业绩预期差距、审计监督与非效率投资
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摘要
基于业绩反馈理论与企业行为理论,本文以2012～2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,理论分析并实证检验了业绩预期差距对企业非效率投资的影响,并进一步考察了审计监督的调节作用。研究结果表明:(1)企业实际业绩与历史业绩预期差距的增大会加剧企业的非效率投资现象;(2)企业实际业绩与行业业绩预期差距的增大会加剧企业的非效率投资现象;(3)审计监督缓解了历史业绩预期差距、行业业绩预期差距对企业投资效率的影响。上述研究结果完善了企业投资效率影响因素的相关研究,为公司治理提供了理论参考。
Based on the performance feedback theory and corporate behavior theory,taking the 2012-2017 A-share listed companies as the research sample,this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of the performance expectation gap on the enterprise's non-efficiency investment,and further examines the regulatory role of audit supervision.The research results show that:(1)the increase of the gap between the actual performance and the historical expected performance will aggravate the inefficient investment;(2)the increase of the gap between the actual performance and the expected performance of the industry will aggravate the inefficient investment;(3)audit supervision has alleviated the impact of historical performance expectation gap and industry performance expectation gap on corporate investment efficiency.The above results improve the related research on improving the influencing factors of investment efficiency,and provide a theoretical reference for corporate governance.
Based on the performance feedback theory and corporate behavior theory,taking the 2012-2017 A-share listed companies as the research sample,this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the impact of the performance expectation gap on the enterprise's non-efficiency investment,and further examines the regulatory role of audit supervision.The research results show that:(1)the increase of the gap between the actual performance and the historical expected performance will aggravate the inefficient investment;(2)the increase of the gap between the actual performance and the expected performance of the industry will aggravate the inefficient investment;(3)audit supervision has alleviated the impact of historical performance expectation gap and industry performance expectation gap on corporate investment efficiency.The above results improve the related research on improving the influencing factors of investment efficiency,and provide a theoretical reference for corporate governance.
引文
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[2]Julio B,Yook Y.Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles[J].The Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):45～83.
[3]Pasto L,Veronesi P.Uncertainty About Government Policy and Stock Prices[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(4):1219～1264.
[4]罗明琦,宋常.投资效率、代理成本与企业绩效——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].云南财经大学学报,2014,30(5):134～140.
[5]Mckinley W,Latham S,Braun M.Organizational Decline and Innovation:Turn Around Sand Down Ward Spirals[J].Academy of Management Review,2014,39(1):88～110.
[6]Gentry R J,Wei S.The Impacts of Performance Relative to Analyst Forecasts and Analyst Coverage on Firm R&D Intensity[J].Strategic Management Journal,2013,34(1):121～130.
[7]刘建国.绩效衰退与企业创新行为——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(4):140～152.
[8]贺小刚,连燕玲,吕斐斐,等.消极反馈与企业家创新:基于民营上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(3):145～156,177.
[9]张燕红.高管薪酬激励对企业绩效的影响[J].经济问题,2016,(6):116～120.
[10]马强.基于薪酬辩护论的垄断国企高管薪酬业绩敏感性研究[J].南通大学学报(社会科学版),2017,33(6):103～110.
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[12]Kahneman D,Knetsch J L,Thaler R H.Anomalies:the Endowment Effect,Loss Aversion,and Status Quo Bias[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1991,5(1):193～206.
[13]Thaler R H,Johnson E J.Gambling With the House Money and Trying to Break Even:the Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice[J].Management Science,1990,36(6):643～660.
[14]Tuggle C S,Sirmon D G,Reutzel C R,et al.Commanding Board of Director Attention:Investigating How Organizational Performance and CEO Duality Affect Board Members' Attention to Monitoring[J].Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(9):946～968.
[15]翟淑萍,黄宏斌,毕晓方.资本市场业绩预期压力、投资者情绪与企业研发投资[J].科学学研究,2017,35(6):896～906.
[16]刘天薇.行业业绩期望差距与资本配置效率研究[D].大连:东北财经大学,2017.
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[19]步丹璐,屠长文.外资持股、制度环境与审计质量[J].审计研究,2017,(4):65～72.
[20]Francis J R,Pinnuck M L,Watanabe O.Auditor Style and Financial Statement Comparability[J].The Accounting Review,2014,89(2):605～633.
[21]杨芳,杨悦莹,所怡君.会计稳健性、审计监督与投资效率[J].会计之友,2018,(18):146～151.
[22]王志红,肖惠宇.股权激励、审计质量与非效率投资——基于我国成长期上市公司的视角[J].财会通讯,2018,(3):3～7,129.
[23]陈西婵.高质量审计能够提高企业的投资效率吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计之友,2018,(1):45～49.
[24]Richardson S.Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159～189.
[25]Chen W R.Determinants of Firms' Backward and Forward-Looking R&D Search Behavior[J].Organization Science,2008,19(4):609～622.
[26]王菁,程博,孙元欣.期望绩效反馈效果对企业研发和慈善捐赠行为的影响[J].管理世界,2014,(8):115～133.
[27]雷光勇,邱保印,王文忠.社会信任、审计师选择与企业投资效率[J].审计研究,2014,(4):72～80.
[28]贺小刚,连燕玲,吕斐斐.期望差距与企业家的风险决策偏好——基于中国家族上市公司的数据分析[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(8):1～20.
[29]李溪,郑馨,张建琦.制造企业的业绩困境会促进创新吗——基于期望落差维度拓展的分析[J].中国工业经济,2018,(8):174～192.
[30]马壮,李延喜,王云,等.媒体监督、异常审计费用与企业盈余管理[J].管理评论,2018,30(4):219～234.
[31]向洪金,朱晨之,徐鹏杰.转型期政府官员滥用职权行为与国家审计监督力度——基于委托代理理论的研究[J].审计与经济研究,2018,33(2):10～18.
[32]Kuusela P,Keil T,Maul M.Driven By Aspirations,But in What Direction?Performance Shortfalls,Slack Resources,and Resource-Consuming vs.Resource-Freeing Organizational Change[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(5):1101～1120.
[33]赵元隆.企业业绩落差与研发行为关系研究[D].南京:南京大学,2018.
[34]Lemmon M L,Lins K V.Ownership Structure,Corporate Go-vernance,and Firm Value:Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(4):1445～1468.
[35]连燕玲,贺小刚,高皓.业绩期望差距与企业战略调整——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2014(11):119～132,188.
[2]Julio B,Yook Y.Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles[J].The Journal of Finance,2012,67(1):45～83.
[3]Pasto L,Veronesi P.Uncertainty About Government Policy and Stock Prices[J].Journal of Finance,2012,67(4):1219～1264.
[4]罗明琦,宋常.投资效率、代理成本与企业绩效——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].云南财经大学学报,2014,30(5):134～140.
[5]Mckinley W,Latham S,Braun M.Organizational Decline and Innovation:Turn Around Sand Down Ward Spirals[J].Academy of Management Review,2014,39(1):88～110.
[6]Gentry R J,Wei S.The Impacts of Performance Relative to Analyst Forecasts and Analyst Coverage on Firm R&D Intensity[J].Strategic Management Journal,2013,34(1):121～130.
[7]刘建国.绩效衰退与企业创新行为——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2017,20(4):140～152.
[8]贺小刚,连燕玲,吕斐斐,等.消极反馈与企业家创新:基于民营上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(3):145～156,177.
[9]张燕红.高管薪酬激励对企业绩效的影响[J].经济问题,2016,(6):116～120.
[10]马强.基于薪酬辩护论的垄断国企高管薪酬业绩敏感性研究[J].南通大学学报(社会科学版),2017,33(6):103～110.
[11]Fama E F.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288～307.
[12]Kahneman D,Knetsch J L,Thaler R H.Anomalies:the Endowment Effect,Loss Aversion,and Status Quo Bias[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1991,5(1):193～206.
[13]Thaler R H,Johnson E J.Gambling With the House Money and Trying to Break Even:the Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice[J].Management Science,1990,36(6):643～660.
[14]Tuggle C S,Sirmon D G,Reutzel C R,et al.Commanding Board of Director Attention:Investigating How Organizational Performance and CEO Duality Affect Board Members' Attention to Monitoring[J].Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(9):946～968.
[15]翟淑萍,黄宏斌,毕晓方.资本市场业绩预期压力、投资者情绪与企业研发投资[J].科学学研究,2017,35(6):896～906.
[16]刘天薇.行业业绩期望差距与资本配置效率研究[D].大连:东北财经大学,2017.
[17]Wallace W A.The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Re-gulated Markets:a Look Back and a Look Forward[J].Research in Accounting Regulation,2004,17:267～298.
[18]李青原.会计信息质量、审计监督与公司投资效率——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2009,(4):65～73,51.
[19]步丹璐,屠长文.外资持股、制度环境与审计质量[J].审计研究,2017,(4):65～72.
[20]Francis J R,Pinnuck M L,Watanabe O.Auditor Style and Financial Statement Comparability[J].The Accounting Review,2014,89(2):605～633.
[21]杨芳,杨悦莹,所怡君.会计稳健性、审计监督与投资效率[J].会计之友,2018,(18):146～151.
[22]王志红,肖惠宇.股权激励、审计质量与非效率投资——基于我国成长期上市公司的视角[J].财会通讯,2018,(3):3～7,129.
[23]陈西婵.高质量审计能够提高企业的投资效率吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计之友,2018,(1):45～49.
[24]Richardson S.Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159～189.
[25]Chen W R.Determinants of Firms' Backward and Forward-Looking R&D Search Behavior[J].Organization Science,2008,19(4):609～622.
[26]王菁,程博,孙元欣.期望绩效反馈效果对企业研发和慈善捐赠行为的影响[J].管理世界,2014,(8):115～133.
[27]雷光勇,邱保印,王文忠.社会信任、审计师选择与企业投资效率[J].审计研究,2014,(4):72～80.
[28]贺小刚,连燕玲,吕斐斐.期望差距与企业家的风险决策偏好——基于中国家族上市公司的数据分析[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(8):1～20.
[29]李溪,郑馨,张建琦.制造企业的业绩困境会促进创新吗——基于期望落差维度拓展的分析[J].中国工业经济,2018,(8):174～192.
[30]马壮,李延喜,王云,等.媒体监督、异常审计费用与企业盈余管理[J].管理评论,2018,30(4):219～234.
[31]向洪金,朱晨之,徐鹏杰.转型期政府官员滥用职权行为与国家审计监督力度——基于委托代理理论的研究[J].审计与经济研究,2018,33(2):10～18.
[32]Kuusela P,Keil T,Maul M.Driven By Aspirations,But in What Direction?Performance Shortfalls,Slack Resources,and Resource-Consuming vs.Resource-Freeing Organizational Change[J].Strategic Management Journal,2017,38(5):1101～1120.
[33]赵元隆.企业业绩落差与研发行为关系研究[D].南京:南京大学,2018.
[34]Lemmon M L,Lins K V.Ownership Structure,Corporate Go-vernance,and Firm Value:Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(4):1445～1468.
[35]连燕玲,贺小刚,高皓.业绩期望差距与企业战略调整——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2014(11):119～132,188.
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