日本全面渗透环孟加拉湾地区:现状、动力与影响

详细信息    查看全文 | 推荐本文 |

	英文篇名：Japan's Entry into the Bay of Bengal:Present Situation,Motivations and Impact 作者：李益波 英文作者：Li Yibo; 关键词：印太战略 ; 孟加拉湾 ; 亚非增长走廊 ; 海洋安全合作 中文刊名：NYYZ 英文刊名：South Asian Studies Quarterly 机构：北京印刷学院马克思主义学院; 出版日期：2019-06-06 出版单位：南亚研究季刊 年：2019 期：No.177 基金：北京高校思想政治理论课择优资助计划“中国传统文化与习近平外交战略研究”的阶段性成果;; 北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心(北京工业大学)的支持 语种：中文; 页：NYYZ201902012 页数：9 CN：02 ISSN：51-1023/D 分类号：6+97-104

摘要

随着孟加拉湾地缘政治、地缘经济重要性的凸显,日本对该地区的重视程度日益提高。这表现在高层访问频繁、经济投入规模加大、军事安全外交稳步发展及公共外交不断深化。日本全面渗透孟加拉湾有其战略、安全和经济利益的考量。未来一段时期,日本在该地区的基础设施投入、海洋安全合作还会继续深化,这将给中国"一带一路"倡议和该地区经济、安全秩序构建带来多重影响。
        Japan is paying increasing attention to the Bay of Bengal as geo-political and geo-economical significance of the region is unfolding. Its effort for an upgraded relation with the region comprised frequent high-level visits, expanded economic investment in addition to enhanced military and diplomatic engagement. Japan's investment in infrastructure in the region and enhanced maritime security cooperation is going to bring about multiple impact to the Belt and Road initiative and economic and security order in the region.

引文

(1)David Brewster,“Japan is back in the Bay of Bengal,” The Lowy Insititute paper, Sep 10 2018. https:∥www. lowyinstitute. org/the-interpreter/japan-back-bay-bengal.
    (2)孟加拉湾是连接南亚和东南亚的纽带,其沿岸七国也分属两个次区域。长期以来,学术界并没有把孟加拉湾视作一个整体加以研究,相关的研究成果大多是国别研究而缺乏区域视角。最近,有印度、澳大利亚和日本学者开始关注孟加拉湾地缘政治经济环境的变化。参阅Vindu Mai Chotani,“India and Japan:Reconnecting in the Bay of Bengal,” ORF paper, Jan. 2016, https:∥www. orfonline. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/OP_83 . pdf; K. Yhome,“the Bay of Bengal at the Crossroads:Potential for Cooperation among Bangladesh,India and Myanmar,” paper presented is based on deliberations at aninternational conference on the Future of the Bay of Bengalheld in Kolkata,India,March 3-4,2014 organised by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; David Brewster,“the Bay of Bengal:the Indo-Pacic'snew zone of competition,” The Strategist,Dec. 2,2014; Mohd Aminul Karim,“21st Century Maritime Power-Politics in the Indian Ocean Region with Special Reference to the Bay of Bengal,” Pacific Focus,Vol. 32,No. 1,April 2017; Satoru Nagao,“The Role of Japan-India-Sri Lanka Maritime Security Cooperation in the Trump Era,” Maritime Affairs:Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India,Vol. 13 No. 1,Summer 2017.
    (1)梅秀庭:“‘印太战略’:安倍晋三新外交战略的实质”,《学习时报》,2017年2月20日,第A2版。
    (2)Nikkei staff writers,“Japan pours on loans to India for infrastructure projects,” The Nikkei,March 30,2018,https:∥asia. nikkei. com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-pours-on-loans-to-India-forinfrastructure-projects.
    (3)“上财年孟加拉国接受日本官方发展援助创历史新高”,中国人民共和国驻孟加拉国大使馆,2018年8月27日。http:∥www. mofcom. gov. cn/article/i/jyjl/j/201808/20180802779151. shtml。
    (4)李益波:“印度东北地区:日本在深耕”,《世界知识》,2017年第20期。
    (1)日本除了为尼科巴-安达曼群岛的基础设施升级提供资金援助,还将帮助印度铺设从金奈到布莱尔港(尼-安群岛的首府)水下光纤,建造一个海底监测传感器的海底网络,从苏门答腊尖端延伸到尼科巴群岛的英迪拉角。该计划一旦完成,将被整合到代号为“鱼钩”(Fish Hook)水下监听网。Abhijit Singh,“India's‘Undersea Wall’ in the Eastern Indian Ocean,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,June 14,2016,http:∥amti. csis. org/indias-undersea-wall-eastern-indian-ocean;Chris Mclachlan,“Andaman and Nicobar Islands as Strategic Deterrent,” The Diplomat,May 6,2014,https:∥thediplomat. com/2014/05/andaman-and-nicobar-islands-as-strategic-deterrent/.
    (2)“MSDF ships make first port call in Myanmar”,The Japan Times,Oct. 1 2013,https:∥www. japantimes. co. jp/news/2013/10/01/national/msdf-ships-make-first-port-call-in-myanmar/#. W11anK2B28U.
    (3)“Japan-Myanmar Summit Meeting”,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,Dec. 15 2013,https:∥www. mofa. go. jp/region/page23e_000032. html.
    (4)“Myanmar's military chief asks Abe to continue SDF support,” The Japan Times,Aug. 5,2017,https:∥www. japantimes. co. jp/news/2017/08/05/national/politics-diplomacy/myanmars-military-chief-asks-abecontinue-support-sdf/#. W8FcB_l6-ZI.
    (5)“日本援助孟加拉24艘救援船”,中国人民共和国驻孟加拉国大使馆,2018年8月28日,http:∥bd. mofcom. gov. cn/article/jmxw/201808/20180802780054. shtml。
    (6)“Japan-Myanmar Summit Meeting and Other Events,”Prime Minister's Office of Japan Dec. 14,2017,https:∥japan. kantei. go. jp/98_abe/actions/201712/14article5. html.
    (1)转引自施爱国:“近年来日本对缅甸政策析评”,《国际论坛》,2016年第1期,第29页。
    (2)“How Asians Rate China,India,Pakistan,Japan and the U. S.,”Pew Research Center,Jul. 11,2014,http:∥www. pewglobal. org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harmto-americas-image/pg-2014-07-14-balance-of-power-4-01/.
    (3)张耀之:“日本的印太战略理念与政策实践”,《日本问题研究》,2018年第2期,第9页。
    (4)David Brewster,“Japan is back in the Bay of Bengal,” The Lowy Insititute Paper, Sep. 10,2018, https:∥www. lowyinstitute. org/the-interpreter/japan-back-bay-bengal.
    (1)A. S. M. G. Kibria,“Bangladesh Juggles Chinese,Japanese Interest,” The Diplomat, Jan. 5,2015, http:∥thediplomat. com/2015/01/bangladesh-juggles-chinese-japanese-interest/.
    (2)Tim Kelly,“As Chinese influence grows,Japanese warship visits Sri Lanka,”The Reuters,Oct. 1,2018,https:∥www. reuters. com/article/us-japan-defence-indonesia-sri-lanka-ins/as-chinese-influence-growsjapanese-warship-visits-sri-lanka-id USKCN1MB221.
    (3)Lasanda Kurukulasuriya,“Japan Eyes Sri Lanka's Deep Water Port of Trincomalee,”The Diplomat,Aug 31,2018,https:∥thediplomat. com/2018/08/japan-eyes-sri-lankas-deep-water-port-of-trincomalee/.
    (1)张锋:“‘印太’的想象:从哪里来,到哪里去?”,中国南海研究院官网,2018年6月28日。
    (2)张耀之:“日本的印太战略理念与政策实践”,《日本问题研究》,2018年第2期,第8页。
    (3)以下文章都提到了印日加强在孟加拉湾开展各领域合作的前景及建议。Darshna M. Baruah,“Tokyo and Delhi:Expanding Strategic Collaborations in the Indo-Pacific,” The Economic Times, Nov. 2, 2018, https:∥economictimes. indiatimes. com/news/defence/tokyo-and-delhi-expanding-strategic-collaborations-in-theindo-pacific/articleshow/66477370. cms; Vindu Mai Chotani,“India and Japan:Reconnecting in the Bay of Bengal,”ORF Report,Jan. 11,2016,https:∥www. orfonline. org/research/india-and-japan-reconnecting-in-the-bay-of-bengal/; Satoru Nagao,“Japan,the United States,and India as Key Balancers in Asia,” CSIS working papers,2015,p. 10. https:∥www. csis. org/programs/japan-chair/strategic-japan-working-papers.
    (4)Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,Darshanna M. Baruah,“Connecting the Bay of Bengal:India,Japan,and Regional Cooperation,”Carnegie India,Oct. 26,2017,https:∥carnegieindia. org/2017/10/26/connecting-bay-of-bengal-india-japan-and-regional-cooperation-event-5711.
    (5)Vindu Mai Chotani and Shutaro Sano,“Japan's Naval Diplomacy in the Bay of Bengal:In Pursuit of a Sound Peacetime Commitment Strategy in Establishing a Stable Maritime Order,” INSSSL,Sep. 19,2018. http:∥www. insssl. lk/preview. php? id=188.
    (6)Sahidul Hasan Khokon,“Dhaka Metro Rail:Deal signed with India-Japan consortium for the final phase,”India Today,Jun. 3,2018,https:∥www. indiatoday. in/world/story/dhaka-metro-rail-deal-signed-with-indiajapan-consortium-for-the-final-phase-1249622-2018-06-03.
    (7)Alice G. Wells,“U. S. Policy in the Indian Ocean Region,” Aug. 20, 2018, https:∥fpc. state. gov/08/285237. htm.
    (1)Kent E. Calder,“The Bay of Bengal:Political-Economic Transition and Strategic Implications,”The Sasakawa Peace Foundation(SPF)Report, July 2018, pp. 79-80, https:∥www. spf. org/en/jupd/publications/20180809_01 . html.
    (2)Lisa Tassi,“Japan's Shameful Myanmar Embrace,” The Diplomat,Sep. 18,2018,https:∥thediplomat. com/2018/09 /japans-shameful-myanmar-embrace/.
    (3)Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh Iyer,“Japanese Naval Diplomacy in the Indian Ocean:Prospects and Possibilities,” National Maritime Foundation,July 9,2018,pp. 3-4.
    (1)“国家发展改革委签署中日第三方市场合作备忘录”,国家发改委网站,2018年5月10日,http:∥www. ndrc. gov. cn/gzdt/201805/t20180510_885874. html。
    (2)“2019年3月21日外交部发言人耿爽主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部网站,2019年3月21日,https:∥www. fmprc. gov. cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1647334. shtml。