巴塞尔协议Ⅲ、宏观审慎监管与政府财政角色安排
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摘要
2007年金融危机爆发以来,人们对国际金融监管、经济增长方式等很多问题进行了反思。其中一个重要结论,就是需要对金融监管进行改革,通过改革降低金融危机的发生概率,减少危机发生后产生的负外部性。根据20国集团领导人会议关于提高金融市场透明度和完善问责制、加强监管、促进金融市场完整性、强化国际合作以及改革国际金融机构的要求,巴塞尔委员会与其他国际金融组织一起开始就加强监管进行研究,并在2009年12月初步形成了改革的框架,最终在2010年9月被20国集团央行行长和监管首脑会议通过。这就是巴塞尔协议Ⅲ诞生的背景。与巴塞尔协议Ⅰ和巴塞尔协议Ⅱ不同,巴塞尔协议Ⅲ除了进一步加强微观审慎监管外,更加注重从宏观审慎的角度设计相关监管思路和工具。这是因为金融危机给人们带来了深刻的教训：单个金融机构稳健和健康,不能保证整个金融体系的稳健和健康,完全脱离实体经济需求的金融泡沫,一定会破裂并对金融体系和实体经济产生负面影响,因此金融监管需要更加从宏观层面关注系统性风险的防范和化解,需要更加关注金融体系与实体经济之间的相互影响。
从历史发展进程来看,在巴塞尔委员会产生之前,银行监管是具有宏观审慎传统的。这表现在中央银行垄断货币发行、充当最后贷款人角色,以及1933年后以美国为代表分业监管制度的确立等方面。巴塞尔委员会成立之初也确立了公平竞争与金融稳健的双重目标,并希望通过加强国际问监管合作、提高监管技术有效性和统一各国监管标准来达到上述目的。考虑到国家主权和各国具体情况,巴塞尔委员会在监管技术和监管标准方面也赋予国家监管当局很多自由选择权。从结果来看,监管技术和监管标准获得了各国的普遍认同,但是,加强监管合作方面却不尽人意。原因是监管合作必须以国家间整体合作为基础,涉及很多方面问题,实施的难度远远大于单纯的监管技术普及和标准推广。不管怎样,通过监管技术推广、监管标准统一和开展监管合作,巴塞尔委员会不仅有力推动了各国对单个金融机构微观审慎监管,同时也在一定程度上推动了各国对系统性金融风险的管理。因此,巴塞尔委会员还是获得了巨大成功。
从巴塞尔协议Ⅰ、2、3之间的比较看,巴塞尔协议Ⅰ的贡献在于提出了风险资产和风险资产权重的概念和方法,确定了8%的最低资本要求。这使得不同银行之间、银行的不同业务之间能够通过这一概念和方法统一起来互相比较,从而推动了监管标准的统一和公平竞争。不足之处在于在确定风险资产权重方法中过于偏向发达国家,同时风险资产权重的设定只有五档,对风险敏感性不高,不利于鼓励银行提高风险管理技术。巴塞尔协议Ⅱ的贡献在于提出了银行资本监管的三大支柱,明确了资本必须覆盖信用、市场和操作三大风险,开发了信用风险和操作风险评级的三种方法。不足之处在于提高资本充足率风险敏感性后,顺周期性问题更加明显,同时资本充足率能不能够真正覆盖风险也值得关注,特别是在标准法中使用外部评级结果作为风险评级的重要依据,客观上弱化了金融机构自身风险评估的意识,加大了对外部评级的依赖。对于巴塞尔协议Ⅲ,尽管目前并没有开始实施,但普遍认为其贡献在于从宏观审慎的视角,重新梳理、强化了资本监管,并引入了杠杆率、流动性、逆周期和系统重要性机构(SIFIS)监管理念和工具,必将提高金融监管水平和对系统性风险的管理能力。同时,也有观点认为,巴塞尔协议Ⅲ提出的资本充足率要求过高,会对经济增长特别是新兴市场国家的经济增长带来负面影响。此外,相对于传统的流动性监管指标,巴塞尔提出的流动性覆盖率和净稳定资金比率这两个指标过于复杂,不利于在实践中推广。真正产生什么影响,还有待进一步观察。
作为巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的重要理念,宏观审慎监管并没有统一的界定。目前大家比较认同的是国际清算银行使用的概念。国际清算银行强调宏观审慎监管关注的是整个金融系统,需要对具有系统重要性的机构、产品和市场加强监管。具体而言,就是通过采取逆周期监管措施和对全球(各国)系统重要性金融机构(GSIFIS)的额外监管措施,来降低系统性风险在时间维度的积累和空间维度的传播。这些措施或者工具大部分存在于对单个金融机构的监管实践中。因此,宏观审慎与微观审慎监管区别并不在于工具方面,而在于着眼点和角度的不同。一般而言,宏观审慎监管的框架包括宏观审慎分析、宏观审慎工具选择、与货币政策的协调以及宏观审慎监管治理结构的建立和完善等方面。但事实上,政府财政在宏观审慎监管中也有着重要的角色定位。原因在于,一方面财政是否稳健直接影响到金融稳定和系统性金融风险的水平,另一方面对于因任何原因导致的既定系统性金融风险,财政必须负责最后兜底。这就需要根据政府财政作为公共主体、经济主体的不同角色,从制度上进行一系列安排,不仅确保财政自身稳健,而且能够尽量减少系统性风险爆发的可能性和事后兜底责任。从本次金融危机后国际金融改革的情况看,各国大多建立了专门的机构,负责加强对系统性风险的监测和评估,同时通过协调监管机构运用相关监管工具来防范和化解系统性风险。在具体监管方面,特别强调对影子银行、场外交易金融市场和复杂衍生产品的监管。此外,新兴市场国家在近年来监管实践中运用的一系列工具,从目前来看也属于宏观审慎监管的范畴并取得了较好的效果。这表明宏观审慎监管还必须结合经济、金融发展的阶段进行。
作为重要的新兴市场国家,中国在本次金融危机中受到的影响总体上看不大,这一方面是由于我国政府在危机前通过引进战略投资者等方式完成了国有商业银行的改制上市,另一方面也得益于对资本项目的管制。但这并不意味着宏观审慎监管水平已经处于领先地位。相反,在看到未来经济增长潜力巨大、中国特色社会主义政治制度和市场经济制度、中国在国际政治和经济舞台上话语权不断增强等有利条件的同时,一定要认识到由于中国处在全面深化金融改革、转变经济增长方式的关键时期,在防范系统性金融风险方面还面临着重要的任务：一是进入了全面建设小康社会的时期后,对系统性风险的容忍度更低,弹性更小,二是在金融体系中处于绝对重要地位的商业银行系统同质化程度非常高,风险偏好和风险暴露趋同,三是按照“十二五”规划,利率市场化和资本项目可兑换等重大改革举措都将稳步推进。从金融市场的功能看,目前通过金融产品和服务的创新分散风险、优化资源配置作用还相对不够,因此这需要更好地处理金融改革与金融稳定之间的关系,处理好加强宏观审慎监管、防范和化解风险与鼓励金融创新、发挥市场机制的基础作用之间的关系。根据宏观审慎监管的内在逻辑和中国目前的实际情况,我们建议在国务院层面建立宏观审慎监管委员会,负责系统性风险的防范和化解工作,并协调相关监管部门和宏观调控部门的政策保持一致,考虑到中国经济经转轨及金融体系的特点,在这个框架中特别要注意加强政府财政在宏观审慎监管中的作用。在具体工作任务方面,既需要加强对系统性风险的监测和对系统重要性机构、产品和市场的评估,又需要加强监管立法,为防范和化解系统性金融风险提供制度保障,这是宏观审慎监管的两项基础性工作。
Since the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis, issues including international financial regulation, economic growth, etc have been awared by people involved. One of the important points is the need for financial regulation reform and through reforms to reduce the probability of financial crisis and its negative externalities after outbreak. According to the G20 summit on the requirements of improving financial market transparency and accountability, strengthening supervision, promoting the integrity of financial markets, strengthening international cooperation and performing the reform of the international financial institutions, Basel Committee together with other international financial organizations began to conduct a study on regulatory reform, and in December 2009 tentatively formed a framework. After revise, the framework was finally accepted by the G20 central bank governors and regulators summit in September 2010. This is the background of the birth of BaselⅢ. Different with the BaselⅠ&Ⅱ，in addition to further strengthening the micro-prudential supervision, BaselⅢemphasis more on the design of related supervision ideas and tools from macro-prudential aspect. This is because the financial crisis brought profound lesson:the soundness and healthy of a single financial institution can not assure the soundness and healthy of the whole financial system. Financial bubbles completely divorced from the needs of the real economy will finally rupture and have bad effects on the whole financial system and the real economy. So, financial regulation needs to pay close attention to preventing and eliminating systemic risk from a more macro level.
From the point of view of the historical development, before the establishment of Basel Committee, banks already have a macro-prudential supervision tradition. This is reflected from monopoly on the issuing of currency, playing role as last lender by central banks, and the establishment of separate supervision system represented by the United States after 1933. It also establishes the dual goals of fair competition and financial stability at the beginning of Basel Committee. It hopes to achieve the above objectives through enhancing international regulatory cooperation, improving the effectiveness of supervision technology and unifying of regulatory standards among different countries. Taking into account of national sovereignty and country-specific circumstances, Basel Committee also entrusted regulatory authority a lot of free options in each country. From the results, monitoring technology and regulatory standards are universally recognized by all countries, however, it is unsatisfactory for strengthening cooperation in the regulation. The reason of which is that the regulatory cooperation must be based on overall cooperation among countries, involving many aspects, the difficulty of implementation is far greater than the sole monitoring and promoting of techniques and standards. In any case, by promoting monitoring technology, integrating regulatory standards and carrying out regulatory cooperation, the Basel Committee has not only promoted the individual countries for micro-prudential regulation of financial institutions, but also promoted different countries for systemic financial risk management to some extent. Therefore, the Basel Committee has achieved great success.
From comparison among BaselⅠ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ, the contribution of BaselⅠlies in its propose of the concept and method of risk assets and risk weighted assets, and Basel III decided the minimum capital requirement of 8%. This made it possible for different banks and different branches of business in banks can compare with each other through this concept and method, which promoted the unifying of regulatory standards and fair competition. The weakness in Basel I is, in the aspect of determine the method of the weight of risky assets, it leans too much on developed countries, and at the same time it has only five ranges in setting of the weight of risky assets which is not so sensitive to risks and is not conducive to encourage banks to improve risk management techniques. The contribution of Basel II lies in its propose of the three pillars of bank capital regulation, Basel II made it clear that capital shall cover the three major risks of credit, market and operation,'and developed three ways for credit risk and operational risk rating. The weakness in Basel II is that after rising the sensitivity of capital adequacy ratio, the procyclicality problem is more obvious, at the same time it also deserves concern whether capital adequacy ratio can completely cover risk, especially in the standard method of using external ratings as an important basis for risk ratings, which objectively weaken the awareness of self-assessment of risk for financial institutions, increases reliance on external ratings. As with BaselⅢ, though it is not in effect yet, but it is widely considered that its contribution lies in re-combing, and strengthening supervision of capital in macro-prudential perspective, and introducing institutional regulatory concepts and tools of leverage, liquidity, reverse cycle and systemic important financial institutions(SIFIS), which will improve the level of financial supervision and management of systemic risk. There are also views that capital adequacy requirements in BaselⅢare too high, which may cause negative impact on economic growth, especially in emerging market countries. Furthermore, compared with the traditional i ndicators of 1 iquidity regulation, the two indicators of Basel's liquidity coverage and stable ratio of net capital are too complicated, and are not conducive for the performing and promotion in practice. It needs further observation to decide whether there are real influences.
As an important notion of BaselⅢ, there is no uniform definition for macro-prudential supervision. The most widely accepted is the concept by bank of International Settlements, which stresses that macro-prudential supervision is concerned the entire financial system, as well as to strengthen supervision on systemically important institutions, products and markets. Specifically, by adopting counter-cyclical regulatory measures and the additional regulatory measures for global (national) systemic important financial institutions (GSIFIS) to reduce the accumulation of systemic risk in the time dimension and the dissemination in spatial dimension. Most of these measures or tools exist in the supervision of individual financial institutions practice. So, the differences between macro-prudential supervision and micro-prudential supervision lie not in tools but in the differences of focus and perspective. In general, macro-prudential framework includes macro-prudential analysis, macro-prudential tool selection, the coordination of monetary policy and the establishment and improvement for the governance structures of macro-prudential supervision and and so on. But in fact, government finances also plays an important role in macro-prudential supervision, which of the reasons lies on two aspects:on the one hand the financial soundness has direct impact on financial stability and the systemic financial risk level, on the other hand finance will be responsible for any systemic financial risk caused by any reasons. This requires a series of institutional arrangements under the different roles of the Government's finance as public as well as economic agents, which not only ensures the financial stability, but also reduces the possibility of the outbreak of systemic risk and the subsequent responsibility for remedy. From the financial reform after this financial crisis in each country, most countries have set up specialized institutions to take charge of monitoring and evaluation of systemic risks and at the same time coordinate with related supervision agencies, by applying related supervision tools to prevent and defuse systemic risks. In specific regulation, the special emphasis is on the supervision of shadow banks, OTC financial markets and complex derivatives. Further more, in recent years, emerging market countries applied a series of tools in supervision practice, from the current point of view, it belongs to the scope of macro-prudential supervision and achieves fairly good results. It shows that macro-prudential supervision shall also keep step with economic and financial development stage.
As an important emerging market country, the influence of the financial crisis on China is not so obvious on the whole, which is because the state-owned commercial banks completed the restructuring and listing in the exchange stock market by introducing strategic investors etc.before the crisis by our government, on the other hand is because we were benefited from the capital controls. But it does not mean its ability of macro-prudential supervision is ahead of the world. Contrarily, while viewing the great potentiality for economic growth in future, socialist political system with Chinese characteristics and the market economic system and in the international political and economic arena, China is gaining greater and greater Rights of Speak and other advantages, we must make it clear that China is in critical period of deepening its financial reform, changing of economic growth. Very important task of preventing systemic risks is lying ahead:The first is, after entering a period of building a moderately prosperous society, the limit to bear systemic risks will be lower and with lesser flexiblity; The second is, there is a very high degree of homogeneity among commercial banks which play a definitely important role in the whole financial system, and risk appetite and risk exposure convergence; The third is, according to "the Twelfth Five-years plan", marketization of interest rate and convertibility of capital account will be promoted steadily. From the functions of financial markets, the ability of diversify risk, optimize resource allocation through innovation of financial products and services is not enough. Consequently we need to handle the relationship in a better way between financial reform and financial stability, as well as the relationship between strengthening macro-prudential regulation, preventing and mitigating risks and encouraging financial innovation, and playing a basic role of market mechanism. According to the inner logic of macro-prudential regulation and the current situation in China, we suggest to set up macro-prudential regulation committee in the State Council level, in responsible of monitoring and evaluation of systemic risks and at the same time coordinate with related supervision agencies. Taking into account of China's economic transition and the characteristics of the financial system, the role of government finance in macro-prudential supervision should be strengthened particularly in this framework. In terms of specific tasks, it needs not only to strengthen systemic risk monitoring and evaluation of systemically important institutions, products and markets but also to strengthen supervision legislation to provide system protect for preventing and defusing systemic financial risks, which is the two basic work of macro-prudential regulation.
从历史发展进程来看,在巴塞尔委员会产生之前,银行监管是具有宏观审慎传统的。这表现在中央银行垄断货币发行、充当最后贷款人角色,以及1933年后以美国为代表分业监管制度的确立等方面。巴塞尔委员会成立之初也确立了公平竞争与金融稳健的双重目标,并希望通过加强国际问监管合作、提高监管技术有效性和统一各国监管标准来达到上述目的。考虑到国家主权和各国具体情况,巴塞尔委员会在监管技术和监管标准方面也赋予国家监管当局很多自由选择权。从结果来看,监管技术和监管标准获得了各国的普遍认同,但是,加强监管合作方面却不尽人意。原因是监管合作必须以国家间整体合作为基础,涉及很多方面问题,实施的难度远远大于单纯的监管技术普及和标准推广。不管怎样,通过监管技术推广、监管标准统一和开展监管合作,巴塞尔委员会不仅有力推动了各国对单个金融机构微观审慎监管,同时也在一定程度上推动了各国对系统性金融风险的管理。因此,巴塞尔委会员还是获得了巨大成功。
从巴塞尔协议Ⅰ、2、3之间的比较看,巴塞尔协议Ⅰ的贡献在于提出了风险资产和风险资产权重的概念和方法,确定了8%的最低资本要求。这使得不同银行之间、银行的不同业务之间能够通过这一概念和方法统一起来互相比较,从而推动了监管标准的统一和公平竞争。不足之处在于在确定风险资产权重方法中过于偏向发达国家,同时风险资产权重的设定只有五档,对风险敏感性不高,不利于鼓励银行提高风险管理技术。巴塞尔协议Ⅱ的贡献在于提出了银行资本监管的三大支柱,明确了资本必须覆盖信用、市场和操作三大风险,开发了信用风险和操作风险评级的三种方法。不足之处在于提高资本充足率风险敏感性后,顺周期性问题更加明显,同时资本充足率能不能够真正覆盖风险也值得关注,特别是在标准法中使用外部评级结果作为风险评级的重要依据,客观上弱化了金融机构自身风险评估的意识,加大了对外部评级的依赖。对于巴塞尔协议Ⅲ,尽管目前并没有开始实施,但普遍认为其贡献在于从宏观审慎的视角,重新梳理、强化了资本监管,并引入了杠杆率、流动性、逆周期和系统重要性机构(SIFIS)监管理念和工具,必将提高金融监管水平和对系统性风险的管理能力。同时,也有观点认为,巴塞尔协议Ⅲ提出的资本充足率要求过高,会对经济增长特别是新兴市场国家的经济增长带来负面影响。此外,相对于传统的流动性监管指标,巴塞尔提出的流动性覆盖率和净稳定资金比率这两个指标过于复杂,不利于在实践中推广。真正产生什么影响,还有待进一步观察。
作为巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的重要理念,宏观审慎监管并没有统一的界定。目前大家比较认同的是国际清算银行使用的概念。国际清算银行强调宏观审慎监管关注的是整个金融系统,需要对具有系统重要性的机构、产品和市场加强监管。具体而言,就是通过采取逆周期监管措施和对全球(各国)系统重要性金融机构(GSIFIS)的额外监管措施,来降低系统性风险在时间维度的积累和空间维度的传播。这些措施或者工具大部分存在于对单个金融机构的监管实践中。因此,宏观审慎与微观审慎监管区别并不在于工具方面,而在于着眼点和角度的不同。一般而言,宏观审慎监管的框架包括宏观审慎分析、宏观审慎工具选择、与货币政策的协调以及宏观审慎监管治理结构的建立和完善等方面。但事实上,政府财政在宏观审慎监管中也有着重要的角色定位。原因在于,一方面财政是否稳健直接影响到金融稳定和系统性金融风险的水平,另一方面对于因任何原因导致的既定系统性金融风险,财政必须负责最后兜底。这就需要根据政府财政作为公共主体、经济主体的不同角色,从制度上进行一系列安排,不仅确保财政自身稳健,而且能够尽量减少系统性风险爆发的可能性和事后兜底责任。从本次金融危机后国际金融改革的情况看,各国大多建立了专门的机构,负责加强对系统性风险的监测和评估,同时通过协调监管机构运用相关监管工具来防范和化解系统性风险。在具体监管方面,特别强调对影子银行、场外交易金融市场和复杂衍生产品的监管。此外,新兴市场国家在近年来监管实践中运用的一系列工具,从目前来看也属于宏观审慎监管的范畴并取得了较好的效果。这表明宏观审慎监管还必须结合经济、金融发展的阶段进行。
作为重要的新兴市场国家,中国在本次金融危机中受到的影响总体上看不大,这一方面是由于我国政府在危机前通过引进战略投资者等方式完成了国有商业银行的改制上市,另一方面也得益于对资本项目的管制。但这并不意味着宏观审慎监管水平已经处于领先地位。相反,在看到未来经济增长潜力巨大、中国特色社会主义政治制度和市场经济制度、中国在国际政治和经济舞台上话语权不断增强等有利条件的同时,一定要认识到由于中国处在全面深化金融改革、转变经济增长方式的关键时期,在防范系统性金融风险方面还面临着重要的任务：一是进入了全面建设小康社会的时期后,对系统性风险的容忍度更低,弹性更小,二是在金融体系中处于绝对重要地位的商业银行系统同质化程度非常高,风险偏好和风险暴露趋同,三是按照“十二五”规划,利率市场化和资本项目可兑换等重大改革举措都将稳步推进。从金融市场的功能看,目前通过金融产品和服务的创新分散风险、优化资源配置作用还相对不够,因此这需要更好地处理金融改革与金融稳定之间的关系,处理好加强宏观审慎监管、防范和化解风险与鼓励金融创新、发挥市场机制的基础作用之间的关系。根据宏观审慎监管的内在逻辑和中国目前的实际情况,我们建议在国务院层面建立宏观审慎监管委员会,负责系统性风险的防范和化解工作,并协调相关监管部门和宏观调控部门的政策保持一致,考虑到中国经济经转轨及金融体系的特点,在这个框架中特别要注意加强政府财政在宏观审慎监管中的作用。在具体工作任务方面,既需要加强对系统性风险的监测和对系统重要性机构、产品和市场的评估,又需要加强监管立法,为防范和化解系统性金融风险提供制度保障,这是宏观审慎监管的两项基础性工作。
Since the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis, issues including international financial regulation, economic growth, etc have been awared by people involved. One of the important points is the need for financial regulation reform and through reforms to reduce the probability of financial crisis and its negative externalities after outbreak. According to the G20 summit on the requirements of improving financial market transparency and accountability, strengthening supervision, promoting the integrity of financial markets, strengthening international cooperation and performing the reform of the international financial institutions, Basel Committee together with other international financial organizations began to conduct a study on regulatory reform, and in December 2009 tentatively formed a framework. After revise, the framework was finally accepted by the G20 central bank governors and regulators summit in September 2010. This is the background of the birth of BaselⅢ. Different with the BaselⅠ&Ⅱ，in addition to further strengthening the micro-prudential supervision, BaselⅢemphasis more on the design of related supervision ideas and tools from macro-prudential aspect. This is because the financial crisis brought profound lesson:the soundness and healthy of a single financial institution can not assure the soundness and healthy of the whole financial system. Financial bubbles completely divorced from the needs of the real economy will finally rupture and have bad effects on the whole financial system and the real economy. So, financial regulation needs to pay close attention to preventing and eliminating systemic risk from a more macro level.
From the point of view of the historical development, before the establishment of Basel Committee, banks already have a macro-prudential supervision tradition. This is reflected from monopoly on the issuing of currency, playing role as last lender by central banks, and the establishment of separate supervision system represented by the United States after 1933. It also establishes the dual goals of fair competition and financial stability at the beginning of Basel Committee. It hopes to achieve the above objectives through enhancing international regulatory cooperation, improving the effectiveness of supervision technology and unifying of regulatory standards among different countries. Taking into account of national sovereignty and country-specific circumstances, Basel Committee also entrusted regulatory authority a lot of free options in each country. From the results, monitoring technology and regulatory standards are universally recognized by all countries, however, it is unsatisfactory for strengthening cooperation in the regulation. The reason of which is that the regulatory cooperation must be based on overall cooperation among countries, involving many aspects, the difficulty of implementation is far greater than the sole monitoring and promoting of techniques and standards. In any case, by promoting monitoring technology, integrating regulatory standards and carrying out regulatory cooperation, the Basel Committee has not only promoted the individual countries for micro-prudential regulation of financial institutions, but also promoted different countries for systemic financial risk management to some extent. Therefore, the Basel Committee has achieved great success.
From comparison among BaselⅠ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ, the contribution of BaselⅠlies in its propose of the concept and method of risk assets and risk weighted assets, and Basel III decided the minimum capital requirement of 8%. This made it possible for different banks and different branches of business in banks can compare with each other through this concept and method, which promoted the unifying of regulatory standards and fair competition. The weakness in Basel I is, in the aspect of determine the method of the weight of risky assets, it leans too much on developed countries, and at the same time it has only five ranges in setting of the weight of risky assets which is not so sensitive to risks and is not conducive to encourage banks to improve risk management techniques. The contribution of Basel II lies in its propose of the three pillars of bank capital regulation, Basel II made it clear that capital shall cover the three major risks of credit, market and operation,'and developed three ways for credit risk and operational risk rating. The weakness in Basel II is that after rising the sensitivity of capital adequacy ratio, the procyclicality problem is more obvious, at the same time it also deserves concern whether capital adequacy ratio can completely cover risk, especially in the standard method of using external ratings as an important basis for risk ratings, which objectively weaken the awareness of self-assessment of risk for financial institutions, increases reliance on external ratings. As with BaselⅢ, though it is not in effect yet, but it is widely considered that its contribution lies in re-combing, and strengthening supervision of capital in macro-prudential perspective, and introducing institutional regulatory concepts and tools of leverage, liquidity, reverse cycle and systemic important financial institutions(SIFIS), which will improve the level of financial supervision and management of systemic risk. There are also views that capital adequacy requirements in BaselⅢare too high, which may cause negative impact on economic growth, especially in emerging market countries. Furthermore, compared with the traditional i ndicators of 1 iquidity regulation, the two indicators of Basel's liquidity coverage and stable ratio of net capital are too complicated, and are not conducive for the performing and promotion in practice. It needs further observation to decide whether there are real influences.
As an important notion of BaselⅢ, there is no uniform definition for macro-prudential supervision. The most widely accepted is the concept by bank of International Settlements, which stresses that macro-prudential supervision is concerned the entire financial system, as well as to strengthen supervision on systemically important institutions, products and markets. Specifically, by adopting counter-cyclical regulatory measures and the additional regulatory measures for global (national) systemic important financial institutions (GSIFIS) to reduce the accumulation of systemic risk in the time dimension and the dissemination in spatial dimension. Most of these measures or tools exist in the supervision of individual financial institutions practice. So, the differences between macro-prudential supervision and micro-prudential supervision lie not in tools but in the differences of focus and perspective. In general, macro-prudential framework includes macro-prudential analysis, macro-prudential tool selection, the coordination of monetary policy and the establishment and improvement for the governance structures of macro-prudential supervision and and so on. But in fact, government finances also plays an important role in macro-prudential supervision, which of the reasons lies on two aspects:on the one hand the financial soundness has direct impact on financial stability and the systemic financial risk level, on the other hand finance will be responsible for any systemic financial risk caused by any reasons. This requires a series of institutional arrangements under the different roles of the Government's finance as public as well as economic agents, which not only ensures the financial stability, but also reduces the possibility of the outbreak of systemic risk and the subsequent responsibility for remedy. From the financial reform after this financial crisis in each country, most countries have set up specialized institutions to take charge of monitoring and evaluation of systemic risks and at the same time coordinate with related supervision agencies, by applying related supervision tools to prevent and defuse systemic risks. In specific regulation, the special emphasis is on the supervision of shadow banks, OTC financial markets and complex derivatives. Further more, in recent years, emerging market countries applied a series of tools in supervision practice, from the current point of view, it belongs to the scope of macro-prudential supervision and achieves fairly good results. It shows that macro-prudential supervision shall also keep step with economic and financial development stage.
As an important emerging market country, the influence of the financial crisis on China is not so obvious on the whole, which is because the state-owned commercial banks completed the restructuring and listing in the exchange stock market by introducing strategic investors etc.before the crisis by our government, on the other hand is because we were benefited from the capital controls. But it does not mean its ability of macro-prudential supervision is ahead of the world. Contrarily, while viewing the great potentiality for economic growth in future, socialist political system with Chinese characteristics and the market economic system and in the international political and economic arena, China is gaining greater and greater Rights of Speak and other advantages, we must make it clear that China is in critical period of deepening its financial reform, changing of economic growth. Very important task of preventing systemic risks is lying ahead:The first is, after entering a period of building a moderately prosperous society, the limit to bear systemic risks will be lower and with lesser flexiblity; The second is, there is a very high degree of homogeneity among commercial banks which play a definitely important role in the whole financial system, and risk appetite and risk exposure convergence; The third is, according to "the Twelfth Five-years plan", marketization of interest rate and convertibility of capital account will be promoted steadily. From the functions of financial markets, the ability of diversify risk, optimize resource allocation through innovation of financial products and services is not enough. Consequently we need to handle the relationship in a better way between financial reform and financial stability, as well as the relationship between strengthening macro-prudential regulation, preventing and mitigating risks and encouraging financial innovation, and playing a basic role of market mechanism. According to the inner logic of macro-prudential regulation and the current situation in China, we suggest to set up macro-prudential regulation committee in the State Council level, in responsible of monitoring and evaluation of systemic risks and at the same time coordinate with related supervision agencies. Taking into account of China's economic transition and the characteristics of the financial system, the role of government finance in macro-prudential supervision should be strengthened particularly in this framework. In terms of specific tasks, it needs not only to strengthen systemic risk monitoring and evaluation of systemically important institutions, products and markets but also to strengthen supervision legislation to provide system protect for preventing and defusing systemic financial risks, which is the two basic work of macro-prudential regulation.
引文
① 1725年24家,1785年为52家,见查尔斯·P·金得尔伯格,《西欧金融史》,89页,2010,中国金融出版社。
①数据统计方面,仍然有不同的结果,例如,根据J·L·汉森,1900年股份银行的数目为77家,分支机构为3757个,见《货币理论与实践》第62页,中国金融出版社,1988。
①1811年州政府批准开立88家银行,到1816年增至246家。
①史为详细的内容可以参见辛子波,《银行监管体系的国际比较》第24页,中国财政经济出版社,2008年)
①以上可见托马斯·F·卡吉尔,吉里安·G·加西亚：《八十年代的金融改革》第39-43,47,89,184-188页,中国金融出版社,1989
①转引自罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议研究文献及评述》第14页,中国金融出版社,2004
① 10%的权重,实际上是委员会为各国监管机构赋予的自主权,即对于国内公共部门的债权,可以使用0、10、20或50%的权重,见《统一资本计量和资本标准的国际协议》(International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards),国际清算银行网站。
②见美国联邦储备公司,“巴塞尔和资本监管的变化：回顾与展望”,2003,转引自罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议研究文献及评述》第14页,中国金融出版社,2004。
①见《打破新资本协议的神话》,转引自罗平：《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》,中国金融出版社,2004年。
①见罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》附录2,中国金融出版社,2004年
①国际货币基金组织,《国际货币基金组织工作人员对巴塞尔新资本协议的意见》,2004年,见罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》,中国金融出版社,2004年
②见《打破新资本协议的神话》,罗平：《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》第239页,中国金融出版社,2004年
①根据各国的安排,在2008年后开始陆续开始正式实施巴塞尔2。例如：欧盟于2008年1月,美国于2009年,澳大利亚和新家坡所有存款类机构计划在2008年正式开始实施。见巴曙松等《金融危机中的巴塞尔新资本协议：挑战与改进》,第13页。中国金融出版社,2010年。
②危机以来改革的内容可见银监会的综述文章：《危机以来国际金融监管改革综述》,2010年2月12日,中国银监会网站
①巴塞尔委员会,2009,《增强银行业抗风险能力(征求意见稿)》第二页。
②中国银监会课题组,2010“商业银行资本监管制度改革(二),《中国金融》,2010年第2期。
①关于这方面的详细分析,可见王胜邦,2007
①转引自俞勇、张扬“宏观审慎监管：概念、框架与逆周期政策”,《当代金融家》2011年2月
②见霍华德·戴维斯,大卫·格林,《全球金融监管》第15页,2009,中国金融出版社
①见霍华德·戴维斯,大卫·格林,《全球金融监管》第116页,中国金融出版社,2009年
①应寅锋,2009,第158页,中国社会出版社,2009.
②张建华,2010,第65页.
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63、中国银监会课题组：商业银行资本监管制度改革系列,“修补新资本协议漏洞扩大资本覆盖风险范围”、“提高资本工具质量增强银行损失吸收能力”、“建立杠杆率监管标准弥补资本充足率的不足”、“建立反周期资本监管框架缓解亲经济周期效应”、“建立额外资本要求降低大型银行的道德风险”、“重新校准资本充足率标准增强银行体系应对风险的能力”、“顺应资本监管国际规则的变化完善我国资本监管制度安排”,《中国金融》,2010年第1-7期。
64、中国银监会：“危机以来国际金融监管改革综述”,2010年2月12日,中国银监会网站。
65、中国银监会：《中国银监会2010年报》,2010,中国银监会网站。
66、中国银监会：“中国银行业实施新监管标准指导意见(银监发[2011]44号)”,2011年4月27日,中国银监会网站。
67、中国证监会：《中国资本市场发展报告》,中国金融出版社,2008年。
68、周小川：“关于改变宏观和微观顺周期性的进一步探讨”,《中国金融》,2009年第8期。
69、周小川：“金融政策对金融危机的响应——宏观审慎政策框架的形成背景、内在逻辑和主要内容”,《金融时报》,2011年1月5日。
70、朱光耀：《聚焦——全球与中国经济热点问题》,中国财政经济出版社,2009年。
71、朱光耀：“第二波金融危机的影响及对我国的警示”,《理论周刊》,2009年第4期。
72、朱小宗、张宗益、耿丹华、吴俊：“现代信用风险度量模型的实证比较与适用性分析”,《管理工程学报》,2006年第1期。
73、约翰·范奥弗特韦德：《伯南克的考验》,郭军译,中信出版社,2009年。
74、詹姆士·R·巴茨、杰瑞德·卡普里奥、罗斯·莱文：《反思银行监管》,中国金融出版社,2008年。
75、Bank of England:"The role of macroprudential policy", Bank of England discussion Paper, Nov.2009
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93、Bernanke, Ben S.:"Challenges for State and Local Governments",remarks at the 2011 annual awards dinner of the Citizens Budget Commission,New York, Mar.2011
94、Bernanke, Ben S.:"Clearinghouse,Financail Stability and Financial Reform"，remarks at the 2011 Financial Markets Conference Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Georgia, Apr.2011
95、Blanchard,O, G Dell'Africa, and P Mauro:"Rethinking Macroecnomic policy", IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/03,Feb.2010
96、Borio, C 2003, "Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation? " BIS Working Paper No.128,2003, February.
97、Borio, C and I Shim:"What can (macro-) prudential policy do to support monetary policy?", BIS Working Paper No.242, December.2007
98、Borio, C and M Drehmann:"Assessing the risk of banking crises revisited" BIS Quarterly Review March.2009 Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0903e.pdf
99、Borio, C and P Lowe:"Assessing the risk of banking crises", BIS Quarterly Review, December.2002
100、Caruana, J (2010a):"Basel III:towards a safer financial system" Speech at the 3rd Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid,15 September 2010. Available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100921.htm
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103、Clement, Piet:"The term "macroprudential ":origins and evolution", BIS Quarterly Review,March 2010
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106、Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS,2009):"Capital flows and emerging market economies", CGFS Papers No.33, January 2009;
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114、FSB、IMF and BIS:"Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments; Initial Considerations", Oct.2009
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①数据统计方面,仍然有不同的结果,例如,根据J·L·汉森,1900年股份银行的数目为77家,分支机构为3757个,见《货币理论与实践》第62页,中国金融出版社,1988。
①1811年州政府批准开立88家银行,到1816年增至246家。
①史为详细的内容可以参见辛子波,《银行监管体系的国际比较》第24页,中国财政经济出版社,2008年)
①以上可见托马斯·F·卡吉尔,吉里安·G·加西亚：《八十年代的金融改革》第39-43,47,89,184-188页,中国金融出版社,1989
①转引自罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议研究文献及评述》第14页,中国金融出版社,2004
① 10%的权重,实际上是委员会为各国监管机构赋予的自主权,即对于国内公共部门的债权,可以使用0、10、20或50%的权重,见《统一资本计量和资本标准的国际协议》(International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards),国际清算银行网站。
②见美国联邦储备公司,“巴塞尔和资本监管的变化：回顾与展望”,2003,转引自罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议研究文献及评述》第14页,中国金融出版社,2004。
①见《打破新资本协议的神话》,转引自罗平：《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》,中国金融出版社,2004年。
①见罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》附录2,中国金融出版社,2004年
①国际货币基金组织,《国际货币基金组织工作人员对巴塞尔新资本协议的意见》,2004年,见罗平,《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》,中国金融出版社,2004年
②见《打破新资本协议的神话》,罗平：《巴塞尔新资本协议：研究文献及评述》第239页,中国金融出版社,2004年
①根据各国的安排,在2008年后开始陆续开始正式实施巴塞尔2。例如：欧盟于2008年1月,美国于2009年,澳大利亚和新家坡所有存款类机构计划在2008年正式开始实施。见巴曙松等《金融危机中的巴塞尔新资本协议：挑战与改进》,第13页。中国金融出版社,2010年。
②危机以来改革的内容可见银监会的综述文章：《危机以来国际金融监管改革综述》,2010年2月12日,中国银监会网站
①巴塞尔委员会,2009,《增强银行业抗风险能力(征求意见稿)》第二页。
②中国银监会课题组,2010“商业银行资本监管制度改革(二),《中国金融》,2010年第2期。
①关于这方面的详细分析,可见王胜邦,2007
①转引自俞勇、张扬“宏观审慎监管：概念、框架与逆周期政策”,《当代金融家》2011年2月
②见霍华德·戴维斯,大卫·格林,《全球金融监管》第15页,2009,中国金融出版社
①见霍华德·戴维斯,大卫·格林,《全球金融监管》第116页,中国金融出版社,2009年
①应寅锋,2009,第158页,中国社会出版社,2009.
②张建华,2010,第65页.
1、巴曙松、范建军、雷薇：“欧美主要经济体金融监管体系改革内容和我国金融监管体系的主要缺陷”,国研视点,2010年8月17日。
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