农业龙头企业包含信贷服务的订单安排及其对农户信贷约束的缓解作用
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摘要
资金是农业生产的重要要素之一,但对于绝大多数农户而言,受自身收入与财富积累水平的限制,往往需要依靠信贷资金来进行农业生产投资。然而考虑到农户作为信贷需求主体时的特殊性,向其提供信贷不仅要承担较高的交易成本,还要面临较大的风险,因此,正规金融机构往往采取谨慎性信贷供给行为。我国农村金融改革尽管历经多年,国家也出台了很多的政策措施力图增强农村金融机构的支农能力和支农意愿,效果都不甚理想。农户依然面临严重的信贷约束。
与正规金融机构的行为相反,很多农业龙头企业却向农户提供了包含信贷服务的订单,这些信贷服务有多种形式,如:为农户向信用社贷款提供担保,允许农户以订单作抵押向信用社申请贷款,或者直接向农户赊销投入品或提供生产性借款。本文基于对这一现象的调查和分析,试图回答两个问题:专业从事放贷的农村正规金融机构都不愿向农户放贷,农业龙头企业为什么愿意向农户提供包含信贷服务的订单?这种形式的订单安排如何缓解农户普遍面临的信贷约束?
本文首先对相关的研究成果进行了回顾,包括关于农户信贷约束的研究,和关于订单农业中的信贷交易的研究。结果发现,目前还没有针对本文所关注问题所进行的深入、系统的研究。
在理论回顾的基础上,本文构建了分析上述问题的理论框架并提出了研究假说。对于第一个问题,本文以农户的生产选择行为为基点,先找出是什么原因致使农户不参加订单农产品生产,然后分析包含信贷服务的订单安排又是如何影响农户生产选择的。理论分析发现:生产企业所需的农产品需面对由产品异质性较高所带来的前期投入大以及各种风险较大的问题,农户缺乏资金且信贷获取能力差、风险防范和应对能力弱,因此不愿意也没有能力参加订单生产,导致企业无法提高原料可得性;而包含信贷服务的订单安排则能有效应对上述问题,促使和保障农户参加订单生产,从而提高企业的原料可得性,这正是龙头企业向农户提供包含信贷服务的订单的原因。对于第二个问题,本文从剖析导致农户信贷约束的根本原因入手,解释包含信贷服务的订单安排究竟是如何起到缓解农户信贷约束作用的。理论分析发现:造成农户信贷约束的根本原因在于农业生产经营存在较大风险、农户策略性赖账成本低、农户与金融机构之间存在严重信息不对称,以及金融机构面向农户放贷需支付高昂成本;而龙头企业通过向农户提供包含信贷服务的订单,并充分利用这一制度安排中的价格保障、技术服务、抵押替代、动态威胁、声誉机制、互联机制以及转贷机制等,可以有效应对以上四个问题,或者提高了正规金融机构的信贷供给意愿,或者形成了对正规金融机构的有效替代,从而缓解了农户的信贷约束。
最后,在实证分析部分,本文采取了多案例研究的实证研究方法,从多次实地调研所获得的案例资料中选取了5个有代表性的案例,通过案例与案例间逐项复制的方式来验证理论假说,并最终使全部假说都得到了有效的论证。
Fund is one of the most important factors in agricultural production, but most farmers, restricted by low level of income and wealth accumulation, often rely on credit for investment in agricultural production. However, taking into account the farmers’characteristics as credit demanders, formal financial institutions tend to supply credit prudently, because, to provide credit to farmers not only has to bear the high transaction costs, but also to face great risks. Although the government has mad a lot of efforts to reform rural financial systems over the years, and has adopted many policy measures to strengthen the rural financial institutions’ability and will to support rural clients, but the results are not good. Farmers are still faced with serious credit constraint.
Contrary to formal financial institutions, many agricultural leading enterprises have put credit services into the agricultural product contracts, such as providing suretyship for farmers to apply for loans, allowing farmers to use the contracts as collaterals for loans, directly supplying inputs to farmers on credit or lending money to farmers to buy the inputs. Based on the investigation and analysis of this phenomenon, this paper is in an attempt to answer two questions: Formal rural financial institutions that are professional in the lending services are reluctant to lend to farmers, why would the leading enterprises be willing to provide agricultural product contracts with credit services to farmers? How can such contract arrangement reduce farmers’credit constraint?
Firstly, the relevant researches are reviewed, including the researches on farmers’credit constraint, and on credit transaction in contract farming. The results showed that there are few literatures paying attention to the questions raised by this paper.
Secondly, based on the research review, this paper constructs the theoretical frameworks to analysis the questions and put forward hypotheses.
For the first question, based on the analysis about the production-choice behaviors of farmers, this paper first identifies the causes why farmers choose not to participate in agricultural production contracts, and then explains how contract arrangement with credit services can affect farmers’production-choice behaviors. If farmers choose to grow/raise the products required by the enterprises, they have to confront higher cost of pre-production investment and many kinds of greater risks which are caused by the differentiation of agricultural products. However, farmers are lack of fund, have poor access to credit, and weak capabilities to prevent and deal with risks, therefore, they have neither will nor ability to participate in contract production. As a result, the leading enterprises can not improve the availability of raw materials. On the contrary, contract arrangement with credit services can deal with these issues effectively. It could motivate and ensure farmers to participate in the contract production, so as to improve the enterprises’availability of raw materials. This is exactly the reason why the leading enterprises provide contract with credit services to farmers.
For the second question, beginning with analyzing the causes of farmers’credit constraint, this paper explains how contract arrangement with credit services can reduce farmers’credit constraint. The fundamental reasons for farmers’credit constraint are as follows: the greater risks of agricultural production and management, the low cost of farmers’strategic default behaviors, the serious information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions, as well as the high cost of financial institutions to lend to farmers. By providing agricultural product contracts with credit services to farmers, the leading enterprises can take full advantage of this institutional arrangement in many aspects, such as price security, technical services, collateral substitutes, dynamic threat, reputation mechanism, interlocking arrangement and on-lending mechanism, all of which help the leading enterprises deal with the problems which cause the credit constraint. In result, such contract arrangement can either improve the credit-supply will of formal financial institutions, or make the leading enterprises effectively replace the role of formal financial institutions. Finally, farmers are released from credit constraint.
Lastly, in the empirical-analysis section, this paper selects 5 representative cases, which are all coming from the field surveys, to do the multiple-case studies. Using the method of literal-replication, all the hypotheses get demonstrated and verified.
与正规金融机构的行为相反,很多农业龙头企业却向农户提供了包含信贷服务的订单,这些信贷服务有多种形式,如:为农户向信用社贷款提供担保,允许农户以订单作抵押向信用社申请贷款,或者直接向农户赊销投入品或提供生产性借款。本文基于对这一现象的调查和分析,试图回答两个问题:专业从事放贷的农村正规金融机构都不愿向农户放贷,农业龙头企业为什么愿意向农户提供包含信贷服务的订单?这种形式的订单安排如何缓解农户普遍面临的信贷约束?
本文首先对相关的研究成果进行了回顾,包括关于农户信贷约束的研究,和关于订单农业中的信贷交易的研究。结果发现,目前还没有针对本文所关注问题所进行的深入、系统的研究。
在理论回顾的基础上,本文构建了分析上述问题的理论框架并提出了研究假说。对于第一个问题,本文以农户的生产选择行为为基点,先找出是什么原因致使农户不参加订单农产品生产,然后分析包含信贷服务的订单安排又是如何影响农户生产选择的。理论分析发现:生产企业所需的农产品需面对由产品异质性较高所带来的前期投入大以及各种风险较大的问题,农户缺乏资金且信贷获取能力差、风险防范和应对能力弱,因此不愿意也没有能力参加订单生产,导致企业无法提高原料可得性;而包含信贷服务的订单安排则能有效应对上述问题,促使和保障农户参加订单生产,从而提高企业的原料可得性,这正是龙头企业向农户提供包含信贷服务的订单的原因。对于第二个问题,本文从剖析导致农户信贷约束的根本原因入手,解释包含信贷服务的订单安排究竟是如何起到缓解农户信贷约束作用的。理论分析发现:造成农户信贷约束的根本原因在于农业生产经营存在较大风险、农户策略性赖账成本低、农户与金融机构之间存在严重信息不对称,以及金融机构面向农户放贷需支付高昂成本;而龙头企业通过向农户提供包含信贷服务的订单,并充分利用这一制度安排中的价格保障、技术服务、抵押替代、动态威胁、声誉机制、互联机制以及转贷机制等,可以有效应对以上四个问题,或者提高了正规金融机构的信贷供给意愿,或者形成了对正规金融机构的有效替代,从而缓解了农户的信贷约束。
最后,在实证分析部分,本文采取了多案例研究的实证研究方法,从多次实地调研所获得的案例资料中选取了5个有代表性的案例,通过案例与案例间逐项复制的方式来验证理论假说,并最终使全部假说都得到了有效的论证。
Fund is one of the most important factors in agricultural production, but most farmers, restricted by low level of income and wealth accumulation, often rely on credit for investment in agricultural production. However, taking into account the farmers’characteristics as credit demanders, formal financial institutions tend to supply credit prudently, because, to provide credit to farmers not only has to bear the high transaction costs, but also to face great risks. Although the government has mad a lot of efforts to reform rural financial systems over the years, and has adopted many policy measures to strengthen the rural financial institutions’ability and will to support rural clients, but the results are not good. Farmers are still faced with serious credit constraint.
Contrary to formal financial institutions, many agricultural leading enterprises have put credit services into the agricultural product contracts, such as providing suretyship for farmers to apply for loans, allowing farmers to use the contracts as collaterals for loans, directly supplying inputs to farmers on credit or lending money to farmers to buy the inputs. Based on the investigation and analysis of this phenomenon, this paper is in an attempt to answer two questions: Formal rural financial institutions that are professional in the lending services are reluctant to lend to farmers, why would the leading enterprises be willing to provide agricultural product contracts with credit services to farmers? How can such contract arrangement reduce farmers’credit constraint?
Firstly, the relevant researches are reviewed, including the researches on farmers’credit constraint, and on credit transaction in contract farming. The results showed that there are few literatures paying attention to the questions raised by this paper.
Secondly, based on the research review, this paper constructs the theoretical frameworks to analysis the questions and put forward hypotheses.
For the first question, based on the analysis about the production-choice behaviors of farmers, this paper first identifies the causes why farmers choose not to participate in agricultural production contracts, and then explains how contract arrangement with credit services can affect farmers’production-choice behaviors. If farmers choose to grow/raise the products required by the enterprises, they have to confront higher cost of pre-production investment and many kinds of greater risks which are caused by the differentiation of agricultural products. However, farmers are lack of fund, have poor access to credit, and weak capabilities to prevent and deal with risks, therefore, they have neither will nor ability to participate in contract production. As a result, the leading enterprises can not improve the availability of raw materials. On the contrary, contract arrangement with credit services can deal with these issues effectively. It could motivate and ensure farmers to participate in the contract production, so as to improve the enterprises’availability of raw materials. This is exactly the reason why the leading enterprises provide contract with credit services to farmers.
For the second question, beginning with analyzing the causes of farmers’credit constraint, this paper explains how contract arrangement with credit services can reduce farmers’credit constraint. The fundamental reasons for farmers’credit constraint are as follows: the greater risks of agricultural production and management, the low cost of farmers’strategic default behaviors, the serious information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions, as well as the high cost of financial institutions to lend to farmers. By providing agricultural product contracts with credit services to farmers, the leading enterprises can take full advantage of this institutional arrangement in many aspects, such as price security, technical services, collateral substitutes, dynamic threat, reputation mechanism, interlocking arrangement and on-lending mechanism, all of which help the leading enterprises deal with the problems which cause the credit constraint. In result, such contract arrangement can either improve the credit-supply will of formal financial institutions, or make the leading enterprises effectively replace the role of formal financial institutions. Finally, farmers are released from credit constraint.
Lastly, in the empirical-analysis section, this paper selects 5 representative cases, which are all coming from the field surveys, to do the multiple-case studies. Using the method of literal-replication, all the hypotheses get demonstrated and verified.
引文
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57. Bell, Clive & Srinivasan, T N & Udry, Christopher. Rationing, Spillover, and Interlinking in Credit Markets: The Case of Rural Punjab. Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 557-85, 1997
58. Baker, C. B.. Agricultural Trade Credit. Illinois Agricultural Economics. July, 1970-January, 1971
59. Charles Eaton and Andrew W. Shepherd. Contract Farming: Partnership for Growth. FAO. Agricultural Services Bulletin 145, 2001
60. Davis, Junior R., Angela Gaburici and Paul G. Hare. What’s Wrong with Romanian Rural Finance? Understanding the Determinants of Private Farmers’ Access to Credit. Memo, Center for Economic Reform and Transformation, Herit-Watt University, 1998
61. De Vletter, F. A Review of Three Successful Rural Finance Cases in Mozambique. Report Prepared for CGAP, Washington, D.C., March 2003
62. Den Ouden, M., etc., Vertical Cooperation in Agricultural Production-Marketing Chains, with Special Reference to Production Differentiation in Pork. Agribusiness(12), 277-290, 1996
63. Diagne, A., Zeller, M., Sharma, M.. Empirical Measurements of Households' Access to Credit and Credit Constraints in Developing Countries: Methodological Issues and Evidence. FCND Discussion Paper No.90, Washington, D.C., 2000
64. Doy, D. G., etc.. Broiler Production: Consideration for Potential Growers. OSU, Extension Facts, CEC, Division of Agricultural Science and Natural Resources No.22, 1992
65. FAO. Agribusiness and Small Farmers. Spotlight, Agriculture 21, 2001
66. Floro, S.L. and Yotopoulos, P.A.. Informal Credit Markets and the NewInstitutional Economics: The Case of Phillipine Agriculture. Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, 1991
67. Frank, S.D., etc.. Transaction Costs as Determinants of Vertical Coordination in the U.S. Food Industries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.74, 941-950, 1992
68. Ghosh, P. and D. Ray. Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows. Review of Economic Studies 63, 491–519, 1996
69. Ghosh, P. and D. Ray. Information and Repeated Interaction: Application to Informal Credit Markets. Mimeograph, Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, 1999
70. Ghosh, P., D. Mookherjee and D. Ray, 1999. Credit Rationing in Developing Countries: An Overview of the Theory. in Mookherjee, D. and D. Ray. A Reader in Development Economics, London: Blackwell, 2000
71. Hennessy and David A.. Information Asymmetry As a Reason For Food Industry Vertical Integration. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.78, 1034-1043, 1996
72. Hoff, Karla, and Joseph Stiglitz, Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets – Puzzles and Policy Perspectives. World Bank Economic Review, 4, 235-250. Reprinted in K. Hoff, A. Braverman, and J.Stiglitz, eds.. The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory Practice and Policy, Chap. 2, London: Oxford University Press, 1993
73. Jaffee, D., and Stiglitz, J., Credit Rationing. in B. M. Friedman and F. H. Hahn, eds.. Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. II, North-Holland, 1990
74. Jappelli, T.. Who is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy? Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, pp. 219-234, 1990
75. Kochar, A.. An Empirical Investigation of Rationing Constraints in Rural Credit Markets in India. Journal of Development Economics 53(2), 339-371, 1997
76. Moore, H. L.. Ensuring Contract Product Producers’ Intereste are Protected. Washington D. C. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives:28-32, 1994
77. Pearce, Douglas. Buyer and Supplier Credit to Farmers: Do Donors Have a Roleto Play? Paving the Way Forward for Rural Finance: An International Conference on Best Practices, 2004
78. Petrick, Martin. Empirical Measurement of Credit Rationing in Agriculture: A Methodological Survey. Discussion Paper No.45, Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe, 2003
79. Reardon, Thomas and Barrett, Chtistopher B.. Agroindustrialization, Globalization, and International Development: an Overview of Issues, Patterns, and Determinants. Agricultural Economics Vol.23, 195-205, 2000
80. Rehber, Erkan. Vertical Coordination in the Agro - food Industry and Contract Farming: A Comparative Study of Turkey and the USA. Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 52, University of Connecticut , 2000
81. Rome. Collateral in Rural Loans. FAO and ALIDE, 1996
82. Roy, E. P.. Contract Farming. Danvill, Illinois: Interstate Prjinters and Publishers Inc., 1963
83. Ruotsi, J. Agricultural Marketing Companies as Sources of Smallholder Credit in Eastern and Southern Africa : Experiences, Insights and Potential Donor Role.Eastern and Southern Africa Division. the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2003
84. Shepherd, Andrew W. Financing of Agricultural Marketing: Case Studies from Asia. Rome: FAO, 2003
85. Smith, L., M.Stockbridge, and H.Lohano. Facilitating the Provision of Farm Credit: The Role of Interlocking Transactions between Traders and Zamindars in Crop Marketing Systems in Sindh. World Development Volume 27, Issue 2, Pages 403-418, February 1999
86. Stiglitz, J and Weiss, A.. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review, 71, Pages 393-410, 1981
87. Yaron, J., Mcdonnald P., Benjamin, Jr., and Gerda L. P.. Rural Finance: Issues, Design, and Best Practices. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs 14. Washington DC: World Bank, 1997
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55. Adams, D.W., Fitchett, D.A.. Informal Finance in Low-income Countries. Bolder – San Francisco – Oxford. Westview Press, Inc., 1992
56. Barry, P. J., Paul N. Ellinger, John A. Hopkin and C.B. Baker. Financial Management in Agriculture, 6th Edition, Interstate Publishers, Inc., 2000
57. Bell, Clive & Srinivasan, T N & Udry, Christopher. Rationing, Spillover, and Interlinking in Credit Markets: The Case of Rural Punjab. Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 557-85, 1997
58. Baker, C. B.. Agricultural Trade Credit. Illinois Agricultural Economics. July, 1970-January, 1971
59. Charles Eaton and Andrew W. Shepherd. Contract Farming: Partnership for Growth. FAO. Agricultural Services Bulletin 145, 2001
60. Davis, Junior R., Angela Gaburici and Paul G. Hare. What’s Wrong with Romanian Rural Finance? Understanding the Determinants of Private Farmers’ Access to Credit. Memo, Center for Economic Reform and Transformation, Herit-Watt University, 1998
61. De Vletter, F. A Review of Three Successful Rural Finance Cases in Mozambique. Report Prepared for CGAP, Washington, D.C., March 2003
62. Den Ouden, M., etc., Vertical Cooperation in Agricultural Production-Marketing Chains, with Special Reference to Production Differentiation in Pork. Agribusiness(12), 277-290, 1996
63. Diagne, A., Zeller, M., Sharma, M.. Empirical Measurements of Households' Access to Credit and Credit Constraints in Developing Countries: Methodological Issues and Evidence. FCND Discussion Paper No.90, Washington, D.C., 2000
64. Doy, D. G., etc.. Broiler Production: Consideration for Potential Growers. OSU, Extension Facts, CEC, Division of Agricultural Science and Natural Resources No.22, 1992
65. FAO. Agribusiness and Small Farmers. Spotlight, Agriculture 21, 2001
66. Floro, S.L. and Yotopoulos, P.A.. Informal Credit Markets and the NewInstitutional Economics: The Case of Phillipine Agriculture. Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, 1991
67. Frank, S.D., etc.. Transaction Costs as Determinants of Vertical Coordination in the U.S. Food Industries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.74, 941-950, 1992
68. Ghosh, P. and D. Ray. Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows. Review of Economic Studies 63, 491–519, 1996
69. Ghosh, P. and D. Ray. Information and Repeated Interaction: Application to Informal Credit Markets. Mimeograph, Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, 1999
70. Ghosh, P., D. Mookherjee and D. Ray, 1999. Credit Rationing in Developing Countries: An Overview of the Theory. in Mookherjee, D. and D. Ray. A Reader in Development Economics, London: Blackwell, 2000
71. Hennessy and David A.. Information Asymmetry As a Reason For Food Industry Vertical Integration. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.78, 1034-1043, 1996
72. Hoff, Karla, and Joseph Stiglitz, Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets – Puzzles and Policy Perspectives. World Bank Economic Review, 4, 235-250. Reprinted in K. Hoff, A. Braverman, and J.Stiglitz, eds.. The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory Practice and Policy, Chap. 2, London: Oxford University Press, 1993
73. Jaffee, D., and Stiglitz, J., Credit Rationing. in B. M. Friedman and F. H. Hahn, eds.. Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. II, North-Holland, 1990
74. Jappelli, T.. Who is Credit Constrained in the U.S. Economy? Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, pp. 219-234, 1990
75. Kochar, A.. An Empirical Investigation of Rationing Constraints in Rural Credit Markets in India. Journal of Development Economics 53(2), 339-371, 1997
76. Moore, H. L.. Ensuring Contract Product Producers’ Intereste are Protected. Washington D. C. National Council of Farmer Cooperatives:28-32, 1994
77. Pearce, Douglas. Buyer and Supplier Credit to Farmers: Do Donors Have a Roleto Play? Paving the Way Forward for Rural Finance: An International Conference on Best Practices, 2004
78. Petrick, Martin. Empirical Measurement of Credit Rationing in Agriculture: A Methodological Survey. Discussion Paper No.45, Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe, 2003
79. Reardon, Thomas and Barrett, Chtistopher B.. Agroindustrialization, Globalization, and International Development: an Overview of Issues, Patterns, and Determinants. Agricultural Economics Vol.23, 195-205, 2000
80. Rehber, Erkan. Vertical Coordination in the Agro - food Industry and Contract Farming: A Comparative Study of Turkey and the USA. Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 52, University of Connecticut , 2000
81. Rome. Collateral in Rural Loans. FAO and ALIDE, 1996
82. Roy, E. P.. Contract Farming. Danvill, Illinois: Interstate Prjinters and Publishers Inc., 1963
83. Ruotsi, J. Agricultural Marketing Companies as Sources of Smallholder Credit in Eastern and Southern Africa : Experiences, Insights and Potential Donor Role.Eastern and Southern Africa Division. the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2003
84. Shepherd, Andrew W. Financing of Agricultural Marketing: Case Studies from Asia. Rome: FAO, 2003
85. Smith, L., M.Stockbridge, and H.Lohano. Facilitating the Provision of Farm Credit: The Role of Interlocking Transactions between Traders and Zamindars in Crop Marketing Systems in Sindh. World Development Volume 27, Issue 2, Pages 403-418, February 1999
86. Stiglitz, J and Weiss, A.. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review, 71, Pages 393-410, 1981
87. Yaron, J., Mcdonnald P., Benjamin, Jr., and Gerda L. P.. Rural Finance: Issues, Design, and Best Practices. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs 14. Washington DC: World Bank, 1997
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