公共治理与国有企业价值——基于高管隐性激励视角的研究
|
摘要
习近平总书记在十九大报告中提出坚定不移进行反腐败"持久战"。十八大之后持续的重拳反腐给中国社会治理和经济发展带来了深远的影响。本文首先以"八项规定"出台作为标志性的外生冲击事件,采用DID模型检验了国有企业在职消费对企业价值的影响;然后在此基础上检验了反腐败的政策效果和作用机制。研究发现:相比于非国有企业,"八项规定"出台以后国有企业的在职消费明显下降;反腐败会降低国有企业当期的财务绩效,但却有利于国有企业价值的提升;反腐败对国有企业绩效和价值的作用机制是通过影响国有企业高管的隐性激励效果来实现的。本研究为十八大之后反腐败的政策效果提供了重要的实证证据,为以后研究反腐败提供了基础框架。
"It is necessary to make continuous war against corruption",President Xi said in 19 th Party Congress Reporting.The continuous efforts to counter corruption after the 18 th National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China has a profound effect on China's social governance and economic development.The anti-corruption and the development of our state-owned enterprises are not only the academic research point,but also the hot topic in public.However,there still some shortcomings exist in the current studies,because the effectiveness of these anti-corruption policies is doubted by the public.Based on the introduction of the "Eight Rules",this paper constructed a standard natural experimental model,which exa-mined the relation between anti-corruption and the state-owned enterprises' perk at first.And then,checked the effectiveness of the anti-corruption policies and the functional mechanism.After studying,we found that:(1) comparing with nonstate-owned enterprises,the perk of state-owned enterprises began to decline remar-kably after the introduce of the "eight rules".(2) Anti-corruption would reduce the current financial performance of state-owned enterprises,but it would,on the other hand,help to improve the value of state-owned enterprises.(3)The anti-corruption's functional mechanism to examine state-owned enterprises' perfor-mance and value is achieved by stimulating the senior executives' implicit incentive in these enterprises.This paper will,after studying,provide significant and solid evidence for anti-corruption policies taken after the 18 th National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China,and therefore provides foundation framework for the future studies in anti-corruption.
"It is necessary to make continuous war against corruption",President Xi said in 19 th Party Congress Reporting.The continuous efforts to counter corruption after the 18 th National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China has a profound effect on China's social governance and economic development.The anti-corruption and the development of our state-owned enterprises are not only the academic research point,but also the hot topic in public.However,there still some shortcomings exist in the current studies,because the effectiveness of these anti-corruption policies is doubted by the public.Based on the introduction of the "Eight Rules",this paper constructed a standard natural experimental model,which exa-mined the relation between anti-corruption and the state-owned enterprises' perk at first.And then,checked the effectiveness of the anti-corruption policies and the functional mechanism.After studying,we found that:(1) comparing with nonstate-owned enterprises,the perk of state-owned enterprises began to decline remar-kably after the introduce of the "eight rules".(2) Anti-corruption would reduce the current financial performance of state-owned enterprises,but it would,on the other hand,help to improve the value of state-owned enterprises.(3)The anti-corruption's functional mechanism to examine state-owned enterprises' perfor-mance and value is achieved by stimulating the senior executives' implicit incentive in these enterprises.This paper will,after studying,provide significant and solid evidence for anti-corruption policies taken after the 18 th National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China,and therefore provides foundation framework for the future studies in anti-corruption.
引文
[1]叶康涛,藏文佼.外部监督与企业费用归类操纵[J].管理世界,2016(1):121-138.
[2]杨蓉.“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016(1):138-172.
[3]梅洁,葛杨.国有企业管理层在职消费的政策干预效果研究——基于2012年“八项规定”出台所构建的拟自然实验[J].经济学家,2016(2):75-83.
[4]王茂斌,孔东民.反腐败与中国公司治理优化:一个准自然实验[J].金融研究,2016(8):159-174.
[5]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[6]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,陈才东.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.
[7]Chen D H,Li O Z,Liang S K.Do Managers Perform for Perks?[Z].Working paper,Nanjing University,2010.
[8]Luo W,Zhang Y,Zhu N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[9]Nguyen T T,Dijk M A.Corruption,Growth,and Governance:Private vs.State-owned Firms in Vietnam[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2012,36(11):2935-2948.
[10]Cai H,Fang H,Xu L.Eat,Drink,Firms and Governments:An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment Expenditures in Chinese Firms[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2011,54:55-78.
[11]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:395-360.
[12]Hart O.Financial Contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39:1079.
[13]Yermack D.Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets,CEO Perquisites,and Inferior Shareholder Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[14]罗宏,黄文华.国有企业分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008(9):139-148.
[15]盛宇明.腐败的经济学分析[J].经济研究,2000(5):52-59.
[16]Fama E.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88:288-307.
[17]Rajan R G,Wulf J.Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J]Journal of Political Economy,2006,79(1):1-33.
[18]Adithipyangkul P,Alon I,Zhang T.Executive perks:Compensation and Corporate Performance in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2011,28(2):401-425.
[19]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,汪剑锋.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[20]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[21] Gibbons R.Incentives in Organizations[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1998(12):115-132.
[22] Dewatripont M,Jewitt I,Tirole J.The Economics of Career Concerns,Part II:Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(1):199-217.
[23] 王新,毛慧贞,李彦霖.企业社会责任与经理人薪酬激励有效性研究——战略性动机还是卸责借口?[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):130-140.
[24] 姜付秀,黄继承.经理激励、负债与企业价值[J].经济研究,2011(5):46-60.
[25] 吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权利的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[26] 周美华,林斌,林东杰.管理层权利、内部控制与腐败治理[J].会计研究,2016(3):56-96.
[27]党力,杨瑞龙,杨继东.反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释[J].中国工业经济,2015(7):146-160.
[28]钟覃琳,陆正飞,袁淳.反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究[J].金融研究,2016(9):161-175.
[29] Xu N,Li X,Yuan Q,Chan K C.Excess Perks and Stock Price Crash Risk:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014(25):419-434.
(1)资料来源:网易新闻(http://news.163.com/15/0628/11/AT6NNE0Q00014AED.html)。
(1)该方法使用原理为:a.进行趋势评分■。其中,Ti为实验组哑变量,即国有企业为1,非国有企业为0,F为Logistic分布函数,h为第i家公司特征向量Xi的线性函数。b.根据评分结果匹配实验组与控制组。c.利用匹配后的样本进行DID估计。本文将使用PSM选择样本的方法做稳健性检验。
(1)资料来源:中国日报(http://caijing.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-09/09/content_18564328.htm)。
[2]杨蓉.“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016(1):138-172.
[3]梅洁,葛杨.国有企业管理层在职消费的政策干预效果研究——基于2012年“八项规定”出台所构建的拟自然实验[J].经济学家,2016(2):75-83.
[4]王茂斌,孔东民.反腐败与中国公司治理优化:一个准自然实验[J].金融研究,2016(8):159-174.
[5]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[6]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,陈才东.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.
[7]Chen D H,Li O Z,Liang S K.Do Managers Perform for Perks?[Z].Working paper,Nanjing University,2010.
[8]Luo W,Zhang Y,Zhu N.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[9]Nguyen T T,Dijk M A.Corruption,Growth,and Governance:Private vs.State-owned Firms in Vietnam[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2012,36(11):2935-2948.
[10]Cai H,Fang H,Xu L.Eat,Drink,Firms and Governments:An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment Expenditures in Chinese Firms[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2011,54:55-78.
[11]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:395-360.
[12]Hart O.Financial Contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39:1079.
[13]Yermack D.Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets,CEO Perquisites,and Inferior Shareholder Returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[14]罗宏,黄文华.国有企业分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界,2008(9):139-148.
[15]盛宇明.腐败的经济学分析[J].经济研究,2000(5):52-59.
[16]Fama E.Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88:288-307.
[17]Rajan R G,Wulf J.Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?[J]Journal of Political Economy,2006,79(1):1-33.
[18]Adithipyangkul P,Alon I,Zhang T.Executive perks:Compensation and Corporate Performance in China[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2011,28(2):401-425.
[19]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,汪剑锋.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[20]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[21] Gibbons R.Incentives in Organizations[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1998(12):115-132.
[22] Dewatripont M,Jewitt I,Tirole J.The Economics of Career Concerns,Part II:Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1999,66(1):199-217.
[23] 王新,毛慧贞,李彦霖.企业社会责任与经理人薪酬激励有效性研究——战略性动机还是卸责借口?[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):130-140.
[24] 姜付秀,黄继承.经理激励、负债与企业价值[J].经济研究,2011(5):46-60.
[25] 吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权利的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[26] 周美华,林斌,林东杰.管理层权利、内部控制与腐败治理[J].会计研究,2016(3):56-96.
[27]党力,杨瑞龙,杨继东.反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释[J].中国工业经济,2015(7):146-160.
[28]钟覃琳,陆正飞,袁淳.反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究[J].金融研究,2016(9):161-175.
[29] Xu N,Li X,Yuan Q,Chan K C.Excess Perks and Stock Price Crash Risk:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014(25):419-434.
(1)资料来源:网易新闻(http://news.163.com/15/0628/11/AT6NNE0Q00014AED.html)。
(1)该方法使用原理为:a.进行趋势评分■。其中,Ti为实验组哑变量,即国有企业为1,非国有企业为0,F为Logistic分布函数,h为第i家公司特征向量Xi的线性函数。b.根据评分结果匹配实验组与控制组。c.利用匹配后的样本进行DID估计。本文将使用PSM选择样本的方法做稳健性检验。
(1)资料来源:中国日报(http://caijing.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-09/09/content_18564328.htm)。
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |