我国“碳锁定”治理过程中的诸方博弈研究——基于制度解锁视角
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摘要
我国经济的高碳化特征明显,在于发展中出现了"碳锁定"的问题。"碳锁定"源于技术锁定,并通过制度锁定得以完全形成并进一步强化。因此,碳解锁实质在于对碳基形成机制的变革,是多方博弈的过程。本文以"碳锁定"治理为研究对象,根据博弈参与方之间的性质,通过建立不同类型的博弈模型,分析了"碳锁定"治理过程中诸方利益博弈关系。研究发现:中央政府以维护和实现整体公共利益最大化为目标,并确保政策实施的权威性;地方政府以政绩为导向,存在打政策"擦边球"现象;企业和消费者在市场经济下致力于自身效益的最大化,存在市场失灵的现象;诸方利益诉求的实现在于碳解锁制度路径的建立和实施。因此,提出了政府应加强制度机制建设、企业应强化约束机制、消费者需树立绿色消费意识倒逼低碳转型的建议。
Our country's economy shows up the characteristic of high carbonization, and the characteristic is obvious. Because our country's economy appears the problem of "carbon locking", and "carbon locking" originates from technology locking, and can be formed completely and further strengthened through institutional locking. Therefore, the essence of carbon unlocking lies in the transformation of carbon-based formation mechanism and it's the process of multi-game. The paper takes the governance of "carbon locking" as the research object, according to the nature of participants in the game, the paper analyzes the relationships between the interests of all participants in the process of "carbon locking" governance through different types of game theory models. It finds out that the central government maintains and realizes the maximization of the overall public interests and ensures the authority of the implementation of the policies; the local government is guided by political achievements, and there exists the phenomenon of "scouring the edge" of the policies; enterprises and consumers are committed to maximize their own benefits under the market economy, and the phenomenon of market failure is unavoidable. The realization of the interests of all participants lies in the establishment and implementation of the carbon-unlocking system. Therefore, the paper puts forward some suggestions that the government should strengthen the system mechanism construction, enterprises should strengthen constraint mechanism, consumers should establish green consumption awareness in order to push low carbon transition.
Our country's economy shows up the characteristic of high carbonization, and the characteristic is obvious. Because our country's economy appears the problem of "carbon locking", and "carbon locking" originates from technology locking, and can be formed completely and further strengthened through institutional locking. Therefore, the essence of carbon unlocking lies in the transformation of carbon-based formation mechanism and it's the process of multi-game. The paper takes the governance of "carbon locking" as the research object, according to the nature of participants in the game, the paper analyzes the relationships between the interests of all participants in the process of "carbon locking" governance through different types of game theory models. It finds out that the central government maintains and realizes the maximization of the overall public interests and ensures the authority of the implementation of the policies; the local government is guided by political achievements, and there exists the phenomenon of "scouring the edge" of the policies; enterprises and consumers are committed to maximize their own benefits under the market economy, and the phenomenon of market failure is unavoidable. The realization of the interests of all participants lies in the establishment and implementation of the carbon-unlocking system. Therefore, the paper puts forward some suggestions that the government should strengthen the system mechanism construction, enterprises should strengthen constraint mechanism, consumers should establish green consumption awareness in order to push low carbon transition.
引文
[1]唐啸，胡鞍钢.创新绿色现代化:隧穿环境库兹涅兹曲线[J].中国人口·资源与环境，2018,(5).
[2]Uuruh G C..Understanding Carbon Lock-in[J].Energy Policy,2000,28(12):817-830.
[3]梁中.“产业碳锁定”的内涵、成因及其“解锁”政策---基于中国欠发达区域情景视角[J].科学学研究，2017,(1).
[4]Meijden G,Smulders S..Carbon Lock-in:The Role of Expectations[J].International Economic Review,2017,58(4):1371-1415.
[5]Karlsson R..Carbon Lock-in,Rebound Effects and China at the Limits of Statism[J].Energy Policy,2012,51(6):939-945.
[6]李宏伟，杨梅锦.低碳经济中的“碳锁定”问题与“碳解锁”治理体系[J].科技进步与对策，2013,(15).
[7]Gerard V D M,Smulders S..Technological Change During the Energy Transition[J].Macroeconomic Dynamics,2018,22(4):805-836.
[8]梁中，徐蓓.“碳锁定”研究:一个文献综述[J].经济体制改革，2016,(2).
[9]Driscoll P A..Breaking Carbon Lock-In:Path Dependencies in Large-Scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects[J].Planning Practice&Research,2014,29(3):317-330.
[10]Steto K C..Carbon Lock-In:Types,Causes,and Policy Implications[J].Annual Review of Environment&Resourc-es,2016,41(1):425-452.
[11]方燕，张昕竹.机制设计理论综述[J].当代财经，2012,(7).
[12]丁利.制度激励、博弈均衡与社会正义[J].中国社会科学，2016,(4).
[2]Uuruh G C..Understanding Carbon Lock-in[J].Energy Policy,2000,28(12):817-830.
[3]梁中.“产业碳锁定”的内涵、成因及其“解锁”政策---基于中国欠发达区域情景视角[J].科学学研究，2017,(1).
[4]Meijden G,Smulders S..Carbon Lock-in:The Role of Expectations[J].International Economic Review,2017,58(4):1371-1415.
[5]Karlsson R..Carbon Lock-in,Rebound Effects and China at the Limits of Statism[J].Energy Policy,2012,51(6):939-945.
[6]李宏伟，杨梅锦.低碳经济中的“碳锁定”问题与“碳解锁”治理体系[J].科技进步与对策，2013,(15).
[7]Gerard V D M,Smulders S..Technological Change During the Energy Transition[J].Macroeconomic Dynamics,2018,22(4):805-836.
[8]梁中，徐蓓.“碳锁定”研究:一个文献综述[J].经济体制改革，2016,(2).
[9]Driscoll P A..Breaking Carbon Lock-In:Path Dependencies in Large-Scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects[J].Planning Practice&Research,2014,29(3):317-330.
[10]Steto K C..Carbon Lock-In:Types,Causes,and Policy Implications[J].Annual Review of Environment&Resourc-es,2016,41(1):425-452.
[11]方燕，张昕竹.机制设计理论综述[J].当代财经，2012,(7).
[12]丁利.制度激励、博弈均衡与社会正义[J].中国社会科学，2016,(4).