财政自主与环境善治:环境税法实施中的法域协调
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摘要
生态文明建设表现为环境善治的塑造过程,离不开政策理性设计和环境合作共治的善政引导。环境税是国家创新环境政策和重构环境伙伴关系的制度产物,其实效效果取决于税制的科学设计、税权的自主实施和税政的环境优化。我国环境税法设计以践行税收法定和地方自主双重原则为出发点,赋予了地方较大的征管自主权和完全的收益自主权,但在后续实施阶段,存在着如何将地方的财政自主权力与环境善治目标严密契合的问题。以地方的现实运作来看,一方面地方在具体税额确定、环保标准设定以及应税污染物项目数增加等方面享有自主决定权,但该项权力行使要么处于静默状态,要么潜藏隐性风险。如在具体税额确定问题上,一些地方根据本地实际要么对特定污染物加以从重征收,要么实行区域内分类、分档征收,要么采取渐进性加重征收的模式,难以规避地方之间的邻避政策效应。另一方面,环境税收入全部归属地方,但大部分省级政府仍保留一定的环境税收入,呈现出倾斜共享、平均分配以及纯地方所有三种收入划分模式,而且现有的环境财政专项资金管理模式也存在一定弊端。本文认为,良好的环境税制度应秉承"环境善治"而非"财政增收"的立税初心,遵从环境税的税收机理和税权效能。高效的环境税实施机制应协调好"规制自主"与"财政自主"的功能向度,处理好"地方自主"与"中央集权"的关系,促成自主权能充分的地方与监管协调有力的中央的合作治理。优质的环境税外联环境应明确政府间事权与支出责任,促成整体税制的生态化转型,在法域范围内实现财税体制与生态体制二元改革的协同化和整合性。
The construction of ecological civilization is characterized by the shaping process of environmental good governance,which cannot be separated from the good governance guidance of policy rational design and environmental cooperation and governance.Environmental tax is the institutional product of the national innovation environmental policy and the reconstruction of environmental partnership. The effectiveness of the tax depends on the scientific design of the tax system,the independent implementation of tax rights and the environmental optimization of tax administration. The design of China's environmental tax law is based on the practice of the dual principles of taxation and local autonomy,and gives local greater autonomy in collection and management and full autonomy of income. However,in the subsequent implementation stage,we are confronted with the problem of how to closely integrate local financial autonomy with environmental good governance. On the one hand,in terms of the actual operation of the locality,the locality has the discretion to determine the specific tax amount,the setting of environmental protection standards,and the increase in the number of taxable pollutants,but the exercise of this power is either in a silent state or hidden risk. For example,when deciding the specific tax,some localities may levy specific pollutants according to local conditions,or carry out regional classification,sub-class levy,or adopt a progressive increase and levy mode,and it is difficult to avoid the avoidance between localities. On the other hand,environmental tax revenues all belong to the localities,but most of provincial governments still retain certain environmental tax revenues,reflecting three income classification models of oblique sharing,average distribution,and all local income sharing. Besides,there are some shortcomings in the management mode of the current special funds for environmental finance. This paper believes that a good environmental tax system should adhere to the'environmental good governance'rather than'financial income increase'taxation,and comply with the taxation mechanism of environmental tax and tax efficiency. The efficient environmental taxation implementation mechanism should coordinate the functional orientation of 'regulatory autonomy'and 'financial autonomy',make balance between'local autonomy'and 'centralization',and promote the central and regulatory coordination with sufficient autonomy. The smooth environmental tax outreach environment should clarify the intergovernmental responsibility and expenditure responsibility,promote the ecological transformation of the overall tax system,and realize the synergy and integration of the dual reform of the fiscal and taxation system and the ecological system within the jurisdiction.
The construction of ecological civilization is characterized by the shaping process of environmental good governance,which cannot be separated from the good governance guidance of policy rational design and environmental cooperation and governance.Environmental tax is the institutional product of the national innovation environmental policy and the reconstruction of environmental partnership. The effectiveness of the tax depends on the scientific design of the tax system,the independent implementation of tax rights and the environmental optimization of tax administration. The design of China's environmental tax law is based on the practice of the dual principles of taxation and local autonomy,and gives local greater autonomy in collection and management and full autonomy of income. However,in the subsequent implementation stage,we are confronted with the problem of how to closely integrate local financial autonomy with environmental good governance. On the one hand,in terms of the actual operation of the locality,the locality has the discretion to determine the specific tax amount,the setting of environmental protection standards,and the increase in the number of taxable pollutants,but the exercise of this power is either in a silent state or hidden risk. For example,when deciding the specific tax,some localities may levy specific pollutants according to local conditions,or carry out regional classification,sub-class levy,or adopt a progressive increase and levy mode,and it is difficult to avoid the avoidance between localities. On the other hand,environmental tax revenues all belong to the localities,but most of provincial governments still retain certain environmental tax revenues,reflecting three income classification models of oblique sharing,average distribution,and all local income sharing. Besides,there are some shortcomings in the management mode of the current special funds for environmental finance. This paper believes that a good environmental tax system should adhere to the'environmental good governance'rather than'financial income increase'taxation,and comply with the taxation mechanism of environmental tax and tax efficiency. The efficient environmental taxation implementation mechanism should coordinate the functional orientation of 'regulatory autonomy'and 'financial autonomy',make balance between'local autonomy'and 'centralization',and promote the central and regulatory coordination with sufficient autonomy. The smooth environmental tax outreach environment should clarify the intergovernmental responsibility and expenditure responsibility,promote the ecological transformation of the overall tax system,and realize the synergy and integration of the dual reform of the fiscal and taxation system and the ecological system within the jurisdiction.
引文
[1]褚睿刚.环境保护税立法目的选择刍议——兼论《环境保护税法》[J].中国石油大学学报(社会科学版),2017,33(3):44-50.
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[6]何锦前.地方财政自主权的边界分析[J].法学评论,2016(3):41-48.
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[8]戚学祥.我国环境治理的现实困境与突破路径——基于中央与地方关系的视角[J].党政研究,2017(6):115-121.
[9]侯卓.论税法分配功能的二元结构[J].法学,2018(1):19-30.
[10]冉冉.中国地方环境政治:政策与执行之间的距离[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2015:53-62,118.
[11]黎江虹,黄家强.论财政嵌入环境治理的制度逻辑和分权路径[J].江汉论坛,2018(4):138-144.
[12]ZHENG Y N. De facto federalism in China:reforms and dynamics of central-local relations[M]. Singapore:World Scientific Publishing,2007:28.
[13]刘承礼.中国式财政分权的解释逻辑:从理论述评到实践推演[J].经济学家,2011(7):61-69.
[14]裴晓菲.我国环境标准体系的现状、问题与对策[J].环境保护,2016,44(14):16-19.
[15]毕岑岑,王铁宇,吕永龙.环境基准向环境标准转化的机制探讨[J].环境科学,2012(12):4422-4427.
[16]逯元堂,吴舜泽,朱建华.中央财政环境保护专项资金优化设计探讨[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(S1):424-427.
[17]刘剑文,侯卓.事权划分法治化的中国路径[J].中国社会科学,2017(2):102-122.
[18]赵永亮,赵德余,辛广海.财政分权下地方政府三大“支出偏好”与经济绩效研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2011(2):1-6.
[19]叶金育.污染产品课税:从消费税到环境税[J].中国政法大学学报,2017(5):101-111.
[20]罗卫东,朱翔宇.“权责对称”与我国分税制以来的财政体制改革[J].南京社会科学,2018(4):30-38.
[21]王桦宇.论财税体制改革的“两个积极性”——以财政事权与支出责任划分的政制经验为例[J].法学,2017(11):26-38.
[22]CORY D C,RAHMAN T,ARADHYULA S V. Environmental justice and federalism[M]. Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing,2012:12.
[23]JAMES M B,RICHARD A M. Public finance and public choice:two contrasting visions of the state[M]. London:The MIT Press,1999:23.
[2]叶金育,褚睿刚.环境税立法目的:从形式诉求到实质要义[J].法律科学,2017(1):79-89.
[3]熊伟.环境财政、法制创新与生态文明建设[J].法学论坛,2014(4):62-69.
[4]何锦前.论环境税法的功能定位——基于对“零税收论”的反思[J].现代法学,2016,38(4):97-109.
[5]陈少英.环境排污费改税的立法选择——基于税收本质观的重新思考[J].华东理工大学学报(社会科学版),2016,31(1):108-116.
[6]何锦前.地方财政自主权的边界分析[J].法学评论,2016(3):41-48.
[7]STAVINS R N,PORTNEY P R. Public policies for environmental protection[M]. Washington D C:Resources for the Future,2000:31.
[8]戚学祥.我国环境治理的现实困境与突破路径——基于中央与地方关系的视角[J].党政研究,2017(6):115-121.
[9]侯卓.论税法分配功能的二元结构[J].法学,2018(1):19-30.
[10]冉冉.中国地方环境政治:政策与执行之间的距离[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2015:53-62,118.
[11]黎江虹,黄家强.论财政嵌入环境治理的制度逻辑和分权路径[J].江汉论坛,2018(4):138-144.
[12]ZHENG Y N. De facto federalism in China:reforms and dynamics of central-local relations[M]. Singapore:World Scientific Publishing,2007:28.
[13]刘承礼.中国式财政分权的解释逻辑:从理论述评到实践推演[J].经济学家,2011(7):61-69.
[14]裴晓菲.我国环境标准体系的现状、问题与对策[J].环境保护,2016,44(14):16-19.
[15]毕岑岑,王铁宇,吕永龙.环境基准向环境标准转化的机制探讨[J].环境科学,2012(12):4422-4427.
[16]逯元堂,吴舜泽,朱建华.中央财政环境保护专项资金优化设计探讨[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(S1):424-427.
[17]刘剑文,侯卓.事权划分法治化的中国路径[J].中国社会科学,2017(2):102-122.
[18]赵永亮,赵德余,辛广海.财政分权下地方政府三大“支出偏好”与经济绩效研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2011(2):1-6.
[19]叶金育.污染产品课税:从消费税到环境税[J].中国政法大学学报,2017(5):101-111.
[20]罗卫东,朱翔宇.“权责对称”与我国分税制以来的财政体制改革[J].南京社会科学,2018(4):30-38.
[21]王桦宇.论财税体制改革的“两个积极性”——以财政事权与支出责任划分的政制经验为例[J].法学,2017(11):26-38.
[22]CORY D C,RAHMAN T,ARADHYULA S V. Environmental justice and federalism[M]. Cheltenham:Edward Elgar Publishing,2012:12.
[23]JAMES M B,RICHARD A M. Public finance and public choice:two contrasting visions of the state[M]. London:The MIT Press,1999:23.
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