环境分权对水环境治理效果的影响——财政分权视角下的动态面板检验
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摘要
选取2002—2015年我国30个省际面板数据,应用系统GMM估计方法,实证检验了环境分权的水环境治理效应。研究结果显示,环境分权与工业废水和生活污水排放、工业废水氨氮排放量及工业废水化学需氧量三类水污染指标呈现显著且稳定的正向关系,这意味着赋予地方政府过高的环境管理自主权将不利于改善水环境治理效果;财政分权对水环境治理效果产生负向效应,随着财政分权程度的提升,环境分权对水环境治理效果的不利影响得以强化。分组检验结果表明,中央政策干预和环境管理体制改革促使财政分权对水环境治理效果的负面作用逐渐趋于不明显,且有效削弱了财政分权对环境分权与水环境治理效果两者关系的调节效应;在东部沿海地区,环境分权可一定程度上降低水污染排放,其治理效应总体上优于中西部内陆地区,而财政分权对水环境治理效果的负向作用及其调节效应在中西部内陆地区更显著。
Based on the panel data of 30 provinces( municipalities and autonomous regions) in China from 2002 to2015,the effects of environmental decentralization on water environment treatment are empirically tested by using the method of system GMM. The results show that the environmental decentralization has a significant and stable positive relationship with the three types of water pollution indices,namely,discharge of industrial and domestic wastewater( DID),ammonia nitrogen emission from industrial wastewater( HN _ I),and chemical oxygen demand of industrial wastewater( COD_I). It means the excessive autonomy of local governments in environmental management is detrimental to water environmental governance.The fiscal decentralization also has a negative effect on water environment governance. With the improvement of the fiscal decentralization, the adverse impact of the environmental decentralization on the effects of water environment treatment is strengthened. The group tests reveal the negative effects of the fiscal decentralization on water environment governance arebecoming less obvious due to the central policy intervention and the reform of environmental management system, and the moderating effects of the fiscal decentralization are also effectively weakened. To some extent, the environmental decentralization having better effects in the eastern areas than those in the central and western areas reduces the water pollution discharge in the eastern coastal areas. At the same time,the negative effects of the fiscal decentralization on water environment governance and its moderating effects are more significant in the central and western areas.
Based on the panel data of 30 provinces( municipalities and autonomous regions) in China from 2002 to2015,the effects of environmental decentralization on water environment treatment are empirically tested by using the method of system GMM. The results show that the environmental decentralization has a significant and stable positive relationship with the three types of water pollution indices,namely,discharge of industrial and domestic wastewater( DID),ammonia nitrogen emission from industrial wastewater( HN _ I),and chemical oxygen demand of industrial wastewater( COD_I). It means the excessive autonomy of local governments in environmental management is detrimental to water environmental governance.The fiscal decentralization also has a negative effect on water environment governance. With the improvement of the fiscal decentralization, the adverse impact of the environmental decentralization on the effects of water environment treatment is strengthened. The group tests reveal the negative effects of the fiscal decentralization on water environment governance arebecoming less obvious due to the central policy intervention and the reform of environmental management system, and the moderating effects of the fiscal decentralization are also effectively weakened. To some extent, the environmental decentralization having better effects in the eastern areas than those in the central and western areas reduces the water pollution discharge in the eastern coastal areas. At the same time,the negative effects of the fiscal decentralization on water environment governance and its moderating effects are more significant in the central and western areas.
引文
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[2] 尹怡诚,刘云国,刘少博,等.中国工业水污染及其成因的de Bruyn模型分析[J].环境工程学报,2015,9(2):639-644.
[3] OATES W E ,PORTNEY P R.The political economy of environmental policy[J].Handbook of Environmental Economics,2003,1(2):325-354.
[4] 张平淡.地方政府环保真作为吗:基于财政分权背景的实证检验[J].经济管理,2018,40(8):23-37.
[5] 陈硕,高琳.央地关系:财政分权度量及作用机制再评估[J].管理世界,2012,34(6):43-59.
[6] TIEBOUT C M.A pure theory of local expenditures[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1956,64(5):416-424.
[7] EASY D C.Revitalizing environmental federalism[J].Michigan Law Review,1996,95(3):570-653.
[8] FREDRIKSSON P G,MILLIMET D L.Strategic interaction and the determination of environmental policy across U.S.States[J].Journal of Urban Economics,2002,51(1):101-122.
[9] DIJKSTRA B R,FREDRIKSSON P G.Regulatory environmental federalism[J].Annual Review of Resource Economics,2010,2(1):319-339.
[10] 高楠,梁平汉.晋升激励、市场化与地方财政预算周期[J].世界经济文汇,2014,57(4):103-119.
[11] 张华,丰超,刘贯春.中国式环境联邦主义:环境分权对碳排放的影响研究[J].财经研究,2017,43(9):33-49.
[12] 陆远权,张德钢.环境分权、市场分割与碳排放[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(6):107-115.
[13] HARDIN G.The tragedy of the commons[J].Science,New Series,1968,162(3859):1243-1248.
[14] 祁毓,卢洪友,徐彦坤.中国环境分权体制改革研究:制度变迁、数量测算与效应评估[J].中国工业经济,2014,36(1):31-43.
[15] 彭星.环境分权有利于中国工业绿色转型吗:产业结构升级视角下的动态空间效应检验[J].产业经济研究,2016,17(2):21-31,110.
[16] 李强.河长制视域下环境分权的减排效应研究[J].产业经济研究,2018,19(3):53-63.
[17] 肖加元,刘潘.财政支出对环境治理的门槛效应及检验:基于2003—2013年省际水环境治理面板数据[J].财贸研究,2018,29(4):68-79.
[18] 胡东滨,蔡洪鹏.财政分权、经济增长与环境污染:基于省级面板数据的实证分析[J].生态经济,2018,34(2):84-88,114.
[19] 王飞成,郭其友.经济增长对环境污染的影响及区域性差异:基于省际动态面板数据模型的研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2014,36(4):14-26.