失业保险制度中被保险人欺诈行为影响因素研究
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摘要
失业保险制度是社会保障制度的重要组成部分,也是一项重要的国家公共政策。自1999年1月国务院颁布实施《失业保险条例》以来,我国的失业保险事业得到了快速发展。然而在失业保险制度实施过程中出现了很多问题,其中包括失业保险欺诈问题。哪些因素导致了失业保险欺诈行为的产生、它们存在何种影响,这些问题的研究可为如何提高失业保险反欺诈能力提供一些启示。因此从被保险人的角度研究失业保险欺诈行为的影响因素具有一定的理论意义和实际意义。
本文以计划行为理论为基础,在计划行为理论原有的三个影响因素(行为态度、主观规范和知觉行为控制)的基础上,加入了人口特征因素、经济特征因素、政府政策因素和行为目标因素,并借鉴国内外相关研究的思路和方法,对影响失业保险制度中被保险人欺诈行为的因素进行了理论分析。
在理论分析的基础上,本文应用Logistic回归模型对调查问卷获得的数据进行了实证研究,得出了影响失业保险被保险人欺诈行为的几个关键因素,同时根据影响因素的重要性进行了排序：知觉行为控制因素、供养人口数因素、行为目标因素、文化程度因素、经济状况因素和年龄因素。并结合实际案例对此进行了深入分析。
在理论分析和实证研究的基础上,本文对我国的失业保险反欺诈工作给出了一些建议。主要从失业保险经办机构、失业保险制度设计、失业保险促进再就业功能和失业保险欺诈行为监管等层面进行了探讨。
As a main part of social security systems,Unemployment Insurance(UI) is an important national public policy.Since the State Council of China promulgated "Regulations on Unemployment Insurance" in 1999,UI system has developed rapidly. However,during the practice of the UI system,many problems including UI fraud occurred.It is important for us to study the main factors affecting the UI fraud,which will give us some insights on how to anti-UI fraud.Therefore,studying the factors from the perspective of the insured will be of some theoretical and practical significance.
This paper carried out research based on the theory of Planned Behavior,which includes the three factors of attitude towards the behavior,subjective norm and perceived behavioral control,with addition of factors of demographic characteristics,economic characteristics,government policy and behavioral target etc. Learning from the research methods in China and abroad,this paper conducted a series of theoretical analyses on the impact factors of the insured fraud.
This paper also carried out the study on the factors affecting the UI fraud in an empirical way using Logistic Regression. Thus this paper presents a rating list of the factors according to the importance as follows:the perceived behavioral control factor, the dependent population factor,the behavioral targeting factor,the educational level factor,the economy factor and the age factor.This paper also made a series of deep and detailed analysis on such factors in some practical cases.
Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical research,some advices were given for anti-fraud measures regarding unemployment insurance agencies,the design of UI systems,the function of UI in promoting reemployment,and monitoring the UI fraud.
本文以计划行为理论为基础,在计划行为理论原有的三个影响因素(行为态度、主观规范和知觉行为控制)的基础上,加入了人口特征因素、经济特征因素、政府政策因素和行为目标因素,并借鉴国内外相关研究的思路和方法,对影响失业保险制度中被保险人欺诈行为的因素进行了理论分析。
在理论分析的基础上,本文应用Logistic回归模型对调查问卷获得的数据进行了实证研究,得出了影响失业保险被保险人欺诈行为的几个关键因素,同时根据影响因素的重要性进行了排序：知觉行为控制因素、供养人口数因素、行为目标因素、文化程度因素、经济状况因素和年龄因素。并结合实际案例对此进行了深入分析。
在理论分析和实证研究的基础上,本文对我国的失业保险反欺诈工作给出了一些建议。主要从失业保险经办机构、失业保险制度设计、失业保险促进再就业功能和失业保险欺诈行为监管等层面进行了探讨。
As a main part of social security systems,Unemployment Insurance(UI) is an important national public policy.Since the State Council of China promulgated "Regulations on Unemployment Insurance" in 1999,UI system has developed rapidly. However,during the practice of the UI system,many problems including UI fraud occurred.It is important for us to study the main factors affecting the UI fraud,which will give us some insights on how to anti-UI fraud.Therefore,studying the factors from the perspective of the insured will be of some theoretical and practical significance.
This paper carried out research based on the theory of Planned Behavior,which includes the three factors of attitude towards the behavior,subjective norm and perceived behavioral control,with addition of factors of demographic characteristics,economic characteristics,government policy and behavioral target etc. Learning from the research methods in China and abroad,this paper conducted a series of theoretical analyses on the impact factors of the insured fraud.
This paper also carried out the study on the factors affecting the UI fraud in an empirical way using Logistic Regression. Thus this paper presents a rating list of the factors according to the importance as follows:the perceived behavioral control factor, the dependent population factor,the behavioral targeting factor,the educational level factor,the economy factor and the age factor.This paper also made a series of deep and detailed analysis on such factors in some practical cases.
Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical research,some advices were given for anti-fraud measures regarding unemployment insurance agencies,the design of UI systems,the function of UI in promoting reemployment,and monitoring the UI fraud.
引文
[1]袁泽春.让欺诈从社保基金走开-云南省临沧市反失业保险欺诈工作侧记.中国劳动保障,2006,(6)：33-34
[2]A.C.PIGOU, The Economics of Welfare (Volume 1)北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999,251
[3]刘鑫宏,顾永红.失业陷阱：成因及其归类分析.中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2007,(2)：11-12
[4]Mortensen, D. Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1977,30 (4):505-517
[5]Steven Shavall, Laurence Wesis. The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time. Journal of Political Economy,1979,87 (6):1347-1362
[6]Feldstein, M. Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wage. NBER Working paper,1982, (1011)
[7]Robert G. Spiegelman, Stephen A. Woodbury, The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Incentive Experiments.http://www.upjohninstitute.org/erdc/Illinois/ execsumm.pdf,1987-2
[8]Meyer, B, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, Econometrica, 1990,58 (4):757-782
[9]Cheng Wang, Stephen D. Williamson. Moral hazard, optimal Unemployment Insurance and experience rating. Journal of monetary Economics,2002, (49): 1337-1371
[10]Carling K. and Bertil Holmlund. Unemployment Duration, Unemployment Benefits and Labor Market Programs in Sweden. Journal of Public Economics, 1996,59(2):313-334.
[11]Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel, An adverse selection model of Optimal unemployment insurance.http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract id=372502,2003-2-7
[12]Hugo A.Hopenhayn, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Optimal Unemployment Insurance. Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(2):412-438
[13]Anderson, Patricia M.& Meyer, Bruce D. The effects of the unemployment insurance payroll tax on wages, employment, claims and denials. Journal of Public Economics,2000,78 (1-2):81-106
[14]Olivier Blanchard, Jean Tirole, View citations in EconPapers.2004,152(1):1-20
[15]Hartz-Konzept.The Economics of Moral Hazard:Further Comment. The American Economics Review,1969,58 (8):537-539
[16]刘惠林.失业保险的市场失灵和效率分析：[中国社会科学院研究生院硕士论文].北京：中国社会科学研究生院.2003,6-9
[17]刘希宋,夏志勇.失业保险市场委托人-代理人博弈模型分.技术经济与管理研究,2004,(6)：31-32.
[18]曹艳春.失业保险的博弈视角分析.经济工作,2005,(21)：116-117
[19]赵曼.就业与失业保险制度的研究思路.开放导报,2003,(4)：8-9.
[20]刘燕生.社会保障的道德风险与负激励问题.北京：中国劳动社会保障出版社,2009,252
[21]Ajzen I. The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human decision processes,1991,50:179-2117
[22]Song Zhaoli. Action-State Orientation and the Theory of Planned Behavior:A Study of Job Search in China. [University of Minnesota, doctoral dissertation]. Twin Cities:University of Minnesota,2004,49-50
[23]李冰.从成本与收益的分析看我国失业保险改革.科学管理,2008,(134)：33-35
[24]汪洁,孙学智.天津市失业保险20年的发展与思考-兼析我国失业保险问题及对策.理论与现代化,2008,(5)：122-127
[25]王天喜,夏循福.当前失业保险基金征缴中存在的问题不容忽视.江西审计与财务,2000,(8)：22
[26]黎民,胡杰容.下岗职工的隐性就业-来自社会与制度层面的分析.理论月刊,2000,(12)：56-58
[27]蔡建芝.走出我国失业保险遭遇的尴尬境地.甘肃农业,2006,(1)：74
[28]别朝霞.失业保险制度优化设计研究：[武汉大学博士论文].湖北：武汉大学.2005,134
[29]邓喜生.失业保险费征缴难的原因及对策.江西财税与会计,2003,(7)：50-51
[30]夏杰长.失业保障制度在反失业中的双重效应及其构建方略.广州市经济管理干部学院学报,2000,(1)：23
[31]向贤敏.论我国失业保险制度的改革与完善.郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),1998,(31)：31-34
[32]刘岚.失业保险基金困境与合理筹措利用.河北农业大学学报(农林教育版),2005,(7)：86-88
[33]乔万敏,冯继康.论我国失业保险制度改革中的困境与出路.东岳论丛,1997， (1)：32-35
[34]曲玉萍,李松吉.我国失业保险制度的纵向分析及展望.长春师范学院学报,2001,(12)：10-12
[35]张熙凤.基于就业导向的失业保险制度探索.商场现代化,2009,(4)：387-388
[36]王福君.浅谈我国享受失业保险待遇资格条件的认定.鞍山师范学院学报,2001,(12)：43-45
[37]李广斌.我国失业保险制度存在的主要问题及其对策.攀登,1999,(4)：47-49
[38]柏灵.中国失业保险制度中道德风险的控制机制研究：[武汉科技大学硕士学位论文].武汉：武汉科技大学,2009,12
[39]林义.社会保险.北京：中国金融出版社,2003,210-212
[40]刘雄.最新实用社会保险政策顾问-失业保险.北京：中国劳动社会保障出版社,2001：22-23
[41]Fishbein, M.,& Ajzen, I., Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior:An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley,1975,1-18
[42]Ajzen I. From Intention to Actions:A Theory of Planned Behavior. In:Action Control From Cognition to behavior.Berlin and New York:Heidelberg Springer, 1985,11-39
[43]段文婷,江光荣.计划行为理论述评.心理科学进展,2008,16(2)：315-320
[44]周洁红.农户蔬菜质量安全控制行为及其影响因素分析-基于浙江省396户菜农的实证分析.中国农村经济,2006,(11)：26
[45]李开兵,汪劭.行人交通违规行为的心理学研究.公路交通科技,2007,(5)：130-134
[46]刘泽文,宋照礼,刘华山等.计划行为理论在求职领域的应用与评价(综述)中国心理卫生杂志,2006,(2)：118-120
[47]王军,张越杰.参农生产优质安全人参行为的实证分析.农业经济问题,2009,(7)：26-31
[48]赫尔格森.性别心理学(第2版).北京：世界图书出版公司,2005：15
[49]Henry S. Shryock, Jacob S. Siegel and Associates, The Methods and Matcricals of Demography. Academic Press,1976,215-216
[50]王超萃.违约概率模型在我国银行信用风险管理中的应用性分析-以Logistic模型为例：[对外经济贸易大学硕士论文].北京：对外经济贸易大学,2006,11
[51]于芳.基于Logistic回归方法的中国移动通信公司客户流失分析-以L市移动公司为例：[湖北大学硕士论文].武汉：湖北大学,2008,16
[52]修风光,修凤丽.影响农户参与农业保险意愿的因素分析-基于陕西奶牛和苹果保险试点的调查分析.农业经济,2009,(2)：23-29
[53]郭志刚.社会统计分析方法-SPSS软件应用.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001,196
[54]许美荣.Logistic回归在电子资源评价中的应用研究：[复旦大学硕士论文].上海：复旦大学,2007,31-34
[55]吕学静.各国失业保险与再就业.北京：经济管理出版社,2000,69-70,97
[56]郭士征.社会保障研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2005,163
[2]A.C.PIGOU, The Economics of Welfare (Volume 1)北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999,251
[3]刘鑫宏,顾永红.失业陷阱：成因及其归类分析.中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2007,(2)：11-12
[4]Mortensen, D. Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Decisions. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1977,30 (4):505-517
[5]Steven Shavall, Laurence Wesis. The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time. Journal of Political Economy,1979,87 (6):1347-1362
[6]Feldstein, M. Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wage. NBER Working paper,1982, (1011)
[7]Robert G. Spiegelman, Stephen A. Woodbury, The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Incentive Experiments.http://www.upjohninstitute.org/erdc/Illinois/ execsumm.pdf,1987-2
[8]Meyer, B, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, Econometrica, 1990,58 (4):757-782
[9]Cheng Wang, Stephen D. Williamson. Moral hazard, optimal Unemployment Insurance and experience rating. Journal of monetary Economics,2002, (49): 1337-1371
[10]Carling K. and Bertil Holmlund. Unemployment Duration, Unemployment Benefits and Labor Market Programs in Sweden. Journal of Public Economics, 1996,59(2):313-334.
[11]Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel, An adverse selection model of Optimal unemployment insurance.http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract id=372502,2003-2-7
[12]Hugo A.Hopenhayn, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Optimal Unemployment Insurance. Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(2):412-438
[13]Anderson, Patricia M.& Meyer, Bruce D. The effects of the unemployment insurance payroll tax on wages, employment, claims and denials. Journal of Public Economics,2000,78 (1-2):81-106
[14]Olivier Blanchard, Jean Tirole, View citations in EconPapers.2004,152(1):1-20
[15]Hartz-Konzept.The Economics of Moral Hazard:Further Comment. The American Economics Review,1969,58 (8):537-539
[16]刘惠林.失业保险的市场失灵和效率分析：[中国社会科学院研究生院硕士论文].北京：中国社会科学研究生院.2003,6-9
[17]刘希宋,夏志勇.失业保险市场委托人-代理人博弈模型分.技术经济与管理研究,2004,(6)：31-32.
[18]曹艳春.失业保险的博弈视角分析.经济工作,2005,(21)：116-117
[19]赵曼.就业与失业保险制度的研究思路.开放导报,2003,(4)：8-9.
[20]刘燕生.社会保障的道德风险与负激励问题.北京：中国劳动社会保障出版社,2009,252
[21]Ajzen I. The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human decision processes,1991,50:179-2117
[22]Song Zhaoli. Action-State Orientation and the Theory of Planned Behavior:A Study of Job Search in China. [University of Minnesota, doctoral dissertation]. Twin Cities:University of Minnesota,2004,49-50
[23]李冰.从成本与收益的分析看我国失业保险改革.科学管理,2008,(134)：33-35
[24]汪洁,孙学智.天津市失业保险20年的发展与思考-兼析我国失业保险问题及对策.理论与现代化,2008,(5)：122-127
[25]王天喜,夏循福.当前失业保险基金征缴中存在的问题不容忽视.江西审计与财务,2000,(8)：22
[26]黎民,胡杰容.下岗职工的隐性就业-来自社会与制度层面的分析.理论月刊,2000,(12)：56-58
[27]蔡建芝.走出我国失业保险遭遇的尴尬境地.甘肃农业,2006,(1)：74
[28]别朝霞.失业保险制度优化设计研究：[武汉大学博士论文].湖北：武汉大学.2005,134
[29]邓喜生.失业保险费征缴难的原因及对策.江西财税与会计,2003,(7)：50-51
[30]夏杰长.失业保障制度在反失业中的双重效应及其构建方略.广州市经济管理干部学院学报,2000,(1)：23
[31]向贤敏.论我国失业保险制度的改革与完善.郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),1998,(31)：31-34
[32]刘岚.失业保险基金困境与合理筹措利用.河北农业大学学报(农林教育版),2005,(7)：86-88
[33]乔万敏,冯继康.论我国失业保险制度改革中的困境与出路.东岳论丛,1997， (1)：32-35
[34]曲玉萍,李松吉.我国失业保险制度的纵向分析及展望.长春师范学院学报,2001,(12)：10-12
[35]张熙凤.基于就业导向的失业保险制度探索.商场现代化,2009,(4)：387-388
[36]王福君.浅谈我国享受失业保险待遇资格条件的认定.鞍山师范学院学报,2001,(12)：43-45
[37]李广斌.我国失业保险制度存在的主要问题及其对策.攀登,1999,(4)：47-49
[38]柏灵.中国失业保险制度中道德风险的控制机制研究：[武汉科技大学硕士学位论文].武汉：武汉科技大学,2009,12
[39]林义.社会保险.北京：中国金融出版社,2003,210-212
[40]刘雄.最新实用社会保险政策顾问-失业保险.北京：中国劳动社会保障出版社,2001：22-23
[41]Fishbein, M.,& Ajzen, I., Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior:An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley,1975,1-18
[42]Ajzen I. From Intention to Actions:A Theory of Planned Behavior. In:Action Control From Cognition to behavior.Berlin and New York:Heidelberg Springer, 1985,11-39
[43]段文婷,江光荣.计划行为理论述评.心理科学进展,2008,16(2)：315-320
[44]周洁红.农户蔬菜质量安全控制行为及其影响因素分析-基于浙江省396户菜农的实证分析.中国农村经济,2006,(11)：26
[45]李开兵,汪劭.行人交通违规行为的心理学研究.公路交通科技,2007,(5)：130-134
[46]刘泽文,宋照礼,刘华山等.计划行为理论在求职领域的应用与评价(综述)中国心理卫生杂志,2006,(2)：118-120
[47]王军,张越杰.参农生产优质安全人参行为的实证分析.农业经济问题,2009,(7)：26-31
[48]赫尔格森.性别心理学(第2版).北京：世界图书出版公司,2005：15
[49]Henry S. Shryock, Jacob S. Siegel and Associates, The Methods and Matcricals of Demography. Academic Press,1976,215-216
[50]王超萃.违约概率模型在我国银行信用风险管理中的应用性分析-以Logistic模型为例：[对外经济贸易大学硕士论文].北京：对外经济贸易大学,2006,11
[51]于芳.基于Logistic回归方法的中国移动通信公司客户流失分析-以L市移动公司为例：[湖北大学硕士论文].武汉：湖北大学,2008,16
[52]修风光,修凤丽.影响农户参与农业保险意愿的因素分析-基于陕西奶牛和苹果保险试点的调查分析.农业经济,2009,(2)：23-29
[53]郭志刚.社会统计分析方法-SPSS软件应用.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001,196
[54]许美荣.Logistic回归在电子资源评价中的应用研究：[复旦大学硕士论文].上海：复旦大学,2007,31-34
[55]吕学静.各国失业保险与再就业.北京：经济管理出版社,2000,69-70,97
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