基于横向和纵向公平偏好的二层供应链网络均衡决策
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摘要
在上层为制造商、下层为多个竞争型零售商和需求市场的二层供应链网络中,分析了多个零售商间横向公平偏好、零售商与制造商间纵向公平偏好行为。构建了下层零售商考虑横向和纵向公平偏好的Nash均衡模型,并且得到上层和下层供应链网络的Stackelberg-Nash博弈模型,利用罚函数法求解得到二层供应链网络均衡决策。定性分析了零售商横向、纵向公平偏好权重和纵向公平参考系数对均衡决策的影响,并通过数值算例验证。最后对供应链各决策者给出应对公平偏好负效用的合理化建议。
With the growth of market size and the intensification of market competition,there are many members in the supply chain.With the increase of supply chain members and the diversification of role types,a two-layer supply chain network based on one manufacturer and many retailerscan reflect the practical problem.The equilibrium decisions of a two-layer supply chain network considering retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness preference is studied.The impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness behaviors on the equilibrium decisions of the network is discussed.The Nash game model of the lower tier supply chain and the Stackelberg-Nash game model of the upper tier and lower tier supply chain network are constructed.The equilibrium decisions of all the decision makers are established by the penalty function method.Finally,qualitative analysis of the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference on the equilibrium decisions is carried out.Numerical examples show that the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference weights and their vertical fairness reference coefficient are different to manufacturers and retailers.The conclusions provide some reasonable suggestions to the decision-makers of the supply chain to deal with the negative effects of fair preference behaviors.
With the growth of market size and the intensification of market competition,there are many members in the supply chain.With the increase of supply chain members and the diversification of role types,a two-layer supply chain network based on one manufacturer and many retailerscan reflect the practical problem.The equilibrium decisions of a two-layer supply chain network considering retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness preference is studied.The impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fairness behaviors on the equilibrium decisions of the network is discussed.The Nash game model of the lower tier supply chain and the Stackelberg-Nash game model of the upper tier and lower tier supply chain network are constructed.The equilibrium decisions of all the decision makers are established by the penalty function method.Finally,qualitative analysis of the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference on the equilibrium decisions is carried out.Numerical examples show that the impact of retailers' horizontal and vertical fair preference weights and their vertical fairness reference coefficient are different to manufacturers and retailers.The conclusions provide some reasonable suggestions to the decision-makers of the supply chain to deal with the negative effects of fair preference behaviors.
引文
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[22]Ho T,Su Xuanming,Wu Yaozhong.Distributional and peer-induced fairness in supply chain contract design[J].Production&Operations Management,2014,23(2):161-175.
[23]Nie Tengfei,Du Shaofu.Dual-fairness supply chain with quantity discount contracts[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,258(2):491-500.
[24]段丁钰,周岩,张华民,等.考虑零售商不公平厌恶行为的供应链网络均衡研究[J].山东大学学报(理学版),2017,52(5):58-69.
[25]NagurneyA,Dong June,Zhang Ding.A supply chain network equilibrium model[J].Transportation Research Part E,2002,38(5):281-303.
[26]Kinderlehrer D,Stampacchia G.An Introduction to variational inequalities and their applications[M].Academic Press,1980.
[27]Luo Zhiquan,Pang Jong Shi,Ralph D.Mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints[J].International Symposium on Mathematical Programming,1996,20(5):2504-2539.
[28]Liu Guosi,Han Jiye,Zhang Jianzhong.Exact penalty functions for convex bilevel programming problems[J].Journal of Optimization Theory&Applications,2001,110(3):621-643.
[2]Roy A,Sana S S,Chaudhuri K.Optimal pricing of competing retailers under uncertain demand-a two layer supply chain model[J].Annals of Operations Research,2018,260(1-2):481-500.
[3]姚锋敏,滕春贤,陈兆波,等.二层供应链网络均衡模型的研究[J].运筹与管理,2010,20(5):8-13.
[4]姚锋敏,滕春贤.基于二层规划的供应链网络间的竞争模型[J].系统工程学报,2012,27(4):527-534.
[5]周岩,胡劲松,王新川,等.政府关于碳排放调控机制下的供应链网络Stackelberg-Nash均衡研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,(s1):786-793.
[6]何丽红,廖茜,刘蒙蒙,等.两层供应链系统最优广告努力水平与直接价格折扣的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):130-138.
[7]Kahneman D,Knetsch J L,Thaler R.Fairness as aconstraint on profit seeking:Entitlements in the market[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(4):728-741.
[8]Fehr E,Schmidt K M.A theory of fairness,competition,and cooperation[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999,114(3):817-868.
[9]Cui T H,Raju J S,Zhang Z J.Fairness and channel coordination[J].Management Science,2007,53(8):1303-1314.
[10]Katok E,Pavlov V.Fairness in supply chain contracts:A laboratory study[J].Journal of Operations Management,2013,31(3):129-137.
[11]Qin Fei,Feng Mai,Fry M J,et al.Supply-chain performance anomalies:Fairness concerns under private cost information[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2016,252(1):170-182.
[12]Patari E,Karell V,Luukka P,et al.Comparison of the multicriteria decision-making methods for equity portfolio selection:The U.S.evidence[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2018,265(2):655-672.
[13]Liu Songsong,Papageorgiou L G.Fair profit distribution in multi-echelon supply chains via transfer prices[J].Omega,in press.
[14]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[15]杜少甫,朱贾昂,高冬,等.Nash讨价还价公平参考下的供应链优化决策[J].管理科学学报,2013,16(3):68-72.
[16]李娟,张迪,沈厚才.具有公平感的零售商订购决策研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(8):90-99.
[17]刘云志,樊治平.模糊需求下考虑供应商公平偏好的VMI供应链协调[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(7):1661-1675.
[18]刘云志,樊治平.不公平厌恶下VMI供应链的批发价格契约与协调[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(4):63-73.
[19]刘威志,李娟,张迪,等.公平感对供应链成员定价决策影响的研究[J].管理科学学报,2017,20(7):115-126.
[20]刘京,周岩,郑英杰,等.考虑零售商公平关切和风险规避的绿色供应链最优决策[J].山东大学学报(理学版),2018,53(5):12-29.
[21]Ho T,Su Xuanming.Peer-induced fairness in games[J].American Economic Review,2009,99(5):2022-2049.
[22]Ho T,Su Xuanming,Wu Yaozhong.Distributional and peer-induced fairness in supply chain contract design[J].Production&Operations Management,2014,23(2):161-175.
[23]Nie Tengfei,Du Shaofu.Dual-fairness supply chain with quantity discount contracts[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,258(2):491-500.
[24]段丁钰,周岩,张华民,等.考虑零售商不公平厌恶行为的供应链网络均衡研究[J].山东大学学报(理学版),2017,52(5):58-69.
[25]NagurneyA,Dong June,Zhang Ding.A supply chain network equilibrium model[J].Transportation Research Part E,2002,38(5):281-303.
[26]Kinderlehrer D,Stampacchia G.An Introduction to variational inequalities and their applications[M].Academic Press,1980.
[27]Luo Zhiquan,Pang Jong Shi,Ralph D.Mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints[J].International Symposium on Mathematical Programming,1996,20(5):2504-2539.
[28]Liu Guosi,Han Jiye,Zhang Jianzhong.Exact penalty functions for convex bilevel programming problems[J].Journal of Optimization Theory&Applications,2001,110(3):621-643.
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