财务顾问与企业并购绩效
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摘要
作为资本市场的广泛参与者,财务顾问能否有效提升企业并购绩效?回答这一问题对于推进供给侧改革、实现产业结构优化升级、提高公司治理绩效具有重要意义。本文基于创业板这一自然实验平台,考察了财务顾问及其异质性特征对企业并购绩效的影响效应。研究结果表明:财务顾问与并购方之间存在利益冲突,聘请财务顾问将降低并购方并购绩效。得益于关系型财务顾问的"关系租金"和高声誉财务顾问的"声誉鉴证"功能,该类型财务顾问可以缓解其与并购方的利益冲突,发挥专业服务功能,进而提升并购绩效。本文进一步检验了财务顾问影响公司并购绩效的作用机制:聘请财务顾问的公司在并购后的内部控制有效性较差,这反映了并购后的资源整合效果较差,导致更低的并购绩效。关系型财务顾问的"关系租金"和高声誉财务顾问的"声誉鉴证"功能可以降低并购溢价、缩短并购持续时间、加快并购进度,最终提升并购绩效。本文的研究拓展了公司社会资本的相关研究,丰富了关于金融中介服务功能的研究,还为监管部门如何更合理地引导上市公司的并购重组行为提供了政策启示。
As broad participants in the capital market, whether financial advisors and their heterogeneous characteristics can effectively improve the performance of M&A, this issue is of great significance for promoting supply-side reform, realizing industrial structure optimization and upgrading, and improving corporate governance performance. Based on the natural experimental platform of GEM, this paper considers the impact of financial advisors and their heterogeneity on corporate M&A performance. The results show that there is a conflict of interest between the financial advisor and the acquirer, so that the M&A performance of the companies who employ financial advisors are significantly lower than those who do not employ financial advisors. Benefiting from the"relationship rent" brought by the relational financial advisors and the "reputation certification function" of the high reputation financial advisors, relational financial advisors or high reputation financial advisors are able to alleviate conflicts of interest and provide professional services to acquirers, and improve M&A performance. This paper also explains the effect mechanism of the financial advisors on the M&A performance. The company employing financial advisor has worse internal control effectiveness after M&A, which reflects the poorer effect of resource integration after M&A, and leads to the lower M&A performance. The "relationship rent" of the relational financial advisor and the "reputation certification function" of the high reputation financial advisor can reduce the M&A premium, shorten the duration of M&A, improve the progress of M&A, and improve the performance of M&A. This study expands the related research on the social capital of the enterprises, enriches the research on the services function of the financial intermediaries, and provides some policy implications for the regulatory departments to guide the M&A of the listed companies more reasonably.
As broad participants in the capital market, whether financial advisors and their heterogeneous characteristics can effectively improve the performance of M&A, this issue is of great significance for promoting supply-side reform, realizing industrial structure optimization and upgrading, and improving corporate governance performance. Based on the natural experimental platform of GEM, this paper considers the impact of financial advisors and their heterogeneity on corporate M&A performance. The results show that there is a conflict of interest between the financial advisor and the acquirer, so that the M&A performance of the companies who employ financial advisors are significantly lower than those who do not employ financial advisors. Benefiting from the"relationship rent" brought by the relational financial advisors and the "reputation certification function" of the high reputation financial advisors, relational financial advisors or high reputation financial advisors are able to alleviate conflicts of interest and provide professional services to acquirers, and improve M&A performance. This paper also explains the effect mechanism of the financial advisors on the M&A performance. The company employing financial advisor has worse internal control effectiveness after M&A, which reflects the poorer effect of resource integration after M&A, and leads to the lower M&A performance. The "relationship rent" of the relational financial advisor and the "reputation certification function" of the high reputation financial advisor can reduce the M&A premium, shorten the duration of M&A, improve the progress of M&A, and improve the performance of M&A. This study expands the related research on the social capital of the enterprises, enriches the research on the services function of the financial intermediaries, and provides some policy implications for the regulatory departments to guide the M&A of the listed companies more reasonably.
引文
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[6]葛结根.并购支付方式与并购绩效的实证研究——以沪深上市公司为收购目标的经验证据[J].会计研究,2015,(9):74-80.
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[10]潘越,戴亦一,刘思超.我国承销商利用分析师报告托市了吗[J].经济研究,2011,(3):131-144.
[11]孙淑伟,何贤杰,赵瑞光,牛建军.中国企业海外并购溢价研究[J].南开管理评论,2017,(3):77-89.
[12]万良勇,胡璟.网络位置、独立董事治理与公司并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014,(2):64-73.
[13]王艳,李善民.社会信任是否会提升企业并购绩效[J].管理世界,2017,(12):125-140.
[14]王艳,阚铄.企业文化与并购绩效[J].管理世界,2014,(11):146-157.
[15]王凤荣,高飞.政府干预、企业生命周期与并购绩效——基于我国地方国有上市公司的经验数据[J].金融研究,2012,(12):137-150.
[16]吴超,薛有志.媒体报道、承销商声誉与IPO首日换手率[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,(1):15-26.
[17]肖土盛,李丹,袁淳.企业风格与政府环境匹配:基于异地并购的证据[J].管理世界,2018,(3):124-138.
[18]许荣,蒋庆欣,李星汉.信息不对称程度增加是否有助于投行声誉功能发挥?——基于中国创业板制度实施的证据[J].金融研究,2013,(7):166-179.
[19]徐浩萍,罗炜.投资银行声誉机制有效性——执业质量与市场份额双重视角的研究[J].经济研究,2007,(2):124-136.
[20]杨道广,张传财,陈汉文.内部控制、并购整合能力与并购业绩——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2014,(3):43-50.
[21]杨德明,林斌,王彦超.内部控制、审计质量与代理成本[J].财经研究,2009,(12):40-49.
[22]杨威,宋敏,冯科.并购商誉、投资者过度反应与股价泡沫及崩盘[J].中国工业经济,2018,(6):156-173.
[23]晏国菀,谢光华.董事联结、董事会职能与并购绩效[J].科研管理,2017,(9):106-115.
[24]张新一.浅谈财务顾问与内幕交易——基于岳远斌案的思考[J].财会通讯,2012,(20):124-125.
[25]张学勇,廖理,罗远航.券商背景风险投资与公司IPO抑价——基于信息不对称的视角[J].中国工业经济,2014,(11):90-101.
[26]Arikan,A.M.,and L.Capron.Do Newly Public Acquirers Benefit or Suffer from Their Pre-IPO Affiliations with Underwriters and VCs[J].Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(12):1257-1289.
[27]Bao,J.,and A.Edmans.Do Investment Banks Matter for M&A Returns[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(7):2286-2315.
[28]Beckman,C.M.,and P.R.Haunschild.Network Learning:The Effects of Partners’Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2002,47(1):92-124.
[29]Bodnaruk,A.,M.Massa,and A.Simonov.Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(12):4989-5026.
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(1)中国证券监督管理委员会2006年5月17日所审议通过的《上市公司收购管理办法》第一章总则第九条规定“收购人进行上市公司的收购,应当聘请在中国注册的具有从事财务顾问业务资格的专业机构担任财务顾问。收购人未按照本办法规定聘请财务顾问的,不得收购上市公司。”之后,《上市公司收购管理办法》分别在2008年8月27日、2012年2月14日和2014年10月23日进行了三次修订,但该条款未发生变化。
(2)实际上,在本文的研究样本中仅有不足3例的创业板上市公司收购的标的为上市公司,且在后续的样本筛选过程中被删掉,因此,本文研究的对象均属于创业板上市公司收购非上市公司的案例。
(1)累退比例佣金是指财务顾问的佣金随着并购交易金额的上升而呈比例下降。根据莱曼公式,假设并购交易金额为500万美元,第1个100万美元佣金比率为5%,第2个100万美元佣金比率为4%,第3个100万美元佣金比率为3%,第4个100万美元佣金比率为2%,第5个100万美元佣金比率为1%,则按照莱曼公式计算的并购佣金应当为100×5%+100×4%+100×3%+100×2%+100×1%。
(2)累进比例佣金是指财务顾问和客户事先对并购交易所需金额进行事前评估,并按照事先评估的并购交易金额收取固定比例的佣金。当实际并购交易金额低于事前估计的交易额时,则给予累进比例佣金作为鼓励;当实际并购交易金额高于事前估计的交易金额时,则扣减累进比例佣金作为惩罚。
(1)在对样本进行选取时,有188件并购事件属于同一家公司在同一年份完成的多起并购事件,为了降低同一家公司的不同并购事件对并购绩效的累积影响,对该类并购事件予以删除。在使用事件研究法计算并购绩效时,窗口期的选择为并购事件发生日前150天至前30天,而创业板市场指数的创立日为2010年5月31日,为保证指数有120个可供观察日,删除了宣告日在2011年1月11日之前的并购事件,即信息不全的并购事件。按照这种删除规则,删掉的样本观测值为46家。最终得到了326个样本观测值。
(1)根据2010年4月15日中华人民共和国财政部、中国证券监督管理委员会、中华人民共和国审计署和中国银行业监督管理委员会联合发布的《企业内部控制评价指引》第四章“内部控制缺陷的认定”第十七条,“重大缺陷是指,一个或多个控制缺陷的组合,可能导致企业严重偏离控制目标。重要缺陷是指,一个或多个控制缺陷的组合,其严重程度和经济后果低于重大缺陷,但仍有可能导致企业偏离控制目标。一般缺陷是指,除重大缺陷、重要缺陷之外的其他缺陷。”有关企业内部控制缺陷的数据来自国泰安数据库根据企业年报披露数据的统计。
(1)相关性检验的结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)内生性检验和稳健性检验的结果见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
[2]陈骏,徐玉德.并购重组是掏空还是支持——基于资产评估视角的经验研究[J].财贸经济,2012,(9):76-84.
[3]陈仕华,李维安.并购溢价决策中的锚定效应研究[J].经济研究,2016,(6):114-127.
[4]陈仕华,卢昌崇.企业间高管联结与并购溢价决策——基于组织间模仿理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013,(5):144-156.
[5]陈仕华,姜广省,卢昌崇.董事联结、目标公司选择与并购绩效——基于并购双方之间信息不对称的研究视角[J].管理世界,2013,(12):117-132.
[6]葛结根.并购支付方式与并购绩效的实证研究——以沪深上市公司为收购目标的经验证据[J].会计研究,2015,(9):74-80.
[7]赖黎,巩亚林,夏晓兰,马永强.管理者从军经历与企业并购[J].世界经济,2017,(12):141-164.
[8]李曜,宋贺.风险投资支持的上市公司并购绩效及其影响机制研究[J].会计研究,2017,(6):60-66.
[9]李善民,黄灿,史欣向.信息优势对企业并购的影响——基于社会网络的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015,(11):141-155.
[10]潘越,戴亦一,刘思超.我国承销商利用分析师报告托市了吗[J].经济研究,2011,(3):131-144.
[11]孙淑伟,何贤杰,赵瑞光,牛建军.中国企业海外并购溢价研究[J].南开管理评论,2017,(3):77-89.
[12]万良勇,胡璟.网络位置、独立董事治理与公司并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014,(2):64-73.
[13]王艳,李善民.社会信任是否会提升企业并购绩效[J].管理世界,2017,(12):125-140.
[14]王艳,阚铄.企业文化与并购绩效[J].管理世界,2014,(11):146-157.
[15]王凤荣,高飞.政府干预、企业生命周期与并购绩效——基于我国地方国有上市公司的经验数据[J].金融研究,2012,(12):137-150.
[16]吴超,薛有志.媒体报道、承销商声誉与IPO首日换手率[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,(1):15-26.
[17]肖土盛,李丹,袁淳.企业风格与政府环境匹配:基于异地并购的证据[J].管理世界,2018,(3):124-138.
[18]许荣,蒋庆欣,李星汉.信息不对称程度增加是否有助于投行声誉功能发挥?——基于中国创业板制度实施的证据[J].金融研究,2013,(7):166-179.
[19]徐浩萍,罗炜.投资银行声誉机制有效性——执业质量与市场份额双重视角的研究[J].经济研究,2007,(2):124-136.
[20]杨道广,张传财,陈汉文.内部控制、并购整合能力与并购业绩——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2014,(3):43-50.
[21]杨德明,林斌,王彦超.内部控制、审计质量与代理成本[J].财经研究,2009,(12):40-49.
[22]杨威,宋敏,冯科.并购商誉、投资者过度反应与股价泡沫及崩盘[J].中国工业经济,2018,(6):156-173.
[23]晏国菀,谢光华.董事联结、董事会职能与并购绩效[J].科研管理,2017,(9):106-115.
[24]张新一.浅谈财务顾问与内幕交易——基于岳远斌案的思考[J].财会通讯,2012,(20):124-125.
[25]张学勇,廖理,罗远航.券商背景风险投资与公司IPO抑价——基于信息不对称的视角[J].中国工业经济,2014,(11):90-101.
[26]Arikan,A.M.,and L.Capron.Do Newly Public Acquirers Benefit or Suffer from Their Pre-IPO Affiliations with Underwriters and VCs[J].Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(12):1257-1289.
[27]Bao,J.,and A.Edmans.Do Investment Banks Matter for M&A Returns[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(7):2286-2315.
[28]Beckman,C.M.,and P.R.Haunschild.Network Learning:The Effects of Partners’Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,2002,47(1):92-124.
[29]Bodnaruk,A.,M.Massa,and A.Simonov.Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(12):4989-5026.
[30]Chahine,S.,and A.Ismail.Premium,Merger Fees and the Choice of Investment Banks:A Simultaneous Analysis[J].Quarterly Review of Economics&Finance,2009,49(2):159-177.
[31]Chuang,K.S.The Role of Investment Banks on the Impact of Firm Performance in Mergers and Acquisitions:Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Market[J].Review of Quantitative Finance&Accounting,2017,48(3):677-699.
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(1)中国证券监督管理委员会2006年5月17日所审议通过的《上市公司收购管理办法》第一章总则第九条规定“收购人进行上市公司的收购,应当聘请在中国注册的具有从事财务顾问业务资格的专业机构担任财务顾问。收购人未按照本办法规定聘请财务顾问的,不得收购上市公司。”之后,《上市公司收购管理办法》分别在2008年8月27日、2012年2月14日和2014年10月23日进行了三次修订,但该条款未发生变化。
(2)实际上,在本文的研究样本中仅有不足3例的创业板上市公司收购的标的为上市公司,且在后续的样本筛选过程中被删掉,因此,本文研究的对象均属于创业板上市公司收购非上市公司的案例。
(1)累退比例佣金是指财务顾问的佣金随着并购交易金额的上升而呈比例下降。根据莱曼公式,假设并购交易金额为500万美元,第1个100万美元佣金比率为5%,第2个100万美元佣金比率为4%,第3个100万美元佣金比率为3%,第4个100万美元佣金比率为2%,第5个100万美元佣金比率为1%,则按照莱曼公式计算的并购佣金应当为100×5%+100×4%+100×3%+100×2%+100×1%。
(2)累进比例佣金是指财务顾问和客户事先对并购交易所需金额进行事前评估,并按照事先评估的并购交易金额收取固定比例的佣金。当实际并购交易金额低于事前估计的交易额时,则给予累进比例佣金作为鼓励;当实际并购交易金额高于事前估计的交易金额时,则扣减累进比例佣金作为惩罚。
(1)在对样本进行选取时,有188件并购事件属于同一家公司在同一年份完成的多起并购事件,为了降低同一家公司的不同并购事件对并购绩效的累积影响,对该类并购事件予以删除。在使用事件研究法计算并购绩效时,窗口期的选择为并购事件发生日前150天至前30天,而创业板市场指数的创立日为2010年5月31日,为保证指数有120个可供观察日,删除了宣告日在2011年1月11日之前的并购事件,即信息不全的并购事件。按照这种删除规则,删掉的样本观测值为46家。最终得到了326个样本观测值。
(1)根据2010年4月15日中华人民共和国财政部、中国证券监督管理委员会、中华人民共和国审计署和中国银行业监督管理委员会联合发布的《企业内部控制评价指引》第四章“内部控制缺陷的认定”第十七条,“重大缺陷是指,一个或多个控制缺陷的组合,可能导致企业严重偏离控制目标。重要缺陷是指,一个或多个控制缺陷的组合,其严重程度和经济后果低于重大缺陷,但仍有可能导致企业偏离控制目标。一般缺陷是指,除重大缺陷、重要缺陷之外的其他缺陷。”有关企业内部控制缺陷的数据来自国泰安数据库根据企业年报披露数据的统计。
(1)相关性检验的结果请参见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。
(1)内生性检验和稳健性检验的结果见《中国工业经济》网站(http://www.ciejournal.org)公开附件。