摘要
以供应链纵向关系为研究背景,构建了一个上游制造商垄断且下游零售商竞争的纵向市场结构,并运用两阶段博弈模型考察由于下游零售商规模差异化而产生的买方势力对上游制造商技术创新决策的影响.结果表明,下游大规模零售商的买方势力的增强能够有效促进上游制造商的创新投入,与此同时,产品的零售价格和上游制造商的利润收益随买方势力的增强而降低,但对批发价格的影响是不确定的,主要取决于买方势力的大小.当买方势力较弱时,制造商会随着下游大规模零售商买方势力的增强而不断提高小规模零售商的批发价格;当买方势力较强时,上游制造商会随着大规模零售商买方势力的增强而降低小规模零售商的批发价格.
The vertical relationship of supply chain was selected as the research background,and a vertical market structure was constructed,consisting of a monopolistic manufacturer and two competing retailers. The two-stage game model was used to study the effect of buyer power caused by the dow nstream retailer's scale differences on the upstream manufacturer's technological innovation decision. The results show that the enhancement of the downstream large-scale retailer's buyer power can effectively promote the innovation of the upstream manufacturer; at the same time,the retailer's product price and the upstream manufacturer's profit will decrease along with the enhancement of buyer power. However,the impact on the wholesale price is uncertain,which mainly depends on the strength of buyer power. When the buyer power is weak,the manufacturer will increase the small-scale retailer's wholesale price along with the enhancement of large-scale retailer's buyer power. When the buyer power is strong,the upstream manufacturer will decrease the small-scale retailer's price along with the enhancement of large-scale retailer's buyer power.
引文
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