拥有自有品牌零售商的平台开放策略研究
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摘要
随着电子商务的快速发展,零售商之间竞争加剧,自有品牌战略成为零售商获取竞争优势的关键。研究拥有自有品牌零售商的平台开放策略,通过对比零售商不开放平台和开放平台下的均衡利润,给出零售商平台开放策略选择条件,并分析产品之间价格影响系数、固定成本和潜在需求差异系数对零售商平台开放策略选择的影响,最后结合数值分析和京东自有品牌的发展现状验证了本文的主要研究结论。研究发现:第一,随着固定成本的增加,佣金费率逐渐减少,随着潜在需求差异系数的增加,佣金费率逐渐增加;第二,当产品之间的价格影响系数较小(较大)时,平台开放(不开放)是零售商的最优选择;第三,当固定成本较小(较大)时,平台开放(不开放)是零售商的最优选择;第四,当潜在需求差异系数较小(较大)时,平台开放(不开放)是零售商的最优选择。
With the rapid development of e-commerce and the increasing competition among retailers,store brand strategy becomes the key to gain competitive advantage.In general,retailers sell store brand products and other manufacturers' products at the same time.In e-commerce,most retailers choose to provide manufacturers with a sales platform that allows them to sell their products directly to consumers and receive commissions.For example,Dangdang.com not only sells its own brand "DANGDANG BABY",also allows other manufacturers to sell maternal and child products on its platform.However,when retailers sell store brand products and other manufacturers' products,the similarities between products may result in competition due to the proximity of products.Thus,many retailers with store brands,such as Wal-Mart and Tesco,still adopt traditional reseller model.In this way,retailers have two different strategies:first,open the platform to allow other manufacturers to sell products on the platform;second,do not open the platform,retailers purchase products form the manufacturer and then sale to consumers.Therefore,the open platform strategy of store brand retailer is examined,and the question is mainly answered in this paper:should the store brand retailer open its platform?Existing literatures on store brand mostly study the retailer's store brand strategy and manufacturer's preventive strategy,there is studies on the open platform strategy for the retailer with store brand.Moreover,few literatures of retailer platform openness strategy consider both the demand difference of store brand and manufacturer brand,price competition,fixed costs,and the endogenous commission rate.Thus,the key contribution of our study can be summarized as follows.The potential demand differences,competition degree and fixed costs are considered at same time.The platform open strategy of store brand retailers is studied,and some theoretical comclusions are proved by taking JD.com as a case.The paper is organized as follows:the equilibrium profit of the retailer and the manufacturer under close platform and open platform is obtained by building a linear demand function model,and then the condition of commission rate endogenous is given.Moreover,the conditions of the retailer open platform are given by comparison the equilibrium profit,and the influence of the coefficient of price influence,the fixed cost and the demand difference coefficient of store brand and manufacturer brand is analyzed.Finally,combined with numerical analysis and the development status of JD's store brand,the main conclusions of this paper are verified.The results show that,firstly,the commission rates gradually reduce with the increase in fixed costs or the decrease in the demand difference coefficient.Secondly,the retailer prefers to open platform when the price impact coefficient,or fixed cost,or the demand difference coefficient is small,and the retailer prefers to close platform when the price impact coefficient,or fixed cost,or the demand difference coefficient is bigger.Our findings not only complement the store brand and online marketplace literature but also provide testable empirical questions on the relationship and magnitude of different factors steering the strategy choice.
With the rapid development of e-commerce and the increasing competition among retailers,store brand strategy becomes the key to gain competitive advantage.In general,retailers sell store brand products and other manufacturers' products at the same time.In e-commerce,most retailers choose to provide manufacturers with a sales platform that allows them to sell their products directly to consumers and receive commissions.For example,Dangdang.com not only sells its own brand "DANGDANG BABY",also allows other manufacturers to sell maternal and child products on its platform.However,when retailers sell store brand products and other manufacturers' products,the similarities between products may result in competition due to the proximity of products.Thus,many retailers with store brands,such as Wal-Mart and Tesco,still adopt traditional reseller model.In this way,retailers have two different strategies:first,open the platform to allow other manufacturers to sell products on the platform;second,do not open the platform,retailers purchase products form the manufacturer and then sale to consumers.Therefore,the open platform strategy of store brand retailer is examined,and the question is mainly answered in this paper:should the store brand retailer open its platform?Existing literatures on store brand mostly study the retailer's store brand strategy and manufacturer's preventive strategy,there is studies on the open platform strategy for the retailer with store brand.Moreover,few literatures of retailer platform openness strategy consider both the demand difference of store brand and manufacturer brand,price competition,fixed costs,and the endogenous commission rate.Thus,the key contribution of our study can be summarized as follows.The potential demand differences,competition degree and fixed costs are considered at same time.The platform open strategy of store brand retailers is studied,and some theoretical comclusions are proved by taking JD.com as a case.The paper is organized as follows:the equilibrium profit of the retailer and the manufacturer under close platform and open platform is obtained by building a linear demand function model,and then the condition of commission rate endogenous is given.Moreover,the conditions of the retailer open platform are given by comparison the equilibrium profit,and the influence of the coefficient of price influence,the fixed cost and the demand difference coefficient of store brand and manufacturer brand is analyzed.Finally,combined with numerical analysis and the development status of JD's store brand,the main conclusions of this paper are verified.The results show that,firstly,the commission rates gradually reduce with the increase in fixed costs or the decrease in the demand difference coefficient.Secondly,the retailer prefers to open platform when the price impact coefficient,or fixed cost,or the demand difference coefficient is small,and the retailer prefers to close platform when the price impact coefficient,or fixed cost,or the demand difference coefficient is bigger.Our findings not only complement the store brand and online marketplace literature but also provide testable empirical questions on the relationship and magnitude of different factors steering the strategy choice.
引文
[1]Jin Yannan,Wu Xiaole,Hu Qiying.Interaction between channel strategy and store brand decisions[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,256(3):911-923.
[2]李海,崔南方,徐贤浩.零售商自有品牌与制造商直销渠道的互动博弈问题研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):107-115.
[3]覃龙飞.电商零售企业与传统百货企业自有品牌运营方式比较[J].商业经济研究,2017,(9):131-133.
[4]杨帆静.网络零售商与传统零售商自有品牌战略比较研究---以京东商城与华润万家为例[J].价格月刊,2017,(11):81-84.
[5]单娟,范小军.零售商形象、品类特征与自有品牌购买意愿[J].管理评论,2016,28(5):85-95.
[6]Cui Qinquan,Chiu Chunhung,Dai Xin,et al.Store brand introduction in a two-echelon logistics system with a risk-averse retailer[J].Transportation Research Part E,2016,90:69-89.
[7]Chen L,Gilbert S,Xia Y.Private labels:facilitators or impediments to supply chain coordination[J].Decision Sciences,2011,42(3):689-720.
[8]Groznik A,Heese H.Supply chain interactions due to store-brand introductions:The impact of retail competition[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,203(3):575-582.
[9]段永瑞,徐建,霍佳震.考虑参照效应的自有品牌动态定价策略[J].工业工程与管理,2017,22(1):14-21.
[10]Choi S,Fredj K.Price competition and store competition:store brands vs.national brand[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,225(1):166-178.
[11]陈瑞义,琚春华,盛昭瀚,等.基于零售商自有品牌供应链质量协同控制研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(8):63-74.
[12]Heese H.Competing with channel partners:Supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands[J].Naval Research Logistics,2010,57(5):441-459.
[13]Ru Jun,Shi Ruixia,Zhang Jun.Does a store brand always hurt the manufacturer of a competing national brand?[J].Production and Operations Management,2015,24(2),272-286.
[14]Nasser S,Turcic D,Narasimhan C.National brand’s response to store brands:Throw in the towel or fight back?[J].Marketing Science,2013,32(4),591-608.
[15]曹宗宏,刘文先,周永务.引入自有产品对零售商主导的供应链成员决策的影响[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(1):120-129.
[16]范小军,陈宏民.零售商导入自有品牌对渠道竞争的影响研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(6):79-87.
[17]Ryan J K,Sun D,Zhao X.Competition and coordination in online marketplaces[J].Production and Operations Management,2012,21(6),997-1014.
[18]Mantin B,Krishnan H,Dhar T.The strategic role of third-party marketplaces in retailing[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(11),1937-1949.
[19]骆品亮,傅联英.零售企业平台化转型及其双边定价策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(10):1-12.
[20]Hagiu A,Wright J.Marketplace or reseller?[J].Management Science,2015,61(1):184-203.
[21]张千帆,于晓娟,张亚军,等.基于消费者从众特性的零售平台的定价机制研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(9):1379-1384.
[22]滕文波,庄贵军.制造商基于服务水平的店中店模式选择[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(8):2004-2013.
[23]Abhishek V,Jerath K,Zhang Z.Agency selling or reselling?channel structures in electronic retailing[J].Management Science,2016,62(8):2259-2280.
[24]Yan Yingchen,Zhao Ruiqing,Liu Zhibing.Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under spillovers from online to offline sales[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,62(8):2259-2280.
[25]李佩,魏航.基于信誉的B2C平台开放和网络零售商进驻策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):172-180.
[26]Tian Lin,Vakharia A,Tan Yinliang,et al.Marketplace,reseller,or hybrid:A strategic analysis of emerging E-commerce model[J].Production and Operations Management,2016,DOI:10.1111/poms.12885.
[27]Economides N,Katsamakas E.Two-sided competition of proprietary vs open source technology platforms and the implications for the software industry[J].Management Science,2006,52(7):1057-1071.
[2]李海,崔南方,徐贤浩.零售商自有品牌与制造商直销渠道的互动博弈问题研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):107-115.
[3]覃龙飞.电商零售企业与传统百货企业自有品牌运营方式比较[J].商业经济研究,2017,(9):131-133.
[4]杨帆静.网络零售商与传统零售商自有品牌战略比较研究---以京东商城与华润万家为例[J].价格月刊,2017,(11):81-84.
[5]单娟,范小军.零售商形象、品类特征与自有品牌购买意愿[J].管理评论,2016,28(5):85-95.
[6]Cui Qinquan,Chiu Chunhung,Dai Xin,et al.Store brand introduction in a two-echelon logistics system with a risk-averse retailer[J].Transportation Research Part E,2016,90:69-89.
[7]Chen L,Gilbert S,Xia Y.Private labels:facilitators or impediments to supply chain coordination[J].Decision Sciences,2011,42(3):689-720.
[8]Groznik A,Heese H.Supply chain interactions due to store-brand introductions:The impact of retail competition[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2010,203(3):575-582.
[9]段永瑞,徐建,霍佳震.考虑参照效应的自有品牌动态定价策略[J].工业工程与管理,2017,22(1):14-21.
[10]Choi S,Fredj K.Price competition and store competition:store brands vs.national brand[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2013,225(1):166-178.
[11]陈瑞义,琚春华,盛昭瀚,等.基于零售商自有品牌供应链质量协同控制研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(8):63-74.
[12]Heese H.Competing with channel partners:Supply chain conflict when retailers introduce store brands[J].Naval Research Logistics,2010,57(5):441-459.
[13]Ru Jun,Shi Ruixia,Zhang Jun.Does a store brand always hurt the manufacturer of a competing national brand?[J].Production and Operations Management,2015,24(2),272-286.
[14]Nasser S,Turcic D,Narasimhan C.National brand’s response to store brands:Throw in the towel or fight back?[J].Marketing Science,2013,32(4),591-608.
[15]曹宗宏,刘文先,周永务.引入自有产品对零售商主导的供应链成员决策的影响[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(1):120-129.
[16]范小军,陈宏民.零售商导入自有品牌对渠道竞争的影响研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(6):79-87.
[17]Ryan J K,Sun D,Zhao X.Competition and coordination in online marketplaces[J].Production and Operations Management,2012,21(6),997-1014.
[18]Mantin B,Krishnan H,Dhar T.The strategic role of third-party marketplaces in retailing[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(11),1937-1949.
[19]骆品亮,傅联英.零售企业平台化转型及其双边定价策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(10):1-12.
[20]Hagiu A,Wright J.Marketplace or reseller?[J].Management Science,2015,61(1):184-203.
[21]张千帆,于晓娟,张亚军,等.基于消费者从众特性的零售平台的定价机制研究[J].管理学报,2015,12(9):1379-1384.
[22]滕文波,庄贵军.制造商基于服务水平的店中店模式选择[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(8):2004-2013.
[23]Abhishek V,Jerath K,Zhang Z.Agency selling or reselling?channel structures in electronic retailing[J].Management Science,2016,62(8):2259-2280.
[24]Yan Yingchen,Zhao Ruiqing,Liu Zhibing.Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under spillovers from online to offline sales[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,62(8):2259-2280.
[25]李佩,魏航.基于信誉的B2C平台开放和网络零售商进驻策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(3):172-180.
[26]Tian Lin,Vakharia A,Tan Yinliang,et al.Marketplace,reseller,or hybrid:A strategic analysis of emerging E-commerce model[J].Production and Operations Management,2016,DOI:10.1111/poms.12885.
[27]Economides N,Katsamakas E.Two-sided competition of proprietary vs open source technology platforms and the implications for the software industry[J].Management Science,2006,52(7):1057-1071.
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