基于修正Raiffa值的三阶段网络租金分配方法
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摘要
为实现网络租金分配的公平和效率,体现公正并有利于调整,提出了基于修正Raiffa值三阶段分配方法:贡献度分配方法、修正方法和调整方法。贡献度分配方法可以按照决策偏好灵活调整分配比例且符合五条公理,并指出三类常用的分配方法实质上是其特例的结论;利用线性加权得到了修正方法;采用波士顿矩阵对共有租金和私有租金分配份额进行分析,提出了调整方法。最后通过算例验证了方法的可行性并与Shapley分配方法进行了比较分析。
In order to realize the fairness and efficiency of network rent distribution, embody justice and facilitate adjustment, this paper proposes the a three-stage allocation method based on Raiffa value, these are contribution method, correction method and adjustment method. Results show that the general allocation method can flexibly adjust the distribution ratio according to the decision preference and conform to the five axioms. It points out that the three commonly used distribution methods are essentially the conclusions of their special cases. The method of linear weighting is used to correct the method, and the Boston matrix is used to share the rent. The private rent distribution share is analyzed and an adjustment method is proposed. Finally, the feasibility of the method is verified by a numerical example and compared with the Shapley distribution method.
In order to realize the fairness and efficiency of network rent distribution, embody justice and facilitate adjustment, this paper proposes the a three-stage allocation method based on Raiffa value, these are contribution method, correction method and adjustment method. Results show that the general allocation method can flexibly adjust the distribution ratio according to the decision preference and conform to the five axioms. It points out that the three commonly used distribution methods are essentially the conclusions of their special cases. The method of linear weighting is used to correct the method, and the Boston matrix is used to share the rent. The private rent distribution share is analyzed and an adjustment method is proposed. Finally, the feasibility of the method is verified by a numerical example and compared with the Shapley distribution method.
引文
[1] Moretti A, Moretti A. The Network Organization[M]. Springer International Publishing, 2017.
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[3] Dyer J H, Singh H, Kale P. Splitting the Pie: Rent Distribution in Alliances and Networks [J]. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2008, 29(2-3):137-148.
[4] 孙凤娥. 模块化网络组织租金分配研究[J].中国工业经济,2013(11):109-121.
[5] 宗文,林源源,金玉健.网络组织的租金创造与租金分配研究[J].江苏社会科学,2017(4):86-94.
[6] 刘雪梅. 联盟组合:价值实现及治理机制研究[D].西南财经大学,2013.
[7] 王琴. 网络参与者的租金来源与实现途径[J].中国工业经济, 2009(11):99-108.
[8] 张根明,杨思涵.技术入股型产学研合作创新的利益分配研究——基于技术价值不确定性的新视角[J].软科学,2017,31(10):1-5.
[9] 何喜军,武玉英,蒋国瑞.基于Shapely修正的供应网络利益分配模型研究[J].软科学,2014,28(2):70-73.
[10] Roson R, Hubert F. Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach[J]. Networks & Spatial Economics, 2015, 15(1):71-87.
[11] 姜启源,谢金星,叶俊. 数学模型(第四版)[M]. 北京:高等教育出版社,2011.
[12] Kikuta K. A Lower Bound of an Imputation of a Game [J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 2017, 21(4):457-468.
[13] 钟运动. 全球价值网络下企业战略研究[D]. 江西财经大学, 2013.
[14] 夏国平,刘开胜. n人Raiffa解的一种算法及应用[J]. 系统工程,1994(3):63-67.
[15] 董保民,王运通,郭桂霞. 合作博弈论:解与成本分摊[M]. 中国市场出版社, 2008.
[16] Meng F, Tan C, Zhang Q. The Induced Generalized Interval-valued Intuitionistic Fuzzy Hybrid Shapley Averaging Operator and Its Application in Decision Making[M]. Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. 2013.
[17] 戴建华,薛恒新. 基于Shapley值法的动态联盟伙伴企业利益分配策略[J].中国管理科学, 2004, 12(4):33-36.
[2] Flores R, Molina E,Tejada J. Assessment of Groups in a Network Organization Based on the Shapley Group Value [J]. Decision Support Systems, 2016, 83:97-105.
[3] Dyer J H, Singh H, Kale P. Splitting the Pie: Rent Distribution in Alliances and Networks [J]. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2008, 29(2-3):137-148.
[4] 孙凤娥. 模块化网络组织租金分配研究[J].中国工业经济,2013(11):109-121.
[5] 宗文,林源源,金玉健.网络组织的租金创造与租金分配研究[J].江苏社会科学,2017(4):86-94.
[6] 刘雪梅. 联盟组合:价值实现及治理机制研究[D].西南财经大学,2013.
[7] 王琴. 网络参与者的租金来源与实现途径[J].中国工业经济, 2009(11):99-108.
[8] 张根明,杨思涵.技术入股型产学研合作创新的利益分配研究——基于技术价值不确定性的新视角[J].软科学,2017,31(10):1-5.
[9] 何喜军,武玉英,蒋国瑞.基于Shapely修正的供应网络利益分配模型研究[J].软科学,2014,28(2):70-73.
[10] Roson R, Hubert F. Bargaining Power and Value Sharing in Distribution Networks: A Cooperative Game Theory Approach[J]. Networks & Spatial Economics, 2015, 15(1):71-87.
[11] 姜启源,谢金星,叶俊. 数学模型(第四版)[M]. 北京:高等教育出版社,2011.
[12] Kikuta K. A Lower Bound of an Imputation of a Game [J]. Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 2017, 21(4):457-468.
[13] 钟运动. 全球价值网络下企业战略研究[D]. 江西财经大学, 2013.
[14] 夏国平,刘开胜. n人Raiffa解的一种算法及应用[J]. 系统工程,1994(3):63-67.
[15] 董保民,王运通,郭桂霞. 合作博弈论:解与成本分摊[M]. 中国市场出版社, 2008.
[16] Meng F, Tan C, Zhang Q. The Induced Generalized Interval-valued Intuitionistic Fuzzy Hybrid Shapley Averaging Operator and Its Application in Decision Making[M]. Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. 2013.
[17] 戴建华,薛恒新. 基于Shapley值法的动态联盟伙伴企业利益分配策略[J].中国管理科学, 2004, 12(4):33-36.