银行竞争的微观效应:来自融资约束的经验证据
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摘要
银行竞争的加剧将促使银行更多地搜集和挖掘企业信息,降低银企之间的信息不对称,进而缓解企业融资约束。为此,本文在构建理论模型分析的基础上,进一步实证检验了这一假定。实证检验结果表明,银行竞争显著降低了企业投资-现金流敏感性,即缓解了企业融资约束;该结论在控制内生性问题,以及采用不同银行竞争指标和融资约束指标进行稳健性检验后仍旧成立。同时,本文还发现,银行竞争降低了企业债务融资成本,从而为银行竞争降低企业融资约束这一结论提供了补充性证据。进一步地,在企业信息不对称程度更严重的情况下,银行竞争缓解企业融资约束的作用更大,且银行竞争能够降低企业贷款的交易成本,从而为银行竞争降低融资约束的作用机制提供了证据支持。本文不仅丰富了银行竞争的经济后果以及融资约束等相关领域文献,同时还具有较为重要的政策含义。
Bank competition in China has increased dramatically over the last few decades. While the Chinese banking industry in the early 1980 s comprised only four commercial banks with separate specializations, both the number and scale of banks in China have grown rapidly since then. Banks now also play an increasing role in China's economy and the government attaches great importance to them. Specifically, the government encourages banks to help alleviate corporate financial difficulties to support the development of the real economy. However, no studies have yet examined how bank competition affects the financial constraints faced by most firms, and how these effects vary across different firms.Information asymmetry is an important factor leading to corporate financial constraints(Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). In this paper, we hypothesize that increased bank competition lowers information asymmetry between banks and firms, thus alleviating corporate financial constraints. Banks have to compete with each other for qualified borrowers, especially as bank competition grows fiercer(Huang & Xiong, 2005; Ma et al., 2013). However, a bank that wins customers may run into the "winner's curse"(Shaffer, 1998). In a highly competitive banking industry, banks with insufficient and asymmetrical information on their customers(i.e., borrowers) may unintentionally win unqualified customers, and thus lose profits(Broecker, 1990; Rajan, 1992). To prevent this and make the right choice, banks make more effort to gather and uncover corporate information. Moreover, to earn a profit in a highly competitive banking industry with lower profit margins(Petersen & Rajan, 1995), banks need to gather more information on firms to make more appropriate credit decisions. Hence, bank competition creates strong incentives for banks to gather corporate information, thus reducing the information asymmetry between banks and firms and alleviating corporate financial constraints. To examine our prediction that bank competition helps to alleviate corporate financial constraints, we first construct a theoretical model to analyze our conjecture and examine it empirically. Using a large sample of commercial banks and all Chinese A-share listed firms from 2000 to 2014, we find that bank competition significantly reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms, which means that bank competition can reduce firm financial constraints. These results hold after controlling for endogeneity concerns and substituting an alternative measure for financial constraints. Furthermore, we show that bank competition reduces the cost of corporate debt financing, providing supplementary evidence that bank competition reduces corporate financial constraints. We also find that the alleviating effects of bank competition on corporate financial constraints are greater when firms face more severe information asymmetry. In addition, bank competition reduces the transaction costs of bank loans raised by firms.Our paper makes two main contributes to the literature. First, while the literature focuses mainly on how bank competition affects the macro-economy(Berger & Hannan, 1989; Carlin & Mayer, 2003), we provide new evidence on how bank competition influences individual firms. Although some studies have examined the effect of bank competition on corporate access to finance(Bonaccorsi Di Patti & Dell'Ariccia, 2004; Chong et al., 2013; Love & Peria, 2014), their conclusions are inconsistent on this issue(Zazutskie, 2006; De Guevara & Maudos, 2011) and do not directly address how bank competition affects corporate financial constraints. Second, we contribute to the literature on financial constraints. From the perspective of funding demands, the literature has mainly studied how firm characteristics and behavior affect firm financial constraints(Custódio & Metzger, 2014; Erel et al., 2015; Deng & Zeng, 2011; Yu et al., 2012). Few studies have examined how financial market development and liberalization may alleviate corporate financial constraints(Love, 2003; Shen et al., 2010), and none have investigated how the structure of the banking industry influences the financial constraints of individual firms.
Bank competition in China has increased dramatically over the last few decades. While the Chinese banking industry in the early 1980 s comprised only four commercial banks with separate specializations, both the number and scale of banks in China have grown rapidly since then. Banks now also play an increasing role in China's economy and the government attaches great importance to them. Specifically, the government encourages banks to help alleviate corporate financial difficulties to support the development of the real economy. However, no studies have yet examined how bank competition affects the financial constraints faced by most firms, and how these effects vary across different firms.Information asymmetry is an important factor leading to corporate financial constraints(Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). In this paper, we hypothesize that increased bank competition lowers information asymmetry between banks and firms, thus alleviating corporate financial constraints. Banks have to compete with each other for qualified borrowers, especially as bank competition grows fiercer(Huang & Xiong, 2005; Ma et al., 2013). However, a bank that wins customers may run into the "winner's curse"(Shaffer, 1998). In a highly competitive banking industry, banks with insufficient and asymmetrical information on their customers(i.e., borrowers) may unintentionally win unqualified customers, and thus lose profits(Broecker, 1990; Rajan, 1992). To prevent this and make the right choice, banks make more effort to gather and uncover corporate information. Moreover, to earn a profit in a highly competitive banking industry with lower profit margins(Petersen & Rajan, 1995), banks need to gather more information on firms to make more appropriate credit decisions. Hence, bank competition creates strong incentives for banks to gather corporate information, thus reducing the information asymmetry between banks and firms and alleviating corporate financial constraints. To examine our prediction that bank competition helps to alleviate corporate financial constraints, we first construct a theoretical model to analyze our conjecture and examine it empirically. Using a large sample of commercial banks and all Chinese A-share listed firms from 2000 to 2014, we find that bank competition significantly reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms, which means that bank competition can reduce firm financial constraints. These results hold after controlling for endogeneity concerns and substituting an alternative measure for financial constraints. Furthermore, we show that bank competition reduces the cost of corporate debt financing, providing supplementary evidence that bank competition reduces corporate financial constraints. We also find that the alleviating effects of bank competition on corporate financial constraints are greater when firms face more severe information asymmetry. In addition, bank competition reduces the transaction costs of bank loans raised by firms.Our paper makes two main contributes to the literature. First, while the literature focuses mainly on how bank competition affects the macro-economy(Berger & Hannan, 1989; Carlin & Mayer, 2003), we provide new evidence on how bank competition influences individual firms. Although some studies have examined the effect of bank competition on corporate access to finance(Bonaccorsi Di Patti & Dell'Ariccia, 2004; Chong et al., 2013; Love & Peria, 2014), their conclusions are inconsistent on this issue(Zazutskie, 2006; De Guevara & Maudos, 2011) and do not directly address how bank competition affects corporate financial constraints. Second, we contribute to the literature on financial constraints. From the perspective of funding demands, the literature has mainly studied how firm characteristics and behavior affect firm financial constraints(Custódio & Metzger, 2014; Erel et al., 2015; Deng & Zeng, 2011; Yu et al., 2012). Few studies have examined how financial market development and liberalization may alleviate corporate financial constraints(Love, 2003; Shen et al., 2010), and none have investigated how the structure of the banking industry influences the financial constraints of individual firms.
引文
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陈冬华、陈信元、万华林,2005:《国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费》,《经济研究》第2期。
陈雄兵,2017:《银行竞争、市场力量与货币政策信贷传导》,《财贸经济》第2期。
邓超、敖宏、胡威、王翔,2010:《基于关系型贷款的大银行对小企业的贷款定价研究》,《经济研究》第2期。
邓建平、曾勇,2011:《金融关联能否缓解民营企业的融资约束》,《金融研究》第8期。
黄宪、熊福平,2005:《外资银行在中国发展的经营动机和经营策略分析》,《金融研究》第2期。
姜付秀、石贝贝、马云飙,2016:《信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束》,《经济研究》第6期。
姜付秀、朱冰、王运通,2014:《国有企业的经理激励契约更不看重绩效吗?》,《管理世界》第9期。
姜国华、饶品贵,2011:《宏观经济政策与微观企业行为——拓展会计与财务研究新领域》,《会计研究》第3期。
蒋琰,2009:《权益成本、债务成本与公司治理:影响差异性研究》,《管理世界》第11期。
刘小玄,1987:《西方宏观经济学的微观基础理论的若干发展》,《经济研究》第3期。
马国臣、李鑫、孙静,2008:《中国制造业上市公司投资——现金流高敏感性实证研究》,《中国工业经济》第10期。
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(1)资料来源:http://www.cbrc.gov.cn。
(2)根据中国金融年鉴资料显示,2002年中国全社会融资规模增量中银行贷款占比为91.8%,即使在2015年,贷款占比仍高达73.1%。
(3)这里假定银行吸收存款量中除去用于贷款的部分,其他资金均未做投资,产生资金存储成本。如果银行将多余资金通过购买债券、基金等方式进行投资,收益率为Ri,能够得到相同的结论。为节省篇幅,本文不再赘述该推导过程,具体细节可向作者索要。
(4)文献中银行竞争的度量主要包括结构化和非结构化两种方法。结构化度量方法是通过计算各银行存款、货款或支行数量的占比来度量银行竞争程度。非结构化方法主要包括Panzar-Rosse A统计量、Lerner指数和Boone指标。如引言部分所述,已有文献为获得银行竞争数据,通过调查或从数据库获取了部分银行的部分分支机构的财务数据及存贷款数据,基于非结构化方法或结构化方法中的存贷款数量占比计算得到了一系列银行竞争指标。由于各分支机构的财务数据统计口径未必一致,且不能获得各地较全面的银行分支机构信息,因此,已有文献的方法难以保证衡量的准确性,且样本选择偏差问题严重。
(5)银行官网发布的数据为当前支行信息,未能反映银行竞争的历史变化情况。
(6)按照银监会的统计,商业银行分支机构的组织类别主要包括总行、总行营业部(专营机构)、一级分行、一级分行营业部、二级分行、二级分行营业部、直属支行、支行、分理处、办事处、营业所等。其中,支行为主要组织类别,占比高达68.58%。
(7)依据银监会2007年4月29日颁发的《金融许可证机构编码编制规则》对金融许可证信息进行数据处理。该《规则》规定,机构编码由大写英文字母和数字组成,共15位,分六部分,分别是机构类型代码、机构代码、组织类别代码、发证机关代码、地址代码、顺序代码,按照从左至右的顺序排列。由此,可以得到每个金融机构分支机构的类型、名称、所在地区以及成立时间,进一步据此可以计算出各个银行在各个年度各个城市的机构数量。
(8)根据中华人民共和国统计局资料显示,截至2016年9月中国大陆地级行政区共计334个。其中,地级市293个,地区8个,自治州30个,盟3个。便于叙述,后文简称之为地级市。
(9)银行竞争变量的描述性统计结果显示,地级市银行竞争水平HHI_City与CR3_City的均值(中位数)分别为0.140(0.127)和0.525(0.508),标准差为0.057和0.123,说明银行竞争水平分布较为分散,各地级市之间差异较大。限于篇幅,本文未报告主要变量的描述性统计。
(10)关于如何度量见下文的实证结果部分。
(11)参照证监会的上市公司行业分类指引2001年的标准,本文对C类制造业使用两位行业代码,除此之外其他行业均使用一位行业代码。最终,本文的样本分属于21个行业。
(12)由于银行竞争程度属于中观层面变量,融资约束是微观层面企业特征变量,我们同时采用了多层线性模型(hierarchical linear model)进行回归,结果保持不变。
(13)KZ指数的具体构造步骤为:每年度按公司发放的现金股利、持有的现金、经营性现金流、资产负债率将公司分类。如果发放现金股利低于中位数,则KZ1=1;持有现金低于中位数,KZ2=1;经营性现金流低于中位数,KZ3=1;资产负债率高于中位数,KZ4=1。然后计算得到KZ=KZ1+KZ2+KZ3+KZ4。随后,以KZ为因变量,以现金股利、现金持有、经营性现金流、资产负债率和销售收入增长率为自变量进行ordered logit回归,估计出各个变量的回归系数。最后用估计的系数计算得到拟合值,即为KZ指数。KZ指数越高,企业的融资约束越严重。
(14)无论是否第一大股东,国有股东在上市公司的存在都会引起市场和媒体的更多关注;且从现实来看,一家上市公司第二大股东的持股比例可能比另外一家第一大股东的持股还多。因此,我们认为,以上市公司中国有股份的比例多少进行分类比按照第一大股东是否为国有性质来分类更为合理。
陈冬华、陈信元、万华林,2005:《国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费》,《经济研究》第2期。
陈雄兵,2017:《银行竞争、市场力量与货币政策信贷传导》,《财贸经济》第2期。
邓超、敖宏、胡威、王翔,2010:《基于关系型贷款的大银行对小企业的贷款定价研究》,《经济研究》第2期。
邓建平、曾勇,2011:《金融关联能否缓解民营企业的融资约束》,《金融研究》第8期。
黄宪、熊福平,2005:《外资银行在中国发展的经营动机和经营策略分析》,《金融研究》第2期。
姜付秀、石贝贝、马云飙,2016:《信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束》,《经济研究》第6期。
姜付秀、朱冰、王运通,2014:《国有企业的经理激励契约更不看重绩效吗?》,《管理世界》第9期。
姜国华、饶品贵,2011:《宏观经济政策与微观企业行为——拓展会计与财务研究新领域》,《会计研究》第3期。
蒋琰,2009:《权益成本、债务成本与公司治理:影响差异性研究》,《管理世界》第11期。
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(1)资料来源:http://www.cbrc.gov.cn。
(2)根据中国金融年鉴资料显示,2002年中国全社会融资规模增量中银行贷款占比为91.8%,即使在2015年,贷款占比仍高达73.1%。
(3)这里假定银行吸收存款量中除去用于贷款的部分,其他资金均未做投资,产生资金存储成本。如果银行将多余资金通过购买债券、基金等方式进行投资,收益率为Ri,能够得到相同的结论。为节省篇幅,本文不再赘述该推导过程,具体细节可向作者索要。
(4)文献中银行竞争的度量主要包括结构化和非结构化两种方法。结构化度量方法是通过计算各银行存款、货款或支行数量的占比来度量银行竞争程度。非结构化方法主要包括Panzar-Rosse A统计量、Lerner指数和Boone指标。如引言部分所述,已有文献为获得银行竞争数据,通过调查或从数据库获取了部分银行的部分分支机构的财务数据及存贷款数据,基于非结构化方法或结构化方法中的存贷款数量占比计算得到了一系列银行竞争指标。由于各分支机构的财务数据统计口径未必一致,且不能获得各地较全面的银行分支机构信息,因此,已有文献的方法难以保证衡量的准确性,且样本选择偏差问题严重。
(5)银行官网发布的数据为当前支行信息,未能反映银行竞争的历史变化情况。
(6)按照银监会的统计,商业银行分支机构的组织类别主要包括总行、总行营业部(专营机构)、一级分行、一级分行营业部、二级分行、二级分行营业部、直属支行、支行、分理处、办事处、营业所等。其中,支行为主要组织类别,占比高达68.58%。
(7)依据银监会2007年4月29日颁发的《金融许可证机构编码编制规则》对金融许可证信息进行数据处理。该《规则》规定,机构编码由大写英文字母和数字组成,共15位,分六部分,分别是机构类型代码、机构代码、组织类别代码、发证机关代码、地址代码、顺序代码,按照从左至右的顺序排列。由此,可以得到每个金融机构分支机构的类型、名称、所在地区以及成立时间,进一步据此可以计算出各个银行在各个年度各个城市的机构数量。
(8)根据中华人民共和国统计局资料显示,截至2016年9月中国大陆地级行政区共计334个。其中,地级市293个,地区8个,自治州30个,盟3个。便于叙述,后文简称之为地级市。
(9)银行竞争变量的描述性统计结果显示,地级市银行竞争水平HHI_City与CR3_City的均值(中位数)分别为0.140(0.127)和0.525(0.508),标准差为0.057和0.123,说明银行竞争水平分布较为分散,各地级市之间差异较大。限于篇幅,本文未报告主要变量的描述性统计。
(10)关于如何度量见下文的实证结果部分。
(11)参照证监会的上市公司行业分类指引2001年的标准,本文对C类制造业使用两位行业代码,除此之外其他行业均使用一位行业代码。最终,本文的样本分属于21个行业。
(12)由于银行竞争程度属于中观层面变量,融资约束是微观层面企业特征变量,我们同时采用了多层线性模型(hierarchical linear model)进行回归,结果保持不变。
(13)KZ指数的具体构造步骤为:每年度按公司发放的现金股利、持有的现金、经营性现金流、资产负债率将公司分类。如果发放现金股利低于中位数,则KZ1=1;持有现金低于中位数,KZ2=1;经营性现金流低于中位数,KZ3=1;资产负债率高于中位数,KZ4=1。然后计算得到KZ=KZ1+KZ2+KZ3+KZ4。随后,以KZ为因变量,以现金股利、现金持有、经营性现金流、资产负债率和销售收入增长率为自变量进行ordered logit回归,估计出各个变量的回归系数。最后用估计的系数计算得到拟合值,即为KZ指数。KZ指数越高,企业的融资约束越严重。
(14)无论是否第一大股东,国有股东在上市公司的存在都会引起市场和媒体的更多关注;且从现实来看,一家上市公司第二大股东的持股比例可能比另外一家第一大股东的持股还多。因此,我们认为,以上市公司中国有股份的比例多少进行分类比按照第一大股东是否为国有性质来分类更为合理。
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