东持股比例总体下降,但股权集中度依然较高。农业上市公司一股独大的状况加深了股东之间的利益冲突,并凸显公司的代理问题。农业上市公司股权激励不到位,并且董事会、监事会监控经理人的意图没有很好实现。农业上市公司债权资本对高管人员的激励作用以及破产约束作用没有有效发挥,流动负债占总负债的比重过高显示缺乏债权人治理。
农业上市公司资本结构优化应以股东财富最大化为目标。为优化资本结构,农业上市公司需要强化理财意识,提高公司的绩效,还需要防范风险,适度负债,并需要优化公司的治理结构。
Agriculture has the fundamental status in China. Agricultural industrialization is the important way boosting agriculture modernization. The agricultural listed companies are the lead of agriculture modernization. View based on the agricultural listed companies, a problem have to face is the worse performance and governance power. The improvement of performance and governance level can not divorce from capital structure. It has important meaning for improving the performance and governance level of agricultural listed companies to discuss the determination factor of capital structure, to analysis the relation between capital structure and performance or corporate governance, and to discuss the countermeasures for the capital structure optimization of agricultural listed companies.
The theory bases of this article are the agency costs theory and the pecking order theory. This article combines the normative method with positive method. It analyzes the current status of capital structure of agricultural listed companies by descriptive statistics method. It tests the difference between agricultural listed companies and other industries’listed companies by the method of Kruskal-Wallis and Tamhane's T2. It finds the influence factors of capital structure by cross-tabulation method. It analyzes the affect of performance to capital structure by panel data model and discusses the effect of capital structure to performance by regression method. It examines the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance by method of logic. It discusses the corrected apply of financial risk warning model which has ensure function to optimize capital structure by the method of statistics classifying.
The main conclusions are as follows:
The debt-asset ratio of agricultural listed companies rises steadily for a long time. It is lower than the other industries whether the listed quantities or the raised money of agricultural listed companies. The current liability to asset ratio of agricultural listed companies is more than the non-current liability to asset ratio and it determines that the financing risk of agricultural listed companies is more than the average of all listed companies. It is found that the non-current liability to asset ratio of agricultural listed companies stay in the middle of twelve industries’, while the current liability to asset ratio at the bottom. The test result shows that the notable difference in capital structure exists widely in different industries. The frame of financing can not prove that the listed agricultural companies have the preference of stock issue. Loan financing is the mostly main mode of financing.
The influence of yield, scale, growth, non-liability tax shield and asset secured value are tested by cross-tabulation method. The main factor influence the capital structure of agricultural listed companies is the scale of assets.
The effect of empirical analysis shows that there is no proof of the relation of long-term liability asset ratio to the rate of return on common stockholders' equity in the current period, and to the rate which has a time lag of one period or two periods. Liability asset ratio has a negative correlation to the rate of return on common stockholders' equity as well as the current liability asset ratio. Regression method is used to analyze the influence of capital structure to corporate performance. It shows that the rate of return on common stockholders' equity has significantly negative correlation to the liability asset ratio in some years if use the linear model. It is discovered that there is significantly quadratic correlation between liability asset ratio and the rate of return on common stockholders' equity in some years when the quadratic model is used. So the optimal capital structure can be found according as extremum theorem in these years. If the stepwise model is used, the analysis effect reveals that the explanatory variables of the rate of return on common stockholders' equity are incompletely same in every year while the current liability asset ratio is imported the most frequently.
The tradable share proportion of agricultural listed companies has increased quickly after reform of non-tradable shares. The share proportion of the largest shareholder as a whole is falling but the equity ownership concentration still keeps high. The status that one share dominates exclusively makes the interest conflict of stockholders deeper. There are faults in the executive ownership incentives of agricultural listed companies. The intentions of directorate and supervisory board to supervise handlers are not realized goodly. The debt ownership capital of agricultural listed companies has not brought the function of inspiriment and bankruptcy restriction into play. The high proportion of current liability to total liability means that loaner governance is absent.
The object of capital structure optimization of agricultural listed companies is shareholder wealth maximization. It is necessary to strengthen the financing consciousness, improve the corporate performance, keep the risk away, get into debt within measure, and optimize the corporate governance structure to optimize the capital structure of agricultural listed companies.
引文
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杨亚达. 2002.国有企业资本结构的实证分析.管理世界,4:148-150
姚琼. 2005.农业上市公司资本结构研究.北京:经济科学出版社
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朱凯,陈信元. 2007.银行腐败与公司资本结构决策.金融研究,1:31-43
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Altman E I. 1968. Financial Ratios Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23(4): 589-609
Baron D P. 1974. Default Risk, Homemade Leverage, and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. The American Economic Review, 64(1): 176-182
Baxter N D. 1967. Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital. The Journal of Finance, 22(3): 395-403
Blair M M. 1995. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institutionz: 3
Bolton P, Freixas X. 2000. Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and FinancialMarket Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2): 324-351.
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Coase R H. 1984. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140: 229-231
Dann L Y, DeAngelo H. 1988. Corporate Financial Policy and Corporate Control: A Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 20(1): 87-127
Deangelo H, Masulis R. 1980. Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, (8): 3-29
Dewatripont M, Tirole J. 1994. A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4): 1027-1054
Durand D. 1952. Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business, Trends and Problerms of Measurement. Conference on Research on Business Finance, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, pp.215-247
Dyck A, Zingales L. 2001. Private benefits of control: an international comparison. NBER working paper, 8711
Farrar D E, Selwyn L L. 1967. Taxes Corporate Financial Policy and Return to Investors. National Tax Journal, 20(4): 444-454
Flannery M J. 1986. Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice. The Journal of Finance, 41(1): 19-37
Harris M, Raviv A. 1990. Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt. The Journal of Finance, 45(2): 321-349
Hart O, Moore J. 1998. default and renegotiation: a dynamic model of debt. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1): 1-41
Haugen R A, Senbet L W. 1981. Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital through Options. The Journal of Finance, 36(3): 629-647
Heinkel R, Zechner J. 1990. The Role of Debt and Perferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(1): 1-24
Israel R. 1992. Capital and ownership structure, and the market for corporate control. The Review of Financial Studies, 5(2): 181-198
Jensen M C, Meckling W H. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360
La Porta R, lopez-de-silanes F, shleifer A, vishnhy R. 2002. investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of finance, 57(3): 1147-1170
Leland H E, Pyle D H. 1977. Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32(2): 371-387
Miller M H. 1977. Debt and Taxes. The Journal of Finance, 32 (2): 261-275
Miller M H, Rock K. 1985. Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance, 40(4): 1031-1051
Modigliani F, Miller M H. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 8(3): 261-297
Modigliani F, Miller M H. 1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction. The American Economic Review, 53(3): 433-443
Myers S C, Majluf N. 1984. Corporate financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information Investors not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 187 -221
Myers S C. 1984. The Capital Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 39(3): 575-592
Robichek A A, Myers S C. 1966. Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1(1): 1-35.
Ross S A. 1977. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. Journal of Economics, 8(1): 23-40
Smith C W, Warner J B. 1979. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2): 117-161
Stiglitz J E. 1969. A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. The American Economic Review, 59(5): 784-793
Stulz R M. 1988. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1): 25-54
Stulz R M, Johnson H. 1985. Analysis of Secured Debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(4): 501-521
Titman S, Wessels R. 1988. The Determinant of Capital Structure Choice. The Journal of Finance, 43(1):1-19
Warner J B. 1977. Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 32(2): 337-347
White M J. 1983. Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code. The Journal of Finance, 38(2): 477-488
Williamson O E. 1988. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 43(3):567-591
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①摘编自《中国证券期货统计年鉴2009》。
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姚琼. 2005.农业上市公司资本结构研究.北京:经济科学出版社
袁康来,李继志. 2009.财务危机预警实证研究——来自农业上市公司的经验证据.北京:社会科学文献出版社:69-77
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朱凯,陈信元. 2007.银行腐败与公司资本结构决策.金融研究,1:31-43
Aghion P, Bolton P. 1992. An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contractin. The Review of Economic Studies, 59(3): 473-494
Altman E I. 1968. Financial Ratios Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23(4): 589-609
Baron D P. 1974. Default Risk, Homemade Leverage, and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. The American Economic Review, 64(1): 176-182
Baxter N D. 1967. Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital. The Journal of Finance, 22(3): 395-403
Blair M M. 1995. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institutionz: 3
Bolton P, Freixas X. 2000. Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and FinancialMarket Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2): 324-351.
Brennan M, Kraus A. 1987. Efficient Financing Under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance, 42(5): 1225-1243 [25] Burgman T A. 1996. An Empirical Examination of Multinational Corporate Capital Structure. Journal of International Business Studies, (3): 553-570
Coase R H. 1984. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140: 229-231
Dann L Y, DeAngelo H. 1988. Corporate Financial Policy and Corporate Control: A Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 20(1): 87-127
Deangelo H, Masulis R. 1980. Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics, (8): 3-29
Dewatripont M, Tirole J. 1994. A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4): 1027-1054
Durand D. 1952. Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business, Trends and Problerms of Measurement. Conference on Research on Business Finance, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, pp.215-247
Dyck A, Zingales L. 2001. Private benefits of control: an international comparison. NBER working paper, 8711
Farrar D E, Selwyn L L. 1967. Taxes Corporate Financial Policy and Return to Investors. National Tax Journal, 20(4): 444-454
Flannery M J. 1986. Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice. The Journal of Finance, 41(1): 19-37
Harris M, Raviv A. 1990. Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt. The Journal of Finance, 45(2): 321-349
Hart O, Moore J. 1998. default and renegotiation: a dynamic model of debt. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1): 1-41
Haugen R A, Senbet L W. 1981. Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital through Options. The Journal of Finance, 36(3): 629-647
Heinkel R, Zechner J. 1990. The Role of Debt and Perferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Incentives. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(1): 1-24
Israel R. 1992. Capital and ownership structure, and the market for corporate control. The Review of Financial Studies, 5(2): 181-198
Jensen M C, Meckling W H. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360
La Porta R, lopez-de-silanes F, shleifer A, vishnhy R. 2002. investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of finance, 57(3): 1147-1170
Leland H E, Pyle D H. 1977. Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32(2): 371-387
Miller M H. 1977. Debt and Taxes. The Journal of Finance, 32 (2): 261-275
Miller M H, Rock K. 1985. Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance, 40(4): 1031-1051
Modigliani F, Miller M H. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 8(3): 261-297
Modigliani F, Miller M H. 1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction. The American Economic Review, 53(3): 433-443
Myers S C, Majluf N. 1984. Corporate financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information Investors not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 187 -221
Myers S C. 1984. The Capital Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 39(3): 575-592
Robichek A A, Myers S C. 1966. Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1(1): 1-35.
Ross S A. 1977. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. Journal of Economics, 8(1): 23-40
Smith C W, Warner J B. 1979. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2): 117-161
Stiglitz J E. 1969. A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. The American Economic Review, 59(5): 784-793
Stulz R M. 1988. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1): 25-54
Stulz R M, Johnson H. 1985. Analysis of Secured Debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(4): 501-521
Titman S, Wessels R. 1988. The Determinant of Capital Structure Choice. The Journal of Finance, 43(1):1-19
Warner J B. 1977. Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 32(2): 337-347
White M J. 1983. Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code. The Journal of Finance, 38(2): 477-488
Williamson O E. 1988. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 43(3):567-591
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