政府清廉、财政政策与经济增长
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摘要
减速治理背景下,政府官员廉洁程度与财政政策有效性之间的动态关系引起社会广泛关注。基于赋予转移概率以时变特征的MS-TVTP模型,研究发现:中国腐败治理取得阶段性成果,但并未呈现持续性改善趋势;政府廉洁状况的改善有助于财政政策有效性的提高,也有利于经济扩张区间的相对延长,最终促进经济增长,但由于中国尚处于腐败较为严重区间且改善程度有限,导致这一促进作用并不十分突出;此外,信贷政策对经济增长的促进作用已十分有限。
Under the background of deceleration governance,the dynamic relationship between the integrity of government officials and the effectiveness of fiscal policy has aroused widespread concern in society.Based on the MS-TVTP model,in consideration of transfer probability with time-varying characteristics,the research found that,China's corruption governance has achieved periodic results,but it has not shown a continuous improvement trend;the improvement of the government's integrity is helpful to improve the effectiveness of fiscal policy,and is conducive to the relative extension of the economic expansion interval,and ultimately promotes economic growth,however,due to the fact that China is still a severe corruption area and the degree of improvement is limited,the promotion effect is not very prominent;in addition,the promotion of credit policy to economic growth is very limited.
Under the background of deceleration governance,the dynamic relationship between the integrity of government officials and the effectiveness of fiscal policy has aroused widespread concern in society.Based on the MS-TVTP model,in consideration of transfer probability with time-varying characteristics,the research found that,China's corruption governance has achieved periodic results,but it has not shown a continuous improvement trend;the improvement of the government's integrity is helpful to improve the effectiveness of fiscal policy,and is conducive to the relative extension of the economic expansion interval,and ultimately promotes economic growth,however,due to the fact that China is still a severe corruption area and the degree of improvement is limited,the promotion effect is not very prominent;in addition,the promotion of credit policy to economic growth is very limited.
引文
[1]陈兴,韦倩,CHEN Xing,等.寻租活动、行政距离与政府补助——基于上市公司数据的实证研究[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2017,1(4):65-72.
[2]杨秋菊,李金龙.腐败行为的经济学思考[J].财经理论与实践,2002(1):18-20.
[3] Engen E M,Skinner J.Fiscal policy and economic growth[R].National Bureau of Economic Research,1992.
[4]Mo P H.Corruption and economic growth[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2001,29(1):66-79.
[5]阎坤,王进杰.积极财政政策与经济增长的效应分析[J].世界经济,2003(4):52-59.
[6]满向昱,宋彦蓉,郑志聪.我国财政政策对经济增长的非对称性效应研究[J].财政研究,2015(4):60-68.
[7] Lui F T.An equilibrium queuing model of bribery[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(4):760-781.
[8] Pellegrini L,Gerlagh R.Corruption's effect on growth and its transmission channels[J].Kyklos,2004,57(3):429-456.
[9] Méndez F,Sepúlveda F.Corruption,growth and political regimes:cross country evidence[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2006,22(1):82-98.
[10]Méon P G,Weill L.Does financial intermediation matter for macroeconomic performance?[J].Economic Modelling,2010,27(1):296-303.
[11] Hessami Z.Political corruption,public procurement,and budget composition:theory and evidence from OECD countries[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2014,34(6):372-389.
[12]刘勇政,冯海波.腐败、公共支出效率与长期经济增长[J].经济研究,2011(9):17-28.
[13]谷成,曲红宝.财政政策、腐败与经济增长:理论分析与现实考察[J].经济社会体制比较,2017(4):70-83.
[14]吴宜勇,胡日东,袁正中.基于MSBVAR模型的中国金融风险预警研究[J].金融经济学研究,2016(5):13-23.
[15]中国人民银行济南分行课题组.信贷政策和财政政策支持三农的协同效应研究[J].金融发展研究,2008(12):3-6.
[16]陈刚.上行下效:高官腐败的示范效应研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2013(2):155-164.
[17]张连城,韩蓓.中国潜在经济增长率分析——HP滤波平滑参数的选择及应用[J].经济与管理研究,2009(3):22-28.
[18]戴克明,王莉,许先普.货币扩张、消费习惯偏好与产出非对称效应研究[J].财经理论与实践,2015,36(2):16-21.
(1)产出缺口指标:利用HP滤波得到工业增加值IP(名义产出的一致指标)的趋势成分,将其视为潜在产出,名义产出与潜在产出之差被定义为产出缺口;财政政策(含政府清廉信息)指标:假定当年内各月份政府官员的廉洁程度不发生显著变化,为弱化量纲影响,最终选定全球清廉指数的1/10与公共财政支出当月同比数据的乘积作为代理指标。
(2)戴克明等(2015)将经济产出分为低增长区制与高增长区制。本文依据经济周期理论以及戴克明等(2015)等学者的研究成果,将中国经济增长划分为经济扩张期与经济收缩期。
[2]杨秋菊,李金龙.腐败行为的经济学思考[J].财经理论与实践,2002(1):18-20.
[3] Engen E M,Skinner J.Fiscal policy and economic growth[R].National Bureau of Economic Research,1992.
[4]Mo P H.Corruption and economic growth[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2001,29(1):66-79.
[5]阎坤,王进杰.积极财政政策与经济增长的效应分析[J].世界经济,2003(4):52-59.
[6]满向昱,宋彦蓉,郑志聪.我国财政政策对经济增长的非对称性效应研究[J].财政研究,2015(4):60-68.
[7] Lui F T.An equilibrium queuing model of bribery[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(4):760-781.
[8] Pellegrini L,Gerlagh R.Corruption's effect on growth and its transmission channels[J].Kyklos,2004,57(3):429-456.
[9] Méndez F,Sepúlveda F.Corruption,growth and political regimes:cross country evidence[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2006,22(1):82-98.
[10]Méon P G,Weill L.Does financial intermediation matter for macroeconomic performance?[J].Economic Modelling,2010,27(1):296-303.
[11] Hessami Z.Political corruption,public procurement,and budget composition:theory and evidence from OECD countries[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2014,34(6):372-389.
[12]刘勇政,冯海波.腐败、公共支出效率与长期经济增长[J].经济研究,2011(9):17-28.
[13]谷成,曲红宝.财政政策、腐败与经济增长:理论分析与现实考察[J].经济社会体制比较,2017(4):70-83.
[14]吴宜勇,胡日东,袁正中.基于MSBVAR模型的中国金融风险预警研究[J].金融经济学研究,2016(5):13-23.
[15]中国人民银行济南分行课题组.信贷政策和财政政策支持三农的协同效应研究[J].金融发展研究,2008(12):3-6.
[16]陈刚.上行下效:高官腐败的示范效应研究[J].经济社会体制比较,2013(2):155-164.
[17]张连城,韩蓓.中国潜在经济增长率分析——HP滤波平滑参数的选择及应用[J].经济与管理研究,2009(3):22-28.
[18]戴克明,王莉,许先普.货币扩张、消费习惯偏好与产出非对称效应研究[J].财经理论与实践,2015,36(2):16-21.
(1)产出缺口指标:利用HP滤波得到工业增加值IP(名义产出的一致指标)的趋势成分,将其视为潜在产出,名义产出与潜在产出之差被定义为产出缺口;财政政策(含政府清廉信息)指标:假定当年内各月份政府官员的廉洁程度不发生显著变化,为弱化量纲影响,最终选定全球清廉指数的1/10与公共财政支出当月同比数据的乘积作为代理指标。
(2)戴克明等(2015)将经济产出分为低增长区制与高增长区制。本文依据经济周期理论以及戴克明等(2015)等学者的研究成果,将中国经济增长划分为经济扩张期与经济收缩期。
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