外部监管、公司治理与内部控制缺陷披露——基于管理层动机选择的视角
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摘要
以2014—2016年发生财务报表重述的沪深主板A股上市公司为基础,确定内部控制存在缺陷的上市公司样本,依据上市公司是否在自评报告中披露内部控制缺陷信息,从外部监管和公司治理两个维度分析了内部控制缺陷信息"动机选择"的影响因素。研究发现:事务所规模大、监事会规模大、财务风险大的上市公司更倾向于主动披露内部控制缺陷信息,而企业规模大、发生事务所变更、总经理和董事长两职合一的上市公司更倾向于隐瞒内部控制缺陷信息。
Based on the A-share listed companies during the 2014—2016 on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen that have been restated in the financial statements,this paper determined the sample of listed companies with defects in internal control. According to whether the listed company disclosed the internal control defect information in the self-evaluation report,this paper analyzed the influencing factors of "motivation selection " of internal control defect information from two dimensions: external supervision and corporate governance. It is found that the listed companies with big accounting firms,large board of supervisors and large financial risks tend to disclose internal control defect information actively,while the listed companies with large size,accounting firm changes and the combination of general manager and chairman tend to conceal internal control defect information.
Based on the A-share listed companies during the 2014—2016 on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen that have been restated in the financial statements,this paper determined the sample of listed companies with defects in internal control. According to whether the listed company disclosed the internal control defect information in the self-evaluation report,this paper analyzed the influencing factors of "motivation selection " of internal control defect information from two dimensions: external supervision and corporate governance. It is found that the listed companies with big accounting firms,large board of supervisors and large financial risks tend to disclose internal control defect information actively,while the listed companies with large size,accounting firm changes and the combination of general manager and chairman tend to conceal internal control defect information.
引文
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[16]王加灿,唐国平.内部控制信息自愿披露水平的影响因素研究———基于沪市A股上市公司的经验证据[J].湖南财政经济学院学报,2011(4):87-93.
[17]杨程程,程小可,王芯卉.内部控制缺陷披露制度有效性及其影响因素[J].经济与管理研究,2015(10):138-144.
[18]李璐.内部控制缺陷、公司治理结构与财务困境[J].财会通讯,2018(3):103-107.
[19]李越冬,严青.机构持股、终极产权与内部控制缺陷[J].会计研究,2017(5):75-81.
[20]林钟高,常青.内部控制监管、内部控制缺陷及修复与董事会治理[J].会计与经济研究,2017(1):65-83.
[2] GE W,MCVAY S. The Disclosure of Material Weaknessin Internal Control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act[J]. Ac-counting Horizons,2005(19):137-158.
[3] DEFOND M,RAGHUNANDAN K. Do Non-audit ServiceFees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from GoingConcern Audit Opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting Re-search,2002(40):1247-1274.
[4] JEFFREY D,WEILI G,SARAH M. Determinants ofWeaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2007(44):193-223.
[5] KIM J B,SONG B Y,ZHANG L D. Internal controlweakness and bank loan contracting:Evidence from SOXSection 404 disclosures[J]. The Accounting Review,2011(4):1157-1188.
[6] BALSAM S,JIANG W,LU B. Equity incentives and in-ternal control weaknesses[J]. Contemporary AccountingResearch,2014(31):119-132.
[7] LIN Y C,WANG Y C,CHIOU J R,et al. CEO character-istics and internal control quality[J]. Corporate Govern-ance:An International Review,2014(8):98-108.
[8]王惠芳.内部控制缺陷认定:现状、困境及基本框架重构[J].会计研究,2011(8):61-67.
[9]杨有红,李宇立.内部控制缺陷的识别、认定与报告[J].会计研究,2011(3):76-80.
[10]李宇立.内部控制缺陷识别与认定的技术路线———基于管理层视角的分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2012(3):113-119.
[11]赵息,许宁宁.管理层权力、机会主义动机与内部控制缺陷信息披露[J].审计研究,2013(4):101-109.
[12]张瑶,郭雪萌,肖序.内控缺陷信息披露、动机选择与经济后果[J].经济问题,2016(5):118-123.
[13]许江波,贺小丹.未能发现还是动机选择?———内部控制缺陷披露困境的成因[J].经济与管理研究,2016(3):123-130.
[14]冯均科,丁沛文,董静然.公司治理结构与内部控制缺陷披露的相关性研究[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016(5):88-94.
[15]林丽花.上市公司自愿披露内部控制的实证分析[J].中南林业科技大学学报(社会科学版),2011(5):99-100.
[16]王加灿,唐国平.内部控制信息自愿披露水平的影响因素研究———基于沪市A股上市公司的经验证据[J].湖南财政经济学院学报,2011(4):87-93.
[17]杨程程,程小可,王芯卉.内部控制缺陷披露制度有效性及其影响因素[J].经济与管理研究,2015(10):138-144.
[18]李璐.内部控制缺陷、公司治理结构与财务困境[J].财会通讯,2018(3):103-107.
[19]李越冬,严青.机构持股、终极产权与内部控制缺陷[J].会计研究,2017(5):75-81.
[20]林钟高,常青.内部控制监管、内部控制缺陷及修复与董事会治理[J].会计与经济研究,2017(1):65-83.