财政分权体制下农村公共服务供给研究
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摘要
本文在财政分权体制背景下研究了中国农村公共服务提供问题,主要以分税制后中国目前的财政分权体制为背景,分析农村公共服务的供给困境及其原因。由于中国的财政分权体制仍处于动态完善过程中,通过本文的研究可以为财政分权体制提供改善和改进的政策建议,进而为提高农村公共服务供给水平提供制度保障。
传统的财政分权理论认为地方政府提供地方公共服务能够更精确符合居民不同偏好,并能提高地方(农村)公共服务的供给效率。但是在实践中并没有得到与理论分析一致的结果,尤其是对中国经济的研究,普遍认为1994年的分税制改革和改革开放后的晋升激励制度的建立,导致地方政府展开标尺竞争,结果导致地方公共服务供给不足。研究发现中国式的财政分权是当前农村公共服务供给不足和供需失衡的体制性约束,中国当前的财政分权体制从内部制度设计、考核制度和相关配套措施三个方面极大地影响了基层政府行为。在本文提出的一般理论分析框架下,通过建立理论模型探讨了政治激励、财政激励以及财政制度设计对农村公共服务供给的影响,并进一步运用中国数据进行了财政分权对农村公共服务供给的实证分析,提出了相关政策建议。
本文的主要结论如下:
1.通过对山东省农村公共服务供给和需求状况的实地调查。发现目前农村公共服务供给中存在一些困境,如政府对农村公共服务的供给不足与错位并存;目前农村义务教育、医疗卫生、社会保障、科技服务等主要农村公共服务供给中由于政府投入不足,城乡差距显著进而导致供给效率低下;基层政府把有限的财政资源主要投向了经济建设支出,而对于义务教育、医疗卫生、科技服务等方面的支出较少,而这些恰恰是农民急需的领域,从而导致供需脱节;农村公共服务供给机制的单一性与农民需求的多样性矛盾;农村公共服务需求表达机制的缺失。
2.中国出现的农村公共服务缺失状况是中国经济发展过程必然出现的经济现象,是中国“先效率后公平”改革发展战略和“以GDP为主的政绩考核”的官员晋升制度从两方面放大了财政激励的必然后果。中国以分税制为主体的财政分权体制本质上是一种财政收入激励,通过税制设计来激发基层政府在促进本地经济增长的努力程度,同时官员的晋升或者连任偏重以经济绩效为考核目标,致使财政分权内生的激励机制扭曲了基层财政支出结构。而中国的财政分权体制的实际设置并不是理想的状态,在规范基层政府的“经济人”行为或者设计基层政府供给农村公共服务的激励机制方面并不有效,例如不匹配的事权和财权安排、尚未完成的省以下分税制改革、并不完善的转移支付制度、不规范的预算制度等。另外,中国财政分权的外部环境,居民可以自由流动和拥有充分民主的环境并不具备,抑制了财政分权体制提供更能符合农村居民偏好的公共服务优势。
3.采用Holmstrom-Milgrom的多任务委托代理模型分析在现行财政分权体制下基层政府的支出行为。在现行的财政分权体制下,分税制极大的提高了基层政府在扩大税收收入的热情,内生了基层政府官员的财政激励,基层政府在分权模式下经常会选择一个均衡解,将全部财政资源投入到效率投资中,以此刺激经济的快速发展。在晋升锦标赛制度下,经济发展给基层政府官员带来的收益要远远大于提供农村公共服务的收益,此时理性基层政府官员的选择是将有限的财政资源投入到经济发展中,甚至会挤占对农村公共服务的投资。因此在财政激励和晋升激励的双重影响下,农村公共服务出现供给不足和供需失衡。
4.实证研究表明财政分权是农村公共服务水平的重要影响因素。通过观察各地区财政分权对其农村公共服务供给水平的影响发现,财政分权对于农村公共服务供给水平有着显著的负面影响,即财政分权程度的增加能够显著地降低大多数农村公共服务供给水平,新型农村合作医疗除外。另外由于我国地区之间发展不平衡,各地经济发展水平差异较大,财政分权体制下,富裕地区和贫困地区基层政府的行为不同,导致财政分权对不同地区的影响不同。从实证分析结果中,我们得到以下结论:当前中国式财政分权阻碍了农村公共服务的供给,是当前农村公共服务供给困境的体制性原因;通过调整考核机制、财政制度设计和相应配套制度可以改变财政分权在供给农村公共服务上的效果。
5.从财政分权体制角度提出了促进农村公共服务供给的主要政策建议。①从财政体制改革方面。第一,合理划分事权。要解决农村公共服务供给的困境,首先就要明确各级政府在提供农村公共服务事权上的划分,另外,在支出责任的划分上,可以考虑通过《政府职责法》加以规范。第二,确保各级政府拥有与事权相对应的财权。在明确各级政府事权的基础上,按照财权与事权相对称的原则,调整各级政府之间的财权分配格局。首先合理划分税种的归属,其次,在中央集中大多收入的情况下,省以下政府间的税收分成要完善,提高基层政府的分成比例。第三,完善政府间转移支付制度。第四,深化省以下财政管理体制改革。第五,增加预算安排的透明度,强化政府预算约束。②改革官员晋升体制。在中国当前经济发展阶段,农村公共服务供给及其均等化问题的解决被提上了重要日程,经济增长的收益应该被分享,需要把政府官员的“唯GDP”增长论改为“公共服务”供给论,应着重考虑在政府官员的晋升机制中加大考核基本公共服务供给水平的比重,超过经济增长在考核中所占比重,由此来抑制被放大的财政激励;③系统化改革相关配套制度。主要从建立农民对农村公共服务的需求表达机制、改革户籍制度,确立平等的城乡居民身份及有效的问责机制等方面分析。
This thesis does a research on the problem of the Chinese rural public services on the background of fiscal decentralization system, mainly setting the background of the Chinese currant fiscal decentralization system that is after the system of tax distribution. It describes the difficult situations of rural public services providing then analyzes the reasons. Because Chinese fiscal decentralization system is still in the perfect developing process, the thesis could provide improving suggestion to afford guarantee for the development of the rural public services. The traditional fiscal decentralization system thought the local public services provided
by the local government fitted the residents' different preferences more accurately, and it could improve the efficiency of supply of the rural public services. But we have not got the agreed results with the theoretical analysis in the practices. Especially in the research of Chinese economics, it is commonly thought that the tax sharing system reform in 1994 and the establishment of the promotion stimulation system lead to the yardstick competition launched by the local government, finally the local public services especially the rural public services are in short supply and inefficient.
The research found that fiscal decentralization of Chinese style is the institutional restraint caused by the undersupply of rural public services and the unbalance of supply and demand. The grassroots governments' behaviours are influenced by the inner system design, check-up system and related supporting measures in Chinese currant fiscal decentralization system. The theses put forwards the general theoretical analysis framework and discusses the influences provided by the rural public service in political incentive, fiscal incentives and financial system design by the way of establishing theoretical model, then further applies the Chinese provincial panel data to analyse the evidences of the fiscal decentralization influencing on the rural public service in order to propose some related policy suggestion.
The main conclusions of the thesis are as follows:
1.According to the finding of supply and demand conditions about Shandong province rural public services, it could be found some difficult situations in supply and demand of current rural public services . For example the dislocating coexistence of supply and demand in rural public services provided by governments; the insufficient of the main rural public services provided by governments e.g. The current rural compulsory education, medical treatment and public health, social security, technology services, the insufficient of provide and supply resulting from the significant gap between city and countryside; the investigative township governments invest the limited financial resources to economic construction, so they pay less money on these aspects, which are what the peasants need urgently. These activities make the supply and demand disjoint.
2.The traditional fiscal decentralization theory considers fiscal decentralization as the important influencing factor determining the supply level of the public service and efficiency. In the recent fiscal decentralization system, system of tax distribution enhances the enthusiasm of enlarging the tax income in grassroots governments, giving birth the fiscal incentives done by grassroots government officials. The grassroots government usually choose a equilibrium solution in the decentralization mode to invest all the financial resources to the most efficient fields in order to stimulate the economy to develop rapidly. This thesis adopts the simplified form of Holmstrom-Milgrom' model to analyse the rural public service behaviours provided by the grassroots governments under the current fiscal decentralization system. In promoting championships system, the benefits caused by the economic developmemnt to the grassroots governments are far better than that provided by the rural public services, at the same time the sense grassroots government officials choose to invest the limited financial resources to the economic development, even divert the investments of the rural public service, which leads the insufficient of the rural public services.
3.The solid evidences show that separation of powers is the important influencing factor of the rural public service supply level, having different effects on different public services. In the scopes of the whole country, the separation of powers has the significant negative effects on the medical treatment and public health, rural compulsory education, while it has the positive effects on the new typed rural cooperative medical services. Besides that, because of the unbalance between different areas in our country and the different economic development levels, in the fiscal decentralization system, behaviors of the grassroots governments are different between the rich areas and poor areas, which leads to the different area influences under the fiscal decentralization.
4.The loss situation appearing in Chinese rural public services is the inevitable economic situation in Chinese economic development, which is the inevitable consequence of financial incentive resulting from the reform development strategy---"fairness comes after efficiency" and the officials promoting system---"the examination mainly in GDP". The fiscal decentralization systemsystem dominated by tax distribution is a kind of fiscal revenue incentive naturally. It aims to stimulate the efforts of the grassroots governments to promote local economic growth by the way of tax system design. At the same time, the promotion and the reappointmentof the officials are aimed by the economic performance, so the endogenous incentive mechanism in fiscal decentralization distorts the structure of grassroots fiscal expenditure. But the actual set of Chinese fiscal decentralization system is not the ideal state.It is not all effective in the way of regulating the grassroots governments "economic man" behaviour or designing the incentive mechanism that the grassroots governments supply basic public services. For example the income dilemma of the grassroots governments: the inadequate financial budget, non-budgetary income expansion; depending greatly on the transferred payment; weakness of the land granted growths,etc.; spending predicament of the grassroots governments: the simplified supply pressure, the competition between the governments resulted from the crossing powers; the mismatching of the power and property arrangement; The unfinished tax system reforms under province; softening constraint budget,etc. Besides, the external Chinese fiscal decentralization environment and fully democratic environment are not available, which restrain the advantages of the public services provided by the fiscal decentralization system to the rural resident.
5.Policy suggestion on perfecting fiscal decentralization system and improving the rural public services.①The reform of public financal system. First, we should divide powers rationally. If we want to solve the rural public service supply difficulties, we should make the providing divisions of governments in rural public services clear.and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities can be constrained by“the law of government expenditure responsibilitier”, Secondly, we should ensure that governments own the property relative to their powers. According to that, we can adjust the distribution pattern of property ownership among different governments to moderate the roles of financial incentives to guide the rural public services' supply behaviours of the grassroots governments. Through the way of redetermining the goal of tax incentives to adopt tax system design to bring the financial rewards into the rural public service, which can arouse "economic man" behaviours from economic angle. Thirdly, we should perfect the transfer payment system among governments. Fourthly, we should deepen the reform of the management system under provincial finance. Fifthly, we should increase the transparency of budget arrangement and strengthen the government budget constraints.②Reform of officials promotion system. In the current phase of economic development in Chin, the problems of rural public services' supply and the equal solved problems should be put to an important agenda. Economic growth earnings should be shared. The theory of " the supply of public services" should take the place of "GDP grows only" theory, governments should consider to assess the proportion of basic public services supply in the promotion mechanism and make the balance with economic growth assessment step by step in order to curb the amplified financial incentive.③Related supporting system with systematic reform. We should analyse the following subjects: establishing the expressing mechanism of the farmers' rural public services, reforming the household registration system, establishing equal identity of resident in urban and rural areas, consolidating unified urban and rural public service supply mechanism and the effective accountability mechanism.
传统的财政分权理论认为地方政府提供地方公共服务能够更精确符合居民不同偏好,并能提高地方(农村)公共服务的供给效率。但是在实践中并没有得到与理论分析一致的结果,尤其是对中国经济的研究,普遍认为1994年的分税制改革和改革开放后的晋升激励制度的建立,导致地方政府展开标尺竞争,结果导致地方公共服务供给不足。研究发现中国式的财政分权是当前农村公共服务供给不足和供需失衡的体制性约束,中国当前的财政分权体制从内部制度设计、考核制度和相关配套措施三个方面极大地影响了基层政府行为。在本文提出的一般理论分析框架下,通过建立理论模型探讨了政治激励、财政激励以及财政制度设计对农村公共服务供给的影响,并进一步运用中国数据进行了财政分权对农村公共服务供给的实证分析,提出了相关政策建议。
本文的主要结论如下:
1.通过对山东省农村公共服务供给和需求状况的实地调查。发现目前农村公共服务供给中存在一些困境,如政府对农村公共服务的供给不足与错位并存;目前农村义务教育、医疗卫生、社会保障、科技服务等主要农村公共服务供给中由于政府投入不足,城乡差距显著进而导致供给效率低下;基层政府把有限的财政资源主要投向了经济建设支出,而对于义务教育、医疗卫生、科技服务等方面的支出较少,而这些恰恰是农民急需的领域,从而导致供需脱节;农村公共服务供给机制的单一性与农民需求的多样性矛盾;农村公共服务需求表达机制的缺失。
2.中国出现的农村公共服务缺失状况是中国经济发展过程必然出现的经济现象,是中国“先效率后公平”改革发展战略和“以GDP为主的政绩考核”的官员晋升制度从两方面放大了财政激励的必然后果。中国以分税制为主体的财政分权体制本质上是一种财政收入激励,通过税制设计来激发基层政府在促进本地经济增长的努力程度,同时官员的晋升或者连任偏重以经济绩效为考核目标,致使财政分权内生的激励机制扭曲了基层财政支出结构。而中国的财政分权体制的实际设置并不是理想的状态,在规范基层政府的“经济人”行为或者设计基层政府供给农村公共服务的激励机制方面并不有效,例如不匹配的事权和财权安排、尚未完成的省以下分税制改革、并不完善的转移支付制度、不规范的预算制度等。另外,中国财政分权的外部环境,居民可以自由流动和拥有充分民主的环境并不具备,抑制了财政分权体制提供更能符合农村居民偏好的公共服务优势。
3.采用Holmstrom-Milgrom的多任务委托代理模型分析在现行财政分权体制下基层政府的支出行为。在现行的财政分权体制下,分税制极大的提高了基层政府在扩大税收收入的热情,内生了基层政府官员的财政激励,基层政府在分权模式下经常会选择一个均衡解,将全部财政资源投入到效率投资中,以此刺激经济的快速发展。在晋升锦标赛制度下,经济发展给基层政府官员带来的收益要远远大于提供农村公共服务的收益,此时理性基层政府官员的选择是将有限的财政资源投入到经济发展中,甚至会挤占对农村公共服务的投资。因此在财政激励和晋升激励的双重影响下,农村公共服务出现供给不足和供需失衡。
4.实证研究表明财政分权是农村公共服务水平的重要影响因素。通过观察各地区财政分权对其农村公共服务供给水平的影响发现,财政分权对于农村公共服务供给水平有着显著的负面影响,即财政分权程度的增加能够显著地降低大多数农村公共服务供给水平,新型农村合作医疗除外。另外由于我国地区之间发展不平衡,各地经济发展水平差异较大,财政分权体制下,富裕地区和贫困地区基层政府的行为不同,导致财政分权对不同地区的影响不同。从实证分析结果中,我们得到以下结论:当前中国式财政分权阻碍了农村公共服务的供给,是当前农村公共服务供给困境的体制性原因;通过调整考核机制、财政制度设计和相应配套制度可以改变财政分权在供给农村公共服务上的效果。
5.从财政分权体制角度提出了促进农村公共服务供给的主要政策建议。①从财政体制改革方面。第一,合理划分事权。要解决农村公共服务供给的困境,首先就要明确各级政府在提供农村公共服务事权上的划分,另外,在支出责任的划分上,可以考虑通过《政府职责法》加以规范。第二,确保各级政府拥有与事权相对应的财权。在明确各级政府事权的基础上,按照财权与事权相对称的原则,调整各级政府之间的财权分配格局。首先合理划分税种的归属,其次,在中央集中大多收入的情况下,省以下政府间的税收分成要完善,提高基层政府的分成比例。第三,完善政府间转移支付制度。第四,深化省以下财政管理体制改革。第五,增加预算安排的透明度,强化政府预算约束。②改革官员晋升体制。在中国当前经济发展阶段,农村公共服务供给及其均等化问题的解决被提上了重要日程,经济增长的收益应该被分享,需要把政府官员的“唯GDP”增长论改为“公共服务”供给论,应着重考虑在政府官员的晋升机制中加大考核基本公共服务供给水平的比重,超过经济增长在考核中所占比重,由此来抑制被放大的财政激励;③系统化改革相关配套制度。主要从建立农民对农村公共服务的需求表达机制、改革户籍制度,确立平等的城乡居民身份及有效的问责机制等方面分析。
This thesis does a research on the problem of the Chinese rural public services on the background of fiscal decentralization system, mainly setting the background of the Chinese currant fiscal decentralization system that is after the system of tax distribution. It describes the difficult situations of rural public services providing then analyzes the reasons. Because Chinese fiscal decentralization system is still in the perfect developing process, the thesis could provide improving suggestion to afford guarantee for the development of the rural public services. The traditional fiscal decentralization system thought the local public services provided
by the local government fitted the residents' different preferences more accurately, and it could improve the efficiency of supply of the rural public services. But we have not got the agreed results with the theoretical analysis in the practices. Especially in the research of Chinese economics, it is commonly thought that the tax sharing system reform in 1994 and the establishment of the promotion stimulation system lead to the yardstick competition launched by the local government, finally the local public services especially the rural public services are in short supply and inefficient.
The research found that fiscal decentralization of Chinese style is the institutional restraint caused by the undersupply of rural public services and the unbalance of supply and demand. The grassroots governments' behaviours are influenced by the inner system design, check-up system and related supporting measures in Chinese currant fiscal decentralization system. The theses put forwards the general theoretical analysis framework and discusses the influences provided by the rural public service in political incentive, fiscal incentives and financial system design by the way of establishing theoretical model, then further applies the Chinese provincial panel data to analyse the evidences of the fiscal decentralization influencing on the rural public service in order to propose some related policy suggestion.
The main conclusions of the thesis are as follows:
1.According to the finding of supply and demand conditions about Shandong province rural public services, it could be found some difficult situations in supply and demand of current rural public services . For example the dislocating coexistence of supply and demand in rural public services provided by governments; the insufficient of the main rural public services provided by governments e.g. The current rural compulsory education, medical treatment and public health, social security, technology services, the insufficient of provide and supply resulting from the significant gap between city and countryside; the investigative township governments invest the limited financial resources to economic construction, so they pay less money on these aspects, which are what the peasants need urgently. These activities make the supply and demand disjoint.
2.The traditional fiscal decentralization theory considers fiscal decentralization as the important influencing factor determining the supply level of the public service and efficiency. In the recent fiscal decentralization system, system of tax distribution enhances the enthusiasm of enlarging the tax income in grassroots governments, giving birth the fiscal incentives done by grassroots government officials. The grassroots government usually choose a equilibrium solution in the decentralization mode to invest all the financial resources to the most efficient fields in order to stimulate the economy to develop rapidly. This thesis adopts the simplified form of Holmstrom-Milgrom' model to analyse the rural public service behaviours provided by the grassroots governments under the current fiscal decentralization system. In promoting championships system, the benefits caused by the economic developmemnt to the grassroots governments are far better than that provided by the rural public services, at the same time the sense grassroots government officials choose to invest the limited financial resources to the economic development, even divert the investments of the rural public service, which leads the insufficient of the rural public services.
3.The solid evidences show that separation of powers is the important influencing factor of the rural public service supply level, having different effects on different public services. In the scopes of the whole country, the separation of powers has the significant negative effects on the medical treatment and public health, rural compulsory education, while it has the positive effects on the new typed rural cooperative medical services. Besides that, because of the unbalance between different areas in our country and the different economic development levels, in the fiscal decentralization system, behaviors of the grassroots governments are different between the rich areas and poor areas, which leads to the different area influences under the fiscal decentralization.
4.The loss situation appearing in Chinese rural public services is the inevitable economic situation in Chinese economic development, which is the inevitable consequence of financial incentive resulting from the reform development strategy---"fairness comes after efficiency" and the officials promoting system---"the examination mainly in GDP". The fiscal decentralization systemsystem dominated by tax distribution is a kind of fiscal revenue incentive naturally. It aims to stimulate the efforts of the grassroots governments to promote local economic growth by the way of tax system design. At the same time, the promotion and the reappointmentof the officials are aimed by the economic performance, so the endogenous incentive mechanism in fiscal decentralization distorts the structure of grassroots fiscal expenditure. But the actual set of Chinese fiscal decentralization system is not the ideal state.It is not all effective in the way of regulating the grassroots governments "economic man" behaviour or designing the incentive mechanism that the grassroots governments supply basic public services. For example the income dilemma of the grassroots governments: the inadequate financial budget, non-budgetary income expansion; depending greatly on the transferred payment; weakness of the land granted growths,etc.; spending predicament of the grassroots governments: the simplified supply pressure, the competition between the governments resulted from the crossing powers; the mismatching of the power and property arrangement; The unfinished tax system reforms under province; softening constraint budget,etc. Besides, the external Chinese fiscal decentralization environment and fully democratic environment are not available, which restrain the advantages of the public services provided by the fiscal decentralization system to the rural resident.
5.Policy suggestion on perfecting fiscal decentralization system and improving the rural public services.①The reform of public financal system. First, we should divide powers rationally. If we want to solve the rural public service supply difficulties, we should make the providing divisions of governments in rural public services clear.and the assignment of expenditure responsibilities can be constrained by“the law of government expenditure responsibilitier”, Secondly, we should ensure that governments own the property relative to their powers. According to that, we can adjust the distribution pattern of property ownership among different governments to moderate the roles of financial incentives to guide the rural public services' supply behaviours of the grassroots governments. Through the way of redetermining the goal of tax incentives to adopt tax system design to bring the financial rewards into the rural public service, which can arouse "economic man" behaviours from economic angle. Thirdly, we should perfect the transfer payment system among governments. Fourthly, we should deepen the reform of the management system under provincial finance. Fifthly, we should increase the transparency of budget arrangement and strengthen the government budget constraints.②Reform of officials promotion system. In the current phase of economic development in Chin, the problems of rural public services' supply and the equal solved problems should be put to an important agenda. Economic growth earnings should be shared. The theory of " the supply of public services" should take the place of "GDP grows only" theory, governments should consider to assess the proportion of basic public services supply in the promotion mechanism and make the balance with economic growth assessment step by step in order to curb the amplified financial incentive.③Related supporting system with systematic reform. We should analyse the following subjects: establishing the expressing mechanism of the farmers' rural public services, reforming the household registration system, establishing equal identity of resident in urban and rural areas, consolidating unified urban and rural public service supply mechanism and the effective accountability mechanism.
引文
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