基于演化博弈模型的金融联结模式下农户信用行为演化
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摘要
在有限理性假设下,构建"银行+农户"和"银行+合作社+农户"两种借贷关系的演化博弈模型,对比分析金融联结前后借贷双方的策略选择变化情况,探讨影响借贷双方决策选择的影响因素。结果显示:(1)农户的决策选择主要取决于抵押资产的金额和贷款所能获得的收益以及信用社的监管力度。(2)银行的"贷款"决策主要取决于农户选择"还款"策略的比率。(3)合作社使得银行以及农户之间的决策行为发生了积极的变化,其作用主要体现为提高农民的贷款金额、减轻贷款难度、保证银行的收益和减少银行的监管成本等。(4)通过提高农户归还贷款的初始概率y,增加银行的贷款收益r来增加银行贷款的可能性,同时提高抵押资产数额、套现比率以及合作社的惩罚来由此提高农民的还款意愿,使得农户和银行二者形成的系统向(银行贷款,农户还款)的决策状态发展。
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of"bank + farmer" and "bank + cooperative + farmer".The comparative analysis analyzes the change of strategy choices of borrowers and lenders before and after financial integration and factors affecting the decision-making choices of both borrowers and lenders. The results show that:(1)farmers' decision-making choices mainly depend on the amount of mortgage assets and the benefits that can be obtained from loans and the supervision of credit unions;(2)the "loan" decision of the bank mainly depends on the ratio of the farmers choosing the "repayment" strategy;(3)the cooperative made positive changes in the decision-making behavior between the bank and the farmers,and its main role is to increase the farmers' loans,ease the difficulty of the loan,guarantee the bank's income and reduce the supervision cost of the bank;(4)the possibility of bank loans can be increased by increasing the initial probability of the farmers to repay the' loans and increasing the bank loan,and by increasing the amount of mortgage assets,the cash ratio and the penalty of the cooperatives,the repayment of farmers can be increased. The willingness makes the system formed by both farmers and banks develop towards the decision-making state of bank loans and fanner repayments.
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of"bank + farmer" and "bank + cooperative + farmer".The comparative analysis analyzes the change of strategy choices of borrowers and lenders before and after financial integration and factors affecting the decision-making choices of both borrowers and lenders. The results show that:(1)farmers' decision-making choices mainly depend on the amount of mortgage assets and the benefits that can be obtained from loans and the supervision of credit unions;(2)the "loan" decision of the bank mainly depends on the ratio of the farmers choosing the "repayment" strategy;(3)the cooperative made positive changes in the decision-making behavior between the bank and the farmers,and its main role is to increase the farmers' loans,ease the difficulty of the loan,guarantee the bank's income and reduce the supervision cost of the bank;(4)the possibility of bank loans can be increased by increasing the initial probability of the farmers to repay the' loans and increasing the bank loan,and by increasing the amount of mortgage assets,the cash ratio and the penalty of the cooperatives,the repayment of farmers can be increased. The willingness makes the system formed by both farmers and banks develop towards the decision-making state of bank loans and fanner repayments.
引文
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[17]蒋国银,胡斌,钱任.进化博弈视角下移动服务商合作行为分析[J].运筹与管理,2010(5):90-94.
[18]郑君君,韩笑,邹祖绪,等.IPO市场中风险投资家策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理科学学报,2012(2):72-82.
[19]陈金龙,龚志文.公司集团内部资本配置的演化博弈分析[J].系统工程学报,2012(5):685-691.
[20]WEIBULL J W. Evolutionary game theory[M]. Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press,1996.
[2]胡士华,郭雨林,杨涛.信息不对称、金融联结与信贷资金配置——基于农户调查数据的实证研究[J].农业技术经济,2016(2):81-91.
[3]CHAVES R A,GONZALEZ-VEGA C. The design of successful rural financial intermediaries:evidence from Indonesia[J]. World Development,1996,24(1):65-78.
[4]FUENTES G A. The use of village agents in rural credit delivery[J]. Journal of Development Studies,1996,33(2):188-209.
[5] VARGHESE G. Bank-moneylender linkages as an alternative to bank competition in rural credit markets[J]. Oxford Economic Papers,2005,57(2):315-335.
[6]刘民权,徐忠,俞建拖.信贷市场中的非正规金融[J].世界经济,2003(7):61-73,80.
[7]钱水土,陆会.农村非正规金融发展与农户融资行为研究——基于温州农村地区的调查分析[J].金融研究,2008(10):174-186.
[8]付秋芳,忻莉燕,马士华.惩罚机制下的供应链企业碳减排投人的演化博弈[J].管理科学学报,2016(4):56-70.
[9] ADOLF A,GENOVESE A,BAKRETT J,et al. Benchmarking carbon emissions performance in supply chains[J]. Supply Chain Management:An International Journal,2014,19(3):306-321.
[10]王玉燕,李帮义,申亮.两个生产商的逆向供应链演化博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2008,12(4):43-49.
[11] ARORA S, SINGH P, JUPTA A J, et al. Adaptive selection of cryptographic protocols in wireless sensor networks using evolutionary game theory[J]. Procedia Computer Science,2016(78):358-366.
[12]SUY,ZHANG X,LIU L,et al. Understanding information interactions in diffusion:an evolutionary game-theroretic perspective[J]. Frontiers of Computer Science,2016,10(3):518-531.
[13]黄凯南.演化博弈与演化经济学[J].经济研究,2009(2):132-145.
[14]梅强,马建国,杜建国,等.中小企业安全生产管制路径演化研究[J].中国管理科学,2009(2):160-168.
[15] LEE C K. Analysis on the evolutionary game of innovative financial system[J]. Journal of American Academy of Business,2007,5(1):338-343.
[16] G(U|¨)TH,MENGEL F,OCKENFELS A. An evolutionary analysis of buyer insurance and seller reputation in online market[J]. Theory and Decision, 2007,63(3):265-282.
[17]蒋国银,胡斌,钱任.进化博弈视角下移动服务商合作行为分析[J].运筹与管理,2010(5):90-94.
[18]郑君君,韩笑,邹祖绪,等.IPO市场中风险投资家策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理科学学报,2012(2):72-82.
[19]陈金龙,龚志文.公司集团内部资本配置的演化博弈分析[J].系统工程学报,2012(5):685-691.
[20]WEIBULL J W. Evolutionary game theory[M]. Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press,1996.