考虑渠道势力和研发溢出的竞争制造商研发决策研究
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摘要
针对供应链中渠道势力的变化,构建了不同渠道势力结构下的研发决策模型,考察了渠道势力变化和研发溢出效应对竞争制造商最优研发决策以及供应链利润的影响。研究发现:1)随着零售商渠道势力的增强,制造商的研发水平降低。2)研发溢出效应对最优研发水平的影响与制造商之间的竞争程度有关:当制造商之间的竞争程度较弱时,随着研发溢出效应的增强,最优研发水平上升;当制造商之间的竞争较强时,随着研发溢出效应的增强,最优研发水平下降;当制造商之间的竞争程度适中时,随着研发溢出效应的增强,最优研发水平呈上升后下降的"倒U"形变化。3)渠道势力的变化不会改变研发溢出效应对研发水平的影响结论,但是会改变结论变化的临界值大小;4)渠道势力对供应链利润的影响主要取决于制造商竞争程度和研发溢出效应的大小。
With the emergence and development of large retailers,such as Walmart,Carrefour,the structures of channel power in supply chain have become more and more complicated.In some supply chains manufacturers have more channel power than retailers while in other supply chains retailers have more channel power than manufacturers.Also there are some supply chains in which manufacturers and retailers have almost equal channel power.An every obvious and important question emerging from this background:how will these different channel power structures effect the decisions in the supply chain?Thia is the main prolem considered in this paper.More specifically,the innovation decision is focused on which is apretty important research topic in supply chain and studies the impacts of channel power and R&D spillover on innovation decisions of competitive manufactures,also on corresponding profits of supply chain.Firstly,Manufacturer Stackerlberg Model(MS),Vertical Nash Model(VN)and Retailer Stackerlberg Model(RS)are constructed to present three different channel power structures.And then the innovation decisions of competitive manufacturers is analyzed in these three different models.By comparing the decisions in these models,the impacts of channel power and R&D spillover on innovation decisions are obtained.The main findings are following:1)The level of innovation reduces with the increasing of retailer's channel power;2)The impacts of R&D spillover on optimal innovation depend on the competition intensity between manufactures.More specifically,when the competition intensity between manufacturers is low,the optimal level of innovation increases with the retailer's channel power;when the competition intensity is high,the optimal level of innovation reduces with the retailer's channel power;when the competition intensity is medium,the optimal level of innovation first increases then reduces with the retailer's channel power.3)The conclusions of 2)don't change under different channel power condition,but the critical values in conclusion 2)will change.4)The impact of channel power on profits of supply chain depends on the competition intensity and R&D spillover.These conclusions have some inspiration for supply chain managers,especially under the background of increasing channel power of retailers.
With the emergence and development of large retailers,such as Walmart,Carrefour,the structures of channel power in supply chain have become more and more complicated.In some supply chains manufacturers have more channel power than retailers while in other supply chains retailers have more channel power than manufacturers.Also there are some supply chains in which manufacturers and retailers have almost equal channel power.An every obvious and important question emerging from this background:how will these different channel power structures effect the decisions in the supply chain?Thia is the main prolem considered in this paper.More specifically,the innovation decision is focused on which is apretty important research topic in supply chain and studies the impacts of channel power and R&D spillover on innovation decisions of competitive manufactures,also on corresponding profits of supply chain.Firstly,Manufacturer Stackerlberg Model(MS),Vertical Nash Model(VN)and Retailer Stackerlberg Model(RS)are constructed to present three different channel power structures.And then the innovation decisions of competitive manufacturers is analyzed in these three different models.By comparing the decisions in these models,the impacts of channel power and R&D spillover on innovation decisions are obtained.The main findings are following:1)The level of innovation reduces with the increasing of retailer's channel power;2)The impacts of R&D spillover on optimal innovation depend on the competition intensity between manufactures.More specifically,when the competition intensity between manufacturers is low,the optimal level of innovation increases with the retailer's channel power;when the competition intensity is high,the optimal level of innovation reduces with the retailer's channel power;when the competition intensity is medium,the optimal level of innovation first increases then reduces with the retailer's channel power.3)The conclusions of 2)don't change under different channel power condition,but the critical values in conclusion 2)will change.4)The impact of channel power on profits of supply chain depends on the competition intensity and R&D spillover.These conclusions have some inspiration for supply chain managers,especially under the background of increasing channel power of retailers.
引文
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[3]Zhang Rong,Liu Bin,Wang Wenliang.Pricing decisions in a dual channels system with different power structures[J].Economic Modelling,2012,29(2):523-533.
[4]东野升振,周岩,段丁钰,等.考虑研发投入溢出效应的供应链网络均衡模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(S1):14-21.
[5]李凯,苏慧清,刘智慧.基于消费者异质性偏好的零售商抗衡势力研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(9):53-63.
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[13]Choi S,Fredj K.Price competition and store competition:Store brands vs.national brand[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,225(1):166-178.
[14]鄢仁秀,汪贤裕.零售商主导型供应链中的知情委托方赊销契约机制设计[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(11):85-93.
[15]王玉燕,申亮.基于消费者需求差异和渠道权力结构差异的MT-CLSC定价、效率与协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(6):34-42.
[16]赵晓敏,林英晖,苏承明.不同渠道权力结构下的S-M两级闭环供应链绩效分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,22(2):78-86.
[17]张国兴,方帅,汪应洛.不同权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈分析[J].系统工程,2015,33(3):52-59.
[18]Chen Xu,Wong Xiaojun,Jiang Xinkuang.The impact of power structure on the retail service supply chain with an O2O mixed channel.[J].2016,67(2):294-301.
[19]Geylani T,Dukes A J,Srinivasan K.Strategic manufacturer response to a dominant retailer[J].Marketing Science,2007,26(2):164-178.
[20]Chen Xi,Zhang Hui,Zhang M,et al.Optimal decisions in a retailer Stackelberg supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,187:260-270.
[21]但斌,曲祯经,张海月,等.供应链中制造商应对强势零售商的混合渠道策略[J].管理评论,2016,28(12):213-224.
[22]Pan K,Lai K K,Leung S C H,et al.Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,203(2):532-538.
[23]Booyens I.Are small,medium-and micro-sized enterprises engines of innovation?The reality in South Africa[J].Science and Public Policy,2011,38(1):67-78.
[24]张西征,刘志远,王静.企业规模与R&D投入关系研究---基于企业盈利能力的分析[J].科学学研究,2012,30(2):265-274.
[25]Lin Ping,Saggi K.Product differentiation,process R&D,and the nature of market competition[J].European Economic Review,2002,46(1):201-211.
[26]张西征.中国企业所有权结构对研发投资影响的研究[J].管理学报,2013,10(10):1492-1501.
[27]Vives X.Innovation and competitive pressure[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,2008,56(3):419-469.
[28]陈守明,胡媛媛.CEO关注当下与企业R&D投入强度相关性实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(S1):704-710.
[29]高扬志,冉茂盛.民营企业腐败对研发投入的影响研究---基于中小板上市公司的经验证据[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):59-67.
[30]Battigalli P,Fumagalli C,Polo M.Buyer power and quality improvements[J].Research in Economics,2007,61(2):45-61.
[31]Inderst R,Wey C.Countervailing power and dynamic efficiency[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2011,9(4):702-720.
[32]孙晓华,郑辉.买方势力对工艺创新与产品创新的异质性影响[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(10):25-39.
[33]Chen Zhiqi.Supplier innovation in the presence of buyer power[R].Working Paper,Carleton University,Department of Economics,2014.
[34]李凯,李伟,马亮.考虑买方议价能力的双寡头供应商技术创新决策[J].技术经济,2015,34(5):22-28.
[35]Lu J,Tsao Y,Charoensiriwath C.Competition under manufacturer service and retail price[J].Economic Modelling,2011,28(3):1256-1264.
[36]张国兴,方帅,汪应洛.不同权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈分析[J].系统工程,2015,33(3):52-59.
[37]Spence M.Cost reduction,competition,and industry performance[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1984:101-121.
[38]孙晓华,郑辉.水平溢出,垂直溢出与合作研发[J].系统工程学报,2012,27(1):79-87.
[39]Yan Ruiliang.Managing channel coordination in a multi-channel manufacturer-retailer supply chain[J].Industrial Marketing Management,2011,40(4):636-642.
[40]王磊,成克河,王世伟.考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链定价策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(S2):563-568.
[41]王桂花.简析沃尔玛与宝洁公司的商业关系从破裂到实现共赢的实例及启示[J].对外经贸实务,2014,(12):77-79.
[2]Almehdawe E,Mantin B.Vendor managed inventory with a capacitated manufacturer and multiple retailers:Retailer versus manufacturer leadership[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2010,128(1):292-302.
[3]Zhang Rong,Liu Bin,Wang Wenliang.Pricing decisions in a dual channels system with different power structures[J].Economic Modelling,2012,29(2):523-533.
[4]东野升振,周岩,段丁钰,等.考虑研发投入溢出效应的供应链网络均衡模型[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(S1):14-21.
[5]李凯,苏慧清,刘智慧.基于消费者异质性偏好的零售商抗衡势力研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(9):53-63.
[6]Choi S C.Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer[J].Marketing Science,1991,10(4):271-296.
[7]Lee E,Staelin R.Vertical strategic interaction:implications for channel pricing strategy[J].Marketing Science,1997,16(3):185-207.
[8]Chen Zhiqi.Dominant retailers and the countervailingpower hypothesis[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,2003,34(4):612-625.
[9]Luo Zheng,Chen Xu,Chen Jing,et al.Optimal pricing policies for differentiated brands under different supply chain power structures[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,259(2):437-451.
[10]Shi Ruixia,Zhang Jun,Ru Jun.Impacts of power structure on supply chains with uncertain demand[J].Production and Operations Management,2013,22(5):1232-1249.
[11]Wei Jie,Zhao Jing,Li Yongjian.Pricing decisions for complementary products with firms’different market powers[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,224(3):507-519.
[12]张廷龙,梁樑.不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链定价和销售努力决策[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(2):68-77.
[13]Choi S,Fredj K.Price competition and store competition:Store brands vs.national brand[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,225(1):166-178.
[14]鄢仁秀,汪贤裕.零售商主导型供应链中的知情委托方赊销契约机制设计[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(11):85-93.
[15]王玉燕,申亮.基于消费者需求差异和渠道权力结构差异的MT-CLSC定价、效率与协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(6):34-42.
[16]赵晓敏,林英晖,苏承明.不同渠道权力结构下的S-M两级闭环供应链绩效分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,22(2):78-86.
[17]张国兴,方帅,汪应洛.不同权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈分析[J].系统工程,2015,33(3):52-59.
[18]Chen Xu,Wong Xiaojun,Jiang Xinkuang.The impact of power structure on the retail service supply chain with an O2O mixed channel.[J].2016,67(2):294-301.
[19]Geylani T,Dukes A J,Srinivasan K.Strategic manufacturer response to a dominant retailer[J].Marketing Science,2007,26(2):164-178.
[20]Chen Xi,Zhang Hui,Zhang M,et al.Optimal decisions in a retailer Stackelberg supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,187:260-270.
[21]但斌,曲祯经,张海月,等.供应链中制造商应对强势零售商的混合渠道策略[J].管理评论,2016,28(12):213-224.
[22]Pan K,Lai K K,Leung S C H,et al.Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,203(2):532-538.
[23]Booyens I.Are small,medium-and micro-sized enterprises engines of innovation?The reality in South Africa[J].Science and Public Policy,2011,38(1):67-78.
[24]张西征,刘志远,王静.企业规模与R&D投入关系研究---基于企业盈利能力的分析[J].科学学研究,2012,30(2):265-274.
[25]Lin Ping,Saggi K.Product differentiation,process R&D,and the nature of market competition[J].European Economic Review,2002,46(1):201-211.
[26]张西征.中国企业所有权结构对研发投资影响的研究[J].管理学报,2013,10(10):1492-1501.
[27]Vives X.Innovation and competitive pressure[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,2008,56(3):419-469.
[28]陈守明,胡媛媛.CEO关注当下与企业R&D投入强度相关性实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(S1):704-710.
[29]高扬志,冉茂盛.民营企业腐败对研发投入的影响研究---基于中小板上市公司的经验证据[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):59-67.
[30]Battigalli P,Fumagalli C,Polo M.Buyer power and quality improvements[J].Research in Economics,2007,61(2):45-61.
[31]Inderst R,Wey C.Countervailing power and dynamic efficiency[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2011,9(4):702-720.
[32]孙晓华,郑辉.买方势力对工艺创新与产品创新的异质性影响[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(10):25-39.
[33]Chen Zhiqi.Supplier innovation in the presence of buyer power[R].Working Paper,Carleton University,Department of Economics,2014.
[34]李凯,李伟,马亮.考虑买方议价能力的双寡头供应商技术创新决策[J].技术经济,2015,34(5):22-28.
[35]Lu J,Tsao Y,Charoensiriwath C.Competition under manufacturer service and retail price[J].Economic Modelling,2011,28(3):1256-1264.
[36]张国兴,方帅,汪应洛.不同权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈分析[J].系统工程,2015,33(3):52-59.
[37]Spence M.Cost reduction,competition,and industry performance[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1984:101-121.
[38]孙晓华,郑辉.水平溢出,垂直溢出与合作研发[J].系统工程学报,2012,27(1):79-87.
[39]Yan Ruiliang.Managing channel coordination in a multi-channel manufacturer-retailer supply chain[J].Industrial Marketing Management,2011,40(4):636-642.
[40]王磊,成克河,王世伟.考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链定价策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(S2):563-568.
[41]王桂花.简析沃尔玛与宝洁公司的商业关系从破裂到实现共赢的实例及启示[J].对外经贸实务,2014,(12):77-79.
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