上市公司股权激励与盈余管理关系实证研究——基于140家沪深上市公司数据
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摘要
自2016年《上市公司股权激励管理办法》推行以来,境内许多上市公司推出了股权激励计划,使得管理层管理效率和效果得以显著提升,但也引发了诸如盈余管理等一系列新问题。在文献研究基础上,文章以2013—2017年实施股权激励的140家上市公司为样本,分析了当前上市公司股权激励与盈余管理之间的关系,对股权激励与盈余管理的总体相关性,以及具体到股票行权时长、公司规模、大股东的持股比例等因素和盈余管理程度的关系进行了实证研究,并从完善激励机制、加强证券市场监管、改善内部治理结构以及建立规范的职业经理人市场等方面提出了针对性的政策建议。
As an effective incentive method, equity incentive can solve the problem of agency cost to improve management efficiency. Benefited from the implementation of equity incentive measures from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in2016, a rapid development of equity incentive can been seen in China's listed companies, and most of them put forward the equity incentive plan, but it also caused some problems, one of which is earnings management. Based on the literature research, this paper analyzes the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management of 140 listed companies from 2013 to 2017, which have implemented equity incentive. The general correlation between equity incentives and earnings management, as well as the relationship between the degree of earnings management and some specific factors such as stock exercise time length, scale of company, the shareholding proportion has been examined empirically. Based on the above research, more perfect incentive mechanism, more stringent securities market regulation, more scientific internal governance structure and more sophisticated professional manager market, which have been taken as policy suggestions, have been offered.
As an effective incentive method, equity incentive can solve the problem of agency cost to improve management efficiency. Benefited from the implementation of equity incentive measures from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in2016, a rapid development of equity incentive can been seen in China's listed companies, and most of them put forward the equity incentive plan, but it also caused some problems, one of which is earnings management. Based on the literature research, this paper analyzes the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management of 140 listed companies from 2013 to 2017, which have implemented equity incentive. The general correlation between equity incentives and earnings management, as well as the relationship between the degree of earnings management and some specific factors such as stock exercise time length, scale of company, the shareholding proportion has been examined empirically. Based on the above research, more perfect incentive mechanism, more stringent securities market regulation, more scientific internal governance structure and more sophisticated professional manager market, which have been taken as policy suggestions, have been offered.
引文
[1]Bergstresser.D.Thomas Philippon.CEO Incentive and Earnings Management[J].Journal of Financial Economies,2010(03):180-202.
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[7]龚慧云、刁淑婷.内部治理结构下的真实盈余管理研究--基于深市A股制造业上市公司的经验数据[J].求索,2016(11):116-120.
[8]唐松、孙铮.政治关联、高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效[J].管理世界,2014(11):93-105.
[2]罗宏、曾永良等.薪酬攀比、盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵[J].南开管理评论,2016(2):19-31.
[3]Jennifer J.Jones,Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-228.
[4]尚银霞.高管薪酬差距对盈余管理的影响研究[D].河北:河北经贸大学,2018.
[5]周华、莫彩华等.信息真实性与证券市场会计监管---基于股权投资信息披露规则的研究[J].中国软科学,2017(7):172-181.
[6]祁怀锦、黄有为.IPO公司盈余管理行为选择及不同市场间的差异[J].会计研究,2016(8):34-41.
[7]龚慧云、刁淑婷.内部治理结构下的真实盈余管理研究--基于深市A股制造业上市公司的经验数据[J].求索,2016(11):116-120.
[8]唐松、孙铮.政治关联、高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效[J].管理世界,2014(11):93-105.
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