所有制混合能促进企业创新吗?——基于委托代理冲突与股东间冲突的整合视角
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摘要
混合所有制已成为国企改革的关键突破口,但也将管理者推向了窘境:股权集中容易引发股东间冲突,而股权分散又会产生委托代理问题,本文从创新视角为国企改革寻求新思路。基于整合的委托代理冲突与股东间冲突视角,本文剖析并检验了所有制混合与创新绩效的关系,在此基础上考察了企业性质和制度发展水平的调节效应。结果发现:无论从混合深度还是混合广度来说,所有制混合均能够显著提高企业创新绩效;在国企与非国企中,所有制混合深度对创新绩效的影响并无明显差异,而非国企中所有制混合广度对创新绩效的积极作用比国企更强;在制度发展水平较高地区,所有制混合对创新绩效具有更强的积极作用。本文不仅有助于进一步丰富代理理论和公司治理理论,而且为国企改革路径选择和公司治理机制完善提供了实践启示。
Mixed ownership has become a key breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises,while this spontaneously pushes managers into a dilemma. Concentrated ownership would easily lead to principal-principal conflicts,while dispersed ownership might bring serious principal-agent problems. Therefore,this paper seeks some new train of thoughts for the reform from the perspective of innovation. Based on the integration of principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts,this paper analyzes and tests the relationship between mixed ownership and innovation performance,and examines the moderating effect of the nature of the enterprise and the level of institutional development. The results show that the mixed depth and the mixed scope of ownership could significantly improve the innovation performance. From the viewpoint of mixed depth,there are no significant differences between state-owned enterprises( SOEs)and non-state-owned enterprises( NSOEs),while from the perspective of mixed scope,the relationship between mixed ownership and innovation performance became stronger in NSOEs. In the high level of institutional development,the effect of mixed ownership on innovation performance is stronger than in the low level. This study not only enriches the agency theory,but also provides some new inspirations for the path selection of SOEs reform and the improvement of corporate governance mechanisms.
Mixed ownership has become a key breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises,while this spontaneously pushes managers into a dilemma. Concentrated ownership would easily lead to principal-principal conflicts,while dispersed ownership might bring serious principal-agent problems. Therefore,this paper seeks some new train of thoughts for the reform from the perspective of innovation. Based on the integration of principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts,this paper analyzes and tests the relationship between mixed ownership and innovation performance,and examines the moderating effect of the nature of the enterprise and the level of institutional development. The results show that the mixed depth and the mixed scope of ownership could significantly improve the innovation performance. From the viewpoint of mixed depth,there are no significant differences between state-owned enterprises( SOEs)and non-state-owned enterprises( NSOEs),while from the perspective of mixed scope,the relationship between mixed ownership and innovation performance became stronger in NSOEs. In the high level of institutional development,the effect of mixed ownership on innovation performance is stronger than in the low level. This study not only enriches the agency theory,but also provides some new inspirations for the path selection of SOEs reform and the improvement of corporate governance mechanisms.
引文
[1]Wang K.,Shailer G.Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in Emerging Markets:A Meta Analysis[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2015,29(2):199-229
[2]冷兆松.发展混合所有制经济的决策演进[J].当代中国史研究,2015,(6):36-45
[3]李维安.深化国企改革与发展混合所有制[J].南开管理评论,2014,(3):1
[4]Dharwadkar R.,George G.,Brandes P.Privatization in Emerging Economies:An Agency Theory Perspective[J].Academy of Management Review,2000,25(3):650-669
[5]陈岩,张斌.基于所有权视角的企业创新理论框架与体系[J].经济学动态,2013,(9):50-59
[6]武常岐,韩煦.管理学视角下的民营化现象:一个多层面的研究框架[J].管理世界,2011,(8):92-101
[7]余玮,郑颖.国有上市公司民营化绩效研究[J].管理评论,2012,24(5):44-52
[8]Kim H.,Kim H.,Lee P.M.Ownership Structure and the Relationship between Financial Slack and R&D Investments:Evidence from Korean Firms[J].Organization Science,2008,19(3):404-418
[9]Xia F.,Walker G.How Much Does Owner Type Matter for Firm Performance?Manufacturing Firms in China 1998-2007[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(3):576-585
[10]马连福,王丽丽,张琦.混合所有制的优序选择:市场的逻辑[J].中国工业经济,2015,(7):5-20
[11]杨志强,石水平,石本仁,等.混合所有制、股权激励与融资决策中的防御行为---基于动态权衡理论的证据[J].财经研究,2016,(8):108-120
[12]Li Y.,Guo H.,Yi Y.,Liu Y.Ownership Concentration and Product Innovation in Chinese Firms:The Mediating Role of Learning Orientation[J].Management and Organization Review,2010,6(1):77-100
[13]Xu E.,Zhang H.The Impact of State Shares on Corporate Innovation Strategy and Performance in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2008,25(3):473-487
[14]Yang Z.,Zhou X.,Zhang P.Centralization and Innovation Performance in an Emerging Economy:Testing the Moderating Effects[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2015,32(2):415-442
[15]张西征.中国企业所有权结构对研发投资影响的研究[J].管理学报,2013,10(10):1492-1501
[16]吴延兵.中国哪种所有制类型企业最具创新性?[J].世界经济,2012,(6):3-25
[17]鲁桐,党印.公司治理与技术创新:分行业比较[J].经济研究,2014,(6):115-128
[18]Young M.N.,Peng M.W.,Ahlstrom D.,et al.Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies:A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective[J].Journal of Management Studies,2008,45(1):196-220
[19]Chen V.Z.,Li J.,Shapiro D.M.,et al.Ownership Structure and Innovation:An Emerging Market Perspective[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2014,31(1):1-24
[20]Jensen M.C.,Meckling W.H.Theory of Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[21]冯根福.双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架---兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J].经济研究,2004,(12):16-25
[22]Su Y.,Xu D.,Phan P.H.Principal-Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation[J].Management and Organization Review,2008,4(1):17-38
[23]Johnson S.,Porta R.L.,Lopez-de-Silanes F.,et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27
[24]Luo J.,Wan D.,Cai D.,et al.Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Governance:The Role of Shareholder Numbers,Contest for Control,and Formal Institutions in Chinese Family Firms[J].Management and Organization Review,2013,9(2):265-294
[25]申慧慧,于鹏,吴联生.国有股权、环境不确定性与投资效率[J].经济研究,2012,(7):113-126
[26]王元芳,马连福.国有企业党组织能降低代理成本吗?---基于“内部人控制”的视角[J].管理评论,2014,26(10):138-151
[27]Morck R.,Yeung B.Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2003,27(4):367-382
[28]Shen W.,Zhou Q.,Lau C.M.Empirical Research on Corporate Governance in China:A Review and New Directions for the Future[J].Management and Organization Review,2016,12(1):41-73
[29]苏敬勤,林菁菁.国有企业的自主创新:除了政治身份还有哪些情境因素?[J].管理评论,2016,28(3):230-240
[30]Aguilera R.V.,Desender K.,Bednar M.K.,et al.Connecting the Dots:Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle[J].Academy of Management Annals,2015,9(1):483-573
[31]周亚虹,贺小丹,沈瑶.中国工业企业自主创新的影响因素和产出绩效研究[J].经济研究,2012,(5):107-119
[32]聂辉华,江艇,杨汝岱.中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题[J].世界经济,2012,(5):142-158
[33]杨洋,魏江,罗来军.谁在利用政府补贴进行创新?---所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应[J].管理世界,2015,(1):75-86
[34]李文贵,余明桂.民营化企业的股权结构与企业创新[J].管理世界,2015,(4):112-125
[35]Zhou C.,Li J.Product Innovation in Emerging Market-Based International Joint Ventures:An Organizational Ecology Perspective[J].Journal of International Business Studies,2008,39(7):1114-1132
[36]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2011
[37]Tihanyi L.,Johnson R.A.,Hoskisson R.E.,et al.Institutional Ownership Differences and International Diversification:The Effects of Boards of Directors and Technological Opportunity[J].Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(2):195-211
[38]Li J.,Chen D.,Shapiro D.M.Product Innovations in Emerging Economies:The Role of Foreign Knowledge Access Channels and Internal Efforts in Chinese Firms[J].Management and Organization Review,2010,6(2):243-266
[39]Zhou K.Z.,Gao G.Y.,Zhao H.State Ownership and Firm Innovation in China:An Integrated View of Institutional and Efficiency Logics[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2017,62(2):375-404
[40]Aiken L.S.,West S.G.,Reno R.R.Multiple Regression:Testing and Interpreting Interactions[M].California:Sage Publications,1991
[41]余汉,杨中仑,宋增基.国有股权、政治关联与公司绩效---基于中国民营控股上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2017,29(4):196-212
[42]Barroso Casado R.,Burkert M.,Dávila A.,et al.Shareholder Protection:The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2016,24(2):105-129
[43]Singla C.,Veliyath R.,George R.Family Firms and Internationalization-Governance Relationships:Evidence of Secondary A-gency Issues[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(4):606-616
[44]Misangyi V.F.,Acharya A.G.Substitutes or Complements?A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms[J].Academy of Management Journal,2014,57(6):1681-1705
[45]张卓元.从“管企业为主”到“管资本为主”:国企改革的重大理论创新[J].新视野,2016,(3):13-16
[46]郝云宏,汪茜.混合所有制企业股权制衡机制研究---基于“鄂武商控制权之争”的案例解析[J].中国工业经济,2015,(3):148-160
[47]Nieto M.J.,Rodríguez A.Offshoring of R&D:Looking Abroad to Improve Innovation Performance[J].Journal of International Business Studies,2011,42(3):345-361
[48]陈岩,张斌,翟瑞瑞.国有企业债务结构对创新的影响---是否存在债务融资滥用的经验检验[J].科研管理,2016,(4):16-26
[49]Nieto M.,Quevedo P.Absorptive Capacity,Technological Opportunity,Knowledge Spillovers,and Innovative Effort[J].Technovation,2005,25(10):1141-1157
[50]陈霞,马连福,丁振松.国企分类治理、政府控制与高管薪酬激励---基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2017,29(3):147-156
(1)由于PAC与PPC可能带来不同的经济效益后果,而且两者也无法从统一的计量单位来度量,因此无法定量讨论PAC与PPC的单位效应大小。在本文分析中,假定两种冲突的单位效应相同,以此为基础来讨论不同情境下两种冲突的主次地位的变化情况。
[2]冷兆松.发展混合所有制经济的决策演进[J].当代中国史研究,2015,(6):36-45
[3]李维安.深化国企改革与发展混合所有制[J].南开管理评论,2014,(3):1
[4]Dharwadkar R.,George G.,Brandes P.Privatization in Emerging Economies:An Agency Theory Perspective[J].Academy of Management Review,2000,25(3):650-669
[5]陈岩,张斌.基于所有权视角的企业创新理论框架与体系[J].经济学动态,2013,(9):50-59
[6]武常岐,韩煦.管理学视角下的民营化现象:一个多层面的研究框架[J].管理世界,2011,(8):92-101
[7]余玮,郑颖.国有上市公司民营化绩效研究[J].管理评论,2012,24(5):44-52
[8]Kim H.,Kim H.,Lee P.M.Ownership Structure and the Relationship between Financial Slack and R&D Investments:Evidence from Korean Firms[J].Organization Science,2008,19(3):404-418
[9]Xia F.,Walker G.How Much Does Owner Type Matter for Firm Performance?Manufacturing Firms in China 1998-2007[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,36(3):576-585
[10]马连福,王丽丽,张琦.混合所有制的优序选择:市场的逻辑[J].中国工业经济,2015,(7):5-20
[11]杨志强,石水平,石本仁,等.混合所有制、股权激励与融资决策中的防御行为---基于动态权衡理论的证据[J].财经研究,2016,(8):108-120
[12]Li Y.,Guo H.,Yi Y.,Liu Y.Ownership Concentration and Product Innovation in Chinese Firms:The Mediating Role of Learning Orientation[J].Management and Organization Review,2010,6(1):77-100
[13]Xu E.,Zhang H.The Impact of State Shares on Corporate Innovation Strategy and Performance in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2008,25(3):473-487
[14]Yang Z.,Zhou X.,Zhang P.Centralization and Innovation Performance in an Emerging Economy:Testing the Moderating Effects[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2015,32(2):415-442
[15]张西征.中国企业所有权结构对研发投资影响的研究[J].管理学报,2013,10(10):1492-1501
[16]吴延兵.中国哪种所有制类型企业最具创新性?[J].世界经济,2012,(6):3-25
[17]鲁桐,党印.公司治理与技术创新:分行业比较[J].经济研究,2014,(6):115-128
[18]Young M.N.,Peng M.W.,Ahlstrom D.,et al.Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies:A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective[J].Journal of Management Studies,2008,45(1):196-220
[19]Chen V.Z.,Li J.,Shapiro D.M.,et al.Ownership Structure and Innovation:An Emerging Market Perspective[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2014,31(1):1-24
[20]Jensen M.C.,Meckling W.H.Theory of Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360
[21]冯根福.双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架---兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J].经济研究,2004,(12):16-25
[22]Su Y.,Xu D.,Phan P.H.Principal-Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation[J].Management and Organization Review,2008,4(1):17-38
[23]Johnson S.,Porta R.L.,Lopez-de-Silanes F.,et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27
[24]Luo J.,Wan D.,Cai D.,et al.Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Governance:The Role of Shareholder Numbers,Contest for Control,and Formal Institutions in Chinese Family Firms[J].Management and Organization Review,2013,9(2):265-294
[25]申慧慧,于鹏,吴联生.国有股权、环境不确定性与投资效率[J].经济研究,2012,(7):113-126
[26]王元芳,马连福.国有企业党组织能降低代理成本吗?---基于“内部人控制”的视角[J].管理评论,2014,26(10):138-151
[27]Morck R.,Yeung B.Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2003,27(4):367-382
[28]Shen W.,Zhou Q.,Lau C.M.Empirical Research on Corporate Governance in China:A Review and New Directions for the Future[J].Management and Organization Review,2016,12(1):41-73
[29]苏敬勤,林菁菁.国有企业的自主创新:除了政治身份还有哪些情境因素?[J].管理评论,2016,28(3):230-240
[30]Aguilera R.V.,Desender K.,Bednar M.K.,et al.Connecting the Dots:Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle[J].Academy of Management Annals,2015,9(1):483-573
[31]周亚虹,贺小丹,沈瑶.中国工业企业自主创新的影响因素和产出绩效研究[J].经济研究,2012,(5):107-119
[32]聂辉华,江艇,杨汝岱.中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题[J].世界经济,2012,(5):142-158
[33]杨洋,魏江,罗来军.谁在利用政府补贴进行创新?---所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应[J].管理世界,2015,(1):75-86
[34]李文贵,余明桂.民营化企业的股权结构与企业创新[J].管理世界,2015,(4):112-125
[35]Zhou C.,Li J.Product Innovation in Emerging Market-Based International Joint Ventures:An Organizational Ecology Perspective[J].Journal of International Business Studies,2008,39(7):1114-1132
[36]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数:各地区市场化相对进程2011年报告[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2011
[37]Tihanyi L.,Johnson R.A.,Hoskisson R.E.,et al.Institutional Ownership Differences and International Diversification:The Effects of Boards of Directors and Technological Opportunity[J].Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(2):195-211
[38]Li J.,Chen D.,Shapiro D.M.Product Innovations in Emerging Economies:The Role of Foreign Knowledge Access Channels and Internal Efforts in Chinese Firms[J].Management and Organization Review,2010,6(2):243-266
[39]Zhou K.Z.,Gao G.Y.,Zhao H.State Ownership and Firm Innovation in China:An Integrated View of Institutional and Efficiency Logics[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2017,62(2):375-404
[40]Aiken L.S.,West S.G.,Reno R.R.Multiple Regression:Testing and Interpreting Interactions[M].California:Sage Publications,1991
[41]余汉,杨中仑,宋增基.国有股权、政治关联与公司绩效---基于中国民营控股上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2017,29(4):196-212
[42]Barroso Casado R.,Burkert M.,Dávila A.,et al.Shareholder Protection:The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2016,24(2):105-129
[43]Singla C.,Veliyath R.,George R.Family Firms and Internationalization-Governance Relationships:Evidence of Secondary A-gency Issues[J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(4):606-616
[44]Misangyi V.F.,Acharya A.G.Substitutes or Complements?A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms[J].Academy of Management Journal,2014,57(6):1681-1705
[45]张卓元.从“管企业为主”到“管资本为主”:国企改革的重大理论创新[J].新视野,2016,(3):13-16
[46]郝云宏,汪茜.混合所有制企业股权制衡机制研究---基于“鄂武商控制权之争”的案例解析[J].中国工业经济,2015,(3):148-160
[47]Nieto M.J.,Rodríguez A.Offshoring of R&D:Looking Abroad to Improve Innovation Performance[J].Journal of International Business Studies,2011,42(3):345-361
[48]陈岩,张斌,翟瑞瑞.国有企业债务结构对创新的影响---是否存在债务融资滥用的经验检验[J].科研管理,2016,(4):16-26
[49]Nieto M.,Quevedo P.Absorptive Capacity,Technological Opportunity,Knowledge Spillovers,and Innovative Effort[J].Technovation,2005,25(10):1141-1157
[50]陈霞,马连福,丁振松.国企分类治理、政府控制与高管薪酬激励---基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2017,29(3):147-156
(1)由于PAC与PPC可能带来不同的经济效益后果,而且两者也无法从统一的计量单位来度量,因此无法定量讨论PAC与PPC的单位效应大小。在本文分析中,假定两种冲突的单位效应相同,以此为基础来讨论不同情境下两种冲突的主次地位的变化情况。
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