Seemings and the possibility of epistemic justification

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• 作者：Matthew Skene (1)
  
• 关键词：Seemings ; Huemer ; Justification ; Self ; defeat ; Phenomenal conservatism
• 刊名：Philosophical Studies
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：March 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：163
• 期：2
• 页码：539-559
• 全文大小：205KB
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• 作者单位：Matthew Skene (1)
  
  1. Syracuse University, 8330 E. Quincy Ave., I-307, Denver, CO, 80237, USA
  
• ISSN：1573-0883

文摘

I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their role of providing us with doxastic instructions guided by our epistemic aims. Understanding the nature of seemings allows us to underwrite recent epistemological work by Michael Huemer, and shows why he was right to claim that seemings are the source of all justification. I then look at some objections both to my arguments regarding the connection between seemings and justification, and to Huemer’s related “Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism-