优惠自贸协定、原产地规则与企业技术升级
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摘要
在新新贸易理论框架下,通过引入原产地规则限制效应和两种不同生产技术,本文分析了自贸协定下的原产地规则对企业技术升级的影响。结果表明,低技术的出口企业要发展成为利用自贸协定进行出口的高技术企业,存在两条不同的发展路径:一是企业先实现技术升级然后再转变出口方式;二是企业先转变出口方式然后再进行技术升级。企业所处的发展路径不同,原产地规则限制效应对企业技术升级的影响也不同:当只存在要素市场的资源配置效应时,较高的原产地规则限制效应反而有利于企业的技术升级;当同时存在要素市场的资源配置效应和产品市场的利润缩减效应时,较低的原产地规则限制效应将有利于企业的技术升级。从企业技术升级的角度,本文为重新认识企业利用自贸协定的原产地规则提供了新的视角。
Under the frame of New-New Trade Theory,this paper introduces the restrictive effect of rule of origin and two different technologies,studies the influence of rule of origin on firm's technological upgrading under the FTA. It concludes that there exist two different paths for low technological export firms developing into high technological export firms. The first path is to achieve technological upgrading before export mode change. The second one is the former after the latter. When firms are in different paths,the effects of ROO restriction are different. If the factor market only has room for resource reallocation,stronger ROO restriction effect will benefit firm's technological upgrading. Otherwise, weaker restriction effect will be beneficial. This paper provides a new perspective to re-recognize firms utilizing the rule of origin under the FTA.
Under the frame of New-New Trade Theory,this paper introduces the restrictive effect of rule of origin and two different technologies,studies the influence of rule of origin on firm's technological upgrading under the FTA. It concludes that there exist two different paths for low technological export firms developing into high technological export firms. The first path is to achieve technological upgrading before export mode change. The second one is the former after the latter. When firms are in different paths,the effects of ROO restriction are different. If the factor market only has room for resource reallocation,stronger ROO restriction effect will benefit firm's technological upgrading. Otherwise, weaker restriction effect will be beneficial. This paper provides a new perspective to re-recognize firms utilizing the rule of origin under the FTA.
引文
1.李海莲、邢丽,2017:《区域自由贸易协定原产地规则的影响及治理策略》,《经济纵横》第1期。
2 .刘洋,2014:《优惠性原产地规则如何影响投资流向———以中国-新加坡自贸区为例的分析》,《世界经济研究》第9期。
3 .徐进亮、文静,2012:《中澳自由贸易区原产地规则模式选择及实证分析》,《国际经贸探索》第10期。
4 .徐世腾、周金燕,2016:《东盟FTA原产地规则比较研究》,《亚太经济》第5期。
5 .张胜满、雷昭明、丁嘉伦,2015:《我国原产地规则的应用研究———基于投入产出的分析》,《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》第3期。
6 .Andersson,A. 2016.“Export Performance and Access to Intermediate Inputs:The Case of Rules of Origin Liberalisation.”The World Economy 39(8):1048-1079.
7 .Bas,M.,and A. Berthou. 2013.“Does Input-trade Liberalization Affect Firms’Foreign Technology Choice?”CEPII Working Papers,No.2013-11.
8 .Bombarda,P.,and E. Gamberoni. 2013.“Firm Heterogeneity,Rules of Origin,and Rules of Cumulation.”International Economic Review 54(1):307-328.
9 .Bustos,P. 2011.“Trade Liberalization,Exports,and Technology Upgrading:Evidence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms.”American Economic Review 101(1):304–340.
10 .Conconi,P.,M. García-Santana,L. Puccio,and R. Venturini. 2018.“From Final Goods to Inputs:The Protectionist Effect of Rules of Origin.”American Economic Review 108(8):2335-2365.
11 .Demidova,S.,and K. Krishna. 2008.“Firm Heterogeneity and Firm Behavior with Conditional Policies.”Economics Letters 98(2):122-128.
12 .Dixit,A. K.,and J. E. Stiglitz. 1977.“Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity.”American Economic Review 67(3):297-308.
13 .Hayakawa,K.,and N. Laksanapanyakul. 2017.“Impacts of Common Rules of Origin on FTA Utilization.”International Economics and Economic Policy 14(1):75-90.
14 .Hayakawa,K.,H.S. Kim,and T. Yoshimi. 2017.“Exchange Rate and Utilization of Free Trade Agreements:Focus on Rules of Origin.”Journal of International Money and Finance 75(5):93-108.
15 .Jinji,N.,and Y. Mizoguchi. 2016.“Rules of Origin and Technology Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment under International Duopoly.”Japan and the World Economy 40(3):47-60.
16 .Kim,Y. H.,and E. H. Ha. 2016.“Are Rules of Origin Protective Measures under Preferential Trade Agreements?”Journal of Korea Trade 20(1):74-96.
17 . Melitz,M. J. 2003.“The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity.”Econometrica 71(6):1695-1725.
18 .Takauchi,K. 2014.“Rules of Origin and Strategic Choice of Compliance.”Journal of Industry,Competition and Trade 14(2):287-302.
19 .Ulloa,A.,and R. Wagner. 2012.“Why Don’t All Exporters Benefit from Free Trade Agreements? Estimating Utilization Costs.”IDB Working Paper Series,No. IDB-WP-388.
20 .Yeaple,S. R. 2005.“A Simple Model of Firm Heterogeneity,International Trade,and Wages.”Journal of International Economics 65(1):1-20.
(1)做出这一假设只是为了模型简洁。需要说明的是,即使允许企业在国内销售,也不影响本文的基本结论。
(1)一般而言,原产地规则限制效应主要影响的是企业生产的可变成本,因此本文并没有考虑其对固定成本d的影响。
(2)当λθ>1时,Cx,FTA(φ,q) (1)与Bustos(2011)的做法类似,这里对参数施加一定的限制:k+1>σ。
(1)为了节省篇幅,具体推导过程没有列出,感兴趣的读者可向作者索要。
(1)为保证存在θ使得企业的发展能遵循路径Ⅱ,要求V≤M,相关参数要满足以下限制:(γσ-1-1)≤(η-1)f d+f+fx。
(2)简便起见,在这一部分的讨论里,我们假设(12)式和(13)式的左右两边相等时,企业的相关行为也不会发生改变。
(1)为了保证企业能够按照路径Ⅰ或路径Ⅱ发展,本文对θ的取值范围有限制,要求θ∈[N,1/λ]或θ∈[V,M]。原因如下:当θ
2 .刘洋,2014:《优惠性原产地规则如何影响投资流向———以中国-新加坡自贸区为例的分析》,《世界经济研究》第9期。
3 .徐进亮、文静,2012:《中澳自由贸易区原产地规则模式选择及实证分析》,《国际经贸探索》第10期。
4 .徐世腾、周金燕,2016:《东盟FTA原产地规则比较研究》,《亚太经济》第5期。
5 .张胜满、雷昭明、丁嘉伦,2015:《我国原产地规则的应用研究———基于投入产出的分析》,《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》第3期。
6 .Andersson,A. 2016.“Export Performance and Access to Intermediate Inputs:The Case of Rules of Origin Liberalisation.”The World Economy 39(8):1048-1079.
7 .Bas,M.,and A. Berthou. 2013.“Does Input-trade Liberalization Affect Firms’Foreign Technology Choice?”CEPII Working Papers,No.2013-11.
8 .Bombarda,P.,and E. Gamberoni. 2013.“Firm Heterogeneity,Rules of Origin,and Rules of Cumulation.”International Economic Review 54(1):307-328.
9 .Bustos,P. 2011.“Trade Liberalization,Exports,and Technology Upgrading:Evidence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms.”American Economic Review 101(1):304–340.
10 .Conconi,P.,M. García-Santana,L. Puccio,and R. Venturini. 2018.“From Final Goods to Inputs:The Protectionist Effect of Rules of Origin.”American Economic Review 108(8):2335-2365.
11 .Demidova,S.,and K. Krishna. 2008.“Firm Heterogeneity and Firm Behavior with Conditional Policies.”Economics Letters 98(2):122-128.
12 .Dixit,A. K.,and J. E. Stiglitz. 1977.“Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity.”American Economic Review 67(3):297-308.
13 .Hayakawa,K.,and N. Laksanapanyakul. 2017.“Impacts of Common Rules of Origin on FTA Utilization.”International Economics and Economic Policy 14(1):75-90.
14 .Hayakawa,K.,H.S. Kim,and T. Yoshimi. 2017.“Exchange Rate and Utilization of Free Trade Agreements:Focus on Rules of Origin.”Journal of International Money and Finance 75(5):93-108.
15 .Jinji,N.,and Y. Mizoguchi. 2016.“Rules of Origin and Technology Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment under International Duopoly.”Japan and the World Economy 40(3):47-60.
16 .Kim,Y. H.,and E. H. Ha. 2016.“Are Rules of Origin Protective Measures under Preferential Trade Agreements?”Journal of Korea Trade 20(1):74-96.
17 . Melitz,M. J. 2003.“The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity.”Econometrica 71(6):1695-1725.
18 .Takauchi,K. 2014.“Rules of Origin and Strategic Choice of Compliance.”Journal of Industry,Competition and Trade 14(2):287-302.
19 .Ulloa,A.,and R. Wagner. 2012.“Why Don’t All Exporters Benefit from Free Trade Agreements? Estimating Utilization Costs.”IDB Working Paper Series,No. IDB-WP-388.
20 .Yeaple,S. R. 2005.“A Simple Model of Firm Heterogeneity,International Trade,and Wages.”Journal of International Economics 65(1):1-20.
(1)做出这一假设只是为了模型简洁。需要说明的是,即使允许企业在国内销售,也不影响本文的基本结论。
(1)一般而言,原产地规则限制效应主要影响的是企业生产的可变成本,因此本文并没有考虑其对固定成本d的影响。
(2)当λθ>1时,Cx,FTA(φ,q)
(1)为了节省篇幅,具体推导过程没有列出,感兴趣的读者可向作者索要。
(1)为保证存在θ使得企业的发展能遵循路径Ⅱ,要求V≤M,相关参数要满足以下限制:(γσ-1-1)≤(η-1)f d+f+fx。
(2)简便起见,在这一部分的讨论里,我们假设(12)式和(13)式的左右两边相等时,企业的相关行为也不会发生改变。
(1)为了保证企业能够按照路径Ⅰ或路径Ⅱ发展,本文对θ的取值范围有限制,要求θ∈[N,1/λ]或θ∈[V,M]。原因如下:当θ
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