专用性视角下军事人力资本投资研究
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摘要
专用性是军事人力资本的一个重要特性。军事人力资本的专用性降低了它在军事领域外获得收益的能力,使军事人力资本投资通过“市场”交易不能形成社会最优的投资量,因此必须设计相应的制度安排使军事人力资本投资达到最优水平。本文从资产专用性的视角,以新制度经济学理论为基础,运用规范分析和数理模型化等方法,分析了军事人力资本投资的“套牢”特性,针对“套牢”导致的专用性投资不足和专用性与通用性投资结构不均的问题,设计合理的投资分担、保护、激励和补偿机制,以促进专用性投资和投资结构的均衡。
本文主要研究成果如下：
1、从现象和理论两个角度分析了军事人力资本投资的“套牢”特性。通过对军队院校学员和退役军人在服役期间投资行为调查,发现军人个体偏好军民通用性人力资本投资,军事人力资本投资存在“套牢”现象。理论研究表明,军事人力资本投资的“套牢”特性源白其用途从军用领域转移到民用领域的价值丧失,“套牢”的本质是专用性准租在军队和军人之间的重新分配,“套牢”的后果是军事专用性投资不足和专用性与通用性投资结构的不均。
2、构建了军队组织获取人力资本“制造-购买决策”模型和军事人力资本投资分担数理模型。“制造-购买决策”模型说明了,军队一般采用“制造”方式即军队自行培养获取军事专用性人力资本；对于军民通用性人力资本,可采用“购买”方式即采用依托培养或招收普通高校毕业生。“制造-购买决策”在于军队对每一项人力资本投资的边际制造成本等于其边际购买成本时的均衡纵向规模,规模大倾向于制造,反之倾向于购买。投资分担模型说明,如果军队与军人两投资主体的成本分担系数K是军队政策决定的外生变量,则军队和军人的投资动机是冲突的；如果K为模型的内生变量,则军人努力程度与投资收益相联系,可以激发军人的积极性。
3、探讨了专用性军事人力资本投资的保护。为保护军队与军人雇佣双方专用性人力资本投资,固定工资合约优于灵活工资合约。军事人力资本专用性程度和工作可分割性的不同影响军队组织的治理方式。对于专用性强的人力资本,如某些特殊的军兵种,采取长期雇佣合约有助于促进专用性人力资本的投资；对于通用性人力资本,由于有外部劳动力市场的相对充足供给,如普通高校毕业生应征入伍,则可以采取灵活性的短期合约。通过内部晋升选拔人才是军队惯常的做法,良好的内部晋升制度,有利于保持军官队伍的稳定性,增强军人提升能力和努力工作的意愿。
4、探讨了专用性军事人力资本投资的激励。军事人力资本投资收益分配格局取决于军队与军人谈判力的大小。在军队与军人的静态博弈中,最优策略显然是双方的合作,实现投资共赢。当军队和军人多次有限度博弈时,期初军队具有来自外生谈判力差异的优势,军人谈判力低,其威胁不可置信。但随着军人人力资本存量的增加,谈判力的增强,博弈重复次数增多,军事人力资本所有者获得的收益份额越大。
5、探讨了专用性军事人力资本投资的补偿。经济补偿本质上是一种激励措施。为使军人安心于本职工作,国家在军人退役时应对其职业转换成本和特殊的机会成本、生理(心理)成本、风险成本在经济上给予补偿。因此,有必要提高现行经济补偿标准,差别对待专用性和通用性人力资本经济补偿的比例和标准,实行不同地区退役金差额补贴、健全经济补偿运行机制和完善经济补偿配套措施。
6、设计了调查问卷并验证了主要的研究结论。为验证理论模型的分析基础和研究结论,设计了针对转业安置和自主择业人员与普通高校毕业生的调查问卷,实证结果支撑了理论分析的研究结论。在理论与实证研究基础上,提出了优化专用性军事人力资本投资的对策,即走中国特色军官职业化道路。构建符合中国国情、军情的职业化军官军事人力资本生成、使用和退出模式,是本文给出的主要政策建议。
Specificity is an important property of the military human capital. The specificity of the military human capital reduces its ability of getting incomes beyond the military territory, so that the military human capital investment can not form the optimal investment in society through market dealing. Therefore, a corresponding system should be designed to achieve the optimal level. This thesis analyses the"hold-up" property of the military human capital investment from the perspective of asset specificity on the basis of the New Institutional Economics Theory by means of normative analysis, mathematical modeling and so on. In addition, for the problem of insufficient military human capital investment and the imbalance of the investment structure caused by "hold-up" property, this thesis focuses on studying how to make a reasonable military human capital investment sharing, protection, incentive and compensation mechanisms to achieve the balance of the specific investment and the investment structure.
The research results are as follows:
1.The "hold-up" property of the military human capital investment was analyzed theoretically and practically in this thesis. Through the investigation into the investment behaviors of the military college students and veterans in their service, it shows that the individual soldiers prefer the human capital investment available to military and civilian application and there exists the "hold-up" property of the military human capital investment. The theoretical research shows that the " hold-up" property of the military human capital investment derives from its value loss when used from the military field to civilian field. The essence of "hold-up" is the re-allocation of specific quasi-rents between armies and soldiers. It leads to the insufficiency of military specificity investment and the imbalance between the specificity and homogeneity of the human capital structure.
2. The "make or buy decisions" model and the military human capital investment shared mathematical model, the purposes of which are to gain human capital, were established. The "make or buy decisions" model signifies that an army generally gets the military specific human capital in a self-made way, namely, they invest in cultivating soldiers in their own army. As to the military and civilian universal human capital, it can be "purchased", which means they can get the human capital by the way of commissioning colleges and universities to train soldiers or directly recruiting college graduates. The "Make or Buy Decisions" lies in the equality between the marginal costs of producing of the military investment for each of human capital and the balanced vertical scale of the marginal costs of purchasing. If the balanced vertical scale is large enough, the investment tends to manufacture. Otherwise, it tends to purchase. The sharing model of the military human capital investment shows that if cost-sharing coefficients K of the army and the military, two main sources of investment, are the exogenous variables of military policy, there will be conflicts between the investment motives of armies and soldiers. However, if cost-sharing coefficient K is the endogenous variable, soldiers' efforts are relevant to the investment income, which could stimulate soldiers' zeal.
3. The protection mechanism of the military specific human capital investment was discussed in this thesis. In order to protect the military-specific human capital investment of both the employer (an army) and the employees (the soldiers), fixed wage contract is better than flexible wage contract. The degree of the specificity of the military human capital and the difference of the severability of the work has an effect on the governance mode of the military. For dedicated and strong human capital, such as certain special branches of the military, a long-term employment contract is helpful to promote investments in specific human capital; for general human capital, due to the external labor market having a relatively abundant supply, such as college graduates recruited into the army, the flexible short-term contracts can be taken. Our army always uses internal promotion to select talents. A good internal promotion system is helpful to maintain the stability of the officer corps and enhance military capability as well as their willingness to work hard.
4. The incentive mechanism of the human capital investment of specific military is also discussed in this thesis. The distribution pattern of military human capital investment income depends on military organization and soldiers'forces on negotiations between them. In the army and the soldiers'static game, obviously cooperation is the optimal strategy, for which could achieve win-win in investment. When the military organizations and the soldiers conduct a number of limited games, at first, military has an advantage, which is originated from the differences of external negotiations over soldiers. Soldiers have a low power of negotiation, and therefore, their threat could be ignored. But with the increase of soldiers'human capital, the strengthening of their negotiating power and the increase of repeated times, military manpower capital owner gets bigger share of the income.
5. This thesis discusses the compensation mechanisms of the specific military human capital investment. Essentially, the economic compensation is a method of giving a boost to the soldiers. In order to encourage soldiers to devote themselves to their work, the State should pay some economic compensation to costs related to career transition, opportunity, physic (psychology), risks when they retire. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the standard of the current economic compensation; to give a differential treatment of the proportion and standard of the compensation to the specificity and generality of the military human capital; to implement a policy that the retirements deficiency payments in different regions; to improve the economic compensation operating system and complete the supporting measures of the economic compensation and so on.
6. The designed questionnaire verifies the main research conclusions. In order to validate the analysis basis and research conclusion of the theoretical model, the questionnaire for university graduates and people who are transferred to civilian jobs and set up business by themselves is designed. The empirical results support the conclusion in this thesis getting from the theoretical analysis of the research. Based on the theoretical and empirical research, the countermeasure of optimizing the investment of the military specific human capital is put forward, that is to go on the officer professional road with Chinese characteristics. The main suggestion given in this thesis is to establish the professional officer military human capital formation, use and exit mode in line with our Chinese national situation and military situation.
本文主要研究成果如下：
1、从现象和理论两个角度分析了军事人力资本投资的“套牢”特性。通过对军队院校学员和退役军人在服役期间投资行为调查,发现军人个体偏好军民通用性人力资本投资,军事人力资本投资存在“套牢”现象。理论研究表明,军事人力资本投资的“套牢”特性源白其用途从军用领域转移到民用领域的价值丧失,“套牢”的本质是专用性准租在军队和军人之间的重新分配,“套牢”的后果是军事专用性投资不足和专用性与通用性投资结构的不均。
2、构建了军队组织获取人力资本“制造-购买决策”模型和军事人力资本投资分担数理模型。“制造-购买决策”模型说明了,军队一般采用“制造”方式即军队自行培养获取军事专用性人力资本；对于军民通用性人力资本,可采用“购买”方式即采用依托培养或招收普通高校毕业生。“制造-购买决策”在于军队对每一项人力资本投资的边际制造成本等于其边际购买成本时的均衡纵向规模,规模大倾向于制造,反之倾向于购买。投资分担模型说明,如果军队与军人两投资主体的成本分担系数K是军队政策决定的外生变量,则军队和军人的投资动机是冲突的；如果K为模型的内生变量,则军人努力程度与投资收益相联系,可以激发军人的积极性。
3、探讨了专用性军事人力资本投资的保护。为保护军队与军人雇佣双方专用性人力资本投资,固定工资合约优于灵活工资合约。军事人力资本专用性程度和工作可分割性的不同影响军队组织的治理方式。对于专用性强的人力资本,如某些特殊的军兵种,采取长期雇佣合约有助于促进专用性人力资本的投资；对于通用性人力资本,由于有外部劳动力市场的相对充足供给,如普通高校毕业生应征入伍,则可以采取灵活性的短期合约。通过内部晋升选拔人才是军队惯常的做法,良好的内部晋升制度,有利于保持军官队伍的稳定性,增强军人提升能力和努力工作的意愿。
4、探讨了专用性军事人力资本投资的激励。军事人力资本投资收益分配格局取决于军队与军人谈判力的大小。在军队与军人的静态博弈中,最优策略显然是双方的合作,实现投资共赢。当军队和军人多次有限度博弈时,期初军队具有来自外生谈判力差异的优势,军人谈判力低,其威胁不可置信。但随着军人人力资本存量的增加,谈判力的增强,博弈重复次数增多,军事人力资本所有者获得的收益份额越大。
5、探讨了专用性军事人力资本投资的补偿。经济补偿本质上是一种激励措施。为使军人安心于本职工作,国家在军人退役时应对其职业转换成本和特殊的机会成本、生理(心理)成本、风险成本在经济上给予补偿。因此,有必要提高现行经济补偿标准,差别对待专用性和通用性人力资本经济补偿的比例和标准,实行不同地区退役金差额补贴、健全经济补偿运行机制和完善经济补偿配套措施。
6、设计了调查问卷并验证了主要的研究结论。为验证理论模型的分析基础和研究结论,设计了针对转业安置和自主择业人员与普通高校毕业生的调查问卷,实证结果支撑了理论分析的研究结论。在理论与实证研究基础上,提出了优化专用性军事人力资本投资的对策,即走中国特色军官职业化道路。构建符合中国国情、军情的职业化军官军事人力资本生成、使用和退出模式,是本文给出的主要政策建议。
Specificity is an important property of the military human capital. The specificity of the military human capital reduces its ability of getting incomes beyond the military territory, so that the military human capital investment can not form the optimal investment in society through market dealing. Therefore, a corresponding system should be designed to achieve the optimal level. This thesis analyses the"hold-up" property of the military human capital investment from the perspective of asset specificity on the basis of the New Institutional Economics Theory by means of normative analysis, mathematical modeling and so on. In addition, for the problem of insufficient military human capital investment and the imbalance of the investment structure caused by "hold-up" property, this thesis focuses on studying how to make a reasonable military human capital investment sharing, protection, incentive and compensation mechanisms to achieve the balance of the specific investment and the investment structure.
The research results are as follows:
1.The "hold-up" property of the military human capital investment was analyzed theoretically and practically in this thesis. Through the investigation into the investment behaviors of the military college students and veterans in their service, it shows that the individual soldiers prefer the human capital investment available to military and civilian application and there exists the "hold-up" property of the military human capital investment. The theoretical research shows that the " hold-up" property of the military human capital investment derives from its value loss when used from the military field to civilian field. The essence of "hold-up" is the re-allocation of specific quasi-rents between armies and soldiers. It leads to the insufficiency of military specificity investment and the imbalance between the specificity and homogeneity of the human capital structure.
2. The "make or buy decisions" model and the military human capital investment shared mathematical model, the purposes of which are to gain human capital, were established. The "make or buy decisions" model signifies that an army generally gets the military specific human capital in a self-made way, namely, they invest in cultivating soldiers in their own army. As to the military and civilian universal human capital, it can be "purchased", which means they can get the human capital by the way of commissioning colleges and universities to train soldiers or directly recruiting college graduates. The "Make or Buy Decisions" lies in the equality between the marginal costs of producing of the military investment for each of human capital and the balanced vertical scale of the marginal costs of purchasing. If the balanced vertical scale is large enough, the investment tends to manufacture. Otherwise, it tends to purchase. The sharing model of the military human capital investment shows that if cost-sharing coefficients K of the army and the military, two main sources of investment, are the exogenous variables of military policy, there will be conflicts between the investment motives of armies and soldiers. However, if cost-sharing coefficient K is the endogenous variable, soldiers' efforts are relevant to the investment income, which could stimulate soldiers' zeal.
3. The protection mechanism of the military specific human capital investment was discussed in this thesis. In order to protect the military-specific human capital investment of both the employer (an army) and the employees (the soldiers), fixed wage contract is better than flexible wage contract. The degree of the specificity of the military human capital and the difference of the severability of the work has an effect on the governance mode of the military. For dedicated and strong human capital, such as certain special branches of the military, a long-term employment contract is helpful to promote investments in specific human capital; for general human capital, due to the external labor market having a relatively abundant supply, such as college graduates recruited into the army, the flexible short-term contracts can be taken. Our army always uses internal promotion to select talents. A good internal promotion system is helpful to maintain the stability of the officer corps and enhance military capability as well as their willingness to work hard.
4. The incentive mechanism of the human capital investment of specific military is also discussed in this thesis. The distribution pattern of military human capital investment income depends on military organization and soldiers'forces on negotiations between them. In the army and the soldiers'static game, obviously cooperation is the optimal strategy, for which could achieve win-win in investment. When the military organizations and the soldiers conduct a number of limited games, at first, military has an advantage, which is originated from the differences of external negotiations over soldiers. Soldiers have a low power of negotiation, and therefore, their threat could be ignored. But with the increase of soldiers'human capital, the strengthening of their negotiating power and the increase of repeated times, military manpower capital owner gets bigger share of the income.
5. This thesis discusses the compensation mechanisms of the specific military human capital investment. Essentially, the economic compensation is a method of giving a boost to the soldiers. In order to encourage soldiers to devote themselves to their work, the State should pay some economic compensation to costs related to career transition, opportunity, physic (psychology), risks when they retire. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the standard of the current economic compensation; to give a differential treatment of the proportion and standard of the compensation to the specificity and generality of the military human capital; to implement a policy that the retirements deficiency payments in different regions; to improve the economic compensation operating system and complete the supporting measures of the economic compensation and so on.
6. The designed questionnaire verifies the main research conclusions. In order to validate the analysis basis and research conclusion of the theoretical model, the questionnaire for university graduates and people who are transferred to civilian jobs and set up business by themselves is designed. The empirical results support the conclusion in this thesis getting from the theoretical analysis of the research. Based on the theoretical and empirical research, the countermeasure of optimizing the investment of the military specific human capital is put forward, that is to go on the officer professional road with Chinese characteristics. The main suggestion given in this thesis is to establish the professional officer military human capital formation, use and exit mode in line with our Chinese national situation and military situation.
引文
1罗伯特·考特,托马斯·尤伦著,张军等译.法和经济学[M].上海：上海三联书店,1991：528-530
1参考来源：祁智宏.中国退役军人经济补偿的经济学分析[D].西北工业大学,2007.
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