管制放松能提升国有企业创新效率吗?
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摘要
民营化在解决国有企业创新效率损失方面的作用尚存争议,尝试以国有企业与民营企业面临的制度约束差异为切入点,寻找解决该问题的途径。研究发现国有企业创新效率损失与政府管制相关,政府放松对高管薪酬的管制,能够提升国有企业创新效率,缩减与民营企业创新效率之间的差距,降低国有企业创新效率损失水平。这意味着民营化不是解决国有企业创新效率损失的唯一途径,进一步还财权于国有企业是改善国有企业存在创新效率损失局面的有效措施。
There remains controversy about whether privatization can solve innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises. This paper tries to take the institutional constraints differences between state-owned and private enterprises as the breakthrough point,and searches for ways to solve the problem. The research finds that innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises is related to government's regulation. It shows that deregulation can loosen the regulation of emolument,improve innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,close the innovation efficiency gap compared with private enterprises,and lower the levels of innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises. The evidence shows that privatization is not the only way to solve innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises,while decentralizing financial powers to state-owned enterprises is also a measure to improve this situation.
There remains controversy about whether privatization can solve innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises. This paper tries to take the institutional constraints differences between state-owned and private enterprises as the breakthrough point,and searches for ways to solve the problem. The research finds that innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises is related to government's regulation. It shows that deregulation can loosen the regulation of emolument,improve innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,close the innovation efficiency gap compared with private enterprises,and lower the levels of innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises. The evidence shows that privatization is not the only way to solve innovation efficiency loss of state-owned enterprises,while decentralizing financial powers to state-owned enterprises is also a measure to improve this situation.
引文
[1]吴延兵.国有企业双重效率损失研究[J].经济研究,2012(3):15-27.
[2]钟昀珈,张晨宇,陈德球.国企民营化与企业创新效率:促进还是抑制?[J].财经研究,2016(7):4-15.
[3]高文亮,曾永良.国有企业创新意愿与投入存在理论与现实的落差[J].财会月刊,2018(8):50-56.
[4]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[5]陈信元,陈冬华,万华林,等.地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J].管理世界,2009(11):130-143.
[6]高文亮,罗宏,潘明清.政府管制、国企分红与企业创新[J].当代财经,2017(9):70-79.
[7]李春涛,宋敏.中国制造业企业的创新活动:所有制和CEO激励的作用[J].经济研究,2010(5):55-67.
[8]FAN J P H,WONG T J,ZHANG T. Institutions and organizational structure:The case of state-owned corporate pyramids[J]. Journal of Law Economics&Organization,2013,29(6):1217-1252.
[9]池国华,王钰.董事会特征与内部控制缺陷信息披露———基于制度变迁视角的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2018,39(6):83-89.
[10]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8):110-122.
[11]FIRTH M,FUNG P M Y,RUI O M. Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(4):693-714.
[2]钟昀珈,张晨宇,陈德球.国企民营化与企业创新效率:促进还是抑制?[J].财经研究,2016(7):4-15.
[3]高文亮,曾永良.国有企业创新意愿与投入存在理论与现实的落差[J].财会月刊,2018(8):50-56.
[4]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[5]陈信元,陈冬华,万华林,等.地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J].管理世界,2009(11):130-143.
[6]高文亮,罗宏,潘明清.政府管制、国企分红与企业创新[J].当代财经,2017(9):70-79.
[7]李春涛,宋敏.中国制造业企业的创新活动:所有制和CEO激励的作用[J].经济研究,2010(5):55-67.
[8]FAN J P H,WONG T J,ZHANG T. Institutions and organizational structure:The case of state-owned corporate pyramids[J]. Journal of Law Economics&Organization,2013,29(6):1217-1252.
[9]池国华,王钰.董事会特征与内部控制缺陷信息披露———基于制度变迁视角的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2018,39(6):83-89.
[10]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8):110-122.
[11]FIRTH M,FUNG P M Y,RUI O M. Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006,12(4):693-714.