北京冬奥会场馆治理的现实问题、理论难题及解题之道
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摘要
北京冬奥会场馆面临如何应对奥组委的特殊要求,雪上场地对管理团队的特别要求,观赛、环境、建设融资与赛后运营等现实问题,以及剩余控制权和剩余索取权配置的理论难题。认为:剩余控制权和剩余索取权对称分布是确保北京冬奥会场馆实现合作治理的基础;保持治理主体之间良好关系是维系北京冬奥会场馆善治的关键;治理主体对北京冬奥会场馆价值的评价决定了政府部门与私人企业的合作及分离程度。
The stadium governance of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games is faced with the problems to satisfy the special requirements of the Olympic Organizing Committee,the special requirements of the snow site to the management team,as well as the problems of observing,environment,construction financing and the post-game operation,plus the theoretical problems in the allocation of the residual control rights and of residual claims,etc.The study holds that the symmetrical distribution of residual control rights and residual claims is the basis of cooperative governance of stadiums of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games.Keeping the good relationship between the main governance bodies is the key to maintain the good governance of stadiums of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games.And the evaluation to the stadiums from the governance body determines the cooperation or division between the government departments and the private enterprises.
The stadium governance of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games is faced with the problems to satisfy the special requirements of the Olympic Organizing Committee,the special requirements of the snow site to the management team,as well as the problems of observing,environment,construction financing and the post-game operation,plus the theoretical problems in the allocation of the residual control rights and of residual claims,etc.The study holds that the symmetrical distribution of residual control rights and residual claims is the basis of cooperative governance of stadiums of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games.Keeping the good relationship between the main governance bodies is the key to maintain the good governance of stadiums of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games.And the evaluation to the stadiums from the governance body determines the cooperation or division between the government departments and the private enterprises.
引文
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[6] 郑志强,陶长琪,冷毅.大型体育设施供给PPP模式的合作博弈分析[J].体育科学,2011,31(5):27-32
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[9] 周其仁.大型乡镇企业研究:横店个案笔谈[J].经济研究,1997(5):31-42
[10] MARK G.Economic action and social structure:The problem of embeddedness[J].American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481-510
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[12] ROY,J.P.International joint venture partner selection and performance:The role of the host country legal environment[D].York University,2005:71
[13] 聂辉华.新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合:以威廉姆斯和哈特为代表的两种进路[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,18(1):81-87
[14] FRANCESCONI M,MUTHOO A.Control rights in public-private partnerships [R].IZA Discussion Paper,2006:2143
[2] 王健,陈元欣,王维.中美体育场馆委托经营比较研究[J].西安体育学院学报,2013,30(1):1-7
[3] 易剑东.大型体育场馆赛后运营的主要理念与方法[EB/OL].[2017-01-15].http://user.qzone.qq.com/622008260#!app=2&via=QZ.HashRefresh&pos=1326589727
[4] 陈元欣,王健.体育场馆不同运营模式的税收筹划研究[J].天津体育学院学报,2013,28(5):208-212
[5] 李艳丽.国外公共服务机构资产管理及其对我国公共体育场馆改革的启示[J].北京体育大学学报,2014,37(8):6-11
[6] 郑志强,陶长琪,冷毅.大型体育设施供给PPP模式的合作博弈分析[J].体育科学,2011,31(5):27-32
[7] HART O,MOORE J.Property rights and nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158
[8] 弗鲁博顿,芮切特.新制度经济学:一个交易费用分析范式[M].姜建强,罗长远,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2006:51
[9] 周其仁.大型乡镇企业研究:横店个案笔谈[J].经济研究,1997(5):31-42
[10] MARK G.Economic action and social structure:The problem of embeddedness[J].American Journal of Sociology,1985,91(3):481-510
[11] WILLIAMSON OLIVER E.The economic institutions of capitalism:Firms,markets,relational contracting[M].New York:Free Press,1985:121
[12] ROY,J.P.International joint venture partner selection and performance:The role of the host country legal environment[D].York University,2005:71
[13] 聂辉华.新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合:以威廉姆斯和哈特为代表的两种进路[J].中国人民大学学报,2005,18(1):81-87
[14] FRANCESCONI M,MUTHOO A.Control rights in public-private partnerships [R].IZA Discussion Paper,2006:2143