环境规制视角下的区域大气污染联合治理——分区方案设计、协同状态评价及影响因素分析
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摘要
大气污染的空间外溢性和污染企业的区域流动性使得各自为政的属地治理模式效率低下,只有走上区域联合之路才能实现大气污染的高效治理。但一直以来,中国大气污染的联合治理都缺乏实质性的进展,其关键在于大气污染联合治理体系的缺失。因此,本文从集体行动理论出发结合共同但有区别原则从经济、地理、气象、污染物、污染源角度提炼出了有效施行大气污染联合治理的五大要素,并从大气污染治理的实际状况入手将五大要素具象化为操作性更强的五大抓手,然后基于中国2004—2015年大气环境污染状况和污染产业分布状况提出了中国大气污染联合治理的最优分区治理方案。在此基础上分析了各联合小组大气污染协同治理的演变趋势和真实动力,得出中国已经产生了大气环境分区治理的萌芽,但区域内治理的协同演进缓慢,且波动性较大。为了推进大气环境联合治理的进程,本文又对影响区域大气污染联合治理的因素进行了分析,结果表明:①人均GDP的差异会妨碍地区间大气污染的联合治理;②产业结构、失业率、人力资本等经济特征的差异对联合治理没有显著影响;③地区间联合组织的建立能有效促进联合治理程度的提升。
The spatial spillover of air pollution and the regional mobility of polluting enterprises make the territorial governance model inefficient, and only regional linkage control can efficiently reduce pollution. However,there has been no substantial progress in the regional linkage control of air pollution in China. The key to this is the lack of a joint air pollution control scheme. Therefore, based on the collective action theory and the common but differentiated principle, this paper refines the five key elements of air pollution's regional linkage control from the perspectives of economy, geography, meteorology, pollutants and pollution sources. From the actual situation of air pollution control, the five key elements are figured into five more operable grasps. Combines the status of air pollution and the distribution of pollution industries in China from 2004 to 2015, the optimal zoning scheme of jointed air pollution control in China is put forward. Moreover, we analyzed the evolution trend and driving force of the regional linkage control in each group. It can be concluded that China has already produced the germination of regional environmental governance, but the coordinated evolution of the regional governance is slow and the volatility is great. In order to promote the process of the regional linkage control and prevention of air pollution,this paper also analyzed the determinants of this and the results show as follows:①The difference of per capita GDP will hinder the regional linkage control of air pollution.②The difference of economic characteristics such as industrial structure, unemployment rate and human capital has no significant impact on the regional linkage control.③The establishment of inter-regional joint organizations can effectively promote the level of regional linkage control.
The spatial spillover of air pollution and the regional mobility of polluting enterprises make the territorial governance model inefficient, and only regional linkage control can efficiently reduce pollution. However,there has been no substantial progress in the regional linkage control of air pollution in China. The key to this is the lack of a joint air pollution control scheme. Therefore, based on the collective action theory and the common but differentiated principle, this paper refines the five key elements of air pollution's regional linkage control from the perspectives of economy, geography, meteorology, pollutants and pollution sources. From the actual situation of air pollution control, the five key elements are figured into five more operable grasps. Combines the status of air pollution and the distribution of pollution industries in China from 2004 to 2015, the optimal zoning scheme of jointed air pollution control in China is put forward. Moreover, we analyzed the evolution trend and driving force of the regional linkage control in each group. It can be concluded that China has already produced the germination of regional environmental governance, but the coordinated evolution of the regional governance is slow and the volatility is great. In order to promote the process of the regional linkage control and prevention of air pollution,this paper also analyzed the determinants of this and the results show as follows:①The difference of per capita GDP will hinder the regional linkage control of air pollution.②The difference of economic characteristics such as industrial structure, unemployment rate and human capital has no significant impact on the regional linkage control.③The establishment of inter-regional joint organizations can effectively promote the level of regional linkage control.
引文
[1]柴发合,云雅如,王淑兰.关于我国落实区域大气联防联控机制的深度思考[J].环境与可持续发展,2013,(4):5-9.
[2]陈贻健.区域性复合环境污染防治法律对策研究:以霾污染为样本[J].法学杂志,2016,(12):78-87.
[3]崔晶,孙伟.区域大气污染协同治理视角下的府际事权划分问题研究[J].中国行政管理,2014,(9):11-15.
[4]董直庆,王辉.环境规制的“本地-邻地”绿色技术进步效应[J].中国工业经济,2019,(1):100-118.
[5]高桂林,陈云俊.评析新《大气污染防治法》中的联防联控制度[J].环境保护,2015,(18):42-46.
[6]高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定——基于演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,(8):62-70.
[7]郭施宏,齐晔.京津冀区域大气污染协同治理模式构建——基于府际关系理论视角[J].中国特色社会主义研究,2016,(3):81-85.
[8]贺璇,王冰.京津冀大气污染治理模式演进:构建一种可持续合作机制[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2016,(1):56-62.
[9]姜玲,乔亚丽.区域大气污染合作治理政府间责任分担机制研究——以京津冀地区为例[J].中国行政管理,2016,(6):47-51.
[10]金太军.从行政区行政到区域公共管理——政府治理形态嬗变的博弈分析[J].中国社会科学,2007,(6):53-65.
[11]李胜兰,初善冰,申晨.地方政府竞争、环境规制和区域生态效率[J].世界经济,2014,(4):88-110.
[12]李欣,杨朝远,曹建华.网络舆论有助于缓解雾霾污染吗?——兼论雾霾污染的空间溢出效应[J].经济学动态,2017,(6):45-57.
[13]李雪松,孙博文.大气污染治理的经济属性及政策演进:一个分析框架[J].改革,2014,(4):17-25.
[14]李永友,沈坤荣.我国污染控制政策的减排效果——基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,(7):7-17.
[15]彭非,袁卫,惠争勤.对综合评价方法中指数功效函数的一种改进探讨[J].统计研究,2007,(12):29-34.
[16]任保平,段雨晨.我国雾霾治理中的合作机制[J].求索,2015,(12):4-9.
[17]邵帅,齐中英.基于“资源诅咒”学说的能源输出型城市R&D行为研究——理论解释及其实证检验[J].财经研究,2009,(1):61-73.
[18]陶品竹.从属地主义到合作治理:京津冀大气污染治理模式的转型[J].河北法学,2014,(10):120-129.
[19]汪克亮,孟祥瑞,杨宝臣,程云鹤.技术异质下中国大气污染排放效率的区域差异与影响因素[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,(1):101-110.
[20]王兵,吴延瑞,颜鹏飞.中国区域环境效率与环境全要素生产率增长[J].经济研究,2010,(5):95-109.
[21]王超奕.“打赢蓝天保卫战”与大气污染的区域联防联治机制创新[J].改革,2018,(1):61-64.
[22]王金南,宁淼,孙亚梅.区域大气污染联防联控的理论与方法分析[J].环境与可持续发展,2012,(5):5-10.
[23]魏巍贤,马喜立,李鹏,陈意.技术进步和税收在区域大气污染治理中的作用[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,(5):1-11.
[24]徐维祥,舒季君,唐根年.中国工业化、信息化、城镇化和农业现代化协调发展的时空格局与动态演进[J].经济学动态,2015,(1):76-85.
[25]徐彦坤,祁毓.环境规制对企业生产率影响再评估及机制检验[J].财贸经济,2017,(6):147-161.
[26]杨海生,陈少凌,周永章.地方政府竞争与环境政策——来自中国省份数据的证据[J].南方经济,2008,(6):15-30.
[27]杨骞,王弘儒,刘华军.区域大气污染联防联控是否取得了预期效果?——来自山东省会城市群的经验证据[J].城市与环境研究,2016,(4):3-21.
[28]余壮雄,杨扬.市场向西、政治向东——中国国内资本流动方向的测算[J].管理世界,2014,(6):53-64.
[29]余懿臻.雾霾联防联控机制的完善——以长三角为例[J].中国环境管理干部学院学报,2017,(1):11-13.
[30]袁凯华,李后建.约束性考核促进了官员的减排激励吗[J].当代经济科学,2014,(11):2-10.
[31]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016,(7):74-90.
[32]张文彬,张理芃,张可云.中国环境规制强度省际竞争形态及其演变——基于两区制空间Durbin固定效应模型的分析[J].管理世界,2010,(12):34-44.
[33]张亚军.京津冀大气污染联防联控的法律问题及对策[J].河北法学,2017,(7):99-106.
[34]郑思齐,万广华,孙伟增,罗党论.公众诉求与城市环境治理[J].管理世界,2013,(6):72-84.
[35]Buchanan,J.M.,and G.Tullock.The Calculus of Consent,Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy[M].Chicago:University of Michigan Press,1962.
[36]Cole,M.A.,and R.J.Elliott.FDI and the Capital Intensity of“Dirty”Sectors:A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven Puzzle[J].Review of Development Economics,2005,9(4),530-548.
[37]Jonathan,B.,and M.Dilip.Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action[J].American Political Science Review,1987,81(1):129-154.
[38]Jordan,G.,and K.Schubert.A Preliminary Ordering of Policy Network Labels[J].European Journal of Political Research,1992,(21):7-27.
[39]Katzenstein,P.J.Between Power and Plenty:Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States[M].Madison:University of Wisconisin Press,1978.
[40]Kim,I.Environmental Cooperation of Northeast Asia:Transboundary Air Pollution[J].International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,2007,7(3):439-462.
[41]Liu,M.,R.Shadbegian,and B.Zhang.Does Environmental Regulation Affect Labor Demand in China?Evidence from the Textile Printing and Dyeing Industry[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2017,(86):277-294.
[42]Mckitrick,R.The Politics of Pollution:Party Regimes and Air Quality in Canada[J].Canadian Journal of Economics/revue Canadienne Déconomique,2010,39(2):604-620.
[43]Olson,M.The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups[M].Boston:Harvard University Press,1971.
[44]Ostrom,E.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1990.
[45]Qin,M.,X.Wang,Y.Hu,X.Huang,L.He,L.Zhong,Y.Song,M.Hu,and Y.Zhang.Formation of Particulate Sulfate and Nitrate over the Pearl River Delta in the Fall:Diagnostic Analysis Using the Community Multiscale Air Quality Model[J].Atmospheric Environment,2015,(112):81-89.
[46]Ralph,H.T.,and M.K.Lewis.Collective Behavior[M].Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall,1987.
[47]Sheldon,K.,and M.R.Ferrall.Intergovernmental Relations and Clear Air Policy in Southern California[J].Journal of Federalism,1991,21(3):143-154.
[48]Smelser,N.J.Theory of Collective Behavior[M].New York:The Free Press,1962.
[49]Song,T.,T.Zheng,and L.Tong.An Empirical Test of the Environmental Kuznets Curve in China:A Panel Cointegration Approach[J].China Economic Review,2008,19(3):381-392.
[50]Taaffe,E.J.The Urban Hierarchy:An Air Passenger Definition[J].Economic Geography,1962,38(1):1-14.
(1)具体数据及图表资料参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)对于最终方案,再次采用污染产业分布条件和风向路径条件进行检验后,依然满足以上条件。
[2]陈贻健.区域性复合环境污染防治法律对策研究:以霾污染为样本[J].法学杂志,2016,(12):78-87.
[3]崔晶,孙伟.区域大气污染协同治理视角下的府际事权划分问题研究[J].中国行政管理,2014,(9):11-15.
[4]董直庆,王辉.环境规制的“本地-邻地”绿色技术进步效应[J].中国工业经济,2019,(1):100-118.
[5]高桂林,陈云俊.评析新《大气污染防治法》中的联防联控制度[J].环境保护,2015,(18):42-46.
[6]高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定——基于演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2016,(8):62-70.
[7]郭施宏,齐晔.京津冀区域大气污染协同治理模式构建——基于府际关系理论视角[J].中国特色社会主义研究,2016,(3):81-85.
[8]贺璇,王冰.京津冀大气污染治理模式演进:构建一种可持续合作机制[J].东北大学学报(社会科学版),2016,(1):56-62.
[9]姜玲,乔亚丽.区域大气污染合作治理政府间责任分担机制研究——以京津冀地区为例[J].中国行政管理,2016,(6):47-51.
[10]金太军.从行政区行政到区域公共管理——政府治理形态嬗变的博弈分析[J].中国社会科学,2007,(6):53-65.
[11]李胜兰,初善冰,申晨.地方政府竞争、环境规制和区域生态效率[J].世界经济,2014,(4):88-110.
[12]李欣,杨朝远,曹建华.网络舆论有助于缓解雾霾污染吗?——兼论雾霾污染的空间溢出效应[J].经济学动态,2017,(6):45-57.
[13]李雪松,孙博文.大气污染治理的经济属性及政策演进:一个分析框架[J].改革,2014,(4):17-25.
[14]李永友,沈坤荣.我国污染控制政策的减排效果——基于省际工业污染数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2008,(7):7-17.
[15]彭非,袁卫,惠争勤.对综合评价方法中指数功效函数的一种改进探讨[J].统计研究,2007,(12):29-34.
[16]任保平,段雨晨.我国雾霾治理中的合作机制[J].求索,2015,(12):4-9.
[17]邵帅,齐中英.基于“资源诅咒”学说的能源输出型城市R&D行为研究——理论解释及其实证检验[J].财经研究,2009,(1):61-73.
[18]陶品竹.从属地主义到合作治理:京津冀大气污染治理模式的转型[J].河北法学,2014,(10):120-129.
[19]汪克亮,孟祥瑞,杨宝臣,程云鹤.技术异质下中国大气污染排放效率的区域差异与影响因素[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,(1):101-110.
[20]王兵,吴延瑞,颜鹏飞.中国区域环境效率与环境全要素生产率增长[J].经济研究,2010,(5):95-109.
[21]王超奕.“打赢蓝天保卫战”与大气污染的区域联防联治机制创新[J].改革,2018,(1):61-64.
[22]王金南,宁淼,孙亚梅.区域大气污染联防联控的理论与方法分析[J].环境与可持续发展,2012,(5):5-10.
[23]魏巍贤,马喜立,李鹏,陈意.技术进步和税收在区域大气污染治理中的作用[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,(5):1-11.
[24]徐维祥,舒季君,唐根年.中国工业化、信息化、城镇化和农业现代化协调发展的时空格局与动态演进[J].经济学动态,2015,(1):76-85.
[25]徐彦坤,祁毓.环境规制对企业生产率影响再评估及机制检验[J].财贸经济,2017,(6):147-161.
[26]杨海生,陈少凌,周永章.地方政府竞争与环境政策——来自中国省份数据的证据[J].南方经济,2008,(6):15-30.
[27]杨骞,王弘儒,刘华军.区域大气污染联防联控是否取得了预期效果?——来自山东省会城市群的经验证据[J].城市与环境研究,2016,(4):3-21.
[28]余壮雄,杨扬.市场向西、政治向东——中国国内资本流动方向的测算[J].管理世界,2014,(6):53-64.
[29]余懿臻.雾霾联防联控机制的完善——以长三角为例[J].中国环境管理干部学院学报,2017,(1):11-13.
[30]袁凯华,李后建.约束性考核促进了官员的减排激励吗[J].当代经济科学,2014,(11):2-10.
[31]张华.地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释[J].中国工业经济,2016,(7):74-90.
[32]张文彬,张理芃,张可云.中国环境规制强度省际竞争形态及其演变——基于两区制空间Durbin固定效应模型的分析[J].管理世界,2010,(12):34-44.
[33]张亚军.京津冀大气污染联防联控的法律问题及对策[J].河北法学,2017,(7):99-106.
[34]郑思齐,万广华,孙伟增,罗党论.公众诉求与城市环境治理[J].管理世界,2013,(6):72-84.
[35]Buchanan,J.M.,and G.Tullock.The Calculus of Consent,Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy[M].Chicago:University of Michigan Press,1962.
[36]Cole,M.A.,and R.J.Elliott.FDI and the Capital Intensity of“Dirty”Sectors:A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven Puzzle[J].Review of Development Economics,2005,9(4),530-548.
[37]Jonathan,B.,and M.Dilip.Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action[J].American Political Science Review,1987,81(1):129-154.
[38]Jordan,G.,and K.Schubert.A Preliminary Ordering of Policy Network Labels[J].European Journal of Political Research,1992,(21):7-27.
[39]Katzenstein,P.J.Between Power and Plenty:Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States[M].Madison:University of Wisconisin Press,1978.
[40]Kim,I.Environmental Cooperation of Northeast Asia:Transboundary Air Pollution[J].International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,2007,7(3):439-462.
[41]Liu,M.,R.Shadbegian,and B.Zhang.Does Environmental Regulation Affect Labor Demand in China?Evidence from the Textile Printing and Dyeing Industry[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2017,(86):277-294.
[42]Mckitrick,R.The Politics of Pollution:Party Regimes and Air Quality in Canada[J].Canadian Journal of Economics/revue Canadienne Déconomique,2010,39(2):604-620.
[43]Olson,M.The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups[M].Boston:Harvard University Press,1971.
[44]Ostrom,E.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1990.
[45]Qin,M.,X.Wang,Y.Hu,X.Huang,L.He,L.Zhong,Y.Song,M.Hu,and Y.Zhang.Formation of Particulate Sulfate and Nitrate over the Pearl River Delta in the Fall:Diagnostic Analysis Using the Community Multiscale Air Quality Model[J].Atmospheric Environment,2015,(112):81-89.
[46]Ralph,H.T.,and M.K.Lewis.Collective Behavior[M].Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall,1987.
[47]Sheldon,K.,and M.R.Ferrall.Intergovernmental Relations and Clear Air Policy in Southern California[J].Journal of Federalism,1991,21(3):143-154.
[48]Smelser,N.J.Theory of Collective Behavior[M].New York:The Free Press,1962.
[49]Song,T.,T.Zheng,and L.Tong.An Empirical Test of the Environmental Kuznets Curve in China:A Panel Cointegration Approach[J].China Economic Review,2008,19(3):381-392.
[50]Taaffe,E.J.The Urban Hierarchy:An Air Passenger Definition[J].Economic Geography,1962,38(1):1-14.
(1)具体数据及图表资料参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)对于最终方案,再次采用污染产业分布条件和风向路径条件进行检验后,依然满足以上条件。
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