回收责任分担视角下零售商主导闭环供应链的政府奖惩机制研究
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摘要
研究零售商主导的闭环供应链奖惩机制问题,分别建立了四个博弈模型:政府对制造商实施奖惩机制;政府对回收商实施奖惩机制;政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制以及同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制。研究表明:政府对制造商实施奖惩机制、政府对回收商实施奖惩机制以及政府同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制三种情形下零售价、回收率和批发价相等,且总利润相等;政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制与其它情形相比,废旧产品的回收率较低,批发价较高,且总利润降低,但四种情形下零售价相同;当政府同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制时,若制造商承担的回收责任较大,则闭环供应链成员都能从奖惩机制中获益。
In recent years,Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment(WEEE)with significant environmental attribute,has attracted more and more attention of the public.The government has also emphasized the collection of WEEE with legislation to prevent pollution,such as the Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR).Despite of the laws and the efforts of the public,the environment still faces serious challenge.The government,further,has adopted several incentive mechanisms,such as subsidy,to encourage enterprises to collect WEEE.Based on these incentive policies,the reward-penalty mechanism(RPM)is proposed to increase the collection rate.In the RPM,the government sets the reward-penalty intensity and target collection rate.The enterprise will receive reward(penalty,resp.)if the actual collection rate is higher(lower,resp.)than the target collection rate.In addition,given the difficulty of collecting WEEE,the collection responsibility-sharing has been investigated in this paper.With the advance of the retail,the retailers,such as WAL-MART,SUNING,GOME and etc.,play a more important role in the supply chain.Therefore,in this paper,a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model is developed,in which the retailer is a Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer and the third-party collector are followers.Then four cases are studied respectively:the government implements the RPM to manufacturer(Case M);the government implements RPM to the third-party collector(Case TP);the government implements RPM to manufacturer and retailer simultaneously(Case MR);the government implements RPM to manufacturer and the third-party collector simultaneously(Case MTP).With the comparison and analysis of the equilibrium,the main results are showed as follows.(i)Under Case M,Case TPand Case MTP,the retail prices,the collection rates,the wholesale prices and the total profits of the CLSC are respectively equal.(ii)Compared with other three cases,Case MRresults in lower collection rate,higher wholesale price and lower total profit of the CLSC,while the retail price under four cases keeps the same.(iii)If the government implements RPM only to the manufacturer(the collector,resp.),the manufacturer(the collector,resp.)will suffer a profit loss,while the collector(the manufacturer,resp.)will share‘free riding'.(iv)When the government implements RPM to the manufacturer and the collector,all the players in the CLSC can benefit the RPM if the manufacturer undertakes more collection responsibility relatively.Our paper extends and complements prior research that has only studied the CLSC with either the RPM or collection responsibility-sharing in the retailer-led setting.
In recent years,Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment(WEEE)with significant environmental attribute,has attracted more and more attention of the public.The government has also emphasized the collection of WEEE with legislation to prevent pollution,such as the Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR).Despite of the laws and the efforts of the public,the environment still faces serious challenge.The government,further,has adopted several incentive mechanisms,such as subsidy,to encourage enterprises to collect WEEE.Based on these incentive policies,the reward-penalty mechanism(RPM)is proposed to increase the collection rate.In the RPM,the government sets the reward-penalty intensity and target collection rate.The enterprise will receive reward(penalty,resp.)if the actual collection rate is higher(lower,resp.)than the target collection rate.In addition,given the difficulty of collecting WEEE,the collection responsibility-sharing has been investigated in this paper.With the advance of the retail,the retailers,such as WAL-MART,SUNING,GOME and etc.,play a more important role in the supply chain.Therefore,in this paper,a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model is developed,in which the retailer is a Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer and the third-party collector are followers.Then four cases are studied respectively:the government implements the RPM to manufacturer(Case M);the government implements RPM to the third-party collector(Case TP);the government implements RPM to manufacturer and retailer simultaneously(Case MR);the government implements RPM to manufacturer and the third-party collector simultaneously(Case MTP).With the comparison and analysis of the equilibrium,the main results are showed as follows.(i)Under Case M,Case TPand Case MTP,the retail prices,the collection rates,the wholesale prices and the total profits of the CLSC are respectively equal.(ii)Compared with other three cases,Case MRresults in lower collection rate,higher wholesale price and lower total profit of the CLSC,while the retail price under four cases keeps the same.(iii)If the government implements RPM only to the manufacturer(the collector,resp.),the manufacturer(the collector,resp.)will suffer a profit loss,while the collector(the manufacturer,resp.)will share‘free riding'.(iv)When the government implements RPM to the manufacturer and the collector,all the players in the CLSC can benefit the RPM if the manufacturer undertakes more collection responsibility relatively.Our paper extends and complements prior research that has only studied the CLSC with either the RPM or collection responsibility-sharing in the retailer-led setting.
引文
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[8]汪翼,孙林岩,李刚,等.闭环供应链的回收责任分担决策[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(4):379-384.
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[11]Subramoniama R,Huisingh D,Chinnam R B.Remanufacturing for the automotive aftermarket-strategic factors:Literature review and future research needs[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2009,17(13):1163-1174.
[12]李新然,蔡海珠,牟宗玉.政府奖惩下不同权利结构闭环供应链的决策研究[J].科研管理,2014,35(8):135-143.
[13]Mitra S,Webster S.Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidies[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2008,111(2):287-298.
[14]Wang Wenbin,Zhang Yu,Li Yuanyuan,et al.Closed-loop supply chains under reward-penalty mechanism:Retailer collection and asymmetric information[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017,142:3938-3955.
[15]Wang Wenbin,Zhang Yu,Zhang Kai,et al.Reward-penalty mechanism for closed-loop supply chains under responsibility-sharing and different power structures[J].International Journal of Production E-conomics,2015,170:178-190.
[16]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Van Wassenhove L N.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[2]浦徐进,朱秋鹰,曹文彬.供应商公平偏好对零售商主导型供应链均衡策略的影响[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(6):876-882.
[3]颜波,刘艳萍,李鸿媛.成本信息不对称下零售商主导的混合渠道供应链决策分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(12):124-134.
[4]Choi T M,Li Yongjian,Xu Lei.Channel leadership,performance and coordination in closed loop supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,146(1):371-380.
[5]Wei Jie,Govindan K,Li Yongjian,et al.Pricing and collecting decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information[J].Computers&Operations Research,2015,54(C):257-265.
[6]王婷婷,南国芳.基于博弈论的零售商产品回收决策模型[J].系统工程学报,2015,30(6):791-802.
[7]Ji Guojun.Effective implementation of WEEE takeback directive:What types of take-back network patterns in China[J].Systems Engineering Procedia,2011,(2):366-381.
[8]汪翼,孙林岩,李刚,等.闭环供应链的回收责任分担决策[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(4):379-384.
[9]聂佳佳,石园.第三方负责回收闭环供应链的回收责任分担策略选择[J].系统科学与数学,2011,31(11):1550-1563.
[10]Yi Pengxing,Huang Min,Guo Lijun,et al.Dual recycling channel decision in retailer oriented closedloop supply chain for construction machinery remanufacturing[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016(137):1393-1405.
[11]Subramoniama R,Huisingh D,Chinnam R B.Remanufacturing for the automotive aftermarket-strategic factors:Literature review and future research needs[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2009,17(13):1163-1174.
[12]李新然,蔡海珠,牟宗玉.政府奖惩下不同权利结构闭环供应链的决策研究[J].科研管理,2014,35(8):135-143.
[13]Mitra S,Webster S.Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidies[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2008,111(2):287-298.
[14]Wang Wenbin,Zhang Yu,Li Yuanyuan,et al.Closed-loop supply chains under reward-penalty mechanism:Retailer collection and asymmetric information[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017,142:3938-3955.
[15]Wang Wenbin,Zhang Yu,Zhang Kai,et al.Reward-penalty mechanism for closed-loop supply chains under responsibility-sharing and different power structures[J].International Journal of Production E-conomics,2015,170:178-190.
[16]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Van Wassenhove L N.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
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