麦克道尔和德雷福斯论涉身性技能行动
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摘要
如果我们既要避免陷入所予神话,又要能够说经验可以作为我们对其思考的外在限制,就必须认为概念能力渗透于经验世界的任何领域中。约翰·麦克道尔以此作为辩护概念论最重要的论据。对这种思想最直接的批判是一种非概念论的观点,其证据源自我们对感觉经验和技能性行动精细性和丰富性的现象把握。非概念论并非处理这一问题的令人满意的方式,在麦克道尔与德雷福斯的著名辩论中,麦克道尔不断调整他的观点,一方面认为感知、行动与思想的关系是一种连续的差异而非"顶层—基础层"的二元划界,另一方面又主张理性的概念能力已然贯穿于涉身性的技能行动中。
If we want to avoid falling into the myth of the given and to be able to say that experience can be used as an external restriction on our thinking, we must think that conceptual capacities permeate all experience of the world. John McDowell used this as the most important argument to defend conceptualism. The most direct criticism of this idea is a non-conceptual point of view, whose evidence comes from our grasp of the phenomena of fineness and richness of sensory experience and skilled action. In this article, I try to argue that non-conceptualism is not a satisfactory way to deal with this problem, and illustrate how McDowell constantly adjusts his views in the famous debate between McDowell and Dreyfus. On the one hand, he believes that the relationship between perception, action and thought is a continuous difference rather than a" top-bottom" dualistic demarcation, on the other hand, it is argued that rational conceptual capacities has already run through the embodied skillful coping.
If we want to avoid falling into the myth of the given and to be able to say that experience can be used as an external restriction on our thinking, we must think that conceptual capacities permeate all experience of the world. John McDowell used this as the most important argument to defend conceptualism. The most direct criticism of this idea is a non-conceptual point of view, whose evidence comes from our grasp of the phenomena of fineness and richness of sensory experience and skilled action. In this article, I try to argue that non-conceptualism is not a satisfactory way to deal with this problem, and illustrate how McDowell constantly adjusts his views in the famous debate between McDowell and Dreyfus. On the one hand, he believes that the relationship between perception, action and thought is a continuous difference rather than a" top-bottom" dualistic demarcation, on the other hand, it is argued that rational conceptual capacities has already run through the embodied skillful coping.
引文
(1)Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Return of the Myth of the Mental”,Inquiry,Vol.50,No.4,2007,pp.352-365.
(1) McDowell,“The Myth of the Mind as Detached”,in Mind,Reason,and Being-in-the-World:The McDowellDreyfus Debate,edited by J.K.Schear,Oxon:Routledge,2013,p.41.
(2) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,Vol.79,No.2,2005,pp.47-65.
(1)“Affordance”是美国心理学家吉布森(J.J.Gibson)创立其生态学的知觉理论所使用的一个核心术语。通过引入可供性概念,吉布森突出了感知世界的特征如何凭借其对感知者的实际行动产生意义。
(2) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,p.49.
(3) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental”,Mind,Reason,and Being-in-the-world,edited by J.K.Schear,Oxon:Routledge,2013,pp.17-18.
(1) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental”,p.28.
(2) Ibid.,p.19.
(3) John McDowell,Mind and World,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1994,p.84.
(1) John McDowell,Mind and World,p.89.
(2) John McDowell,“The Myth of the Mind as Detached”,p.51.
(3) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Return of the Myth of the Mental”,Inquiry,Vol.50,No.4,2007,p.354.
(1) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,p.53.
(1) John McDowell,“Response to Dreyfus”,Inquiry,Vol.50,No.4,2007,p.367.
(2) Aristotle,The Ethics of Aristotle,translated by J.A.Thompson,Hammondsworth:Penguin,1955,p.182.
(3) John McDowell,“What Myth?”,Inquiry,Vol.50,No.4,2007,p.348.
(1) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Return of the Myth of the Mental”,p.360.
(2) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,p.61.
(1) McDowell,“The Myth of the Mind as Detached”,in Mind,Reason,and Being-in-the-World:The McDowellDreyfus Debate,edited by J.K.Schear,Oxon:Routledge,2013,p.41.
(2) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,Vol.79,No.2,2005,pp.47-65.
(1)“Affordance”是美国心理学家吉布森(J.J.Gibson)创立其生态学的知觉理论所使用的一个核心术语。通过引入可供性概念,吉布森突出了感知世界的特征如何凭借其对感知者的实际行动产生意义。
(2) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,p.49.
(3) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental”,Mind,Reason,and Being-in-the-world,edited by J.K.Schear,Oxon:Routledge,2013,pp.17-18.
(1) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental”,p.28.
(2) Ibid.,p.19.
(3) John McDowell,Mind and World,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1994,p.84.
(1) John McDowell,Mind and World,p.89.
(2) John McDowell,“The Myth of the Mind as Detached”,p.51.
(3) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Return of the Myth of the Mental”,Inquiry,Vol.50,No.4,2007,p.354.
(1) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,p.53.
(1) John McDowell,“Response to Dreyfus”,Inquiry,Vol.50,No.4,2007,p.367.
(2) Aristotle,The Ethics of Aristotle,translated by J.A.Thompson,Hammondsworth:Penguin,1955,p.182.
(3) John McDowell,“What Myth?”,Inquiry,Vol.50,No.4,2007,p.348.
(1) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“The Return of the Myth of the Mental”,p.360.
(2) Hubert L.Dreyfus,“Overcoming the Myth of the Mental:How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise”,p.61.