买方势力与技术创新:研究综述与未来展望
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摘要
技术创新是引领企业发展的第一动力。企业的创新决策不仅受到横向市场结构的影响,还受到来自于产业链上下游相对市场势力的制约。本文从四个研究视角梳理总结了买方势力的概念内涵,并从三个维度剖析了其产生动因与形成机制。在此基础上,本文从理论与实证两个视角对买方势力与技术创新关系的研究进行归纳与评述。最后,基于现有研究的局限性提出未来研究方向,以期为企业创新机制的建立和反垄断规制政策的实施提供参考与借鉴。
Technological innovation is the first driving force to lead the development of enterprises,and it is also the main factor for enterprises to gain core technological advantages. The innovation decision-making of enterprises is not only affected by the horizontal market structure,but also by the relative market forces from the upstream and downstream of the industry chain. With the continuous evolution of the vertical relationship of the industrial chain,the one-stop shopping malls,the franchise model,and the large-scale specialized retail chain enterprises have appeared in large numbers,which has promoted the horizontal competition among enterprises in the industry to extend to the vertical distribution relationship in the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain. The market position of downstream retail organization has undergone a revolutionary transformation,and the economic effects generated by the buyer's power have become an emerging field of research in recent years.As a complex dynamic process,innovation not only involves the innovation ability of the enterprises themselves,but also highly depends on external relationships. The buyer from the downstream of the industrial chain is a vital stakeholder of the company,and its bargaining power has an important influence on the strategic decision of the enterprise. Retailers in a dominant position often influence the interests of suppliers in various ways. Common economic regulation methods can be roughly divided into two categories: one is price regulation,such as non-linear pricing,slotting fees,discount points,deferred payments,resale price maintenance; the other is rights regulation,such as the signing of exclusive contracts (including exclusive areas and exclusive transactions),bundling sales and so on. Large retailers have changed the vertical equilibrium relationship of the original industrial chain with the increase of buyer power,and triggered a series of conflicts between retailers and suppliers. The problems caused by the contradiction between retailers and suppliers have become the focus of attention of social and the anti-monopoly department.This paper sorts out and summarizes the conceptual and connotation of buyer power from four research perspectives of purchasing intermediate goods price,transaction negotiation ability,long-term opportunity cost and external selection value. At the same time,this paper analyzes its generating motivation and formation mechanism from three dimensions,namely the change of market structure,the choice of external value and the degree of vertical dependence. On this basis,this paper summarizes and reviews the research on the relationship between buyer power and technological innovation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The existing theoretical researches can be subdivided into two categories. The first kind of theoretical research mainly discusses the influence of buyer power on process innovation of upstream manufacturers. The second kind of theoretical research is mainly based on the horizontal differentiation model to explore the influence of buyer power on product innovation of upstream manufacturers. The existing empirical researches on the relationship between buyer power and technological innovation mainly focus on traditional industries with strong industry chain correlations,such as retail industry,pharmaceutical industry,steel industry,automobile manufacturing and so on,while the research based on micro-enterprise data is relatively less. From the empirical research results,the relationship between the two is uncertain,and the existing research conclusions can be summed up into tree types: promotion relationship,inhibition relationship or non-linear relationship. Different types of research results are mainly due to the difference of data selection and the different measurement methods of core variables.Finally,based on the limitations of existing research,the future research directions are proposed,which can provide reference for the establishment of enterprise innovation mechanism and the implementation of anti-monopoly regulation policy.Firstly,in the future research,factors such as R&D decision-making,service decision-making,and information sharing decision-making should be taken into account to further analyze the influence of buyer power on the technological innovation effect of upstream suppliers.Secondly,as a network-based organizational structure,the market forces between the horizontal and vertical dimensions have interaction and mutual influence. The enhancement of the horizontal market power of downstream enterprises will expand their vertical control ability,and then affect the profit distribution of the industrial chain and the innovation decision-making of the upstream enterprises. Therefore,market power in the horizontal dimension is a prerequisite for the formation of vertical market power. However,the existing relevant researches often separate the two. Therefore,in the future research,the interaction between the horizontal and vertical market forces on upstream technological innovation should be taken into account.Thirdly,in the future research,more attention should be paid to emerging industries with strong vertical correlations in the industry chain and close links between upstream and downstream technologies,such as emerging industries relying on Internet development.Fourthly,with the continuous strengthening of the technological innovation diffusion caused by the industrialinnovation strategic alliance,in order to achieve mutual benefit and win-win goal while sharing the cost of R&D and obtaining complementary resources,some retailers and suppliers have transformed the situation of competing from upstream to downstream into the situation of supply chain coordination,and established a vertical supply chain cooperation system centered on downstream retailers. Therefore,more attention should be paid to the impact of vertical technology spillover effects brought by buyer power and technological innovation in the future research,including vertical cooperative innovation forms such as R&D alliance characterized by benefit sharing.The theoretical significance of this paper mainly includes three aspects. Firstly,this paper reviews relevant literatures at home and abroad,and defines the connotation and characteristics of each concept,and builds a more comprehensive concept system to provide a clear overview for subsequent research. Secondly,it also deconstructs the motivation mechanism generated by the buyer's power from different dimensions,refines its influencing factors and mechanism of action. Thirdly,from the perspective of different innovation modes,this paper systematically summarizes and organizes the representative theoretical and empirical research literatures in this field,which not only clarifies the main line of the existing research system,but also makes up for the gap of literature research in this field.From the practical point of view,the research in this paper can provide systematic guidance for the formulation of innovation strategies and the implementation of anti-monopoly regulation polices for upstream and downstream enterprises in the industrial chain.
Technological innovation is the first driving force to lead the development of enterprises,and it is also the main factor for enterprises to gain core technological advantages. The innovation decision-making of enterprises is not only affected by the horizontal market structure,but also by the relative market forces from the upstream and downstream of the industry chain. With the continuous evolution of the vertical relationship of the industrial chain,the one-stop shopping malls,the franchise model,and the large-scale specialized retail chain enterprises have appeared in large numbers,which has promoted the horizontal competition among enterprises in the industry to extend to the vertical distribution relationship in the upstream and downstream of the industrial chain. The market position of downstream retail organization has undergone a revolutionary transformation,and the economic effects generated by the buyer's power have become an emerging field of research in recent years.As a complex dynamic process,innovation not only involves the innovation ability of the enterprises themselves,but also highly depends on external relationships. The buyer from the downstream of the industrial chain is a vital stakeholder of the company,and its bargaining power has an important influence on the strategic decision of the enterprise. Retailers in a dominant position often influence the interests of suppliers in various ways. Common economic regulation methods can be roughly divided into two categories: one is price regulation,such as non-linear pricing,slotting fees,discount points,deferred payments,resale price maintenance; the other is rights regulation,such as the signing of exclusive contracts (including exclusive areas and exclusive transactions),bundling sales and so on. Large retailers have changed the vertical equilibrium relationship of the original industrial chain with the increase of buyer power,and triggered a series of conflicts between retailers and suppliers. The problems caused by the contradiction between retailers and suppliers have become the focus of attention of social and the anti-monopoly department.This paper sorts out and summarizes the conceptual and connotation of buyer power from four research perspectives of purchasing intermediate goods price,transaction negotiation ability,long-term opportunity cost and external selection value. At the same time,this paper analyzes its generating motivation and formation mechanism from three dimensions,namely the change of market structure,the choice of external value and the degree of vertical dependence. On this basis,this paper summarizes and reviews the research on the relationship between buyer power and technological innovation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The existing theoretical researches can be subdivided into two categories. The first kind of theoretical research mainly discusses the influence of buyer power on process innovation of upstream manufacturers. The second kind of theoretical research is mainly based on the horizontal differentiation model to explore the influence of buyer power on product innovation of upstream manufacturers. The existing empirical researches on the relationship between buyer power and technological innovation mainly focus on traditional industries with strong industry chain correlations,such as retail industry,pharmaceutical industry,steel industry,automobile manufacturing and so on,while the research based on micro-enterprise data is relatively less. From the empirical research results,the relationship between the two is uncertain,and the existing research conclusions can be summed up into tree types: promotion relationship,inhibition relationship or non-linear relationship. Different types of research results are mainly due to the difference of data selection and the different measurement methods of core variables.Finally,based on the limitations of existing research,the future research directions are proposed,which can provide reference for the establishment of enterprise innovation mechanism and the implementation of anti-monopoly regulation policy.Firstly,in the future research,factors such as R&D decision-making,service decision-making,and information sharing decision-making should be taken into account to further analyze the influence of buyer power on the technological innovation effect of upstream suppliers.Secondly,as a network-based organizational structure,the market forces between the horizontal and vertical dimensions have interaction and mutual influence. The enhancement of the horizontal market power of downstream enterprises will expand their vertical control ability,and then affect the profit distribution of the industrial chain and the innovation decision-making of the upstream enterprises. Therefore,market power in the horizontal dimension is a prerequisite for the formation of vertical market power. However,the existing relevant researches often separate the two. Therefore,in the future research,the interaction between the horizontal and vertical market forces on upstream technological innovation should be taken into account.Thirdly,in the future research,more attention should be paid to emerging industries with strong vertical correlations in the industry chain and close links between upstream and downstream technologies,such as emerging industries relying on Internet development.Fourthly,with the continuous strengthening of the technological innovation diffusion caused by the industrialinnovation strategic alliance,in order to achieve mutual benefit and win-win goal while sharing the cost of R&D and obtaining complementary resources,some retailers and suppliers have transformed the situation of competing from upstream to downstream into the situation of supply chain coordination,and established a vertical supply chain cooperation system centered on downstream retailers. Therefore,more attention should be paid to the impact of vertical technology spillover effects brought by buyer power and technological innovation in the future research,including vertical cooperative innovation forms such as R&D alliance characterized by benefit sharing.The theoretical significance of this paper mainly includes three aspects. Firstly,this paper reviews relevant literatures at home and abroad,and defines the connotation and characteristics of each concept,and builds a more comprehensive concept system to provide a clear overview for subsequent research. Secondly,it also deconstructs the motivation mechanism generated by the buyer's power from different dimensions,refines its influencing factors and mechanism of action. Thirdly,from the perspective of different innovation modes,this paper systematically summarizes and organizes the representative theoretical and empirical research literatures in this field,which not only clarifies the main line of the existing research system,but also makes up for the gap of literature research in this field.From the practical point of view,the research in this paper can provide systematic guidance for the formulation of innovation strategies and the implementation of anti-monopoly regulation polices for upstream and downstream enterprises in the industrial chain.
引文
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(1)大型零售商基本都拥有自有品牌,如:沃尔玛有“惠宜”、“宜洁”等多个自有品牌;华润万家有“润之家”、“惠买”等多个自有品牌;华联超市于1996年创建“勤俭”等自有品牌。
[2]Scherer F M.Changing perspectives on the firm size problem[J].Innovation and Technological Change,1991,30(1):24-28.
[3]Yin X,Zuscovitch E.Is firm size conducive to R&D choice?A strategic analysis of product and process innovations[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1998,35(2):243-262.
[4]Yew-Kwang N G.Competition,monopoly,and the incentive to invent[J].Australian Economic Papers,1977,16(28):154-156.
[5]王子君.市场结构与技术创新---以美国AT&T公司的拆分为例[J].经济研究,2002(12):70-78.Wang Zijun.Market structure and technology innovation[J].Economic Research Journal,2002(12):70-78.
[6]Acs Z J,Audretsch D B.Innovation,market structure,and firm size[J].The Review of Economics and Statistics,1987,69(4):567-574.
[7]任峰,李垣,赵更申.产品生命周期对技术创新影响的实证研究[J].科研管理,2003(3):13-18.Ren Feng,Li Yuan,Zhao Gengshen.Empirical analyzing on the influence between product life cycle and technology innovation[J].Science Research Management,2003(3):13-18.
[8]Lin P,Saggi K.Product differentiation,process R&D,and the nature of market competition[J].European Economic Review,2002,46(1):201-211.
[9]Weiss P.Adoption of product and process innovations in differentiated markets:The impact of competition[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2003,23(3):301-314.
[10]Chen Z,Ding H,Liu Z.Downstream competition and the effects of buyer power[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2016,49(1):1-23.
[11]Galbraith J K.American capitalism:The concept of countervailing power[M].Boston:Boston Press,1952.
[12]Blair R D,Harrison J L.Monopsony:Antitrust law and economics[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1993.
[13]Noll R G.“Buyer power”and economic policy[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2005,72(2):589-624.
[14]Carstensen P C.Buyer power and the horizontal merger guidelines:Minor progress on an important issue[J].University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law,2012,14(3):775-821.
[15]OECD.Buying power:The exercise of market power by dominant buyers[R].Report of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices,Paris,1981.
[16]Dobson P,Waterson M,Chu A.The welfare consequences of the exercise of buyer power[R].London:Office of Fair Trading,1998.
[17]Clarke R,Davies S,Dobson P,et al.Buyer power and competition in European food retailing[M].Cheltenham:Edward Elgar,2002.
[18]Grimes W S..Buyer power and retail gatekeeper power:Protecting competition and the atomistic seller[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2005,72(2):563-588.
[19]Kirkwood J B.Buyer power and exclusionary conduct:Should brooke group set the standards for buyer-induced price discrimination and predatory bidding symposium:Buyer power and antitrust[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2005,72(2):625-668.
[20]OECD.Buyer power of large scale multiproduct retailers[R].Background Paper by the Secretariat,Roundtable on Buying Power,DAFFE/CLP(98)21,Paris,1998.
[21]Dobson P W,Inderst R.Differential buyer power and the waterbed effect:Do strong buyers benefit or harm consumers?[J].European Competition Law Review,2007,28(7):393-400.
[22]迈克尔·波特.竞争优势(中译本)[M].北京:华夏出版社,1997.Porter,M E.Competitive advantage[M].Beijing:Huaxia Publishing House.
[23]Caprice S,Schlippenbach V V.One-stop shopping as a cause of slotting fees:A rent-shifting mechanism[J].Journal of Economic&Management Strategy,2013,22(3):468-487.
[24]Salinger M A.Vertical mergers and market foreclosure[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1988,103(2):345-356.
[25]Kirkwood J B.Buyer power and exclusionary conduct:Should brooke group set the standards for buyer-induced price discrimination and predatory bidding?[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2005,72(2):625-668.
[26]Innes R,Sexton R J.Customer coalitions,monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence[J].European E-conomic Review,1993,378(8):1569-1597.
[27]K9hler C,Rammer C.Buyer power and suppliers’incentives to innovate[R].ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper,2012.
[28]Bergès-Sennou F.Store loyalty,bargaining power and the private label production issue[J].European Review of Agricultural Economics,2006,33(3):315-335.
[29]Mills D E.Why retailers sell private labels[J].Journal of E-conomics&Management Strategy,1995,4(3):509-528.
[30]Narasimhan C,Wilcox R T.Private labels and the channel relationship:A cross-category analysis[J].The Journal of Business,1998,71(4):573-600.
[31]Scott-Morton F,Zettelmeyer F.The strategic positioning of store brands in retailer-manufacturer negotiations[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2004,24(2):161-194.
[32]Meza S,Sudhir K.Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power?[J].Quantitative Marketing and Economics,2010,8(3):333-363.
[33]杨秀云,郭永,周鑫.资产专用性强度、买方抗衡势力与战略联盟---对航空公司拖欠机场费用案例的考察[J].产业经济研究,2010(5):01-08.Yang Xiuyun,Guo Yong,Zhou Xin.Asset specificity intensity,buyer countervailing power and strategic alliance---An investigation on a case which airlines own to airports[J].Industrial Economics Research,2010(5):01-08.
[34]Dosi G.Sources,procedures,and microeconomic effects of innovation[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1988,26(3):1120-1171.
[35]Inderst R,Wey C.Bargaining,mergers,and technology choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2003,34(1):1-19.
[36]Faulí-Oller R,Sandonís J,Santamaría J.Downstream mergers and upstream investment[J].The Manchester School,2011,79(4):884-898.
[37]Inderst R,Wey C.Buyer power and supplier incentives[J].European Economic Review,2007,51(3):647-667.
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(1)大型零售商基本都拥有自有品牌,如:沃尔玛有“惠宜”、“宜洁”等多个自有品牌;华润万家有“润之家”、“惠买”等多个自有品牌;华联超市于1996年创建“勤俭”等自有品牌。
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