展厅模式下制造商的质量与价格竞争
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摘要
根据消费者对线上产品信息的了解程度,将市场中消费者分为高信息消费者和低信息消费者,利用Hotelling模型构造消费者的效用函数,分析两个竞争性的制造商关于开设展厅的Bertrand博弈以及制造商开设展厅后的质量和价格决策,并进行均衡分析。结果表明:当开设展厅的固定成本很低或可以忽略不计时,若低信息消费者对线上产品信任度很低,两个制造商都会开设展厅,同时其最优价格以及质量都会增加,但双方都获得较低的利润,陷入囚徒的困境;若低信息消费者对线上产品信任度很高时,两个制造商都不开设展厅,双方达到帕累托最优;当低信息消费者对线上产品信任度中等时,均衡策略与市场中低信息消费者比例有关,低信息消费者较多时,都不开设展厅,低信息消费者较少时,都开设展厅。当开设展厅的固定成本达到某一值,无论市场中的低信息消费者的多少或者信任度的高低,制造商都不会开设展厅。
This paper divides consumers into high-level and low-level informed ones based on different consumers with different product information,and then establishes the utility function for each consumer. Subsequently,it analyzes the Bertrand game between two manufacturers about whether to open the showroom and their corresponding quality-price strategies after opening showrooms. The results show that when the fixed cost of showroom is low or can be ignored,both manufactures would open showrooms if low-level informed consumers have a low trust degree of online products,and meanwhile their optimal prices and quality will increase,but both manufacturers would get the least profits and are trapped into Prisoner's Dilemma. While under the condition of low-level informed consumers with high trust degree of online products,both manufacturers will choose not to open showrooms,and both parties achieve Pareto optimality. And when their trust degree is medium or partial,both manufactures would open showrooms or choose not to open showrooms,which are connected with the proportion of low-level informed consumers. However,while the fixed cost of opening showroom reaches a certain value,no matter how many low-level informed consumers or how high the trust degree of the low-level informed consumers in the market it has,the manufacturer will not open showroom.
This paper divides consumers into high-level and low-level informed ones based on different consumers with different product information,and then establishes the utility function for each consumer. Subsequently,it analyzes the Bertrand game between two manufacturers about whether to open the showroom and their corresponding quality-price strategies after opening showrooms. The results show that when the fixed cost of showroom is low or can be ignored,both manufactures would open showrooms if low-level informed consumers have a low trust degree of online products,and meanwhile their optimal prices and quality will increase,but both manufacturers would get the least profits and are trapped into Prisoner's Dilemma. While under the condition of low-level informed consumers with high trust degree of online products,both manufacturers will choose not to open showrooms,and both parties achieve Pareto optimality. And when their trust degree is medium or partial,both manufactures would open showrooms or choose not to open showrooms,which are connected with the proportion of low-level informed consumers. However,while the fixed cost of opening showroom reaches a certain value,no matter how many low-level informed consumers or how high the trust degree of the low-level informed consumers in the market it has,the manufacturer will not open showroom.
引文
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[15] Wang Y. Joint pricing-production decisions in supply chains of complementary products with uncertain demand[J]. Operations Research,2006,54(6):1110-1127.
[16] Matsubayashi N. Price and quality competition:the effect of differentiation and vertical integration[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,180(2):907-921.
[17] Kim K, Chhajed D. Product design with multiple quality-type attriutes[J]. Management Science,2002,48(11):1502-1511.
[18]胡东滨,李洋,陈晓红,彭宛露.基于信息共享角度的团购策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(11):2849-2861.
[19] Bohlmann J D,Golder P N,Mitra D. Deconstructing the pioneer’s advantage:examining vintage effects and consumer valuations of quality and variety[J]. Management Science,2002,48(9):1175-1195.
[20] Kim HW,Xu Y,Gupta S. Which is more important in Internet shopping,perceived price or trust?[J]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,2012,11(3):241-252.
[21] Shin J. How does free riding on customer service affect competition?[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(4):488-503.
[22]孙晓东,田澎,赵藜.消费者异质下基于质量-价格竞争的定价策略选择[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(3):349-357.
[23]丁正平,刘业政.存在搭便车时双渠道供应链的收益共享契约[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(3):370-376.
[24] Balasubramanian S,Bhardwaj P. When not all conflict is bad:Manufacturing-marketing conflict and strategic incentive design[J]. Management Science,2004,50(4):489-502.
[2] Yan R,Wang J,Zhou B. Channel integration and profit sharing in the dynamics of multi-channel firms[J].Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services,2010,17(5):430-440.
[3] Xu L,Li Y,Govindan K,Xu X. Consumer returns policies with endogenous deadline and supply chain coordination[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2015,242(1):88-99.
[4] Bell D R,Gallino S,Moreno A. Inventory showrooms and customer migration in omni-channel retail:the effect of product information[J]. Available at SSRN2370535,2013.
[5] Neslin S A,Jerath K,Bodapati A,et al. The interrelationships between brand and channel choice[J]. Marketing Letters,2014,25(3):319-330.
[6] Feit E M D,Wang P,Bradlow E T,Fader P S. Fusing aggregate and disaggregate data with an application to multiplatform media consumption[J]. Journal of Marketing Research,2013,50(3):348-364.
[7] Soh C,Markus M L,Goh K H. Electronic marketplaces and price transparency:strategy,information technology,and success[J]. MIS quarterly,2006:705-723.
[8] Rapp A,Baker T L,Bachrach D G,Ogilvie J,Beitelspacherc L S. Perceived customer showrooming behavior and the effect on retail salesperson self-efficacy and performance[J]. Journal of Retailing,2015,91(2):358-369.
[9] Sharma A,Levy M,Kumar A. Knowledge structures and retail sales performance:an empirical examination[J].Journal of Retailing,2000,76(1):53-69.
[10] Liu Q.‘Showrooming’and price-matching guarantee[J]. Available at SSRN 1862181,2013:53-69.
[11]李波,孙鹏,李庆华.双渠道供应链中信息共享价值研究[J].系统工程学报,2015,30(004):530-538.
[12] Xiao T, Xia Y, Zhang G P. Strategic outsourcing decisions for manufacturers competing on product quality[J]. IIE Transactions,2014,46(4):313-329.
[13] Gilbert S M,Xia Y,Yu G. Strategic outsourcing for competing OEMs that face cost reduction opportunities[J]. IIE Transactions,2006,38(11):903-915.
[14] Xiao T,Xia Y,Zhang G P. Strategic outsourcing decisions for manufacturers that produce partially substitutable products in a quantity-setting duopoly situation[J].Decision Sciences,2007,38(1):81-106.
[15] Wang Y. Joint pricing-production decisions in supply chains of complementary products with uncertain demand[J]. Operations Research,2006,54(6):1110-1127.
[16] Matsubayashi N. Price and quality competition:the effect of differentiation and vertical integration[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,180(2):907-921.
[17] Kim K, Chhajed D. Product design with multiple quality-type attriutes[J]. Management Science,2002,48(11):1502-1511.
[18]胡东滨,李洋,陈晓红,彭宛露.基于信息共享角度的团购策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(11):2849-2861.
[19] Bohlmann J D,Golder P N,Mitra D. Deconstructing the pioneer’s advantage:examining vintage effects and consumer valuations of quality and variety[J]. Management Science,2002,48(9):1175-1195.
[20] Kim HW,Xu Y,Gupta S. Which is more important in Internet shopping,perceived price or trust?[J]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,2012,11(3):241-252.
[21] Shin J. How does free riding on customer service affect competition?[J]. Marketing Science,2007,26(4):488-503.
[22]孙晓东,田澎,赵藜.消费者异质下基于质量-价格竞争的定价策略选择[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(3):349-357.
[23]丁正平,刘业政.存在搭便车时双渠道供应链的收益共享契约[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(3):370-376.
[24] Balasubramanian S,Bhardwaj P. When not all conflict is bad:Manufacturing-marketing conflict and strategic incentive design[J]. Management Science,2004,50(4):489-502.
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