环境税制下污染行业竞争结构的动态演化分析
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摘要
本文在环境税开征条件下,构建了多寡头排污企业间的动态演化博弈模型,通过各企业间产量博弈,研究了环境税对企业竞争的内在影响。研究发现,当企业的调整变量Kk满足一定条件时,整个行业的产量竞争是收敛的,我们可以求出此均衡解,并据此分析得到以下结论:(1)环境税对于整个社会的环境改善大有裨益,环境税制下,企业排污大幅下降;(2)环境税存在税收扭曲,通过价格机制使得一部分税额转嫁于消费者,加重了消费者负担;(3)环境税的征收使得整个污染行业的竞争格局发生转变,由环境税产生的成本差异促使清洁企业在行业竞争中占据优势,一定程度上促进了整个行业向着绿色化转型升级。
Under the condition of environmental tax levy,this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model between multi-truth polluters,and studies the intrinsic impact of environmental tax on enterprise competition through the game between enterprises. The study finds that when the enterprise's adjustment variable Kkmeets certain conditions,the output competition of the whole industry is convergent. We can find this equilibrium solution and analyze the following conclusions:( 1) the environmental tax has great environmental improvement for the whole society. Under the environmental tax system,corporate emissions have fallen sharply;( 2) environmental taxes have tax distortions. The price mechanism has shifted some of the tax revenues to consumers,which has increased the burden on consumers;( 3) the environmental tax has changed the competition pattern of the entire polluting industry. The difference in costs caused by taxes has prompted clean companies to take advantage of industry competition,which has promoted the transformation of the entire industry towards green.
Under the condition of environmental tax levy,this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model between multi-truth polluters,and studies the intrinsic impact of environmental tax on enterprise competition through the game between enterprises. The study finds that when the enterprise's adjustment variable Kkmeets certain conditions,the output competition of the whole industry is convergent. We can find this equilibrium solution and analyze the following conclusions:( 1) the environmental tax has great environmental improvement for the whole society. Under the environmental tax system,corporate emissions have fallen sharply;( 2) environmental taxes have tax distortions. The price mechanism has shifted some of the tax revenues to consumers,which has increased the burden on consumers;( 3) the environmental tax has changed the competition pattern of the entire polluting industry. The difference in costs caused by taxes has prompted clean companies to take advantage of industry competition,which has promoted the transformation of the entire industry towards green.
引文
[1]王班班,齐绍洲.市场型和命令型政策工具的节能减排技术创新效应——基于中国工业行业专利数据的实证[J].中国工业经济,2016,(6):91~108.
[2]徐顺青,逯元堂,陈鹏,等.环境保护财政支出现状及发展趋势研究[J].生态经济,2018,34(2):71~76.
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[14]刘晔,周志波.完全信息条件下寡占产品市场中的环境税效应研究[J].中国工业经济,2011,281(8):5~14.
[15]秦昌波,王金南,葛察忠,等.征收环境税对经济和污染排放的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(1):17~23.
[16]李红侠.民营企业绿色技术创新与环境税政策[J].税务研究,2014,347(3):12~15.
[17]吉卓伟,马军海.寡头垄断电力市场重复博弈模型及其内在复杂性[J].系统管理学报,2007,16(3):251~256.
[18] K Okuguchi, F Szidarovszky. The Theory of Oligopoly with Multi-Product Firms,(Second Edition)[M],Springer-Verlag,Berlin,1999:121~133.
[19]袁志强,邓超平,蒋传文,等.电力寡头垄断市场的均衡分析[J]继电器,2004,32(5):7~10.
[20] WBCSD. Strategy 2003,Internal Document RJ. Geneva[M].WBCSD,2000:18~21.
[2]徐顺青,逯元堂,陈鹏,等.环境保护财政支出现状及发展趋势研究[J].生态经济,2018,34(2):71~76.
[3]秦艳,蒋海勇.发达国家绿色税收理论与实践及对中国的启示[J].生态经济,2010,(8):68~71,102.
[4]裴辉儒,刘星.基于环境税下的企业博弈行为分析[J].生产力研究,2007,(9):139~140,147
[5]张倩,刘丹,章金霞.环境偏好和环境税视角下企业技术决策博弈分析[J].技术经济,2014,33(9):66~73,103.
[6]孔鹏志,杨忠直.基于Stackelberg博弈的循环经济闭环产业链研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(9):132~137.
[7] Franckx L. Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics,2005,30(2):195~220.
[8]肖江文,罗云峰,赵勇,等.寡头垄断条件下环境污染税收的博弈分析[J].系统工程,2001,(2):29~32.
[9]刘苗苗,饶海琴.环境税机制下的经济博弈分析[J].改革与开放,2015,(21):12~14.
[10] Dong X,Li C,Li J,et al. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Implementation of Cleaner Production Policies in the Chinese Electroplating Industry[J] Resource Conservation and Recycling,2010,54(12):1442~1448.
[11]龚利,郭菊娥,张国兴.环境税条件下项目可进入与退出期权博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2010,20(4):90~94
[12]李长胜,范英,朱磊.基于两阶段博弈模型的钢铁行业碳强度减排机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(2):93~101.
[13]陈真玲,王文举.环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论,2017,29(5):226~236.
[14]刘晔,周志波.完全信息条件下寡占产品市场中的环境税效应研究[J].中国工业经济,2011,281(8):5~14.
[15]秦昌波,王金南,葛察忠,等.征收环境税对经济和污染排放的影响[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(1):17~23.
[16]李红侠.民营企业绿色技术创新与环境税政策[J].税务研究,2014,347(3):12~15.
[17]吉卓伟,马军海.寡头垄断电力市场重复博弈模型及其内在复杂性[J].系统管理学报,2007,16(3):251~256.
[18] K Okuguchi, F Szidarovszky. The Theory of Oligopoly with Multi-Product Firms,(Second Edition)[M],Springer-Verlag,Berlin,1999:121~133.
[19]袁志强,邓超平,蒋传文,等.电力寡头垄断市场的均衡分析[J]继电器,2004,32(5):7~10.
[20] WBCSD. Strategy 2003,Internal Document RJ. Geneva[M].WBCSD,2000:18~21.