家族企业为何解雇家族CEO?——基于QCA的探索性研究
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摘要
已有研究认为,非家族CEO会因为威胁家族控制、引发代理问题等原因,更容易被家族企业解雇。而本研究则进一步关注为何具有家族身份的CEO同样会遭到解雇。基于手工获取的研究样本,本研究通过定性比较分析(QCA)的方法进行了探索性研究,发现了"外部压力模式""家族利益权衡模式"以及"类创始人独控模式"三种解雇家族CEO的常见模式,并基于亲属关系与管理角色的视角进行了理论化阐释,尝试将家族企业领域的已有研究从"家族企业与非家族企业之间有何不同",向"包含不同亲属关系和管理角色的家族企业之间有何不同"的层面推动。
While family firms are more inclined to place family member in CEO position,this study focuses on what types of family firms are more likely to dismiss their family CEOs under performance pressure.The sample of this study comes from 458 Chinese family firms listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board and Growth Enterprise Board from 2004 to 2014.We define a firm as a family firm if it meets the following three requirements:(1) family members(usually the chairman) are the actual controller of the firm;(2) family ownership is higher than 20%;(3) at least one family member serve as executive,director or supervisor in the firm besides the chairman.We only retain sample family firms that have a family CEO and are under performance pressure(firm performance has declined for two consecutive years).69 family firms out of the 458 firms meet the requirement and are retained as our final sample firms to be added into analysis.We conduct a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis(QCA) on the sample firms and find three family firm styles that can lead to family CEO dismissal under performance pressure,namely "outside pressure style","family parliamentary style" and "quasi-lone-founder style".We explain the internal mechanisms of these styles from the perspectives of agency theory and socioemotional wealth:"outside pressure style" stands for the situation where family firm underperforms and retaining family CEO causes pressure from external shareholders,if the family lacks sufficient control over the firm,family firm will have to mitigate such pressure through "de-familiarization"; "family parliamentary style" stands for the situation where the family is controlling shareholder and multiple family members are engaged,continuing retaining family control bring lower utilities for family firms while improving economic benefits bring higher utilities,hence,family firms will have stronger motivation to replace CEO in order to improve economic benefits; "quasi-lone-founder style" stands for the situation where the chairman has absolute control over the firm and only close relatives work in the firm as directors,family firms will show characteristics of lone-founder firms— focusing more on the development and economic growth of the firm,rather than noneconomic benefit gains like socioemotional wealth,hence are willing to dismiss family CEO when firm performance is poor to improve firm performance.On such basis,we further summarize a family effect matrix focusing on kinships and managerial roles of family members and explain the differences between family firms with different types of kinships and managerial roles,proposing the stratification phenomenon of socioemotional wealth and family effect.We suggest that when close relatives serve as directors,they will emphasize family goal,aim to preserve socioemotional wealth and their presence in family firm enhances chairman authority; by contrast,when distant relatives serve as directors,they will weaken family firms' intention to pursue family-centered goals and they focus more on the economic benefits,the presence of distant relatives weakens chairman authority.Close relatives serving as executives will accentuate principal-principal problem with family firms and thus trigger outside pressure,meanwhile,compare with serving as directors,close relatives might also disperse chairman power when serve as executives; by contrast,distant relatives serving as executives might help alleviate principal-principal problems and mitigate outside pressure.In view of the above findings,we propose several theoretical propositions for future empirical test.The contributions of our research are two folds.First,we systematically summarize the reasons why family CEOs might be fired,analyze in detail the internal logic and mechanism of family CEO dismissal under different situations and clearly answer the questions of what kinds of family firms are more likely to fire family CEO.Second,we analyze the distinct effects of different kinship ties and managerial roles on family firms and contribute to the knowledge of family firm heterogeneity,extending existing research in family business field from "family firm vs.nonfamily firm" level to "family firms with different kinship ties and managerial roles" level.
While family firms are more inclined to place family member in CEO position,this study focuses on what types of family firms are more likely to dismiss their family CEOs under performance pressure.The sample of this study comes from 458 Chinese family firms listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board and Growth Enterprise Board from 2004 to 2014.We define a firm as a family firm if it meets the following three requirements:(1) family members(usually the chairman) are the actual controller of the firm;(2) family ownership is higher than 20%;(3) at least one family member serve as executive,director or supervisor in the firm besides the chairman.We only retain sample family firms that have a family CEO and are under performance pressure(firm performance has declined for two consecutive years).69 family firms out of the 458 firms meet the requirement and are retained as our final sample firms to be added into analysis.We conduct a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis(QCA) on the sample firms and find three family firm styles that can lead to family CEO dismissal under performance pressure,namely "outside pressure style","family parliamentary style" and "quasi-lone-founder style".We explain the internal mechanisms of these styles from the perspectives of agency theory and socioemotional wealth:"outside pressure style" stands for the situation where family firm underperforms and retaining family CEO causes pressure from external shareholders,if the family lacks sufficient control over the firm,family firm will have to mitigate such pressure through "de-familiarization"; "family parliamentary style" stands for the situation where the family is controlling shareholder and multiple family members are engaged,continuing retaining family control bring lower utilities for family firms while improving economic benefits bring higher utilities,hence,family firms will have stronger motivation to replace CEO in order to improve economic benefits; "quasi-lone-founder style" stands for the situation where the chairman has absolute control over the firm and only close relatives work in the firm as directors,family firms will show characteristics of lone-founder firms— focusing more on the development and economic growth of the firm,rather than noneconomic benefit gains like socioemotional wealth,hence are willing to dismiss family CEO when firm performance is poor to improve firm performance.On such basis,we further summarize a family effect matrix focusing on kinships and managerial roles of family members and explain the differences between family firms with different types of kinships and managerial roles,proposing the stratification phenomenon of socioemotional wealth and family effect.We suggest that when close relatives serve as directors,they will emphasize family goal,aim to preserve socioemotional wealth and their presence in family firm enhances chairman authority; by contrast,when distant relatives serve as directors,they will weaken family firms' intention to pursue family-centered goals and they focus more on the economic benefits,the presence of distant relatives weakens chairman authority.Close relatives serving as executives will accentuate principal-principal problem with family firms and thus trigger outside pressure,meanwhile,compare with serving as directors,close relatives might also disperse chairman power when serve as executives; by contrast,distant relatives serving as executives might help alleviate principal-principal problems and mitigate outside pressure.In view of the above findings,we propose several theoretical propositions for future empirical test.The contributions of our research are two folds.First,we systematically summarize the reasons why family CEOs might be fired,analyze in detail the internal logic and mechanism of family CEO dismissal under different situations and clearly answer the questions of what kinds of family firms are more likely to fire family CEO.Second,we analyze the distinct effects of different kinship ties and managerial roles on family firms and contribute to the knowledge of family firm heterogeneity,extending existing research in family business field from "family firm vs.nonfamily firm" level to "family firms with different kinship ties and managerial roles" level.
引文
[1]Wiklund,J.,M.Nordqvist,K.Hellerstedt,and M.Bird,Internal versus External Ownership Transition in Family Firms:An Embeddedness Perspective[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,(6):1319-1340.
[2]Chrisman,J.,E.Memili,and K.Misra,Nonfamily Managers,Family Firms,and the Winner’s Curse:The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2014,(5):1103-1127.
[3]Miller,D.,I.Le Breton-Miller,A.Minichilli,G.Corbetta,and D.Pittino,When do Non-Family CEO’s Outperform in Family Firms?Agency and Behavioural Agency Perspectives[J].Journal of Management Studies,2014,(4):547-572.
[4]Combs,J.,C.Penney,T.Crook,and J.Short,The Impact of Family Representation on CEO Compensation[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2010,(6):1125-1144.
[5]Strike,M.,P.Berrone,S.Sapp,and L.Congiu,A Socioemotional Wealth Approach to CEO Career Horizons in Family Firms[J].Journal of Management Studies,2015,(4):555-583.
[6]Calabro,A.,G.Campopiano,and R.Basco,Principal-Principal Conflicts and Family Firm Growth:The Moderating Role of Business Family Identity[J].Journal of Family Business Management,2017,(3):291-308.
[7]Jenter,D.,and F.Kanaan,CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,(5):2155-2184.
[8]Gomez-Mejia,L.,K.Haynes,M.Nunez-Nickel,K.Jacobson,and J.Moyano-Fuentes,Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-Controlled Firms:Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2007,(1):106-137.
[9]Zellweger,T.,R.Nason,M.Nordqvist,and G.Brush,Why Do Family Firms Strive for Nonfinancial Goals?An Organizational Identity Perspective[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,(2):229-248.
[10]Berrone,P.,C.Cruz,and L.Gomez-Mejia,Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms:Theoretical Dimensions,Assessment Approaches,and Agenda for Future Research[J].Family Business Review,2012,(3):258-279.
[11]Parker,S.,Family Firms and the “Willing Successor” Problem[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2016,(6):1241-1259.
[12]DeTienne,D.,and F.Chirico,Exit Strategies in Family Firms:How Socioemotional Wealth Drives the Threshold of Performance[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,(6):1297-1318.
[13]于晓东,刘小元.不同类型亲属关系如何影响家族企业治理——基于中外研究的文献回顾与理论归纳[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(4):195-208.
[14]Belenzon,S.,A.Patacconi,and R.Zarutskie,Married to the Firm?A Large-Scale Investigation of the Social Context of Ownership[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,(13):2611-2638.
[15]Yu,X.,L.Stanley,Y.Li,F.Kellermanns,and K.Eddleston,The Invisible Hand of Evolutionary Psychology:The Importance of Kinship in First Generation Family Firms[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2019,forthcoming.
[16]Dyer,W.,W.Dyer,and R.Gardner,Should My Spouse Be My Partner?Preliminary Evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics[J].Family Business Review,2013,(1):68-80.
[17]Salvato,C.,and G.Corbetta,Transitional Leadership of Advisors as a Facilitator of Successors’ Leadership Construction[J].Family Business Review,2013,(3):235-255.
[18]Le Breton-Miller,I.,and D.Miller.Socioemotional Wealth Across the Family Firm Life Cycle:A Commentary on “Family Business Survival and the Role of Boards”.Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,(6):1391-1397.
[19]Santiago,A.,The Family in Family Business:Case of the In-Laws in Philippine Businesses[J].Family Business Review,2011,(4):343-361.
[20]Mehrotra,V.,R.Morck,J.Shim,and Y.Wiwattanakantang,Adoptive Expectations:Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,(3):840-854.
[21]Minichilli,A.,M.Nordqvist,G.Corbetta,and M.Amore,CEO Succession Mechanisms,Organizational Context,and Performance:A Socio-Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family-Controlled Firms[J].Journal of Management Studies,2014,(7):1153-1179.
[22]Bianco,M.,A.Ciavarella,and R.Signoretti,Women on Corporate Boards in Italy:The Role of Family Connections[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2015,(2):129-144.
[23]Miller,D.,I.Le Breton-Miller,and R.Lester,Family Firm Governance,Strategic Conformity,and Performance:Institutional vs.Strategic Perspectives[J].Organization Science,2013,(1):189-209.
[24]Gomez-Mejia,L.,C.Cruz,P.Berrone P,and J.De Castro,The Bind that Ties:Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms[J].Academy of Management Annals,2011,(1):653-707.
[25]王凤彬,江鸿,王璁.央企集团管控架构的演进:战略决定、制度引致还是路径依赖?——一项定性比较分析(QCA)尝试[J].北京:管理世界,2014,(12):92-114.
[26]杜运周,贾良定.组态视角与定性比较分析(QCA):管理学研究的一条新道路[J].北京:管理世界,2017,(6):155-167.
[27]Ragin,C.,Redesigning Social Inquiry:Fuzzy Sets and Beyond[M].University of Chicago Press,2009.
[28]Fiss,C.,Building Better Causal Theories:A Fuzzy Set Approach to Typologies in Organization Research[J].Academy of Management Journal,2011,(2):393-420.
[29]于晓东,刘刚,梁晗.家族企业亲属关系组合与高效治理模式研究——基于中国家族上市公司的定性比较分析[J].北京:中国软科学,2018,(3):153-165.
[30]Shen,W.,and A.Cannella,Revisiting the Performance Consequences of CEO Succession:The Impacts of Successor Type,Post-succession Senior Executive Turnover,and Departing CEO Tenure[J].Academy of Management Journal,2002,(4):717-733.
[31]Gomulya,D.,and W.Boeker,Reassessing Board Member Allegiance:CEO Replacement Following Financial Misconduct[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,(9):1898-1918.
[32]Helwege,J.,V.Intintoli,and A.Zhang,Voting with Their Feet or Activism?Institutional Investors’ Impact on CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2012,(1):22-37.
[33]Inoue,C,S.Lazzarini,and A.Musacchio,Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder:Firm-Level Implications of State Equity Purchases[J].Academy of Management Journal,2013,(6):1775-1801.
[34]Marx,A.,and A.Dusa,Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA),Contradictions and Consistency Benchmarks for Model Specification[J].Methodological Innovations Online,2011,(2):103-148.
[35]魏春燕,陈磊.家族企业CEO更换过程中的利他主义行为——基于资产减值的研究[J].北京:管理世界,2015,(3):137-150.
[36]Duran,P.,N.Kammerlander,M.Van Essen,and T.Zellweger,Doing More with Less:Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms[J].Academy of Management Journal,2016,(4):1224-1264.
[37]Martin,G.,L.Gomez-Mejia,P.Berrone,and M.Makri,Conflict between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders:Much Ado About Nothing?[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2017,(6):999-1027.
[38]Bell,R.,and I.Filatotchev,Aguilera R V.Corporate Governance and Investors’ Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value:An Institutional Perspective[J].Academy of Management Journal,2014,(1):301-320.
[39]Ragin,C.,Set Relations in Social Research:Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage[J].Political Analysis,2006,(3):291-310.
[40]Muske,G.,and M.Fitzgerald,A Panel Study of Copreneurs in Business:Who Enters,Continues,and Exits?[J].Family Business Review,2006,(3):193-205.
[41]Cannella,A.,C.Jones,and M.Withers,Family versus Lone-Founder-Controlled Public Corporations:Social Identity Theory and Boards of Directors[J].Academy of Management Journal,2015,(2):436-459.
[42]杨婵,贺小刚,徐容慈.“创一代—至亲”组合治理模式与企业绩效——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(6):17-37.
(1)前因变量包括预测要素与情境要素,相当于回归分析中的自变量与控制变量。
(2)所谓前因不对称性,指的是假定因素A的存在或者发生能够正向影响家族企业解雇家族CEO,那么因素A不存在或不发生(记为～A)未必是负向影响家族企业解雇家族CEO的原因。
(3)对此,本研究也进行了验证,结果显示,在绩效良好的家族企业中,家族CEO因客观原因离职的比例显著地高于绩效不佳的家族企业(Chi2=167.97,p<0.001)。
(4)例如,长生生物董事长、实际控制人高俊芳之子张洺豪,虽然名义上为企业的副董事长、董事,但随着长生生物疫苗事件曝光后,媒体与公众发现,张洺豪并未参与到公司实际经营管理之中。
[2]Chrisman,J.,E.Memili,and K.Misra,Nonfamily Managers,Family Firms,and the Winner’s Curse:The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2014,(5):1103-1127.
[3]Miller,D.,I.Le Breton-Miller,A.Minichilli,G.Corbetta,and D.Pittino,When do Non-Family CEO’s Outperform in Family Firms?Agency and Behavioural Agency Perspectives[J].Journal of Management Studies,2014,(4):547-572.
[4]Combs,J.,C.Penney,T.Crook,and J.Short,The Impact of Family Representation on CEO Compensation[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2010,(6):1125-1144.
[5]Strike,M.,P.Berrone,S.Sapp,and L.Congiu,A Socioemotional Wealth Approach to CEO Career Horizons in Family Firms[J].Journal of Management Studies,2015,(4):555-583.
[6]Calabro,A.,G.Campopiano,and R.Basco,Principal-Principal Conflicts and Family Firm Growth:The Moderating Role of Business Family Identity[J].Journal of Family Business Management,2017,(3):291-308.
[7]Jenter,D.,and F.Kanaan,CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation[J].The Journal of Finance,2015,(5):2155-2184.
[8]Gomez-Mejia,L.,K.Haynes,M.Nunez-Nickel,K.Jacobson,and J.Moyano-Fuentes,Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-Controlled Firms:Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2007,(1):106-137.
[9]Zellweger,T.,R.Nason,M.Nordqvist,and G.Brush,Why Do Family Firms Strive for Nonfinancial Goals?An Organizational Identity Perspective[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,(2):229-248.
[10]Berrone,P.,C.Cruz,and L.Gomez-Mejia,Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms:Theoretical Dimensions,Assessment Approaches,and Agenda for Future Research[J].Family Business Review,2012,(3):258-279.
[11]Parker,S.,Family Firms and the “Willing Successor” Problem[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2016,(6):1241-1259.
[12]DeTienne,D.,and F.Chirico,Exit Strategies in Family Firms:How Socioemotional Wealth Drives the Threshold of Performance[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,(6):1297-1318.
[13]于晓东,刘小元.不同类型亲属关系如何影响家族企业治理——基于中外研究的文献回顾与理论归纳[J].北京:经济管理,2017,(4):195-208.
[14]Belenzon,S.,A.Patacconi,and R.Zarutskie,Married to the Firm?A Large-Scale Investigation of the Social Context of Ownership[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,(13):2611-2638.
[15]Yu,X.,L.Stanley,Y.Li,F.Kellermanns,and K.Eddleston,The Invisible Hand of Evolutionary Psychology:The Importance of Kinship in First Generation Family Firms[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2019,forthcoming.
[16]Dyer,W.,W.Dyer,and R.Gardner,Should My Spouse Be My Partner?Preliminary Evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics[J].Family Business Review,2013,(1):68-80.
[17]Salvato,C.,and G.Corbetta,Transitional Leadership of Advisors as a Facilitator of Successors’ Leadership Construction[J].Family Business Review,2013,(3):235-255.
[18]Le Breton-Miller,I.,and D.Miller.Socioemotional Wealth Across the Family Firm Life Cycle:A Commentary on “Family Business Survival and the Role of Boards”.Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2013,(6):1391-1397.
[19]Santiago,A.,The Family in Family Business:Case of the In-Laws in Philippine Businesses[J].Family Business Review,2011,(4):343-361.
[20]Mehrotra,V.,R.Morck,J.Shim,and Y.Wiwattanakantang,Adoptive Expectations:Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,(3):840-854.
[21]Minichilli,A.,M.Nordqvist,G.Corbetta,and M.Amore,CEO Succession Mechanisms,Organizational Context,and Performance:A Socio-Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family-Controlled Firms[J].Journal of Management Studies,2014,(7):1153-1179.
[22]Bianco,M.,A.Ciavarella,and R.Signoretti,Women on Corporate Boards in Italy:The Role of Family Connections[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2015,(2):129-144.
[23]Miller,D.,I.Le Breton-Miller,and R.Lester,Family Firm Governance,Strategic Conformity,and Performance:Institutional vs.Strategic Perspectives[J].Organization Science,2013,(1):189-209.
[24]Gomez-Mejia,L.,C.Cruz,P.Berrone P,and J.De Castro,The Bind that Ties:Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms[J].Academy of Management Annals,2011,(1):653-707.
[25]王凤彬,江鸿,王璁.央企集团管控架构的演进:战略决定、制度引致还是路径依赖?——一项定性比较分析(QCA)尝试[J].北京:管理世界,2014,(12):92-114.
[26]杜运周,贾良定.组态视角与定性比较分析(QCA):管理学研究的一条新道路[J].北京:管理世界,2017,(6):155-167.
[27]Ragin,C.,Redesigning Social Inquiry:Fuzzy Sets and Beyond[M].University of Chicago Press,2009.
[28]Fiss,C.,Building Better Causal Theories:A Fuzzy Set Approach to Typologies in Organization Research[J].Academy of Management Journal,2011,(2):393-420.
[29]于晓东,刘刚,梁晗.家族企业亲属关系组合与高效治理模式研究——基于中国家族上市公司的定性比较分析[J].北京:中国软科学,2018,(3):153-165.
[30]Shen,W.,and A.Cannella,Revisiting the Performance Consequences of CEO Succession:The Impacts of Successor Type,Post-succession Senior Executive Turnover,and Departing CEO Tenure[J].Academy of Management Journal,2002,(4):717-733.
[31]Gomulya,D.,and W.Boeker,Reassessing Board Member Allegiance:CEO Replacement Following Financial Misconduct[J].Strategic Management Journal,2016,(9):1898-1918.
[32]Helwege,J.,V.Intintoli,and A.Zhang,Voting with Their Feet or Activism?Institutional Investors’ Impact on CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2012,(1):22-37.
[33]Inoue,C,S.Lazzarini,and A.Musacchio,Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder:Firm-Level Implications of State Equity Purchases[J].Academy of Management Journal,2013,(6):1775-1801.
[34]Marx,A.,and A.Dusa,Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA),Contradictions and Consistency Benchmarks for Model Specification[J].Methodological Innovations Online,2011,(2):103-148.
[35]魏春燕,陈磊.家族企业CEO更换过程中的利他主义行为——基于资产减值的研究[J].北京:管理世界,2015,(3):137-150.
[36]Duran,P.,N.Kammerlander,M.Van Essen,and T.Zellweger,Doing More with Less:Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms[J].Academy of Management Journal,2016,(4):1224-1264.
[37]Martin,G.,L.Gomez-Mejia,P.Berrone,and M.Makri,Conflict between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders:Much Ado About Nothing?[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2017,(6):999-1027.
[38]Bell,R.,and I.Filatotchev,Aguilera R V.Corporate Governance and Investors’ Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value:An Institutional Perspective[J].Academy of Management Journal,2014,(1):301-320.
[39]Ragin,C.,Set Relations in Social Research:Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage[J].Political Analysis,2006,(3):291-310.
[40]Muske,G.,and M.Fitzgerald,A Panel Study of Copreneurs in Business:Who Enters,Continues,and Exits?[J].Family Business Review,2006,(3):193-205.
[41]Cannella,A.,C.Jones,and M.Withers,Family versus Lone-Founder-Controlled Public Corporations:Social Identity Theory and Boards of Directors[J].Academy of Management Journal,2015,(2):436-459.
[42]杨婵,贺小刚,徐容慈.“创一代—至亲”组合治理模式与企业绩效——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(6):17-37.
(1)前因变量包括预测要素与情境要素,相当于回归分析中的自变量与控制变量。
(2)所谓前因不对称性,指的是假定因素A的存在或者发生能够正向影响家族企业解雇家族CEO,那么因素A不存在或不发生(记为～A)未必是负向影响家族企业解雇家族CEO的原因。
(3)对此,本研究也进行了验证,结果显示,在绩效良好的家族企业中,家族CEO因客观原因离职的比例显著地高于绩效不佳的家族企业(Chi2=167.97,p<0.001)。
(4)例如,长生生物董事长、实际控制人高俊芳之子张洺豪,虽然名义上为企业的副董事长、董事,但随着长生生物疫苗事件曝光后,媒体与公众发现,张洺豪并未参与到公司实际经营管理之中。