知识产权非实施行为的法律规制
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摘要
知识产权非实施行为,是指权利控制者并不实际实施其知识产权,只注重实现知识产权本身的货币价值,即从被控侵权者处获得高额的许可使用费或和解金,而不是阻止侵权行为对其市场利益的影响。知识产权非实施行为作为一种以金钱利益为导向的新型商业模式,是极端"功利主义"价值理念的产物,旨在从知识产权中获得更大比例经济租金的寻租行为。此外,知识产权制度在权利设计上依循的是有形财产的一般思路,认为知识产权作为一项私人财产权,理应与其他传统财产类型一样,无论动机如何,财产所有者都具有使用或不使用的特权。然而,从知识信息的特性及知识产权的终极目的考量,知识产权人不仅没有"不使用"的权利,相反,"使用"更应该是一种义务。因此,为有效应对知识产权非实施行为,我国首先应矫正知识产权制度的立法根基,以"经济社会规划论"为正当性基础,真正兼顾权利人、使用人及社会公众的利益,同时促进知识产权商业化激励,强化知识产权的使用义务。除此之外,我国还应在行政上加强国家知识产权防御性保护能力建设、增强知识产权的信息披露并提高知识产权审查质量标准,在司法上遏制恶性诉讼、确立双向律师费转付规则等。
Non-practicing behaviors in relation to intellectual property means that the right owners don't implement IPR, instead, they try to realize the monetary value of IPR by seeking high license fees or settlement payment from alleged infringers rather than preventing the infringement from affecting their market interests. As a new money-oriented business model, non-practicing behaviors of intellectual property is the product of extreme "utilitarianism" value, aiming at obtaining a larger proportion of economic rent from IPR. Besides, the design of intellectual property right system is based on the general idea of tangible property right, insisting that as a private property, intellectual property should, regardless motives, be similar to other traditional property types and empower the IPR owner prerogative to use or not to use their IPR. However, considering the characteristics of intellectual information and the ultimate purpose of IPR, the owners of IPR don't have the right to abstain from using IPR, rather, they are obligated to use it. To effectively deal with the IPR non-practicing behaviors, China should firstly correct the legislative foundation of IPR system, taking "economic-social planning theory" as the legitimate basis, truly taking into account the interests of the right holders, users and the public, and at the same time, promoting the commercialization of IP and strengthening the obligation to use IP. Moreover, administratively, China should strengthen the national IPR defensive protection capacity building, increase IPR information disclosure, and improve IPR examination quality; while judicially, China should curb malicious lawsuit and establish the "loser party pays" rule in judicial field.
Non-practicing behaviors in relation to intellectual property means that the right owners don't implement IPR, instead, they try to realize the monetary value of IPR by seeking high license fees or settlement payment from alleged infringers rather than preventing the infringement from affecting their market interests. As a new money-oriented business model, non-practicing behaviors of intellectual property is the product of extreme "utilitarianism" value, aiming at obtaining a larger proportion of economic rent from IPR. Besides, the design of intellectual property right system is based on the general idea of tangible property right, insisting that as a private property, intellectual property should, regardless motives, be similar to other traditional property types and empower the IPR owner prerogative to use or not to use their IPR. However, considering the characteristics of intellectual information and the ultimate purpose of IPR, the owners of IPR don't have the right to abstain from using IPR, rather, they are obligated to use it. To effectively deal with the IPR non-practicing behaviors, China should firstly correct the legislative foundation of IPR system, taking "economic-social planning theory" as the legitimate basis, truly taking into account the interests of the right holders, users and the public, and at the same time, promoting the commercialization of IP and strengthening the obligation to use IP. Moreover, administratively, China should strengthen the national IPR defensive protection capacity building, increase IPR information disclosure, and improve IPR examination quality; while judicially, China should curb malicious lawsuit and establish the "loser party pays" rule in judicial field.
引文
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(2)Emiliano Giudici&Justin Blount,Evaluating Market Reactions to Non-Practicing Entity Litigation,20 Vand.J.Ent.&Tech.L.51(2017),p.53.
(3)Ryan T.Holte,Trolls or Great Inventors:Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities,59 St.Louis U.L.J.1(2014),p.4.
(4)Sara Jeruss,Robin Feldman&Joshua Walker,The America Invents Act 500:Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation,11Duke L.&Tech.Rev.357(2013),p.369.
(5)易继明:《遏制专利蟑螂--评美国专利新政及其对中国的启示》,载《法律科学(西北政法大学学报)》2014年第2期,第174页。
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(7)姜伟、赵露泽:《专利海盗现象引发的思考》,载《知识产权》2012年第9期,第69页。
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(9)袁晓东、高璐琳:《美国“专利主张实体”商业模式、危害及应对政策研究》,载《情报杂志》2015年2期,第63页。
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(14)易继明、蔡元臻:《版权蟑螂现象的法律治理--网络版权市场中的利益平衡机制》,载《法学论坛》2018年第2期,第10页。
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(16)James Bessen,Michael J.Meurer,The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes,99 Cornell L.Rev.387(2014),p.389.
(17)James F McDonough,III,The Myth of the Patent Troll:An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy,56 Emory L.J.189(2006),p.204.
(18)Michael Risch,Patent Troll Myths,42 Seton Hall L.Rev.457(2012),p.460.
(19)Amy L.Landers,Private Value Determinations and the Potential Effect on the Future of Research and Development,18 Chap.L.Rev.647(2014-2015),p.667.
(20)Continental Paper Bag Co.v.Eastern Paper Bag Co.,210 U.S.405,429(1908).
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(25)李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2014年版,第950页。
(26)傅瑶、孙玉涛、刘凤朝:《美国主要技术领域发展轨迹及生命周期研究--基于S曲线的分析》,载《科学学研究》2013年第2期,第215页。
(27)张体锐:《专利海盗投机诉讼的司法对策》,载《人民司法》2014年第17期,第110页。
(28)Alice Corp.Pty.Ltd.v.CLS Bank Int’l,573 U.S.,134 S.Ct.2347(2014).
(29)e Bay,Inc.v.MercExchange,L.L.C.,547 U.S.388,391(2006).
(30)David O.Taylor,Legislative Responses to Patent Assertion Entities,23 Tex.Intell.Prop.L.J.313(2015).,p.317
(31)Michele Boldrin&David K.Levine,The Case Against Patents,at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(32)张体锐:《商业寻租与专利制度:经济社会规划策略研究》,载《学术界》2014年第6期,第83页。
(33)Traditional Knowledge Digital Library,at http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Abouttkdl.asp?GL=Eng.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(34)郝兴辉:《韩国首家知识产权管理公司成立》,载《中国发明与专利》2010年第11期,第10页。
(35)The White House,Fact Sheet:Executive Actions:Answering the President s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation,at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(36)Peter Kunin,Vermont Approves Legislation Prohibiting Bad Faith Patent Infringement Claims,at http://www.theipstone.com/2013/05/23/vermont-approves-legislation-prohibiting-bad-faith-patent-infringement-claims/.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(37)张耕、王淑君:《知识产权诉讼中律师费应有限转付》,载《人民司法》2014年第9期,第97页。
(2)Emiliano Giudici&Justin Blount,Evaluating Market Reactions to Non-Practicing Entity Litigation,20 Vand.J.Ent.&Tech.L.51(2017),p.53.
(3)Ryan T.Holte,Trolls or Great Inventors:Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities,59 St.Louis U.L.J.1(2014),p.4.
(4)Sara Jeruss,Robin Feldman&Joshua Walker,The America Invents Act 500:Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation,11Duke L.&Tech.Rev.357(2013),p.369.
(5)易继明:《遏制专利蟑螂--评美国专利新政及其对中国的启示》,载《法律科学(西北政法大学学报)》2014年第2期,第174页。
(6)程永顺、吴莉娟:《“专利地痞”在中国的现状评述及对策研究》,载《知识产权》2013年第8期,第3页。
(7)姜伟、赵露泽:《专利海盗现象引发的思考》,载《知识产权》2012年第9期,第69页。
(8)刘淼:《非专利实施实体的是与非--美国专利制度的变革及其启示》,载《知识产权》2014年第12期,第65页。
(9)袁晓东、高璐琳:《美国“专利主张实体”商业模式、危害及应对政策研究》,载《情报杂志》2015年2期,第63页。
(10)Mark A.Lemley,Are Universities Patent Trolls,18 Fordham Intell.Prop.Media&Ent.L.J.611(2008),p.629.
(11)岳哲平、张晓东:《高智发明公司启动诉讼的影响分析》,载《电子知识产权》2011年第6期,第27页。
(12)The White House,Patent Assertion and U.S.Innovation,2013,at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.last visited:2019-06-06.
(13)Shyamkrishna Balganesh,The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls,86 S.Cal.L.Rev.723(2012-2013),p.741.
(14)易继明、蔡元臻:《版权蟑螂现象的法律治理--网络版权市场中的利益平衡机制》,载《法学论坛》2018年第2期,第10页。
(15)Mark Lemley,Kent Richardson&Eric Oliver,The Patent Enforcement Iceberg,97 Tex.L.Rev.801(2019),p.806.
(16)James Bessen,Michael J.Meurer,The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes,99 Cornell L.Rev.387(2014),p.389.
(17)James F McDonough,III,The Myth of the Patent Troll:An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy,56 Emory L.J.189(2006),p.204.
(18)Michael Risch,Patent Troll Myths,42 Seton Hall L.Rev.457(2012),p.460.
(19)Amy L.Landers,Private Value Determinations and the Potential Effect on the Future of Research and Development,18 Chap.L.Rev.647(2014-2015),p.667.
(20)Continental Paper Bag Co.v.Eastern Paper Bag Co.,210 U.S.405,429(1908).
(21)Zorina Khan,Trolls and Other Patent Inventions:Economic History and the Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First Century,21 Geo.Mason L.Rev.825(2014),p.829.
(22)John Allison,Mark Lemley&Joshua Walker,Patent Quality and Settlement among Repeat Patent Litigants,99 GEO.L.J.677,712(2011),p.694.
(23)James Bessen,The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software Patent Crisis,at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis/?utm_term=.b65d199be206,last visited:2019-06-06.
(24)Diamond v.Diehr,450 U.S.175,186(1981).
(25)李明德著:《美国知识产权法》,法律出版社2014年版,第950页。
(26)傅瑶、孙玉涛、刘凤朝:《美国主要技术领域发展轨迹及生命周期研究--基于S曲线的分析》,载《科学学研究》2013年第2期,第215页。
(27)张体锐:《专利海盗投机诉讼的司法对策》,载《人民司法》2014年第17期,第110页。
(28)Alice Corp.Pty.Ltd.v.CLS Bank Int’l,573 U.S.,134 S.Ct.2347(2014).
(29)e Bay,Inc.v.MercExchange,L.L.C.,547 U.S.388,391(2006).
(30)David O.Taylor,Legislative Responses to Patent Assertion Entities,23 Tex.Intell.Prop.L.J.313(2015).,p.317
(31)Michele Boldrin&David K.Levine,The Case Against Patents,at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(32)张体锐:《商业寻租与专利制度:经济社会规划策略研究》,载《学术界》2014年第6期,第83页。
(33)Traditional Knowledge Digital Library,at http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Abouttkdl.asp?GL=Eng.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(34)郝兴辉:《韩国首家知识产权管理公司成立》,载《中国发明与专利》2010年第11期,第10页。
(35)The White House,Fact Sheet:Executive Actions:Answering the President s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation,at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(36)Peter Kunin,Vermont Approves Legislation Prohibiting Bad Faith Patent Infringement Claims,at http://www.theipstone.com/2013/05/23/vermont-approves-legislation-prohibiting-bad-faith-patent-infringement-claims/.,last visited:2019-06-06.
(37)张耕、王淑君:《知识产权诉讼中律师费应有限转付》,载《人民司法》2014年第9期,第97页。
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