贸易自由化能提高消费者福利吗?——基于进出口商合约选择行为的研究
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摘要
将进出口商的合约选择行为引入异质性企业贸易的理论框架,分析进出口商之间的合约选择行为如何影响贸易利益在进口商、进口国消费者及出口商之间的分配。双重边际效应使得匿名市场无法实现进出口双方之间的利润最大化,双边合约虽能克服双重边际效应,但仍存在进出口商之间因生意窃取而产生的外部性,而共同合约不仅能通过各方结盟以降低最终产品市场的竞争,还能通过垂直一体化等方式使各方通过内部化解决生意窃取问题,并使各方利润最大化,但进口国市场的销量会减少,价格会提高。贸易自由化带来的交易成本降低可提高出口商的讨价还价能力及获利能力,促使其倾向于选择共同合约。此时,各方会通过共同合约将更多贸易利益限定在合作框架之内,导致利润总额增加,同时进口商会大幅提高销售价格而使国内消费价格提高,交易数量和品种随之减少。以中韩自由贸易协定签署前后2012—2016年470种HS六位数编码商品的交易数据进行实证分析的结果证实了以上结论,多角度的稳健性分析结果也支持了以上结论。为此,在关注贸易自由化带来整体利益的同时,政府应科学全面地评估其对国内各经济主体影响的差异性,有针对性地制定相应的国内政策,同时还应重视制度质量在一国经济发展中的作用。
By introducing contract selection behavior between exporters and importers in the theoretical framework of heterogeneous enterprise trade,the authors analyze how does the contract selection behavior affect the distribution of trade gains between exporters,importers and consumers in import countries. Double marginalization makes anonymous market impossible to maximize profit between importers and exporters. Although double marginalization can be overcome by the bilateral contracts,there is an externality between the importers and exporters due to the business stealing. Joint contracts can not only be aligned with the parties to reduce the competition in the final product market,but also enable the parties to solve the business stealing through the internalization by means of the vertical integration or other ways,so that the profits of the parties can be maximized.At the same time,the sale amounts will be reduced in the importing country,and the price will be increased. The reduction of transaction costs caused by trade liberalization leads to the bargaining power and profitability of exporters are strengthened. Then the parties tend to choose joint contracts and limit more trade gains within the framework of cooperation which leads to the increasing of profits as a whole. Now importers will significantly increase the price of domestic consumption by markup to consumers,and the number and variety of transactions will also be reduced. The results of LOGIT analysis by using the transaction data of the signing of China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement before and after including 470 HS 6 digits commodities between 2012—2016 confirm the above conclusions,and the results of multi-angle robust analysis also support the above conclusions. For this purpose,governments should assess the different effects of trade liberalization for different economic entities scientifically and comprehensively while focusing on the overall benefits so as to formulate relevant domestic policies in a targeted manner. It should also be realized that the importance of institution quality in a country's economic development.
By introducing contract selection behavior between exporters and importers in the theoretical framework of heterogeneous enterprise trade,the authors analyze how does the contract selection behavior affect the distribution of trade gains between exporters,importers and consumers in import countries. Double marginalization makes anonymous market impossible to maximize profit between importers and exporters. Although double marginalization can be overcome by the bilateral contracts,there is an externality between the importers and exporters due to the business stealing. Joint contracts can not only be aligned with the parties to reduce the competition in the final product market,but also enable the parties to solve the business stealing through the internalization by means of the vertical integration or other ways,so that the profits of the parties can be maximized.At the same time,the sale amounts will be reduced in the importing country,and the price will be increased. The reduction of transaction costs caused by trade liberalization leads to the bargaining power and profitability of exporters are strengthened. Then the parties tend to choose joint contracts and limit more trade gains within the framework of cooperation which leads to the increasing of profits as a whole. Now importers will significantly increase the price of domestic consumption by markup to consumers,and the number and variety of transactions will also be reduced. The results of LOGIT analysis by using the transaction data of the signing of China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement before and after including 470 HS 6 digits commodities between 2012—2016 confirm the above conclusions,and the results of multi-angle robust analysis also support the above conclusions. For this purpose,governments should assess the different effects of trade liberalization for different economic entities scientifically and comprehensively while focusing on the overall benefits so as to formulate relevant domestic policies in a targeted manner. It should also be realized that the importance of institution quality in a country's economic development.
引文
[1]RAFF H,SCHMITT N.Endogenous vertical restraints in international trade[J].European economic review,2000(7):1877-1 889.
[2]SPENGLER,JOSEPH J.Vertical integration and antitrust policy[J].Journal of political economy,1950(4):347-352.
[3]ARKOLAKIS C,DEMIDOVA S,KLENOW P J,RODRI-GUEZ-CLARE A.Endogenous variety and the gains from trade[J].American economic review,2008(2):444-450.
[4]HSIEH C T,LI N,OSSA R,YANG M J.Accounting for the new gains from trade liberalization[Z].NBER working paper,2018.
[5]BLAUM J,LELARGE C,PETERS M.The gains from input trade in firm-based models of importing[Z].NBER working paper,2015.
[6]MALLICK S,MARQUES H.Pass through of exchange rate and tariffs into import prices of India:currency depreciation versus import liberalization[J].Review of international economics,2008(4):765-782.
[7]DE LOECKER J,GOLDBERG P K,KHANDELWAL AK,PAVCNIK N.Prices,markups and trade reform[J].Econometrica,2016(2):445-510.
[8]LAWRENCE R Z,SAXONHOUSE G R.Efficient or exclusionist?the import behavior of Japanese corporate groups[J].Brookings papers on economic activity,1991(1):311-341.
[9]ANTRAS P,COSTINOT A.Intermediated trade[J].The quarterly journal of economics,2011(3):1 319-1 374.
[10]RAUCH J E,WASTON J.Network intermediaries in international trade[J].Journal of economics&management strategy,2004(1):69-93.
[11]BLUM B S,CLARO S,HORSTMANN I.Facts and figures on intermediated trade[J].The American economic review,2010(2):419-423.
[12]BLUM B S,CLARO S,HORSTMANN I.Import intermediaries and trade costs:theory and evidence[R].Toronto:University of Toronto,2012.
[13]EATON J,ESLAVA M,JINKINS D,KRIZAN C,TY-BOUT J.A search and learning model of export dynamics[J].AEA meetings,2015(8):51-86.
[14]CARBALLO J,OTTAVIANIO G I,MARTINCUS C V.The buyer margins of firms’exports[Z].CFS working paper,2016.
[15]BERNARD A B,MOXNES A,ULLTVEIT-MOE K H.Two-sided heterogeneity and trade[Z].NBER working paper,2014.
[16]CALIENDO L,FEENSTRA R C,ROMALIS J,TAYLORA M.Tariff reductions,entry,and welfare:theory and evidence for the last two decades[Z].NBER working paper,2017.
[17]LEVCHENKO A A,ZHANG J.Comparative advantage and the welfare impact of European integration[J].Economic policy,2012(72):567-602.
[18]CASTELLANI D,SERTI F,TOMASI C.Firms in international trade:importers’and exporters’heterogeneity in Italian manufacturing industry[J].World economy,2010(3):424-457.
[19]MUULS M,PISU M.Imports and exports at the level of the firm:evidence from Belgium[J].World economy,2009(5):692-734.
[20]HALPERN L,KOREN M,SZEIDL A.Imported inputs and productivity[J].American economic review,2015(12):3 660-3 703.
[21]AMITI M,KONINGS J.Trade liberalization,intermediate inputs and productivity:evidence from Indonesia[J].American economic review,2007(5):1 611-1 638.
[22]AMITI M,DAI M,FEENSTRA R C,ROMALIS J.How did China’s WTO entry benefit U.S.consumers[Z].NBERworking paper,2017.
[23]BADINGER H.Has the EU’s single market programme fostered competition?testing for a decrease in mark-up ratios in EU industries[J].Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics,2007(4):497-519.
[24]BOLER E A,MOXNES A,ULLTVEIT-MOE K H.Technological change,international sourcing and the joint impact on productivity[J].American economic review,2007(7):589-655.
[25]毛其淋,许家云.中间品贸易自由化的生产率效应--以中国加入WTO为背景的经验研究[J].财经研究,2015(4):42-53.
[26]毛其淋,许家云.中间品贸易自由化、制度环境与生产率演化[J].世界经济,2015(9):80-106.
[27]李平,姜丽.贸易自由化、中间品进口与中国技术创新--1998-2012年省级面板数据的实证研究[J].国际贸易问题,2015(7):3-12.
[28]MELITZ M J.The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity[J].Econometrica,2003(6):1 695-1 725.
[29]KRUGMAN P R.Scale economies,product differentiation,and the pattern of trade[J].American economic review,1980(5):950-959.
[30]HORN H,WOLINSKY A.Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger[J].The journal of economics,1988(19):408-419.
[31]MARTIN S,NORMANN H T,SNYDER C M.Vertical foreclosure in experimental markets[J].RAND journal of economics,2001(3):466-496.
[32]M?LLERS T M J,NIEDORF C.Regulation and liability of credit rating agencies-a more efficient European law?[J].European company&financial law review,2014(3):333-363.
[33]BALLER S.Product quality,market size and welfare:theory and evidence from French exporters[R].Oxford:University of Oxford,2017.
[34]述评:从中韩自贸协定看中国全方位对外开放新格局[EB/OL].(2015-06-01)(2019-03-19).http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-06/01/c_1115477164.htm.
(1)匿名市场交易是基于完全竞争与不合作条件下的交易行为,其价款转移和产权移交同时进行,即共时合约。若价款转移和产权移交非同时进行,交易双方都希望通过签订合约以保障履约的可靠性,如落实预防违约以及违约后的处罚措施,以防止可能出现的机会主义行为,或实现既定条件下各自利益的最大化。
(2)双重边际效应,也叫双重加价。美国经济学家斯宾格勒和约瑟夫(Spengler&Joseph)在早期研究产业组织行为时发现,当产业链上下游企业(如制造商与分销商)存在竞争时,各自仅考虑自身利益而独立决策的产品价格会高于集中决策,这主要源于双方都通过加价来确定各自愿意接受的价格。此外,这种双重边际效应还体现为较少的交易数量。
(3)共同合约常常会使各方形成交叉持股现象。马丁等(Martin et al)、穆勒斯和勒多夫(M?llers&Niedorf)使用实验数据进行分析后认为,不同形式(不涉及公司的垂直一体化)的垂直限制更容易使共同利润最大化。
(4)考虑到在竞争环境下,进口国国内消费价格主要随进口交易价格而变化,且本文关注价格变化而非价格绝对值,因此这里用进口交易价格变化来间接反映进口国消费价格变化。
(5)签署自贸协定本身就可以视为一种制度安排。
[2]SPENGLER,JOSEPH J.Vertical integration and antitrust policy[J].Journal of political economy,1950(4):347-352.
[3]ARKOLAKIS C,DEMIDOVA S,KLENOW P J,RODRI-GUEZ-CLARE A.Endogenous variety and the gains from trade[J].American economic review,2008(2):444-450.
[4]HSIEH C T,LI N,OSSA R,YANG M J.Accounting for the new gains from trade liberalization[Z].NBER working paper,2018.
[5]BLAUM J,LELARGE C,PETERS M.The gains from input trade in firm-based models of importing[Z].NBER working paper,2015.
[6]MALLICK S,MARQUES H.Pass through of exchange rate and tariffs into import prices of India:currency depreciation versus import liberalization[J].Review of international economics,2008(4):765-782.
[7]DE LOECKER J,GOLDBERG P K,KHANDELWAL AK,PAVCNIK N.Prices,markups and trade reform[J].Econometrica,2016(2):445-510.
[8]LAWRENCE R Z,SAXONHOUSE G R.Efficient or exclusionist?the import behavior of Japanese corporate groups[J].Brookings papers on economic activity,1991(1):311-341.
[9]ANTRAS P,COSTINOT A.Intermediated trade[J].The quarterly journal of economics,2011(3):1 319-1 374.
[10]RAUCH J E,WASTON J.Network intermediaries in international trade[J].Journal of economics&management strategy,2004(1):69-93.
[11]BLUM B S,CLARO S,HORSTMANN I.Facts and figures on intermediated trade[J].The American economic review,2010(2):419-423.
[12]BLUM B S,CLARO S,HORSTMANN I.Import intermediaries and trade costs:theory and evidence[R].Toronto:University of Toronto,2012.
[13]EATON J,ESLAVA M,JINKINS D,KRIZAN C,TY-BOUT J.A search and learning model of export dynamics[J].AEA meetings,2015(8):51-86.
[14]CARBALLO J,OTTAVIANIO G I,MARTINCUS C V.The buyer margins of firms’exports[Z].CFS working paper,2016.
[15]BERNARD A B,MOXNES A,ULLTVEIT-MOE K H.Two-sided heterogeneity and trade[Z].NBER working paper,2014.
[16]CALIENDO L,FEENSTRA R C,ROMALIS J,TAYLORA M.Tariff reductions,entry,and welfare:theory and evidence for the last two decades[Z].NBER working paper,2017.
[17]LEVCHENKO A A,ZHANG J.Comparative advantage and the welfare impact of European integration[J].Economic policy,2012(72):567-602.
[18]CASTELLANI D,SERTI F,TOMASI C.Firms in international trade:importers’and exporters’heterogeneity in Italian manufacturing industry[J].World economy,2010(3):424-457.
[19]MUULS M,PISU M.Imports and exports at the level of the firm:evidence from Belgium[J].World economy,2009(5):692-734.
[20]HALPERN L,KOREN M,SZEIDL A.Imported inputs and productivity[J].American economic review,2015(12):3 660-3 703.
[21]AMITI M,KONINGS J.Trade liberalization,intermediate inputs and productivity:evidence from Indonesia[J].American economic review,2007(5):1 611-1 638.
[22]AMITI M,DAI M,FEENSTRA R C,ROMALIS J.How did China’s WTO entry benefit U.S.consumers[Z].NBERworking paper,2017.
[23]BADINGER H.Has the EU’s single market programme fostered competition?testing for a decrease in mark-up ratios in EU industries[J].Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics,2007(4):497-519.
[24]BOLER E A,MOXNES A,ULLTVEIT-MOE K H.Technological change,international sourcing and the joint impact on productivity[J].American economic review,2007(7):589-655.
[25]毛其淋,许家云.中间品贸易自由化的生产率效应--以中国加入WTO为背景的经验研究[J].财经研究,2015(4):42-53.
[26]毛其淋,许家云.中间品贸易自由化、制度环境与生产率演化[J].世界经济,2015(9):80-106.
[27]李平,姜丽.贸易自由化、中间品进口与中国技术创新--1998-2012年省级面板数据的实证研究[J].国际贸易问题,2015(7):3-12.
[28]MELITZ M J.The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity[J].Econometrica,2003(6):1 695-1 725.
[29]KRUGMAN P R.Scale economies,product differentiation,and the pattern of trade[J].American economic review,1980(5):950-959.
[30]HORN H,WOLINSKY A.Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger[J].The journal of economics,1988(19):408-419.
[31]MARTIN S,NORMANN H T,SNYDER C M.Vertical foreclosure in experimental markets[J].RAND journal of economics,2001(3):466-496.
[32]M?LLERS T M J,NIEDORF C.Regulation and liability of credit rating agencies-a more efficient European law?[J].European company&financial law review,2014(3):333-363.
[33]BALLER S.Product quality,market size and welfare:theory and evidence from French exporters[R].Oxford:University of Oxford,2017.
[34]述评:从中韩自贸协定看中国全方位对外开放新格局[EB/OL].(2015-06-01)(2019-03-19).http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-06/01/c_1115477164.htm.
(1)匿名市场交易是基于完全竞争与不合作条件下的交易行为,其价款转移和产权移交同时进行,即共时合约。若价款转移和产权移交非同时进行,交易双方都希望通过签订合约以保障履约的可靠性,如落实预防违约以及违约后的处罚措施,以防止可能出现的机会主义行为,或实现既定条件下各自利益的最大化。
(2)双重边际效应,也叫双重加价。美国经济学家斯宾格勒和约瑟夫(Spengler&Joseph)在早期研究产业组织行为时发现,当产业链上下游企业(如制造商与分销商)存在竞争时,各自仅考虑自身利益而独立决策的产品价格会高于集中决策,这主要源于双方都通过加价来确定各自愿意接受的价格。此外,这种双重边际效应还体现为较少的交易数量。
(3)共同合约常常会使各方形成交叉持股现象。马丁等(Martin et al)、穆勒斯和勒多夫(M?llers&Niedorf)使用实验数据进行分析后认为,不同形式(不涉及公司的垂直一体化)的垂直限制更容易使共同利润最大化。
(4)考虑到在竞争环境下,进口国国内消费价格主要随进口交易价格而变化,且本文关注价格变化而非价格绝对值,因此这里用进口交易价格变化来间接反映进口国消费价格变化。
(5)签署自贸协定本身就可以视为一种制度安排。
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