监管限度内中国监管绩效评价体系的构建研究
|
摘要
通过对西方国家市场监管演变轨迹的梳理可以发现,监管理论与实践呈现出放任自流—加强监管—放松监管—重构监管的历程。理论的变迁和监管的实践表明,政府对市场过于严格的监管可能导致市场效率低下;而相对放松的监管又可能助长市场失灵,增加市场的脆弱性。当前,我国正处于经济和社会的双重转型进程中,政府如何正确履行市场监管职能成为理论和现实关注的焦点,问题的关键是在明晰市场监管目标的前提下从领域边界、底线思维、力度选择和成效评价四个方面来界定合理的监管限度,并在监管限度内通过四条路径构建监管绩效评价体系用来衡量监管的成效,进而进行监管政策的取舍或改革,以便更好地应对转型的挑战。
After analyzing the evolution of market regulation in Western countries,it is found that the regulation theory and practice can be divided into four stages:loose,strengthened,loose and reconstructed.The continuous improvement of theory and regulatory practice shows that the government's strict market regulation may lead to a inefficient market,while relatively relaxed regulation may contribute to market failure and increase the vulnerability of the market.At present,our country is in the process of double transformation of economy and society.The focus of theory and reality is how the government correctly fulfills its responsibilities of market regulation.The key to solve this problem is to define reasonable regulatory limits from four aspects:field boundaries,bottom line thoughts,strength selection and performance assessment with the premise of clear market regulatory objectives.In order to better meet the challenges brought by the transformation,it is necessary to build a Regulation Performance Assessment system that is able to measure the effectiveness within the regulatory limit through the above four paths,and then to revise or to reform the current regulatory policies.
After analyzing the evolution of market regulation in Western countries,it is found that the regulation theory and practice can be divided into four stages:loose,strengthened,loose and reconstructed.The continuous improvement of theory and regulatory practice shows that the government's strict market regulation may lead to a inefficient market,while relatively relaxed regulation may contribute to market failure and increase the vulnerability of the market.At present,our country is in the process of double transformation of economy and society.The focus of theory and reality is how the government correctly fulfills its responsibilities of market regulation.The key to solve this problem is to define reasonable regulatory limits from four aspects:field boundaries,bottom line thoughts,strength selection and performance assessment with the premise of clear market regulatory objectives.In order to better meet the challenges brought by the transformation,it is necessary to build a Regulation Performance Assessment system that is able to measure the effectiveness within the regulatory limit through the above four paths,and then to revise or to reform the current regulatory policies.
引文
[1][美]查尔斯·林德布洛姆.政治与市场:世界的政治-经济制度[M].上海:三联书店,1994.
[2][英]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下卷)[M].北京:商务印书馆,1983.
[3]KARL POLANYI.The great transformation:the political and economic origins of our time[M].Boston:Beacon Press,1944.
[4]OECD.Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries:From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance[R].Paris,2002.
[5][美]戴维·奥斯本,特德·盖布勒.改革政府——企业家精神如何改革着公共部门[M].上海:上海译文出版社,2007.
[6]ANTHONY OGUS.Regulation:legal from and economic theory[M].Oxford:Clarendon Press,1994.
[7]邱本.论市场监管法的基本问题[J].社会科学研究,2012(3):70-76.
[8]徐鸣.我国政府市场监管体制存在的问题及成因分析[J].重庆理工大学学报:社会科学版,2016,30(9):62-68.
[9]道格拉斯·C.诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海:三联书店,1994.
[10]RUDDY T F,HILTY L M.Impact assessment and policy learning in the European Commission[J].Environmental impact assessment review,2008,28(2-3):90-105.
[11]OECD.Regulatory Impact Analysis:Best Practices in OECD Countries[R].Paris,1997.
[12]张成福,吴俣丹.政府管制影响评价体系:国际经验及对中国的启示[J].国家行政学院学报,2017(1):44-49,126.
[13]席涛.谁来监管美国的市场经济——美国监管体制的演变:从命令-控制到成本-收益分析[J].国际经济评论,2004(6):5-13.
[14]REAGAN.Executive Order 12291:Task Force on Regulatory Relief[R].Federal Register Presidential Documents,1981,46(2):13193.
[15]席涛.政府监管影响评估分析:国际比较与中国改革[J].中国人民大学学报,2007,21(4):16-24.
[16]OECD.Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation[R].Paris,1995.
[17]OECD.Regulatory Impact Assessment and Regulatory Policy[R].Paris,2015.
[18]OECD.Practices in Regulatory Policy Evaluation across the OECD,in OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation[R].Paris,2014:43.
[19]HARRISON M.Assessing the impact of regulatory impact assessments[J].Agenda a journal of policy analysis&reform,2009,16(3):41-49.
[20]王蕾,唐任伍.论中国建立监管绩效评估制度[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2012,14(5):126-128.
(1)监管型国家的崛起是20世纪人类重要的制度创新,学者们把监管型国家定义为一个历史范畴的概念,其核心特征就是政府不直接介入经济过程,而运用宏观政策工具进行调控。具体可参见Majone G. The rise of the regulatory state in Europe,West European Politics,1994,17(3):77-101;Loughlin M,Scott C. The Regulatory State,Developments in British Politics 5. Macmillan Education UK,1997。
(2)参见[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,集体选择经济学,上海:上海人民出版社, 1999:69-70。四种条件分别为:第一,提供的商品或服务属于纯私人物品,满足竞争性和排他性的属性要求。第二,一种商品对潜在消费者的全部价值或效用都反映在该商品的需求函数上,不存在虚张声势,没有威胁和策略,所有消费者都只有正确和诚实的偏好显示。第三,商品按边际成本出售,没有生产者剩余,没有转嫁给他人的未付成本。所有生产要素都能够、也只能获得它的机会成本,即在其他用途上能够得到的东西。第四,假定市场是竞争性的。没有个别的生产者或消费者能够影响价格,所有资源在用途和空间上都是流动的,企业必须尽可能有效生产才能生存。
(3)学者查尔斯·沃尔夫将这种非市场失灵引发的负外部性称之为“派生的负外部性”。参见Wolf C. A Theory of Nonmarket Failure:Framework for Implementation Analysis,Journal of Law&Economics,1979,22(1):107-139。
(4)具体包括清晰界定监管问题、政府行为的正当性、监管的必要性、监管活动的法律基础、监管活动需选择合适的政府层级、监管的收益大于成本、监管的影响公开透明、监管制度通俗易懂、利益相关者有表达诉求的渠道、有保障监管落实的措施。
[2][英]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下卷)[M].北京:商务印书馆,1983.
[3]KARL POLANYI.The great transformation:the political and economic origins of our time[M].Boston:Beacon Press,1944.
[4]OECD.Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries:From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance[R].Paris,2002.
[5][美]戴维·奥斯本,特德·盖布勒.改革政府——企业家精神如何改革着公共部门[M].上海:上海译文出版社,2007.
[6]ANTHONY OGUS.Regulation:legal from and economic theory[M].Oxford:Clarendon Press,1994.
[7]邱本.论市场监管法的基本问题[J].社会科学研究,2012(3):70-76.
[8]徐鸣.我国政府市场监管体制存在的问题及成因分析[J].重庆理工大学学报:社会科学版,2016,30(9):62-68.
[9]道格拉斯·C.诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海:三联书店,1994.
[10]RUDDY T F,HILTY L M.Impact assessment and policy learning in the European Commission[J].Environmental impact assessment review,2008,28(2-3):90-105.
[11]OECD.Regulatory Impact Analysis:Best Practices in OECD Countries[R].Paris,1997.
[12]张成福,吴俣丹.政府管制影响评价体系:国际经验及对中国的启示[J].国家行政学院学报,2017(1):44-49,126.
[13]席涛.谁来监管美国的市场经济——美国监管体制的演变:从命令-控制到成本-收益分析[J].国际经济评论,2004(6):5-13.
[14]REAGAN.Executive Order 12291:Task Force on Regulatory Relief[R].Federal Register Presidential Documents,1981,46(2):13193.
[15]席涛.政府监管影响评估分析:国际比较与中国改革[J].中国人民大学学报,2007,21(4):16-24.
[16]OECD.Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation[R].Paris,1995.
[17]OECD.Regulatory Impact Assessment and Regulatory Policy[R].Paris,2015.
[18]OECD.Practices in Regulatory Policy Evaluation across the OECD,in OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation[R].Paris,2014:43.
[19]HARRISON M.Assessing the impact of regulatory impact assessments[J].Agenda a journal of policy analysis&reform,2009,16(3):41-49.
[20]王蕾,唐任伍.论中国建立监管绩效评估制度[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2012,14(5):126-128.
(1)监管型国家的崛起是20世纪人类重要的制度创新,学者们把监管型国家定义为一个历史范畴的概念,其核心特征就是政府不直接介入经济过程,而运用宏观政策工具进行调控。具体可参见Majone G. The rise of the regulatory state in Europe,West European Politics,1994,17(3):77-101;Loughlin M,Scott C. The Regulatory State,Developments in British Politics 5. Macmillan Education UK,1997。
(2)参见[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,集体选择经济学,上海:上海人民出版社, 1999:69-70。四种条件分别为:第一,提供的商品或服务属于纯私人物品,满足竞争性和排他性的属性要求。第二,一种商品对潜在消费者的全部价值或效用都反映在该商品的需求函数上,不存在虚张声势,没有威胁和策略,所有消费者都只有正确和诚实的偏好显示。第三,商品按边际成本出售,没有生产者剩余,没有转嫁给他人的未付成本。所有生产要素都能够、也只能获得它的机会成本,即在其他用途上能够得到的东西。第四,假定市场是竞争性的。没有个别的生产者或消费者能够影响价格,所有资源在用途和空间上都是流动的,企业必须尽可能有效生产才能生存。
(3)学者查尔斯·沃尔夫将这种非市场失灵引发的负外部性称之为“派生的负外部性”。参见Wolf C. A Theory of Nonmarket Failure:Framework for Implementation Analysis,Journal of Law&Economics,1979,22(1):107-139。
(4)具体包括清晰界定监管问题、政府行为的正当性、监管的必要性、监管活动的法律基础、监管活动需选择合适的政府层级、监管的收益大于成本、监管的影响公开透明、监管制度通俗易懂、利益相关者有表达诉求的渠道、有保障监管落实的措施。
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |