产权制度安排对农户森林经营决策的影响研究
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摘要
集体林地是国家重要的土地资源,是林业重要的生产要素,是农民重要的生活保障。集体林业的发展对于促进山区农民增收、维护国家生态安全和木材安全具有十分重要的意义。改革开放以来,我国集体林权制度虽然经历了多次改革,但仍存在产权不明晰、经营主体不落实、产权残缺等问题。2O03年开始的全面性集体林权制度改革,将以家庭承包经营为主的经营制度在林业中不断拓展,全面落实了林地承包经营权和林木所有权,使农户成为森林经营的主体。在新的制度背景下,农户森林经营决策问题成为学者和政府决策者研究和关注的热点。
近年来,土地产权和市场化改革作为促进农户森林可持续经营的手段被广泛讨论。由于过去我国森林经营的主体主要是林业企业和村集体组织,对森林资源管理的研究主要侧重林业调查规划以及从政策角度进行的林地管理、采伐管理、公益林管理、林业重点工程管理等,很少考虑农户森林经营决策。另外,国内学者们虽然针对集体林权制度研究作了诸多努力,但是这类研究主要集中于林业产权制度理论、集体林权制度中存在的问题、改革的方向和对策措施,很少涉及集体林权制度等社会、经济和政策因素如何影响农户森林经营决策及其作用机制,针对集体林权制度演变过程进行的系统研究更少见。
本研究的主要目的是,建立一个统一的分析框架,在此基础上考察诱导集体林权制度安排的因素以及影响农户造林决策和木材采伐决策的相关因素,探讨集体林权制度安排对农户森林经营决策的作用机制,为进一步完善集体林权制度改革,促进农户参与森林经营活动提供一些决策参考。为了达到研究目的,我们在森林资源丰富、农户对林业依赖程度较高、集体林权制度变迁较为明显的辽宁东部山区选择了3个县15个村118个农户的236块林地进行了实地调查。本文的主要结论如下:
(1)从集体林权制度演变来看,20世纪80年代以后,农村集体林产权向非集体化演变,尤其是2003年以后,非集体经营林地面积比例大幅增加。总的来看,非集体化的形式以承包经营为主。本文利用面板数据模型估计了辽东地区集体林权制度安排的影响因素,结果发现集体林地非集体化主要受到国家生态公益林政策和采伐限额政策、劳动力非农就业、农民收入水平、人均耕地面积和林地立地条件等。以生态保护为目标的生态公益林保护政策和采伐限额政策,不利于林业的非集体化经营;劳动力非农就业越高、劳动力资源越丰富、受教育程度越高以及农民收入越高,越有可能促进集体林地的非集体化经营;人均耕地面积和林地立地质量显著影响集体林权制度安排。
(2)通过对农户是否造林和造林投入多少采用Heckman模型回归,结果发现:农民在自留山上更愿意造林;林地使用权越稳定,对促进农户参与造林越显著;林木处分权越完善,越有利于农户参与造林,应适当放松采伐限额政策;减轻林业税费负担,有利于促进农户造林和增加造林投入;农户所在地区林业社会化服务开展得越好,越有利于农户获得更多的林业生产技术和信息,抓住林业生产的机会。
(3)通过对农户是否采伐进行Probit回归分析以及对农户木材采伐量进行Tobit回归分析,结果发现自留山、使用权稳定性、木材价格、林龄、林地立地质量等是影响农户木材采伐决策的主要因素。农户更愿意在自留山上采伐林木;使用权越不稳定,农户木材采伐越多;木材价格越高,林地立地质量越好,林龄越大,农户木材采伐量越多。之后,利用Probit模型估计了农户木材采伐意愿的影响因素,发现影响因素与木材决策的相似,但是木材价格与农户木材采伐意愿负相关,在木材价格持续走高的形势下,农户持观望态度;林地地块面积越大,农户采伐意愿越高;林地立地质量越差,农户越想采伐,可能是想进行低产林改造;其他变量结论与木材采伐决策结论相同。
最后,根据研究结论,本文提出了如下五个方面的政策建议以促进农户从事森林经营:第一,稳定林业政策;第二,完善采伐限额管理制度;第三,减轻林业税费负担;第四,加强林业社会化服务体系建设;第五,加快木材市场化改革。
Collective forestlands are the important land resources, forest production factors and living guarantee of households. The development of collective forestry have significant effect on increasing farmers' income, maintaining ecology security and keeping timber supply stable. Since reform and opening-up of our country, collective forest tenure institution still have the problems of ambiguitiy and trunctation of Forest tenure after many reforms. In the all-round reform of collective forest tenure institution beginning in 2003, individual household management is the main tenure type. Meanwhile, forestland contractual operation right was made sure and household became the main body of forest management. Under a new institutional background, household's forest management decision has become research and concerned focus.
In recent years, land tenure and market reform has extensively discussed. They are the measures which protmote forest sustainable management. In past, as the forestry enterprises and village collective economic organizations were the main bodies of forest management. And the forest resources management put emphasis on the forestland management, harvest management, ecological reserve management and key forestry programs etc, while household forest management decision tend to be neglected. Otherwise, there are some researches and fruits about theory, problems, reform direction and policy suggestions of Forest tenure institution, but there are still no researches about how society, economy and policy factors effect on household's forest management decision and its effect mechanism.
The objective is building an integrate analysis frame and exploring the factors that affect on collective forest tenure institutional arrangements, household's afforest decision and household's timber harvest decision and impact mechanism of forest tenure institution. Finally, according to the research conclusions, it will bring up some policy suggestions in order to perfect the reform of collective forest tenure institution and promote household to participate in forest management. The data used in the article are from 2 counties, 15 villages, 118 households and 236 forest plots in the regions which have abundant forest, high forest dependency and rapid evolution of forest tenure institution. The main conclusions are as follows:
First, after the 1980s, collective forest tenure institution evolved to non-clollectivization. Particularly after 2003, the non-collective management forestland area proportion increased largely. Generally speaking, non-collectivization forms by household undertaking primarily. This article uses panel data model to estimate the factors of collective forest tenure institution evolution in Liaoning. The results indicate that logging quota policy, labor non-agriculture employment, farmers' income level, the average cultivated land area, and forestland condition are the main factors. Logging quota policy hampers the development of non-collectivization management. The many labor non-agriculture employment, high farmers' income level and high education level will promote the development of non-collectivization management.
Second, it uses heckman model to estimate the factors of household's afforest decision. The results indicate that private plot, good tenure security, complete forest tenure, low forestry tax, good forest service will promote household's afforestation.
Third, it uses probit model to estimate the factors of household whether to harvest and uses tobit model to estimate the household's harvest volumes. The results indicate that private plot, tenure security, timber price, forest ages, forest condition are the main factors. The farmers are willing to harvest the forest in the private plot. Meanwhile, good tenure security, high timber price, good forestland condition, big forest ages will promote the farmers to increase the harvest volumes. Afterward, it uses probit model to estimate the factors of household's harvest willingness. The results indicate that the main infuenciong factors are the same as the results of household's harvest decision model. But the timber price is higher, farmers' harvest willingness is higher as famers hold the waiting attitude. Farmers want to harvest in the large forest plot and bad quality forestland. Other varibles results are sames as the above.
In the end, the article puts forward some policy suggestions from three aspects to promote farmers to promote household to engage in forest management on the basis of above analysis. These suggestions are as follows: first, keep forest policy stable; second, perfect logging quota policy; third, release the burden of forestry tax; fourth, strengthen the construction of forest socialized service system; fifth, accelerate the timber market reform.
近年来,土地产权和市场化改革作为促进农户森林可持续经营的手段被广泛讨论。由于过去我国森林经营的主体主要是林业企业和村集体组织,对森林资源管理的研究主要侧重林业调查规划以及从政策角度进行的林地管理、采伐管理、公益林管理、林业重点工程管理等,很少考虑农户森林经营决策。另外,国内学者们虽然针对集体林权制度研究作了诸多努力,但是这类研究主要集中于林业产权制度理论、集体林权制度中存在的问题、改革的方向和对策措施,很少涉及集体林权制度等社会、经济和政策因素如何影响农户森林经营决策及其作用机制,针对集体林权制度演变过程进行的系统研究更少见。
本研究的主要目的是,建立一个统一的分析框架,在此基础上考察诱导集体林权制度安排的因素以及影响农户造林决策和木材采伐决策的相关因素,探讨集体林权制度安排对农户森林经营决策的作用机制,为进一步完善集体林权制度改革,促进农户参与森林经营活动提供一些决策参考。为了达到研究目的,我们在森林资源丰富、农户对林业依赖程度较高、集体林权制度变迁较为明显的辽宁东部山区选择了3个县15个村118个农户的236块林地进行了实地调查。本文的主要结论如下:
(1)从集体林权制度演变来看,20世纪80年代以后,农村集体林产权向非集体化演变,尤其是2003年以后,非集体经营林地面积比例大幅增加。总的来看,非集体化的形式以承包经营为主。本文利用面板数据模型估计了辽东地区集体林权制度安排的影响因素,结果发现集体林地非集体化主要受到国家生态公益林政策和采伐限额政策、劳动力非农就业、农民收入水平、人均耕地面积和林地立地条件等。以生态保护为目标的生态公益林保护政策和采伐限额政策,不利于林业的非集体化经营;劳动力非农就业越高、劳动力资源越丰富、受教育程度越高以及农民收入越高,越有可能促进集体林地的非集体化经营;人均耕地面积和林地立地质量显著影响集体林权制度安排。
(2)通过对农户是否造林和造林投入多少采用Heckman模型回归,结果发现:农民在自留山上更愿意造林;林地使用权越稳定,对促进农户参与造林越显著;林木处分权越完善,越有利于农户参与造林,应适当放松采伐限额政策;减轻林业税费负担,有利于促进农户造林和增加造林投入;农户所在地区林业社会化服务开展得越好,越有利于农户获得更多的林业生产技术和信息,抓住林业生产的机会。
(3)通过对农户是否采伐进行Probit回归分析以及对农户木材采伐量进行Tobit回归分析,结果发现自留山、使用权稳定性、木材价格、林龄、林地立地质量等是影响农户木材采伐决策的主要因素。农户更愿意在自留山上采伐林木;使用权越不稳定,农户木材采伐越多;木材价格越高,林地立地质量越好,林龄越大,农户木材采伐量越多。之后,利用Probit模型估计了农户木材采伐意愿的影响因素,发现影响因素与木材决策的相似,但是木材价格与农户木材采伐意愿负相关,在木材价格持续走高的形势下,农户持观望态度;林地地块面积越大,农户采伐意愿越高;林地立地质量越差,农户越想采伐,可能是想进行低产林改造;其他变量结论与木材采伐决策结论相同。
最后,根据研究结论,本文提出了如下五个方面的政策建议以促进农户从事森林经营:第一,稳定林业政策;第二,完善采伐限额管理制度;第三,减轻林业税费负担;第四,加强林业社会化服务体系建设;第五,加快木材市场化改革。
Collective forestlands are the important land resources, forest production factors and living guarantee of households. The development of collective forestry have significant effect on increasing farmers' income, maintaining ecology security and keeping timber supply stable. Since reform and opening-up of our country, collective forest tenure institution still have the problems of ambiguitiy and trunctation of Forest tenure after many reforms. In the all-round reform of collective forest tenure institution beginning in 2003, individual household management is the main tenure type. Meanwhile, forestland contractual operation right was made sure and household became the main body of forest management. Under a new institutional background, household's forest management decision has become research and concerned focus.
In recent years, land tenure and market reform has extensively discussed. They are the measures which protmote forest sustainable management. In past, as the forestry enterprises and village collective economic organizations were the main bodies of forest management. And the forest resources management put emphasis on the forestland management, harvest management, ecological reserve management and key forestry programs etc, while household forest management decision tend to be neglected. Otherwise, there are some researches and fruits about theory, problems, reform direction and policy suggestions of Forest tenure institution, but there are still no researches about how society, economy and policy factors effect on household's forest management decision and its effect mechanism.
The objective is building an integrate analysis frame and exploring the factors that affect on collective forest tenure institutional arrangements, household's afforest decision and household's timber harvest decision and impact mechanism of forest tenure institution. Finally, according to the research conclusions, it will bring up some policy suggestions in order to perfect the reform of collective forest tenure institution and promote household to participate in forest management. The data used in the article are from 2 counties, 15 villages, 118 households and 236 forest plots in the regions which have abundant forest, high forest dependency and rapid evolution of forest tenure institution. The main conclusions are as follows:
First, after the 1980s, collective forest tenure institution evolved to non-clollectivization. Particularly after 2003, the non-collective management forestland area proportion increased largely. Generally speaking, non-collectivization forms by household undertaking primarily. This article uses panel data model to estimate the factors of collective forest tenure institution evolution in Liaoning. The results indicate that logging quota policy, labor non-agriculture employment, farmers' income level, the average cultivated land area, and forestland condition are the main factors. Logging quota policy hampers the development of non-collectivization management. The many labor non-agriculture employment, high farmers' income level and high education level will promote the development of non-collectivization management.
Second, it uses heckman model to estimate the factors of household's afforest decision. The results indicate that private plot, good tenure security, complete forest tenure, low forestry tax, good forest service will promote household's afforestation.
Third, it uses probit model to estimate the factors of household whether to harvest and uses tobit model to estimate the household's harvest volumes. The results indicate that private plot, tenure security, timber price, forest ages, forest condition are the main factors. The farmers are willing to harvest the forest in the private plot. Meanwhile, good tenure security, high timber price, good forestland condition, big forest ages will promote the farmers to increase the harvest volumes. Afterward, it uses probit model to estimate the factors of household's harvest willingness. The results indicate that the main infuenciong factors are the same as the results of household's harvest decision model. But the timber price is higher, farmers' harvest willingness is higher as famers hold the waiting attitude. Farmers want to harvest in the large forest plot and bad quality forestland. Other varibles results are sames as the above.
In the end, the article puts forward some policy suggestions from three aspects to promote farmers to promote household to engage in forest management on the basis of above analysis. These suggestions are as follows: first, keep forest policy stable; second, perfect logging quota policy; third, release the burden of forestry tax; fourth, strengthen the construction of forest socialized service system; fifth, accelerate the timber market reform.
引文
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37.詹姆士·布坎南,陈国雄.寻求租金和寻求利润.经济社会体制比较,(6):18-24.
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40.张道卫.2001.为什么中国的许多林地不长树?.管理世界,(3):141-146.
41.张蕾,刘璨,王丽,李育明.2004.我国林业主要政策与社区林业发展案例研究.绿色中国,(1):68-74.
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43.左停,苟天来.2008.政府管制、潜规则与林农受益的获得性研究——中南集体林区案例.林业经济,(3).66-69.
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47.Alig Ralph J.1986.Econometric analysis of the factors influencing forest acreage trends in the Southeast.Forest Science, 32(1):119-134.
48.Amacher G S, Conway M Christine, Sullivan J.2003.Econometric analyses of nonindustrial forest landowners: Is there anything left to study?.Journal of Forest Economics, 9(2): 137-164.
49.Besley Timothy.1995.Property rights and investment incentives: theory and evidence from Ghana.The Journal of Political Economy, 103(5):903-937.
50.Binkley Clark Shepard.1981.Timber supply from private nonindustrial forests: A microeconomic analysis of landowner behavior.School of Forest and Environment Studies Bulletin 92, New Haven, Yale Univ.97p.
51.Boyd Roy G 1984.Government support of nonindustrial production: the case of private forests.Southern Journal of Economics, (51):89-1 07.
52.Boyd Roy G, Hyde William F.1989.Forestry sector intervention: the impacts of public regulation on social welfare.Iowa State University Press, Ames.295p.
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55.de Steiguer.1984.Impact of cost-share programs on private reforestation investment.Forest Science, 30(3): 697-704.
56.Feder Gershon, Lawrence J Lau, Lin Justin Yifu, Luo Xiaopeng.1992.The determinants of farm investment and residential construction in post-reform China.Economic Development and Cultural Change, 41(1):l-26.
57.Furubotn Eirik G, Svetozar Pejovich.1972.Property rights and economic theory: A survey of recent literature.Journal of Economic Literature, (10):1137-1162.
58.Gan Jianbang, Kebede Ellene.2005.Multivariate probit modeling of decisions on timber harvesting and request for assistance by African-American forestland owners.Southern Journal of Applied Forestry, 29(3): 135-142.
59.Gavian S, S Ehui.1999.Measuring the production efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts in a mixed crop-livestock system in Ethiopia.Agricultural Economics, 20(1):37-49.
60.Healy Robert G 1985.Competition for land in the American South.Washington, DC:The Conservation Foundation.
61.Holmes Thomas.1986.An economic analysis of timber supply from nonindustrial private forests in Connecticut.Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut.130 pp.Ph.D.dissertation.
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63.Kendra Angelina, Hull R Bruce.2005.Motivations and behaviors of new forest owners in Virginia.Forest Science, 51(2): 142-154.
64.Kline J D, B J Butler, R.J Alig.2002.Tree planting in the South: What does the future hold?.Southern Journal of Applied Forestry, 26(2):99-107.
65.Kula E, D McKillo.1988.A planting function for private afforestation in Northern Ireland.Journal of Agricultural Economics, 39(1):133-140.
66.Kuuluvainen J, H Karppinen, V Ovaskainen.1996.Landowner objectives and non-industrial private timber supply.Forest Science, 42(3):300-309.
67.Lee K, F Kaiser, R Alig.1992.Substitution of public for private funding in planting southern pine.Southern Journal of Applied Forestry, 16(4):204-208.
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69.Lin Justin Yifu.1988.The household responsibility system in China's agricultural reform: A theoretical and empirical Sstudy.Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36(3):5199-5245.
70.Lin Justin Yifu.1992.Rural reform and agricultural growth in China.American Economic Review, 82(1):34-51.
71.Loyland K, V Ringstad, H Oy.1995.Determinants of forest activities: A study of private nonindustrial forestry in Norway.Journal of Forest Economics, l(2):219-237.
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75.Newman D, D Wear.1993.Production economics of private forestry: A comparison of industrial and nonindustrial forest owners.American Journal of Agricultural Economics, (75): 674-684.
76.Pasicolan Paulo N, Helias A Udo de Haes, Percy E Sajise.1997.Farm forestry: An alternative to government-driven reforestation in the Philippines.Forest Ecology and Management, (12): 261-274.
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88.Zhang Daowei, P Pearse.1996.Differences in silvicultural investment under various types of forest tenure in British Columbia.Forest Science, 42(4): 442-449.
89.Zhang Daowei, P Pearse.1997.The influence of the form of tenure on reforestation in British Columbia.Forest Ecology and Management, 98: 239-250.
90.Zhang Daowei, Flick.2001.Sticks, carrots and reforestation investment.Land Economics, 77(3):443-456.
91.Zhang Yaoqi, Jussi Uusivuori, Jari Kuuluvainen.2000.Impacts of economic reforms on rural forestry in China.Forest Policy and Economics, 1(1): 27-40.
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31.徐秀英.2005.南方集体林区森林可持续经营的林权制度研究.北京林业大学,博士学位论文.
32.鄢哲,姜雪梅.2008.南方集体林区木材供给行为研究.林业经济,(9):44-49.
33.严金泉.1998.土地承包制与耕地持续利用问题的实证研究.中国农村观察,(6):13-17.
34.姚洋.1998.农地制度与农业绩效的实证研究.中国农村观察,(6):1-10.
35.姚洋.2000.中国农地制度:一个分析框架.中国社会科学,(2):54-65.
36.俞海,黄季焜,Scott Rozzelle,Loren Brandt,张林秀.2003.地权稳定性、土地流转与农地资源持续利用.经济研究,(9):82-92.
37.詹姆士·布坎南,陈国雄.寻求租金和寻求利润.经济社会体制比较,(6):18-24.
38.张敏新,肖平.1999.南方集体林区森林产权的界定与清晰.林业经济问题,(5):9-14.
39.张春霞.1994.集体林业要发展产权制度改革需破题.林业经济问题,(2):15-21.
40.张道卫.2001.为什么中国的许多林地不长树?.管理世界,(3):141-146.
41.张蕾,刘璨,王丽,李育明.2004.我国林业主要政策与社区林业发展案例研究.绿色中国,(1):68-74.
42.左停,柴浩放.2006.中国农村社区集体林治理及其制度视角的评述.林业经济,(4):17-21.
43.左停,苟天来.2008.政府管制、潜规则与林农受益的获得性研究——中南集体林区案例.林业经济,(3).66-69.
44.张红宇.2002.中国农地制度变迁的制度绩效:从实证到理论分析.中国农村观察,(2):22-34,81.
45.Adams Darius M,Haynes Richard W.1980.The 1980 softwood timber assessment market model: structure, projections, and policy simulations.Forest Science Monographs,(22):4.
46.Albers Heidi J, Rozelle Scott D, Li Guo.1998.China's forests under economic reform: timber supplies, environmental protection, and rural resource access.Contemporary Economic Policy, 16(1): 22-33.
47.Alig Ralph J.1986.Econometric analysis of the factors influencing forest acreage trends in the Southeast.Forest Science, 32(1):119-134.
48.Amacher G S, Conway M Christine, Sullivan J.2003.Econometric analyses of nonindustrial forest landowners: Is there anything left to study?.Journal of Forest Economics, 9(2): 137-164.
49.Besley Timothy.1995.Property rights and investment incentives: theory and evidence from Ghana.The Journal of Political Economy, 103(5):903-937.
50.Binkley Clark Shepard.1981.Timber supply from private nonindustrial forests: A microeconomic analysis of landowner behavior.School of Forest and Environment Studies Bulletin 92, New Haven, Yale Univ.97p.
51.Boyd Roy G 1984.Government support of nonindustrial production: the case of private forests.Southern Journal of Economics, (51):89-1 07.
52.Boyd Roy G, Hyde William F.1989.Forestry sector intervention: the impacts of public regulation on social welfare.Iowa State University Press, Ames.295p.
53.Bromley, D W.1991 Environment and economy: Property rights and public policy, Blackwell, Cambridge, USA.
54.Cohen, M.A.1983.Public cost share programs and private investment in forestry in the South.P.181-186 in Proc.of nonindustrial private forests: A review of economic and policy studies.
55.de Steiguer.1984.Impact of cost-share programs on private reforestation investment.Forest Science, 30(3): 697-704.
56.Feder Gershon, Lawrence J Lau, Lin Justin Yifu, Luo Xiaopeng.1992.The determinants of farm investment and residential construction in post-reform China.Economic Development and Cultural Change, 41(1):l-26.
57.Furubotn Eirik G, Svetozar Pejovich.1972.Property rights and economic theory: A survey of recent literature.Journal of Economic Literature, (10):1137-1162.
58.Gan Jianbang, Kebede Ellene.2005.Multivariate probit modeling of decisions on timber harvesting and request for assistance by African-American forestland owners.Southern Journal of Applied Forestry, 29(3): 135-142.
59.Gavian S, S Ehui.1999.Measuring the production efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts in a mixed crop-livestock system in Ethiopia.Agricultural Economics, 20(1):37-49.
60.Healy Robert G 1985.Competition for land in the American South.Washington, DC:The Conservation Foundation.
61.Holmes Thomas.1986.An economic analysis of timber supply from nonindustrial private forests in Connecticut.Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut.130 pp.Ph.D.dissertation.
62.Hyberg B, D Holthausen.1989.The behavior of nonindustrial private forest landowners.Canadian Journal of Forest Research, (19):1014-1023.
63.Kendra Angelina, Hull R Bruce.2005.Motivations and behaviors of new forest owners in Virginia.Forest Science, 51(2): 142-154.
64.Kline J D, B J Butler, R.J Alig.2002.Tree planting in the South: What does the future hold?.Southern Journal of Applied Forestry, 26(2):99-107.
65.Kula E, D McKillo.1988.A planting function for private afforestation in Northern Ireland.Journal of Agricultural Economics, 39(1):133-140.
66.Kuuluvainen J, H Karppinen, V Ovaskainen.1996.Landowner objectives and non-industrial private timber supply.Forest Science, 42(3):300-309.
67.Lee K, F Kaiser, R Alig.1992.Substitution of public for private funding in planting southern pine.Southern Journal of Applied Forestry, 16(4):204-208.
68.Li Yanshu, Zhang Daowei.2007.A spatial panel data analysis of tree planting in the U.S.South.Southern Journal of Applied Forestry, 31(4): 192-198.
69.Lin Justin Yifu.1988.The household responsibility system in China's agricultural reform: A theoretical and empirical Sstudy.Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36(3):5199-5245.
70.Lin Justin Yifu.1992.Rural reform and agricultural growth in China.American Economic Review, 82(1):34-51.
71.Loyland K, V Ringstad, H Oy.1995.Determinants of forest activities: A study of private nonindustrial forestry in Norway.Journal of Forest Economics, l(2):219-237.
72.M Christine Conway, Gregory S Amacher, Jay Sullivan, David Wear.2003.Decisions non-industrial forest landowners make: an empirical examination.Journal of Forest Economics, 9(3): 181-203.
73.Miranda Marie Lynn.1988.The relationship between forestry investment and profit-maximizing land management: an application to the Southeastern and South central United States.Work.Pap.64.Research Triangle Park, NC: Southeastern Center for Forest Economics Research.33.
74.Natasha Landell-Mills, Ford Jason.1999.Privating sustainable forestry: A global review of trends and challenges.ⅡED.
75.Newman D, D Wear.1993.Production economics of private forestry: A comparison of industrial and nonindustrial forest owners.American Journal of Agricultural Economics, (75): 674-684.
76.Pasicolan Paulo N, Helias A Udo de Haes, Percy E Sajise.1997.Farm forestry: An alternative to government-driven reforestation in the Philippines.Forest Ecology and Management, (12): 261-274.
77.Roth Michael, F Place, P Hazell.1994.Land tenure, security and agricultural performance in Africa: Overview of research methodology.In John Bruce and Shem Migot-Adhollaeds, Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa.Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company.
78.Royer J.1987.Determinants of reforestation behavior among Southern landowners.Forest Science, 33(3): 654-667.
79.Scott Rozelle, Huang Jinkun, Vince Benziger.2003.Forest exploitation and protection in reform China: assessing the impact of policy, tenure and economic growth.In China's Forest Policy: Global Lessons from Market Reforms, edited by Hyde W, Belcher B, Xu J T, 109-134.Washington, DC .-Resources for the Future.
80.Shashi Kant.2003.Extending the boundaries of forest economics.Forest Policy and Economics, 5(1):31-39.
81.Stale Stordal, Gudbrand Lien, Sjur Baardsen.2008.Analyzing determinants of forest owners' decision-making using a sample selection framework.Journal of Forest Economics, 14(3): 159-176.
82.StataCorp.2003.Stata base reference manual: release 8.0, vol.2.Stata Corporation, College Station, TX: 59-74.
83.Viitala E J, H Janninen.1998.Measuring the efficiency of public forestry organizations.Forest Science, 44(2): 298-307.
84.Yin Runsheng and David H Newman.1997.Impacts of rural reforms: the case of the Chinese forest sector.Environment and Development Economics, 2(3): 289-303.
85.Yin Runsheng, Xu Jintao, Li Zhou.2003.Building institutions for markets: Experience and lessons from China's rural forest sector.Environment Development and Sustainability, (5): 333-351.
86.Yin Runsheng.1994.An empirical analysis of rural forest reform in China 1978-1990.Draft.Dissertation submitted in Partial fulfillment of The Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the University of Georgia.
87.Zhang Daowei, E Aboagye Owiredu.2007.Land tenure, market, and the establishment of forest plantations in Ghana.Forest Policy and Economics, (9): 602-610.
88.Zhang Daowei, P Pearse.1996.Differences in silvicultural investment under various types of forest tenure in British Columbia.Forest Science, 42(4): 442-449.
89.Zhang Daowei, P Pearse.1997.The influence of the form of tenure on reforestation in British Columbia.Forest Ecology and Management, 98: 239-250.
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