导弹扩散及其控制制度
|
摘要
导弹是大规模杀伤性武器的最佳运载工具，导弹的扩散给人类生存和国际安全带来了现实威胁，是国际社会优先关注的安全议题，导弹控制机制则是国际社会治理导弹扩散的重要选项。在美国的主导和默许下，国际社会创立了“导弹及其技术控制制度”(MTCR)、“防止弹道导弹扩散国际行为准则”(ICOC)、“防扩散安全倡议”(PSI)和“全球导弹监控机制”(GCS)，其中MTCR是导弹控制的核心机制，ICOC、PSI和GCS是导弹控制的准机制。核心机制与准机制相互作用和相互补充，构成了较为完备的导弹控制体系。论文的主要目的就是在分析现有导弹控制制度控制内容、运行机制和决策程序的基础上，对导弹控制制度进行全面的绩效评估，寻找导弹控制制度功效低下的症结，指出未来导弹控制的发展方向。
通过分析和评估国内外研究现状，论文将力求在三个方面有所突破：
一是尝试建立一种理论分析框架。导弹控制研究的技术性、法理性和实践性很强，国内外研究基本上都是一种实证性研究，理论研究比较薄弱。为评估现有导弹控制体系的控制功效，本文把国际机制引入导弹控制领域，尝试为导弹控制研究提供一种理论分析框架。
二是对导弹扩散和导弹控制进行全面、系统的研究。西方学者对导弹扩散的研究重点集中于“无赖国家”、“导弹供应国”和第三世界国家身上，没有关注或很少关注西方发达国家的导弹扩散，没有指出西方发达国家对导弹扩散应负的主要国际责任；没有从西方发达国家与发展中国家、国家与地区、横向扩散与纵向扩散结合的基础上研究导弹扩散问题；西方学者只把MTCR看作导弹控制的唯一核心机制，不认为ICOC、PSI和GCS是导弹控制体系的重要组成部分。论文在克服这些研究缺陷的基础上，力争对导弹扩散和导弹控制进行全面系统的研究。
三是观点上有所突破。许多发展中国家把歧视性看作是MTCR的主要制度缺陷。三大准机制的创立旨在克服和超越MTCR的缺陷，但努力的结果是制造出了更大的缺陷。因此，本文认为歧视性安排是现有导弹控制体系的基础，如果完全消除歧视性，现有的导弹控制体系就丧失了存在的基础。
全文近20万字，主要内容包括引论、正文三部分和结论。论文的主要内容如下：
引论首先是提出问题，然后在分析和评估国内外研究现状的基础上，阐述了论文需要解决的主要问题、研究方法和论文可能的创新之处。
第一章是评估国际机制功能的理论框架，主要是为评估现有导弹控制体系的功效提供理论分析框架。论文在遴选和界定国际机制概念的基础上，从国际机制的有效性、合法性和局限性三个方面建构理论框架，最后分析了运用国际机制研究导弹控制的可能性和现实意义。
第二章概述了导弹扩散的历史与现状，第三章则具体分析了导弹扩散的动因，是为后面章节的研究提供背景知识。论文从国家和地区两个层次上分析了导弹扩散的历史与现状。在国家层次上，论文选取美国、俄罗斯和中国作为研究对象；在地区层次上，论文选取南亚、中东和东北亚三个地区作为研究对象。通过对导弹大国和热点地区导弹扩散的分析，基本勾勒出全球导弹扩散的概貌。在此基础上，论文从导弹扩散的理论解释、导弹扩散的美国因素和导弹扩散的现实诱因三个方面探讨了导弹扩散的动因和根源。
第四章和第五章分别研究了导弹控制的核心机制和三大准机制。MTCR是在美国的主导下创立的，论文分析了美国导弹防扩散政策的形成对MTCR创立的影响，机制目标的实现路径，MTCR框架下的国家出口控制，MTCR与中国的关系。三大准机制旨在克服和超越MTCR的缺陷，论文从机制创立的背景、机制控制内容和决策程序等方面对准机制进行了全面分析和研究。
第六章和第七章是对导弹控制体系的绩效评估。论文运用国际机制理论分析框架，结合案例研究方法，从有效性、局限性和合法性方面对现有导弹控制制度进行了全面的绩效评估。
通过分析研究，本文得出如下结论：
第一、歧视性安排是现有导弹控制体系的基础；
第二、现有导弹控制体系的控制功效总体低下；
第三、导弹扩散的长期存在具有一定的现实必然性；
第四、导弹控制的未来是建立全面的条约机制。
The proliferation of missiles, the most important delivery systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), poses severe threats to human being as well as international security and thus has become the primary security concern of international community. As the main approach to this issue, the international missile control regimes consist of the core Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and some quasi ones such as International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS). Based on the systematical examination of the contents, working regimes and policy-making procedure of the missile control system, this thesis aims to evaluate its effects and figures out why it does not function well and how it will develop in the future.
Compared with current research literatures, this thesis is supposed to make the following breakthroughs.
The first one is the establishment of a theoretical framework. Different from the existing literatures on the study of missile control regimes, most of which focus on the technicality, legitimacy and practices of the regimes, this thesis attempts to establish a theoretical framework for evaluating the effects of the missile control regimes by applying the theory of international regimes.
The second one is the complete and systematical research of missile proliferation and control. In their study on the missile proliferation, the western scholars usually pay close attention to the "rogue states", "the suppliers of missile" and the third world countries rather than the western countries, which in fact should be responsible for the proliferation of missile. Furthermore, they regard MTCR as the only core regime for missile control and deny the fact that ICOS, PSI and GCS are the important parts of the missile control system. To avoid these biases and prejudices, this thesis tries to make a complete and systematical study of missile proliferation and control.
The third breakthrough this thesis achieves is shown in its research findings. Most of the developing countries think that the major institutional drawback of MTCR is its discrimination. The three quasi regimes established for overcoming the drawback of MTCR have caused more serious problems. So, this thesis argues that discrimination is the basis of the current missile control system; if discrimination is
eliminated thoroughly, the missile control system will not exist any more.
The whole paper, approximately 200,000 words, consists of foreword, text with seven chapters and conclusions. It develops as the following.
The foreword firstly raises the question, on the basis of analyzing and evaluating domestic and overseas research status, and introduces the central problems this thesis is going to resolve. It also introduces research approach and the potential findings of the paper.
The first chapter is theoretic framework of evaluation function of international regimes, basically the evaluating efficacy of the existing missile control system. On the basis of selecting and ascertaining the concept of international regimes, the paper constructs theoretic framework in terms of efficiency, validity and deficiency of international regimes, and finally analyzes the possibility and realistic significance in the way of applying international regimes to researching missile control.
The second chapter which offers the history and status of the missile control proliferation while the third one which mainly analyzes the cause, thus gives background knowledge for the follow chapters. The thesis analyzes the history and status of missile proliferation on both national and regional aspects. On the national aspect, the paper selects the US, Russia and China as researching objects. On the regional aspect, the paper selects South Asia, Middle East and Northeast Asia as researching objects. By the way of analyzing the missile proliferation about the important nations and significant regions, one can basically draw the picture of the missile diffusion. Based on the above research, the paper discusses its cause and the root of the missile proliferation on the theoretic explanation, the American factor and the realistic incentives.
The fourth and fifth chapters discuss the core regime and three quasi- regimes of the missile control. MTCR is founded under the initiative of the US. This thesis analyzes how the formation of American missile nonproliferation policy influences the foundation of MTCR, the achieving path of the regime's aim, the national export control under the MTCR framework, the connection between MTCR and China. The three quasi-regimes aim at conquering and surpassing the deficiency of the MTCR. The paper makes research on the quasi-regimes in terms of the background of the regime's founding, the content of the regime control, the policy-making procedure.
The sixth and seventh chapters evaluate the performance of the missile control regime. The thesis applies the analytical framework of the international regime theory
and integrates case studies to evaluate efficiency of existing missile control regimes in terms of efficiency, validity and deficiency.
Based of the above research, this thesis has reached conclusions as follow.
Firstly, discriminatory arrangement is the basis of the existing missile control system.
Secondly, the existing missile control system has low efficiency.
Thirdly, the existence of the missile proliferation has certain realistic rationality.
Fourthly, in the future the direction of missile control is to work out a full-scale missile control treaty regime.
通过分析和评估国内外研究现状，论文将力求在三个方面有所突破：
一是尝试建立一种理论分析框架。导弹控制研究的技术性、法理性和实践性很强，国内外研究基本上都是一种实证性研究，理论研究比较薄弱。为评估现有导弹控制体系的控制功效，本文把国际机制引入导弹控制领域，尝试为导弹控制研究提供一种理论分析框架。
二是对导弹扩散和导弹控制进行全面、系统的研究。西方学者对导弹扩散的研究重点集中于“无赖国家”、“导弹供应国”和第三世界国家身上，没有关注或很少关注西方发达国家的导弹扩散，没有指出西方发达国家对导弹扩散应负的主要国际责任；没有从西方发达国家与发展中国家、国家与地区、横向扩散与纵向扩散结合的基础上研究导弹扩散问题；西方学者只把MTCR看作导弹控制的唯一核心机制，不认为ICOC、PSI和GCS是导弹控制体系的重要组成部分。论文在克服这些研究缺陷的基础上，力争对导弹扩散和导弹控制进行全面系统的研究。
三是观点上有所突破。许多发展中国家把歧视性看作是MTCR的主要制度缺陷。三大准机制的创立旨在克服和超越MTCR的缺陷，但努力的结果是制造出了更大的缺陷。因此，本文认为歧视性安排是现有导弹控制体系的基础，如果完全消除歧视性，现有的导弹控制体系就丧失了存在的基础。
全文近20万字，主要内容包括引论、正文三部分和结论。论文的主要内容如下：
引论首先是提出问题，然后在分析和评估国内外研究现状的基础上，阐述了论文需要解决的主要问题、研究方法和论文可能的创新之处。
第一章是评估国际机制功能的理论框架，主要是为评估现有导弹控制体系的功效提供理论分析框架。论文在遴选和界定国际机制概念的基础上，从国际机制的有效性、合法性和局限性三个方面建构理论框架，最后分析了运用国际机制研究导弹控制的可能性和现实意义。
第二章概述了导弹扩散的历史与现状，第三章则具体分析了导弹扩散的动因，是为后面章节的研究提供背景知识。论文从国家和地区两个层次上分析了导弹扩散的历史与现状。在国家层次上，论文选取美国、俄罗斯和中国作为研究对象；在地区层次上，论文选取南亚、中东和东北亚三个地区作为研究对象。通过对导弹大国和热点地区导弹扩散的分析，基本勾勒出全球导弹扩散的概貌。在此基础上，论文从导弹扩散的理论解释、导弹扩散的美国因素和导弹扩散的现实诱因三个方面探讨了导弹扩散的动因和根源。
第四章和第五章分别研究了导弹控制的核心机制和三大准机制。MTCR是在美国的主导下创立的，论文分析了美国导弹防扩散政策的形成对MTCR创立的影响，机制目标的实现路径，MTCR框架下的国家出口控制，MTCR与中国的关系。三大准机制旨在克服和超越MTCR的缺陷，论文从机制创立的背景、机制控制内容和决策程序等方面对准机制进行了全面分析和研究。
第六章和第七章是对导弹控制体系的绩效评估。论文运用国际机制理论分析框架，结合案例研究方法，从有效性、局限性和合法性方面对现有导弹控制制度进行了全面的绩效评估。
通过分析研究，本文得出如下结论：
第一、歧视性安排是现有导弹控制体系的基础；
第二、现有导弹控制体系的控制功效总体低下；
第三、导弹扩散的长期存在具有一定的现实必然性；
第四、导弹控制的未来是建立全面的条约机制。
The proliferation of missiles, the most important delivery systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), poses severe threats to human being as well as international security and thus has become the primary security concern of international community. As the main approach to this issue, the international missile control regimes consist of the core Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and some quasi ones such as International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS). Based on the systematical examination of the contents, working regimes and policy-making procedure of the missile control system, this thesis aims to evaluate its effects and figures out why it does not function well and how it will develop in the future.
Compared with current research literatures, this thesis is supposed to make the following breakthroughs.
The first one is the establishment of a theoretical framework. Different from the existing literatures on the study of missile control regimes, most of which focus on the technicality, legitimacy and practices of the regimes, this thesis attempts to establish a theoretical framework for evaluating the effects of the missile control regimes by applying the theory of international regimes.
The second one is the complete and systematical research of missile proliferation and control. In their study on the missile proliferation, the western scholars usually pay close attention to the "rogue states", "the suppliers of missile" and the third world countries rather than the western countries, which in fact should be responsible for the proliferation of missile. Furthermore, they regard MTCR as the only core regime for missile control and deny the fact that ICOS, PSI and GCS are the important parts of the missile control system. To avoid these biases and prejudices, this thesis tries to make a complete and systematical study of missile proliferation and control.
The third breakthrough this thesis achieves is shown in its research findings. Most of the developing countries think that the major institutional drawback of MTCR is its discrimination. The three quasi regimes established for overcoming the drawback of MTCR have caused more serious problems. So, this thesis argues that discrimination is the basis of the current missile control system; if discrimination is
eliminated thoroughly, the missile control system will not exist any more.
The whole paper, approximately 200,000 words, consists of foreword, text with seven chapters and conclusions. It develops as the following.
The foreword firstly raises the question, on the basis of analyzing and evaluating domestic and overseas research status, and introduces the central problems this thesis is going to resolve. It also introduces research approach and the potential findings of the paper.
The first chapter is theoretic framework of evaluation function of international regimes, basically the evaluating efficacy of the existing missile control system. On the basis of selecting and ascertaining the concept of international regimes, the paper constructs theoretic framework in terms of efficiency, validity and deficiency of international regimes, and finally analyzes the possibility and realistic significance in the way of applying international regimes to researching missile control.
The second chapter which offers the history and status of the missile control proliferation while the third one which mainly analyzes the cause, thus gives background knowledge for the follow chapters. The thesis analyzes the history and status of missile proliferation on both national and regional aspects. On the national aspect, the paper selects the US, Russia and China as researching objects. On the regional aspect, the paper selects South Asia, Middle East and Northeast Asia as researching objects. By the way of analyzing the missile proliferation about the important nations and significant regions, one can basically draw the picture of the missile diffusion. Based on the above research, the paper discusses its cause and the root of the missile proliferation on the theoretic explanation, the American factor and the realistic incentives.
The fourth and fifth chapters discuss the core regime and three quasi- regimes of the missile control. MTCR is founded under the initiative of the US. This thesis analyzes how the formation of American missile nonproliferation policy influences the foundation of MTCR, the achieving path of the regime's aim, the national export control under the MTCR framework, the connection between MTCR and China. The three quasi-regimes aim at conquering and surpassing the deficiency of the MTCR. The paper makes research on the quasi-regimes in terms of the background of the regime's founding, the content of the regime control, the policy-making procedure.
The sixth and seventh chapters evaluate the performance of the missile control regime. The thesis applies the analytical framework of the international regime theory
and integrates case studies to evaluate efficiency of existing missile control regimes in terms of efficiency, validity and deficiency.
Based of the above research, this thesis has reached conclusions as follow.
Firstly, discriminatory arrangement is the basis of the existing missile control system.
Secondly, the existing missile control system has low efficiency.
Thirdly, the existence of the missile proliferation has certain realistic rationality.
Fourthly, in the future the direction of missile control is to work out a full-scale missile control treaty regime.
引文
1 核历史学家理查德·休立特(Richard G Hewlett)和杰克·霍德伯勒(Jack M．Holl)曾这样论述美国人在核扩散问题上的天真：原子用于和平的愿望无疑是真诚的，但这几乎是一种不计后果的想法。美国提出原子用于和平的动力来自于某种道德的需求，没有这种道德需求，原子用于和平的设想就无法令人想象。同时，核战争的残酷性又把原子的控制推到了国际社会关注的焦点上，最大的困境就是无法在这两种目标之间取得平衡。参阅：Avner Cohen, "Israel and The Evolution of U.S Nonproliferation Policy: The Critical Decade (1958-1968)," The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998, p.2.
2 Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation," International Security, Vol.18, No.1 (Summer, 1993), p.139.
3 1955至1957年间，以色列已开始酝酿核计划，并于1958年早期开始了核计划的基础设施建设，在内盖夫沙漠建立了核设施。自1969年起，在没有签署《核不扩散条约》的情况下，美国实际上已接受以色列的核国家地位。美国认为容忍以色列拥有核武器的道理与容忍英国和法国拥有核武器的道理是一样的，就是认为以色列不会对美国造成威胁。参阅：Avner Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S Nonproliferation Policy : The Critical Decade (1958-1968)," The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998, p.1.;《以色列的核武库》，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/sjhll/450447.htm.
4 南非曾宣布己拥有核武器，但在西方国家的制裁和压力下，最后宣布拆除核技术和核弹，从而使南非成为第一个从有核转为无核状态的国家。
5 邹德浩、张晓春、金谷、青木等：“德媒体披露美国准备打伊朗，北约内部已在协调”，《环球时报》，2006年1月2日，第1版。
6 William B. Vogele, "Is the Future like the Past? Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.41, No.2 (Nov., 1997), p.320.
7 包括核武器、化学武器和生物武器。
8 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Security, Winter 1984/85(Vol.9, No.3), p.166.
9 联合国裁军事务部：“导弹” http:/Avww.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/missiles.htm.
10 Jon Wolfsthal, "Nuclear Weapons in the World," http://nst.pku.edu.cn/print.php?sid=6004.
11 《日内瓦公约》禁止在战争中使用窒息性、毒性或其他气体和细菌作战方法。
12 日本化学战罪行研究课题组：“日本化学战在中国犯下的滔天罪行”，《光明日报》，2005年9月28日，http://www.gmw.cn/content/2005-O9/28/content_307080.htm.
13 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Security, Winter 1984/85(Vol.9, No.3), p.169.
14 联合国裁军事务部网站：“生物武器”，http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/biological.htm.
15 国内对MTCR的翻译，计有：“国际导弹技术控制制度”，“导弹技术控制制度”，“导弹及其技术控制制度”，“国际导弹技术控制组织”“全球导弹技术控制机制”等。本文从中国外交部译法，称为“导弹及其技术控制制度”。见，“中国重申愿意加入导弹及其技术控制制度(MTCR)”，http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/gb/doc/2004-06/03/content_336265.htm.
16 因为准则出台的首次大会在海牙召开，有些文章把准则也称为“Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation，简写为HCOC”。中国外交部军控司时任司长沙祖康将其称为“防止弹道导弹扩散国际行为准则草案”。
17 有些中文文献将其翻译为“导弹与导弹技术防扩散的全球控制体系”，本文的翻译从沙祖康司长的说法。参阅：“沙祖康司长就NMD问题在“吹风会”上答记者问”，2001年3月14日，http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697073.htm.
18 Mark Smith, "Efficiency and Inefficiency of the MTCR," http://www.inesao.org/bulletin19/bul19art22.htm.
19 刘华秋主编：《军备控制与裁军手册》，国防工业出版社，2000年12月第1版，第386页。
20 他们的代表作分别是：Mistry, Dinshaw., Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control. Seattle: University of Washington Press.2003.; Karp, Aaron., Ballistic missile proliferation: the politics and technics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Wyn Q. Bowen, The politics of ballistic missile nonproliferation. Basingstoke, Hampshire,New York:Macmillan Press Ltd. St. Martin's Press in association with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton.; Jing-dong Yuan, "The MTCR and Missile Proliferation: Moving Toward the Next Phase", May 2000, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/MTCR missile-e.PDF.
21 中国国家图书馆，2005年2月25日查询结果，http://210.82.118.4:8080/F/2RUGANQ2DAFF7KQ2AGJDQ7BX39PYS3HGFHSJ8UD52M1RYN9GJ5-31501?func=find-m-results&set_number=001382.
22 例如Payne, Keith B., Missile defense in the 21st century: protection against limited threats including lessons from the Gulf War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Lindsay, James M., Defending America: the case for limited national missile defense, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
23 "Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," July 15, 1998. http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/BMThreat.html; Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001 .pdf.
24 例如Mohamed Kadry Said, "Missile proliferation in the Middle East: a regional perspective," http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art75.pdf;Robert D. Walpole, "The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to the United States Through 2015", http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2000/walpole_missile_092200.htm.
25 Hideshi Takesada, "North Korea's Missile Development: Implications for Neighboring Countries," http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/corea/proc/042.pdf;Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," Updated February 26, 2003. http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-rl31555.pdf.
26 沈教授对博士生的研究分工是：李小军：导弹扩散及其控制；吴莼思：导弹防御、威慑和国际安全；章节根：印度核威慑理论：郑飞：美国的全球核部署和核分享；李治军：美韩同盟与朝鲜核问题；赵建明：伊朗核问题：高奇琦：美韩核关系与朝鲜核认知。
27 朱锋：《弹道导弹防御计划与国际安全》，上海人民出版社，2001；吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年；朱强国：《美国战略导弹防御计划的动因》，世界知识出版社，2004年。
28 夏立平：“亚太地区弹道导弹及其技术的扩散和控制”，《国际观察》，2001年第1期。
29 高硕：“试析中尔弹道导弹的扩散”，《阿拉伯世界》，2003年第3期。
30 作者发表的与导弹扩散相关的文章计有：“制度根基、制度缺陷与制度修复：对‘导弹技术控制制度’的理论思考”，《国际论坛》2005年第1期；“美国与巴西关系中的‘核因素’及其影响”，《国际论坛》2005年第5期；“美国对南亚导弹扩散的安全评估与政策选择”，《美国研究》2004年第4期：“‘导弹技术控制制度’的困境及其出路：一种机制研究”，《国际政治研究》(季刊)2005年第3期；“欧美防扩散战略的分歧与合作”，《外交学院学报》2005年第6期，总第85期：“中东对全球防扩散体制的十大挑战”，《阿拉伯世界》2005年第2期。
31 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
32 阎学通、孙学峰：《国际关系研究实刚方法》，人民出版社，2001年9月第1版，第132页。
33 关于“technology denial”一词，国内有些学者将其翻译为“技术拒止”或“技术禁阻”。作者认为，MTCR的主要功效是通过从供应方对导弹技术的限制或禁运来延缓和终止导弹计划，故翻译为“技术阻禁”最贴近MTCR的功效。
1 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the Worm Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.57.
2 Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, "Editor's Introduction," ⅹⅱ,egime Theory and International Relations,Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003.
3 国外关于国际机制研究的突出成果是：Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997.从国内来看，北京大学王杰教授主编的《国际机制论》对国际机制理论做了系统介绍和梳理；复旦大学苏长和副教授著的《全球公共问题与国际合作：一种制度的分析》和中央党校门洪华博士著的《和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究》中，运用国际机制理论研究现实问题。苏长和与门洪华是国内目前研究国际制度问题最为活跃的两位青年学者。
4 Eric Brahm, "International Regimes,"September 2005, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_regimes/.
5 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年1月第1版，第2页。
6 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997,p. 1.
7 Helen Milner, "International Regimes and World Politics: Comments on the Articles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jonsson," International Social Science Journal, 1993,No.45, p. 494.
8 Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, "Editor's Introduction", ⅹⅱ., Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003.
9 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年1月第1版，第3页。
10 Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables," cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第1页。
11 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997,p.8.
12 Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.9.
13 Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world," cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第115页。
14 Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," International Organization 36,2,Spring 1982.
15 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power ,Boulder:Westview Press,1989,p4.
16 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder:Westview Press,1989,p3.
17 Stephen Krasner,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables,"cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第2页。
18 Krotochwil and Ruggie,"International Organization:A State of Art or an Art of State," International Organization,Vol.40,1986,p764.
19 Stephen Krasner,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables," International Organization,Vol.36,1982, p.186.
20 Robert Keohane,After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1984.
21 Young, Oran R, "International Regimes:Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics,No.39, p.106.
22 John J. Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International Institutions,"International Security,Vol.19.No.3,Winter 1994/1995, 0.337.
23 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海人民出版社，1998年4月第1版，第389页。
24 李钢：“西方国际制度理论探析”，《世界经济与政治》，2000年第2期。
25 梁守德、洪银娴：《国际政治学概论》，北京大学出版社，第244页。
26 国际政治秩序是在缺乏中央政府的情况下，基于领土主权国家之间相互作用的一种体系。世界秩序处理不同的问题领域，每个问题领域都要接受一个或多个机制的控制。例如集体安全问题就是由联合国框架来调节的。防扩散领域是通过《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT)，《化学武器公约》(CWC)，《生物武器公约》(BWC)和更广泛的“大规模杀伤性武器”(WMD)防扩散机制处理的。地区安全问题，是通过地区组织与联合国集体安全和维持和平结构来处理的。
27 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年1月第1版，第16页。
28 孙仲：“国际组织理论研究评析”，《浙江大学学报》(人文社会科学版)，2001年3月，第31卷第2期，第59页。
29 国际条约在国内法中如何实施是一个非常复杂的问题，通常包括“国际条约能否直接适用国内”和“国际条约与国内法发生冲突时如何解决”两个问题。国际条约在国内法中的适用，主要有个别转换(individual transformation)和自动纳入(automatic incorporating)两种模式。前者是指国际条约在国内法发生效力的前提，是国际条约在本质上是不能直接在国内适用的，必须由国家通过个别的立法来实施条约，这种立法活动可能是立法行为，也可能是国际条约颁布或其它宪法程序。后者是指国家一旦缔结或加入某一国际条约，该国际条约便自动地成为国内法的一部分，从而无需转化即可在国内法中直接适用。另一个重要问题，是当国际条约与国内法发生冲突时如何解决，实际上也就是国际条约与国内法的相互地位问题。国际法对此没有强制性的统一规定，各国在实践中也有不同的解决办法。但至少有一条原则已得到各国的普遍首肯，即国家不能以国内法为理由来违反或规避国家应尽的条约义务。因为条约一般一定需要被批准，而且通常不会得不到国家立法的赞成。形成对照的是，不以条约为核心的机制不要求国内的批准。
30 Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie,"International Organization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State,"International Organization,Vol. 40,No.4,1986,pp.763-771,772,774.
31 Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie ,"International Organization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State,"International Organization,Vol.40,No.4,1986.no.763-771.772.774.
32 约翰·鲁杰．主编、苏长和等译：《多边主义》，浙江人民出版社，2003，年2月第1版，第9页。
33 John G. Ruggie,"Multilateralism:The Anatomy of an Insti2tution,"in John G. Ruggie ed.Multilateralism Matters,pp. 12-13.
34 新现实主义是在“修正”传统现实主义和批判新自由主义的过程中逐渐发展起来的。华尔兹以新的理论贡献，确立了其在西方国际关系学中作为新现实主义开拓者的地位。新现实主义的基本理论主张是：国家作为国际社会中心角色的地位不可撼动；国际系统包括结构和过程两部分，“结构层次”分析非常重要，因为新现实主义提出体系结构的概念，就“划出了国际政治研究的领域，并使研究者能够看到体系的结构、结构内的变量，是如何影响互动的单元及其行为的。”国家仍然把权力视为目的和手段，国家的一切行动仍然重要是为追求经济和经济权力。
35 基欧汉的《新现实主义及其批评者》，构成了新现实主义和新自由主义争论的主要标志，该书对新现实主义和新自由主义的批评观点作出了最初的总结。
36 在过去的十多年时间里，新自由主义或基于利益的机制理论代表了研究国际机制的主流方法，影响巨大。该学派强调国际机制在帮助国家实现共同利益中扮演着重要角色。为了阐述自己的理论主张，新自由主义把国家描绘为只关心自己绝对收益的理性的自我主义者(egoists)。新自由主义主要是通过对关注信息和交易成本的制度经济学，来阐发观点的。新自由制度主义理论认为：国际机制是有影响和有弹性的。为了避免出现共同的最不满意的结果，机制将在具有自我利益的的国家，帮助协调其行为。如前所述，新现实主义和新自由主义都是理性主义者，都把国家视为具有自私利益和寻求自我目标的行为体。国际机制的建立，是国家根据偏好对自我利益盘算的结果。
37 长达半个多世纪的冷战对峙突然以和平方式结束，新现实主义者事前未能对其作出任何预测性研究，引来国际关系研究者的许多批评。在对主流国际关系理论进行深刻反思的基础上，建构主义研究取向应运而生。任何一项国际关系研究都试图通过建立一套理论概念，来确立其理论框架。建构主义者使用的是一组在意义上相互关联的概念，即“规范”、“认同”和“文化”。建构主义认为，规范是指对某个特定国家本体作出适当行为的集体期望，包括规则、标准、法律、习惯、习俗等。
38 从本体论而言，新现实主义和新自由制度主义均属理性主义。而建构主义是反理性主义的；从世界观而言，新现实主义和新自由制度主义都接受物质主义理念，不承认观念的实质性意义。建构主义虽不否认物质的客观存在，但反对把客观存在绝对化，认为权力分配的意义，在很大程度是由利益分配的意义建构的，利益的内容在很大程度上是由观念建构的；在认识论上，新现实主义和新自由制度主义都是科学实证主义的归纳式解释，而建构主义是科学实证主义的个性式解释；在方法论上，新现实主义和新自由制度主义是个体主义，建构主义是整体主义。
39 大卫·鲍德温：《新现实主义与新自由主义》，浙江人民出版社，2001年版，第152页。
40 [美]西摩·马丁·李普塞特，刘钢敏译：《政治人—政治的社会基础》，商务印书馆，1993年。
41 随新民：“国际制度的合法性与有效性—新现实主义、新自由制度主义和建构主义三种范式比较”，《学术探索》，2004年第6期，第72页。
42 Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Regimes," in Oran Young, Governance in World Affairs, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.112.
43 门洪华：《和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究》，上海人民出版社，2002年9月第1版，第96-97页。
44 现实主义强调冲突与战争，认为国家是追逐利益和权力的；自由主义则强调合作与稳定，认为国家是自律、自控和理性的。现实主义学派认为，国际制度并不能促使国家合作，而仅仅促使国家间的协调，因为“制度对国家行为的影响很小”，“不能减轻无政府状态对国家之间合作的抑制作用”。而且，“当无论是讨价还价力量的平衡，还是对国家利益的看法(或两者都包括在内)，在那些就制度进行谈判的国家之间发生变化以后，所有那些贴上制度标签被抬高了的国际安排，都很容易地走向倾覆”。制度，如果真正存在的话，也几乎很少或根本没有什么影响，它们只不过是权力政治的附带现象。新现实主义认为，基欧汉为了制度理论的完善淡化了权力的重要作用。现实主义正是抓住新自由制度主义淡化国家实力作用这一点，强调权力对合作的影响比制度对合作的影响更大。新自由主义学派认为绝对收益(absolute gains)是促使各国合作的重要因素，而现实主义学派关注的相对收益(relative Rains)，认为实力才是制度建立和延续的关键。华尔兹以新的理论贡献，确立了其在西方国 际关系学中作为新现实主义开拓者的地位。
45 本文虽然将把霸权稳定论作为新现实主义国际机制论的研究对象，但霸权稳定论并不是为了解释国际机制而专门设计和形成的。霸权稳定论最初来自于经济学家金德尔伯格(Charles Kindleberger)对20世纪20、30年代大萧条(the Great Depression)的研究，认为“要使世界经济稳定，需要一个稳定者，而且只能有一个稳定者(Stabilizer)。”从理论归属上来讲，霸权稳定论是现实主义理论的一个分支，与现实主义的理论主张完全一致。从20世纪70年代后期开始，莫德尔斯基和吉尔平将该理论扩展到军事、安全领域，对霸权国实力和稳定的国际秩序之间的关系作了最系统的理论分析和阐述。从功能来上看，它又常被用来解释为什么国际体系在一种体系下能正常运转，而在另外一种情况下国际合作却不能成功实现的问题。
46 Van Ham, "The lack of a Big Bully: Hegemonic Stability Theory and Regimes in the Study of International Relations,"Acta Politica 27,1992,pp.29-48.
47 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社出版，2001年5月第1版，第59页。
48 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.90.
49 Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 137-138.
50 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories oflnternational Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.90-91.
51 显然，强制性的霸权是基于权力，而仁慈性的霸权是基于利益。从理论归属上来看，前者属于新现实主义，后者属于新自由主义。此外，仁慈霸权中霸权国家容忍力量弱小的行为体的盘剥(exploitation)，这与国家难以容忍相对损失(relative losses)的现实主义原则是相悖的，这足以说明作为理性国际机制论的新现实主义和新自由主义之间的密切联系。
52 在理论层次上，有学者对霸权稳定论提出了直接批评。首先，国际机制真是一种公共产品吗?衡量公共产品的标准一是看其是否免费，二是看其是否向全体公众开放。从第一个标准而言，邓肯·斯奈德尔和拉塞特认为所谓公共产品是一种虚拟的存在，是霸权国家为追求自己利益而恣意玩弄的、毫无公共性的工具而已。就第二个标准而言，相当多的学者认为被视为国际公共产品的大多数具有分割性、竞争性和排他性的特征。正如克拉斯纳所认为的：国际政治中国家力量的分布决定状况决定着国际机制的形态。具体来说，实力强大的国家制定游戏规则，决定谁参加游戏并有能力变更游戏的结果。因此认为国际机制是公共产品的观点是不能成立的。
53 门洪华：《和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究》，上海人民出版社，2002年9月第1版，第47页。
54 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》(After Hegemony：Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy)，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社，2001年5月第1版。
55 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社出版，2001年5月第1版，第62页。
56 认为它们共同的瑕疵，在于把国家的认同和利益视为是外生给予(exogenously given)的，也就是在解释诸如国际机制这样的国际现象时，把认同和利益看作非理论化的初始条件。因此，新现实主义和新自由主义对国际机制的解释是不完全的(incomplete)。
57 这种知识的分布不但构成了认同，而且也塑造了国家行为体的偏好与感觉的选择。
58 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories oflinternational Regimes, Cambridge University Press,1997,p.136.
59 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International regimes,Cambridge University Press,1997,p.167-168.
60 Wendt,"The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,"International Organization,No. 41,1987,p.363.
61 Stephen Krasner (ed.)International Regimes,Cornell University Press,1983, p.62.
62 Robert Keohane,After Hegemony, Princeton University Press.1984,p.132.
63 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press.1984, p.26.
64 在国际机制对国家行为的影响上，有学者总结了四种理论解释视角：一、新自由主义—功 利主义(Neo-liberal-utilitarian approach)的观点认为，国家特别偏好未来竞争的确定性，并会相应计算它们的成本与收益。就对机制遵守的选择而言，国家会评估它们自己的成本收益分析与合作的稳定性，对它们目前的净价值作出结论，并相应调整自己的行为。二、纯粹制度主义者(Pure Institutionalism)主张，国家会不折不扣地执行遵守，因为机制要生存。制度会承担它们自己的权力，并将成员社会化而进入遵从的行为。此外，因为国家承担了过多的信息，它们一定会创造规则，去避免相互审视的必要。机制的规范和规则，有助于国家削减通过创立无可争辩的决策选择规则而形成的决策负担。三、从知识理论(theories of knowledge)的观点来看，机制为国家“学习”创立了一种框架。国家能“考察”它们关于成本与收益行为的假定，以及合作机制的充足性。四、复合制度理论(complex institutional theory)把机制嵌入规范和规则的一般框架。遵从之所以会出现，是因为高级规则的规范体系在发挥作用，就如强化特殊机制里遵从的证明结构一样。参阅：Harald Muller, "The International of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," Volker Rittberger(ed), Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press.Oxford 1993. pp.362-363.
65 [加拿大]江忆恩(Alastair Iain Johnston)：“简论国际机制对国家行为的影响”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第12期，第22页。
66 Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press, 1996, p.16.
67 关于国家声誉和国际制度的关系问题，请参阅：王学东：“国家声誉与国际制度”，《现代国际关系》，2003年第7期。
68 关于偏好和国际机制的关系问题，请参阅：范菊华：“论偏好与国际制度的关系”，《现代国际关系》，2003年第8期。
69 Erik Gartzke, "Preferences and the Democratic Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2,2000, p.210.
70 韩俊艳、刘丰：“国际机制中的国家参与问题析论”，《华侨大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)，2003年第4期，第38页。
71 John J. Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security,Vol.19,1994/95,p.7.
72 Gneco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues,eds.by Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis,Harper Collins College Publishers,1996,4th ed.,p.76.
73 Susan Strange ,"Cave! Hic Dragones:a Critique of Regime Analysis,"in International Regimes,p.345.
74 Robert Keohane,"The Demand for International Regimes,"International Institutions and State Power, pp.110-111.
75 周否启：“霸权稳定论：批判与修正”，《太平洋学报》，2005年第1期，第19页。
76 Robert O. Keohane, "The demand for international regimes," International Organization 36,2, Spring 1982. cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第141-171。
77 David A.Baldwen.Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate.New York:Columbia University Press,1993,p.274.
78 简军波、丁冬汉：“国际机制的功能与道义”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第16-17页。
79 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社，2001年5月第1版，第125-127页。
80 Robert Keohane,"International Institutions:Can Interdependence Work?"Foreign Policy,Spring 1998,pp.82-96.
81 Stephen Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983. pp.86-91.
82 Jacob Werksman,ed.,Greening International Institations,London:Earthscan Publications,1996.p.16.
83 倪世雄：《当代西方国际关系理论》，复旦大学出版社，2001年7月第1版，第375页。
84 王缉思：“美国霸权的逻辑”，《美国研究》，2003年第3期，第7页。
85 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译 上海人民出版社出版，2001年5月第1版，第43页。
86 Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages:American Politics and International Organizations,1919-1999 (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution,1999).
87 “隐性违规”是一种没有明文禁止的保全国家利益的作法，虽然并不违反国际机制的正式规定，但却违背了国际机制的目的和宗旨，使国际机制解决共同问题的效力遭到损害。参阅：刘宏松：“浅析国际机制中的隐性违规现象及其理论含义”，《欧洲研究》2005年第3期。
88 Mancur Olson,The Logic of CollectiveAction: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups(New York.'Schocken Books,1965),p.2.;George Downs, Davis Rocke,and Peter Barsoom,"Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism,"International Organization52,No.2 (Spring 1998), pp.397-419.
89 [英]迈克尔·H·莱斯诺夫：《二十世纪的的政治哲学家》，商务印书馆，2001年版，第25页。
90 薛民：“哈贝马斯科学技术社会功能理论评析”，《复旦学报》(社会科学版)，1994年第2期，第37页。
91 [德]哈贝马斯：《交往与社会进化》，重庆出版社，1989年版，第184～185页。
92 [法]让—马克·夸克，佟心平、王远飞译，《合法性与政治》，中央编译出版社，2002年5月第1版，第1-3页。
93 王宏强：“论政治合法性的三个层面”，《济南市社会主义学院学报》，2003年。
94 赵海立：“政治合法性理论及其分析架构”，《厦门大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)，2004年第5期。
95 周丕启：“国际关系中的政治合法性”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第11页。
96 周丕启：“国际关系中的政治合法性”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第14页。
97 [美]大卫·A·鲍德温(Baldwin D．A)主编，肖欢容译，《新现实主义和新自由主义》，浙江人民出版社，2001年5月第1版，第143-146。
98 战后美国与欧洲等西方国家达成制度性的“相互确保战略”，主要通过一整套国际制度，保证美国不会对其伙伴国(或承认美国霸权的国家)滥用其权力(包括压榨伙伴国或在危急时弃伙伴国于不顾)，从而换取西方盟国对其霸权战略的支持。
99 G. John Ikenberry ,"Institutions, Strategic Restraint,and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,"International Security,Vol.23,No.3 (Winter 1998/1999) ,pp.54-56.
100 张睿壮认为之所以使用“正当性”而不用“合法性”(英语中同为legitimacy)，是为了定性一种良性的霸权或霸权秩序，原因有二：一是国际政治中的所谓“合法”，当指合乎国际法规，而一个特定时代的国际法规即便不是由那个时代的霸权国家一手制定，也往往带有它的深深烙印，用霸权主宰下制定的法规来衡量霸权的“合法性”在很大程度上成了同义反复；二是仅仅“合法”的霸权不一定能被视为“良性”，因为“法规”的范围过窄，不能涵盖国际关系准则或国家行为规范的内容，况且“合法”的要求过低，不能满足国际社会对“世界领袖”的道义期待。
101 张睿壮：“美国霸权的正当性危机”，《国际问题论坛》，2004年夏季号，总第35期。
102 随新民：“国际制度的合法性与有效性—新现实主义、新自由制度主义和建构主义三种范式比较”，《学术探索》，2004年第6期，第71页。
103 郭树勇：“评‘国际制度和平论’”，《美国研究》，2000年第1期。
104 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海人民出版社，1998年4月出版，第417页。
105 Martha Finnemore et al, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization, Vol.52, No.4, 1998,pp.881.
106 简军波、丁冬汉：“国际机制的功能与道义”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第20页。
107 大卫·A·鲍德威(DavidA．Baldwin)：《新现实主义和新自由主义》，肖欢容译，浙江人民出版社，2001年5月第1版，第144。
108 [德]尤尔根·哈贝马斯：《合法性危机》，(中国台北)时报出版公司，1994年版，第99页。
109 新现实主义曾在防扩散问题上强调过三个要点：其一，出口控制和防止技术方面扩散的合作，不同于国家安全问题(例如军事)上的合作。其二，权力和利益等现实主义原则是防扩散机制存在的根据。其三，大国或霸权国家在诸如防扩散机制之类的安全机制形成中扮演了 重要角色。但遗憾的是，新自由制度主义国际机制理论却没有涉足安全领域的问题。
110 与国际机制概念的命运一样，国际安全机制的概念也存分歧，没有形成统一定义。具体请参阅：陈须隆：“国际安全机制：定义与分类”，《国际政治研究》，2000年第1期。
111 Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes,"in Stephen Krasner, ed.,International Regimes (Ithaca: Corell University Press, 1982),pp.173-194.
112 Charles Lipson,"International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,"World Politics 37,No.1(October 1984), pp.1-23.
113 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, No.6 (Summer 1990):5-56.
114 Robert Jervis,"Security Regimes,"International Organization,36,2, Spring 1982, p.357.
115 Robert M. Crawford, Regime Theory in the Post-Cold War World: Rethinking Neoliberal roaches to International Relations,Dartmouth Publishing Company, pp.101-103.
116 Seema Gahlaut and Gary K. Bertsch,"The War on Terrorism and the Nonproliferation Regime," Orbis,Summer 2004,Vol.48,No.3,p.2
1 John Simpson,"Current Issues Concerning the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defenses,"Occasional Papers Available From CNS, Monterey Institute of International Studies,March 2001.p.1.
2 [美]汉斯·摩根索：《国家与政治》，中国人民公安大学出版社，1990年版，第511页。转引自齐秀丽：“美国与导弹技术控制体制”，《唐山师范学院学报》，2004年7月，第26卷第4期，第75页。
3 德国火箭专家冯·布劳恩为研制V-2导弹立下了汗马功劳，战后布劳恩等100余名德国火箭专家和技术人员被美国虏走，为日后美国的导弹研制作出了重要贡献。V-2导弹总重约13吨，导弹全长14米，直径1.3米，最大射程100多千米。总体来说，V-2导弹精确度低，可靠性差，只有大约40％到达目标。具体请参阅：总装备部电子信息基础部编：《导弹武器与航天器装备》，原子能出版社，航空出版社，兵器工业出版社，2003年7月第1版。
4 George Lindsey,"Ballistic Missile Defense in the 1990s,"Canadian Defense Quarterly (September 1995)，pp．6-11．转引自：吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第70页。
5 Randall Forsberg,"Abolishing Ballistic Missiles:Pros and Cons,"International Security,Vol.12,No.1(Summer,1987),p.190.
6 吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第66页。
7 Henry Sokolski,"Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence," http://fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch16.htm.
8 中国外交部原军控司司长沙祖康在美国卡内基研讨会上的发言：“关于防扩散问题的一些看法”，2000年11月7日，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wzzt/2290/2294/t10505.htm.
9 “巴基斯坦‘核弹之父’卡迪尔汗副手供认核交易”，《解放军报》，2004年2月23日。
10 Whn Q. Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, Published in the United States of America, New York, 2000,p.16.
11 在一本名为“The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation”的专著中，论述美国扩散的篇幅，仅是中国、前苏联的三分之一。参阅：Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America, New York, 2000.pp.14-15.
12 西方学界和政界的主流观点是：中国、俄罗斯、朝鲜、伊朗、印度、巴基斯坦是世界导弹 扩散的主要来源地，以美国为首的西方企图通过机制规制、技术禁运、政治压力、反扩散等手段，逐步削减这些导弹扩散源。
13 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes and International Cooperation in Arms Control, p.41.
14 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000 (Washington, D.C.:February 2001).
15 国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措施”，2003年12月，http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/27/content_1469.htm.
16 国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措旖”，2003年12月，http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/27/content_1469.htm.
17 [印度]昌德拉斯卡兰：“‘周边看中国’之印度篇：三国鼎立一三种安全观的较量与冲突”，http://www.armystar.corn/new_page_1599.htm.
18 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措施”，2003年12月，http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/27/content_1469.htm.
19 新华网：“背景资料：美国核武器”，2005年2月9日，http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-02/09/content_2564003.htm.
20 "Chapter 7:Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist-Sponsoring States,"http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/ch7_02.htm.
21 典型例子是古巴导弹危机。苏联在美国家门口的“盟国”转移具有核打击能力的导弹。参阅：李德福：《干钧一发：古巴导弹危机纪实》，世界知识出版社，1997年。
22 艾森豪威尔政府提出“原子用于和平”(Atoms for Peace)的倡议计划，这种核与太空技术共享政策刺激了包括导弹在内的武器扩散。冷战时期，美国对盟国的导弹及其技术的扩散，被看作是加强西方阵营团结的粘合剂。在美国遏制共产主义政治影响的背景下，一些发展中国家从美国获得了有限的导弹体系。为遏制苏联影响，美国对位于共产主义集团边缘的盟国或有条约义务的国家提供了大量武器援助。1950和1958年间，美国提供的武器数量从1950年的5100万美元上升到1955年的2.56亿美元，1958年竟达到6.33亿美元。具体参阅：Wyn Q.Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, First published in the United Stated of America,2000.pp. 14-15.
23 Aaron Karp,The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East (New York:Institute for East-West Security Studies,1990).pp.382-390.
24 世界上许多导弹问世后，各国为了方便，往往给导弹取个有意思的名字。主要有：有些导弹以人类的形象命名。如美国的“民兵”、“和平卫士”、“侏儒”、“爱国者”、“斗牛士”；俄罗斯的“斗十”、“野人”、“飞毛腿”、英国的“独眼巨人”、“恶妇”；以色列的“哨兵”、“猎手”等。有些导弹以兵器、片j具命名。如美国的“捕鲸叉”、“长矛”、“军刀”、“战斧”；俄罗斯的“飞镖”、“警棍”、“塞子”、“锉子”；英国的“吹管”；中国的“红旗”等。有些导弹以鸟类的名字命名。如美国的“不死鸟”、“麻雀”、“百舌鸟”、“超猎鹰”、“那伐鹤”、“秃鹰”；法国的“猎鹰”；英国的“雷鸟”、“海鸥”、“海鹰”；意大利的“信天翁”；挪威的“企鹅”和阿根廷的“翠鸟”。有些导弹以某些蛇、虫的名字命名。如美国的“铜斑蛇”、“壁虎”、“龙”；德国的“毒蛇”；法国的“响尾蛇”；以色列的“怪蛇”；意大利的“蚊”；中国的“蚕”等。有些导弹是以鱼类的名字命名的。如俄罗斯的“鳟鱼”、“五鱼”、“甲鱼”；法国的“飞鱼”等。还有一些导弹以兽类的名字命名。如美国的“小猎犬”、“大猎犬”、“小斗犬”、“幼畜”、“蝙蝠”：俄罗斯的“黑牛”、“黑羚羊”；英国的“海猫”、“海狼”、“警犬”和德国的“大象”等。参阅：吴凤鸣著《导弹：战争的革命》，海潮出版社，2001年4月第1版，第19页。
25 Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows and Richard Fieldhouse,Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume Ⅴ: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder:Westview,1999), pp.100-117.
26 Aaron Karp,Ballistic Missile Proliferation:The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1996), p.139.
27 "Israel Seeks Pre-emptive Strike Capability,"Aviation Week and Space Technology,No.27 October 1975.
28 美国认为，在面对阿拉伯邻国的威胁时，作为盟国的美国有义务确保以色列的生存和安全。 除出口“长矛”导弹外，1969年至1975年间，美国还向以色列转让了高技术军事装备，例如F-4E幻影战斗机(phantom)，F-15A鹰式(eagle)战斗机等。此外，1974年，叙利亚、利比亚和埃及从苏联获得了射程为280公里的“飞毛腿-B”(Scud-B)后，为遏制苏联的渗透，美国也认为有必要给以色列出口“长矛”导弹。
29 "Israel Seeks Pre-emptive Strike Capability,"Aviation Week and Space Technology,27 October 1975.
30 Aaron Karp,"Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,"International Security,V.9,No.3 (Winter 1984/85),p176.
31 SIPRI Yearbooks 1979,1980,1981,1982,1983 and 1984 (London and Philadelphia:Taylor and Francis).
32 Zhubaozao,"US Missile Development Programs Harmful for Global Strategic Balance and Stability,"Xinhua January 13,2000,http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/000113-abmt-prc.htm.
33 其中韩国出资1963万美元，占总出资额的68.4％，台湾地区出资628万美元，占出资额的21.9％，阿联酋出资263.4万美元，占出资额的9.2％。另外，日本政府出资14.4万美元，占出资额的5％。
34 “美国将向亚洲出口战术‘鱼义’导弹，台湾将获5枚”，http://news.sol.sohu.com/92/19/news205271992.shtml.
35 "US may supply Taiwan with Aegis missile system,"PLA Daily,2004-02-18,http://english.pladaily.com.cn/english/pladaily/2004/02/18/20040218001018_TodayHeadlines.html.
36 吴惟：“美最新战机只给以色列”，http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/ztpd/2004-09/08/content_3792.htm.
37 “美国称2004年度有望实现首次出口爱国者3型导弹”，http://www.qzwb.com.cn/gb/content/2004-08/12/content_1325493.htm.
38 日本政府已提出购买9枚“标准3”导弹“布洛克1A”型导弹的要求，包括与之配套的9个MK21Mod2型贮运箱，对1套“宙斯盾”武器系统进行升级，使其具备弹道导弹防御能力。所有相关配套设备，例如垂直发射系统的ORDALT设备、贮运箱、配件、检修设备，以及美国政府和供应商的技术支持和其它后勤保障，估计总价值为7.25亿美元。日本打算用“标准”导弹取代目前日本海上自卫队舰队中老式或可靠性差的导弹，目前日本舰队弹药库中已贮存有“标准”导弹。参阅："Approval seen for US sale of SM-3 missile to Japan," http://www.forbes.com/business/manufacturing/newswire/2004/05/10/rtr1366206.html.
39 澳大利亚政府申请购买的SLAM-ER导弹系统包括260枚箱装的实战、遥感探测和系留空中训练导弹、保障设备、集成和验收支持、训练导弹、运载箱、备用和维修部件、导弹维护和试验设备、项目管理、出版物和技术文献、人员培训和培训设备、美国政府和承包商的技术与后勤人员服务，以及其他与项目支持相关的文件。参阅：刘晓燕：“美国将向澳大利亚出售SLAM-ER和JASSM导弹”，http://news.163.com/05/0421/23/1HTAOLOA0001123L.html.
40 澳大利亚政府申请购买的JASSMR导弹包括260枚箱装的AGM-158实战、遥感探测和系留空中训练导弹、保障设备、集成和验收支持、训练弹、运载箱、备用和维修部件、导弹维护和试验设备、防备装置、项目管理、出版物和技术文献、人员培训和培训设备、美国政府和承包商技术及后勤人员服务，以及其他与项目支持相关的条件。参阅："US proposes missile sale to Australia,"http://au.biz.yahoo.com/050414/19/43lt.html.
41 “爱国者”先进性能—3(PAC—3)导弹防御系统是美国战区导弹防御系统中低层点防御系统的一个重要组成部分，主要用于对高度在40公里以下的弹道导弹在飞行末端进行拦截以保护战役战术目标；PAC—3由四个基本部分组成：地基雷达，交战控制站，发射装置和拦截弹；它的弹头以“碰撞杀伤”方式取代PAC—2的“碎片杀伤”方式，因为拦截弹的动能比爆炸所产生碎片的能量高的多，这种高能量还能摧毁化学或生物武器，所以，PAC—3导弹的杀伤力更大，http://www.shiyanhospital.com/my/news/shownews.asp?id=2485.
42 中新网：“台湾三军导弹装备一览表”，2002年7月30日，http://mil.fjii.com/2002-07-30/lajldsm_550.htm.
43 "Taiwan:Missile Profile,"The Risk Report,Vol.4 ,No. 6 (November-December 1998),http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/taiwan/missiles.html.
44 阮次山：“美国出售导弹给台湾的意义”，《联合早报》，2000年4月10日，http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/sino_us/pages2/sino_us041000.html.
45 刘宏：“冷战后美国对台政策调整对两岸关系的影响”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/179294.htm.
46 雪莉A．卡恩：“美国对台军售现状及发展”，摘自美国会研究机构于2005年3月21日的一份题为《台湾：自1990年以来美国主要军售》研究报告，http://www.defence.org.cn/aspnet/usa-mil/News/Articles/15547.html.这里需要特别注意的是，原文把台湾地区称为“国家”，这是严重的政治错误，特此更正。
47 原载美国《国防新闻周刊》，中新网2月19日电：《台被美正式列为军售“盟国”，可优先获尖端武器》，2004年2月19日，http://news.sohu.com/2004/02/19/19/news219131903.shtml.
48 Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma (Random House,New York, 1984),p. 122.
49 这种现象在其他国家也存在，虽说数量没有苏联那样巨大。比如美国有500多枚退役的Sargent导弹，法国有42枚“普吕东”(Pluton)等。
50 Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000.p15.
51 A. Karp,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World,"in SIPRI Yearbook 1989:World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.294.
52 A. J. Pierre,The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1982 ),p.74
53 A. J. Pierre,The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1982 ),p.74
54 "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/cia/9-99CIA.pdf.
55 Andrei Kozyrev, "Nonproliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons:The Record,Challenges and Prospects,"International Affairs,11(November 1993),pp.3-12.
56 从经济因素看，通过对伊朗的导弹技术出口，俄罗斯企业可获取不菲的经济收入，因为俄罗斯政府极少给本国的航空企业下发定单，为了生存，这些企业不得不瞄准国外市场。从地缘因素看，保持与伊朗的友好关系，不但能遏制伊朗国内的伊斯兰极端主义势力，而且能共同反对土耳其在中亚的渗透。
57 Kenneth Katzman,"Iran:Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers,"Updated January 3,2003.http://www.iranwatch.org/goverument/US/Congress/CRS/us-crs-wmdsuppliers-010303.pdf
58 Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44 No. 1,Winter,2000,p.3.
59 Reuters,March 9,1998,online, http://biz.yahoo.com.
60 Kenneth Katzman,"Iran: Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers,"Updated January 3,2003.
61 Richard B. Stone,"Call your member of Congress to override Iran Missile Veto!"http://www.ou.org/public/actionalerts/1998/iranmissiles.htm.
62 ABC News,"Putin Defends Missile Sales toSyria," http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=711089.
63 顾亚美：“俄罗斯向伊朗出售武器引起美国不满”，《环球时报》，2005年12月5日。
64 "Russia Sells Iran 29 Anti-Missile systems," http://mmrs.fema.gov/news/threats/2005/nov/nthr2005-12-03.aspx.
65 关于所谓俄罗斯向中国扩散导弹技术的论述，请参阅：Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44,No.1,Winter,2000.p.4.
66 关于所谓俄罗斯向中国扩散导弹技术的论述，请参阅：Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44,No.1,Winter,2000.p.4.
67 关于所谓俄罗斯向中国扩散导弹技术的论述，请参阅：Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44,No.1,Winter,2000.p.4.
68 Bates Gill,"Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,"Middle East Review of International Affairs,Vol.2,No.2 (May 1998),p.58.
69 突出的文献有：Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000.pp.14-15;Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Contror, University of Washington Press,Seattle and London,2003.p.57-65;Shidey A.Kan,"China:Possible Missile Technology Transfers," New York,2003;Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation,First Published 2004 by Routledge Curzon,New York.pp.91-108. Edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry M.Wortzel,China's Growing Military Power:Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, September 2002.p.105-149;Shidey A. Kan,"China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:Policy Issues,"Updated April 5,2005,http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf;National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,"September 1999.
70 Mark Smith,"Missile Proliferation, Missile Defenses and Arms Control,"from Special Joint Series on Missile Issues,Center for Nonproliferation Studies Mountbatten,Centre for International Studies,"International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses,"Occasional Paper No.5,p.25.
71 在作者搜集的三十多本资料中，以“导弹扩散”冠名的中文专著尚未发现。现有的中文著作主要论述的是关于导弹基本知识、各国导弹发展概览和美国的导弹防御等方面的内容。
72 比如：《中国的防扩散政策和措施》(2003／12／03)，全文见：http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/jks/jksxwlb/t54977.htm;《2004年中国的国防》白皮书，全文请参阅：http://www.gmw.cn/content/node_4980.htm.
73 Mark A. Stokes, "Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses," from Edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry M.Wortzel, China's Growing Military Power:Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, September 2002.p.107.
74 Robert A. Manning,Ronald Montaperto,Brad Roberts Cochbairs,China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment,Printed in the United States of America,2000.P.18.
75 指基于摧毁民间目标如城市、工业、资源等的一种战略。参阅：陆谷孙主编：《英汉大词典》(未删节版)，上海译文出版社，1993年8月第1版，第389页。
76 Edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry M.Wortzel,China's Growing Military Power:Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities,September 2002.p.110.
77 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,"http://www.cia.gov/nichaDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
78 Kenneth G. Weiss,"The Limits of Diplomacy:Missile Proliferation,Diplomacy, and Defense,"World Affairs,Vol.163 No.3 ,Winter2001.p.110.
79 Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers:Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New Worm Order,p.114.
80 Arms Control Reporter,6-7 September 1988(602. B.152/1988).
81 西方认为，20世纪80年代晚期之前，中国武器出口的标准是意识形态考虑，主要把武器出口给发展中世界，诸如北越，朝鲜和巴基斯坦这样的革命政权和缓冲国(buffer state)。此后，中国军备扩散政策的意识形态考虑越米越少，因为资金缺乏对中国军队实现现代化形成了很大制约，于是只有通过武器出口才能换取军队现代化的资金来源。20世纪80年代早期，中国成立了许多国防工业公司。1982年至1989年间，中国成为世界第五大武器供应国，军火出口收入达130亿美元。中国也开始出口地对空导弹(SAMs)、反舰导弹、喷气轰炸机，潜艇和弹道导弹。两伊战争时期，中国是双方武器的重要供应者。在这种环境下，中国成为世界上重要的弹道导弹供应者。参阅：R. A Bitzinger, Chinese Arms Production and Sales to the Third Worm (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,1991),p.3;D.Silverberg,"Iran-Iraq War Gives a Boost in Effort to Enter the World's Weapons Market,"Defense News,13 June 1988,p.24.
82 西方学者认为，虽然中国向沙特出售导弹的主要动机是经济因素，但也具有微妙的政治战略动机。包括：中国希望沙特在牺牲台湾的基础上对中国进行外交承认：通过获得沙特的外交承认，中国能在抵消美国和苏联的基础上，扩大其在中东的影响。参阅：Y. Scichor, East Wind over Arabia:Origins and Implications of the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal (Berkeley:University of California,Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies,1989, pp.18-25).
83 Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York, 2000,pp.16-18.
84 Bates Gill,"Two Steps Forward,One Step Back:The Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-Making in an Era of Reform,"Chapter 9 in David M. Lampton (ed.),The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform,1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001),p.266.
85 Bates Gill,"Chinese Arms Exports to kan,"Middle East Review oflnternationalAffairs Vol.2,No.2 (May 1998),p.55.
86 Wyn Q.Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation,1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Lawrence Freedman,2000.p.22.
87 Richard L. Russell, "China's WMD foot in the Greater Middle East's Door,"The Middle East Review of lnternational Affairs,Volume 9,No.3,September 2005. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jvgno3a6.html.
88 The Washington Times,21 November 1996.
89 The Washington Times, 10 September 1997.
90 The Washington Times,15 April 1999.
91 President George W. Bush, Report to Congress on the Emergency Regarding Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 18, 2002.
92 这五家中国公司是：淄博市化工设备厂——根据《防止向伊朗扩散法》，曾于2002年5月受到制裁；溧阳市云龙化工设备集团公司——根据《防止向伊朗扩散法》，曾于2002年1月和5月受到制裁：中国精密机械进出口公司——根据《防止向伊朗扩散法》，曾于2002年5月受到制裁，并曾于1991年受到与导弹有关的法规的制裁；中国北方工业公司——根据经修正的第12938号行政令，曾于2003年5月受到制裁；泰安市外贸总公司在2003年6月首次遭到制裁。请参阅：美国国务院国际信息局：“美国根据，<防止向伊朗扩散法>制裁中国和北韩公司(全文)”，http://bj2.netsh.com/bbs/90856/messazes/6324.html.
93 John Bolton,Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, "Coordinated Allied Approaches to China,"Tokyo,Japan, February 7,2005.
94 C-802是一个射程为120公里，负载量为165公斤弹头的次音速导弹。国际上没有禁止反舰导弹扩散的国际协议，C-802也没有包括在MTCR规制的范畴中。
95 The Washington Post,3 April 1999.
96 The Washington Time,21 January 2000.
97 Jane's Defense Weekly,18 August 2004.
98 The Washington Times,30 June 2000.
99 CIA.,"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/.
100 例如2003年9月19日美国国务院宣布，因中国向某国出售先进导弹技术，美国政府已批准对中国北方工业公司进行最严厉的经济制裁。美国官员估计，最新一波制裁可能导致北方公司失去多达一亿美元的对美贸易业绩。参阅：《香港商报》，2003年9月21日。
101 “国务院称不向出口导弹技术中国公司实施制裁”，http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/sino_us/pages2/sino_us080801a.html.
102 “外交部发言人就<华盛顿时报>称中国向外出口导弹部件发表谈话”，2001年8月9日，http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/gb/doc/2001-08/09/content_6537.htm.
103 Harry Harding, "China's Co-operative Behavior," Chapter 14 in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 386.
104 Robert E. Mullins, "The Dynamics of Chinese Missile Proliferation," Pacific Review Vol. 8, No. 1 (1991), p. 142-143.
105 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London ,2003, p.57.
106 Testimony of Dr. Gordon Oehler, Hearing on the Proliferation of Chinese Missiles, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Senate, 11 June 1998.
107 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (popularly known as the Rumsfeld Commission), report, July 15, 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm.
108 Richard L. Russell, "China's WMD foot in the Greater Middle East's Door," The Middle East Review of International Affairs,Volume 9,No.3,September 2005. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a6.html.
109 The Washington Post, 25 August 1996.
110 The Washington Times, 6 August 2001.
111 Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," Updated April 5, 2005. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf.
112 参阅：时殷弘、陈然然：“论冷战思维”，载《世界经济与政治》，2001年第6期，第4页。
113 "Chapter 7: Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist-Sponsoring States," http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/ch7_02.htm.
114 "Chapter 7:Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist-Sponsoring States," http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003 /reports/ch7_02.htm.
115 刘结一：“加强团结合作，共同应对挑战，国际防扩散展望与中国的政策”，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wzzt/2290/2294/t10520.htm.
116 本节部分内容已发表于：《美国研究》，2004年第4期，第86-102。
117 四大地区指的是欧洲、南亚、中东和朝鲜半岛。参阅：Michael Kraig and James Henderson,ed.,"US Strategies for Regional Security:South Asia,"Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference,Convened at Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton,Virginia October 25～27,2001,p. 1.
118 Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b/reading/sagan.pdf.
119Naeem Salik, "Missile Issues in South Asia," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 48.
120 B. Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia,"A paper presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall,Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003.p.12.
121 Sharon Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan," CRS Report RL31900, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL31900.pdf
122 Ben Shepard, "India and Pakistan: A Tale of Two Processes," Jane's Ballistic Missile Proliferation, March 2000, p. 11.
123 美国传统基金会亚洲研究中心高级政策分析员理查德费希尔核觉醒号令载[美]华盛顿时报1998年5月29日。转引自：夏立平：“亚太地区弹道导弹及其技术的扩散和控制”，载《国际观察》，2001年第1期，第16页。
124 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web,"Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,"October 17,2003.
125 "Agni:India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems, Federation of American Scientists," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/agni.htm.
126 "India:Agni Ⅲ Reportedly Developed to Counter China,"Periscope Daily Defense News, January 21, 2003.
127 "Prithvi-India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems,"Federation of American Scientists,June 19,2003.http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/prithvi.htm.
128 Zahid Hussain," Missile Tests Raise Indo-Pakistan Fears,"Times Online,March 27,2003, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-3-624736,00.html.
129 "Pnthvi-India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems,"http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/prithvi.htm.
130 邹强：“走向军事大国之路：印度导弹指向谁”，http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channe12/18/20000922/245431.html.
131 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web,"Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,"October 17, 2003.
132 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web,"Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,"October 17, 2003.
133 "Musharraf Says No Arms Race On Subcontinent,"Associated Press Newswire,(September 4,2003);"India Not In Arms Race: PM,"Hindustan Times,( October 13,2003).
134 U.S. Department of Defense,"Proliferation: Threat and Response,"2001.
135 Statement of George Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,"Woddwide Threats to National Security,"(February 6, 2002).
136 Edward Lace, "India and Pakistan Launch Test Missiles," Financial Times, (March 27, 2003).
137 Neil Joeck,Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York:Oxford University Press,1997).
138 U.S. Department of Defense,"Proliferation: Threat and Response,"1997.
139 Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne,eds.,"Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade,"The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia,(Washington,D.C.:Henry L.Stimson Center Report No.46, July 2002).
140 关于两派的争论，参阅：Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread ofNuclear Weapons:A Debate (New York: WW Norton & Co, 1995).
141 Madeleine K. Albright & Robin Cook,"A Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy for the 21st Century,"http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7D/NUCLEAR_NP_STRAT.PDF.
142 US DoD,op. cit. in note 63, pp. 45-49;Carnegie Endowment,op. cit. in note 61,pp. 305-312.
143 Robert Walpole,"National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs,"Testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,and Federal Services(September 21, 2000).
144 U.S. National Intelligence Council,"Global Trends 2015".A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts,"NIC 2000-2002 (December 2000),pp13.38-39.
145 “印度公司曾非法售伊大规模杀伤性武器原料”，http://news.shangdu.com/17/2003-01-21/20030121-160792-17.shtml.
146 White House Press Secretar, "A National Security Strategy for A New Century," (January 5, 2000),p.6.
147 "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Naval Interception Bush-Style,"August 25, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/program.
148 Jennifer K. Elsea, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft ," CRS Report RL32097, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32097.pdf.
149 Shirley A. Kan ,"China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues ,"CRS Report RL31555, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/17339.pdf.
150 Gregory Koblentz, "Viewpoint: Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix," The Nonproliferation Review(Spring-Summer 1997), p. 55.
151 Ramatanu Maitra, "An Arrow to Washington's Heart," Asia Times Online, (August 20,2002), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DH20Df08.html.
152 "Shishir Gupta, "India Hopes for Patriot Nod, Indian Express (May 23, 2003).
153 “印度海军将试验超音速巡航导弹”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/junshi/115847.html.
154 “巴基斯坦前总理披露巴导弹技术来自朝鲜”，http://news.eastday.com/eastday/news/news/node4941/node26108/userobject1ai377715.html.
155 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous counter-trades." Strategic Comments. Volume 8 Issue 9 November 2002.
156 孙玉庆：“英国官员称：在阿富汗发现基地组织生物武器实验室”，http://news.sohu.com/28/97/news148239728.shtml.
157 “9．11后接受专访，拉登称其持有核武器和化学武器”，http://news.tom.com/Archive/2001/11/10-23579.html.
158 David Albright, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein, "ISIS Issue Brief ecuring Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal: Principles for Assistance," October 4,2001.
159 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, "A Failure of Intelligence?" The New York Review of Books, December 20, 2001, pp. 76-80
160 Ibid.
161 Leitenberg, Milton."An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents," September 18, 2000, p. 18.
162 S.Gopal, "Nuclear Terrorism: Relevance and Prospects in South Asia", South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 359, October 11,2001.
163 C. Raja Mohan, "A Paradigm Shift Toward South Asia?" Washington Quarterly 26, 1, Winter 2002-2003.
164 "Pakistan: 'A Front-Line Ally' on Terrorism," LosAngeles Times, February 2, 2003.
165 Chun Yong Taek, "Missile Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and Consequences of theater Missile Defense (TMD) Program," Rome Forum: Missile Threats and BMD.p.13.
166 北京中朝友联国际经济文化交流中心网：“美国回应朝鲜试射导弹问题，称有能力对付核 武器”，http://www.xttzw.com/dprk/shownews.asp?newsid=16058.
167 U.S. National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," September 1999, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publication/nie/nie99msl.html, pp. 7-8.
168 "Statements by Col. Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko,"Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,U.S.Senate,October 21,1997.
169 ROK Ministry of National Defense,Defense White Paper 1996-1997 (Seoul: MND, 1997),pp. 96-97.
170 伊朗将为朝鲜的导弹发展提供必要的资金，而朝鲜将提供已开发出的导弹，并支持伊朗建立导弹生产基础。
171 Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 204-207.
172 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,"Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
173 因为伊朗和叙利亚努力从朝鲜购买中程弹道导弹，威胁到了以色列安全，以色列发起了与朝鲜的直接谈判。1992年11月，以色列外交部部长伊坦·边索(Eitain Bentsur)访问朝鲜，跟朝鲜官员谈判导弹出口问题。
174 Yun Duk-min,"US-North Korea Missile Talks," (in Korean)No.2000-46(Seoul:Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,2000).
175 "South Korea,"http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/skorea.htm.
176 鲁智：“韩国要让导弹打得更远”，http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/isslpdjs/2005-03/10/content_155534.htm.
177 1991年的海湾战争是中东安全环境的转折点。阿以冲突虽然重要，但已不是中东地区占主导地位的冲突。大规模杀伤性武器和弹道导弹扩散的重要性开始上升。海湾战争是导弹战的一次重要演示，表明了导弹在现代战争中的地位。1991年1月17日至2月26日，伊拉克向以色列和沙特发射了大约90枚经过改装的飞毛腿(Scud)弹道导弹，美国和英国对伊拉克总共发射了288枚“战斧”(Tomahawk)巡航导弹。
178 十大挑战是：抵制参与防扩散机制；蔑视防扩散机制的权威；获得防扩散机制禁止的WMD；公然使用防扩散机制禁止的WMD；滥用国际社会的默许和容忍；冷淡应对“防扩散安全倡议”；防扩散义务从属多重外交目标；WMD扩散竞赛侵蚀机制规制；中东强国对防扩散机制的“否决权”侵蚀；负面示范效应(Demonstration Effects)的无限放大。参阅：李小军：“中东对全球防扩散机制的十大挑战”，《阿拉伯世界》，2005年第2期。
179 Wyn O.Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, Lawrence Freedman, 2000.p.21.
180 Whn Q. Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation,1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000,p.21.
181 Mohamed KADRY SAID, "Missile proliferation in the Middle East:a regional perspective," The Middle East,2,2001. p.52.
182 "Germany locates Iraqi missile factory,"Jane's Defense Weekly,30 August 2000,p.8.
183 D. Lennox, 1998,"Iran Ballistic Missile Projects:Uncovering The Evidence,"Jane's Intelligence Review,June,pp.24-27.
184 Jing-dong Yuan,"Understanding Motivations For Proliferation:The Role of Confidence Building Measures,"http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/MTCR/page8-en.asp.
185 Scott D. Sagan,"Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?-Three Models in Search of a Bomb,"International Security, Vol.21,No.3 (Winter 1996/97),pp.54-86.
186 滕建群：“50年来印度核武器发展政策演变”，http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:-APdalKNSBIJ:iaps.cass.cn/Bak/nyyj/0002-1.htm+%E5%8D%B0%E5%BA%A6%E6%A0%B8%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95&h1=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=4.
187 Brahma Chellaney, "Non-proliferation: an Indian critique of U.S. export controls," ORBIS, Summer, 1994. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n3_v38/ai_15595403.
188 “延伸威慑”是美国在二战结束后奉行的军事战略和核战略指导方针的重要内容之一。它的基本含义是，向美国的盟国(包括其在亚太地区的盟国)提供核保护伞。在冷战时期，强调运用核武器威慑前苏联，不论前苏联对美国本土或盟国发动核或常规进攻，美国都准备以 核武器进行回击；在冷战后时期，坚持以核武器威慑对手或潜在对手，以慑止它们用核、生、化等大规模杀伤性武器攻击美国、海外美军和美国的盟国。参阅：夏立平：“国际军备控制理论研究与建立有中国特色的军控理论”，http://www.siis.org.cn/giwtlt/2002/02/1pxia.htm.
189 伊泰普大坝建在流经巴西和巴拉圭两国之间的巴拉那河上，由两国联合建造，耗资200亿美元。伊泰普大坝的修建，从20世纪70年代中期开始，直到1982年才竣工。大坝有60层高，坝后的水库沿河延伸达161千米。自1990年改进以后，伊泰普大坝是世界上最大的水电站，18台水轮机组发电量达1.26万兆瓦。伊泰普水电站生产的电能由巴西与巴拉圭两国分享。但是，巴拉圭只使用了发电量中极小的一部分。所以，巴拉圭将其份额中的大部分卖给了巴西。参阅：“世界著名水坝概览” http://xintv.xinhuanet.com/html/NEWS/SHEHUINEIKUIJING/2003/05/31/91741.html.
190 顾国良：“和平谈判是解决大规模杀伤性武器扩散的有效途径”， http://www.beijingreview.com.cn/2004-02/200402-world1.htm.
191 Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics among Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace (6 thedition),New York:Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,1985, p.87.
192 滕建群：“50年来印度核武器发展政策演变”，http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:-APdalKNSBIJ:iaps.cass.cn/Bak/nyyj/0002-1.htm+%E5%8D%B0%E5%BA%A6%E6%A0%B8%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95&h1=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=4.
193 泽乌丁·萨达尔认为，在防扩散领域，美国的外交政策就是对那些发展核武器的国家进行批判、实行制裁并将它们妖魔化。因为巴基斯坦和印度展核武器，美国就对它们实行削弱性的制裁。因为北朝鲜拥有核武器库，美国就将之妖魔化。然而，美国的核武器储备却是世界上最大的，而且它也是世界上惟一一个曾经在战争中(在日本的广岛和长崎)使用过原子武器的国家。美国强迫其他国家签署和批准《全面禁止核试验条约》，而它自己却意孤行，拒绝在条约上签字。更有甚者，美国还拒绝放弃首先使用核武器，甚至还拒绝承诺保持克制、不对没有核能力的国家使用核武器。此外，美国还模糊了长期以来对于核武器和非核武器之间的界限，而且还扬言要对像地下掩体这样可以抵常规武器打击的目标使用核武器。美国还准备对像“非国家行为体”这样的非核武器目标使用核武器，也就是说要对使用生化武的恐怖主义组织使用核武器。美国强迫其他国家放弃核武器计划，但它自己却在继续进行着这一计划，开发和设计“小型核武器”，重新开始进行核试验。更坏的是，美国还恬不知耻地卢称，他们正在开发的新型核弹头实际上可以“减少间接损害”，即小型核武器可以减少常规武器所造成的平民伤亡(但这种说法和我们所了解的有关核武器的信息完全相反)，并希望以此来提自己的道德地位。美国制定了可以对七个国家—俄罗斯、中国、伊拉克、北朝鲜、伊朗、利比亚和叙利亚—在紧急情况下实行核打击的计划。参阅：泽乌丁·萨达尔梅尼尔·W．戴维斯，袁征、朱琳、付宇译：“美国是如何使用双重标准的”，《中外书摘》， http://www.ewen.cc/licai/bkview.aso?bkid=79772&cid=202308.
194 沈丁立：“发展核武器的权与责”，http://www.dfdaily.com/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=23620.
195 沈丁立：“博弈在拥核与弃核之间”，《文汇报》，2005年8月26日。
196 专家观点来自于：“核武器发展有‘动力’”，《世界知识》， http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2003-11/29/content_2767789.htm.
197 专家观点来自于：“核武器发展有‘动力’”，《世界知识》，http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2003-11/29/content_2767789.htm.
198 James Cotton,"North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Proliferation and Regional Security," Current Issues Brief 1 1999-2000,31 August 1999.http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/Pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib01.htm.
199 “美联社：布什引导印进核俱乐部，辛格称创造历史”，2006年3月3日，http://news.sohu.com/20060303/n242107998.shtml.
200 “美核政策搞双重标准，对印度和伊朗态度截然不同”，http://news.sohu.com/20060303/n242108562.shtml.
201 “美国会议员称美印达成核协议是‘历史性灾难’”，http://news.sohu.com/20060303/n242109159.shtml.
202 John R. Bolton,"Beyond the Axis of Evil:Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,"May 6, 2002. http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:W8VIkuZMAlUJ:www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm+WMD +proliferation+and+Axis+of+Evil&hl--zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=2.
203 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 201, "http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
204 Charles R. Smith,"New Missile Threat to Amedca,"Tuesday, Dec.3,2002. http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/12/2/214523.shtml.
205 “美国死咬伊拉克10年轰炸13轮”，《中国国防报》，2001年2月23日，http://news.sina.com.cn/w/192380.html.
206 B. Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards (Santa Monica:Rand Corporation,1993),p.2
207 TWhn O. Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation,1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000,p.25.
208 Arthur A. Stein,"Coordination and Collaboration:regimes in an anarchic world,"lnternational Organization 36,2,Spring 1982.
209 Janne E. Nolan,Trappings of Power:Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1991).
210 Aaron Karp,"Controlling Ballistic Missile Proliferation,"Survival 33 (November/December 1991),p.527.
211 吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第6页。
212 Rachel Schmidt, U.S Export Control Policy and The Missile Technology Control Regimes, January 1990.p.4.
213 jing-dong Yuan,"Understanding Motivations For Proliferation:The Role of Confidence Building Measures,"http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/MTCR/page8-en.asp.
214 Members of The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,"Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to assess the Ballistic missile threat to the United States,"July 15,1998, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/BMD/documents/Rumsfeld150798.pdf.
215 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,produced by the National Intelligence Council,"Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,"December 2001.http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
216 J. Mohan Malik,"India Goes Nuclear: Rationale,Benefits,Costs and Implications,"Contemporary Southeast Asia 20(2) (August 1998), pp.191-215.
217 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press,Seattle and London, 2003.p.82.
1 门洪华：“国际机制与美国霸权”，《美国研究》，2001年第1期。
2 David A. Cooper,"The United States and the Evolution of International Supply-Side Missile Non-Proliferation Controls,"p.15.cited in Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Mountbatten Centre for International Studie,"Missile Proliferation and Defences:Problems and Prospects,"Occasional Paper No. 7,http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op7/op7.pdf.
3 秦亚青：《霸权体系与国际冲突—美国在国际武装冲突中的支持行为(1945—1988)》，上海人民出版社，1999年8月第1版，第1页。
4 Joseph Nye,Bound to Lead:The Changing Nature of American Power, New York,1990,p.267.
5 Ronald Reagan,Nattonal Securtty Decision Dtrective 70:Nuclear Capable Missde Technology Transfer Policy,November 30,1982.
6 Richard Speier, The Missile Technology Control Regime:Case Study of a Multilateral Negotiation (Manuscript submitted to the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC,November 1995).
7 George Abbey and Neal Lane,"United States Space Policy:Challengesand Opportunities," http://www.amacad.org/publications/spacePolicy.pdf.
8 Gary Milhollin,"The Link Between Space Launch and Missile Technology,"March 16,2000,http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/speeches/2000/GM%20Hawaii%20speech.htm.
9 NSDM出台的直接诱因是尼克松政府决定向日本出售Delta太空发射装置，但遭到了国会的否决，理由是这种出售会伤害美国的技术安全。
10 Martin Navias,Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World (Adelphi Paper No.252,Summer 1990),p.49.
11 U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978(Washington DC:GPO,December 1980),p.21.
12 这次试验以失败告终。
13 这种限制被前面提到的NSDM187的限制更为严格。
14 Richard Speier, The Missile Technology Control Regime:Case Study of a Multilateral Negotiation (Manuscript submitted to the United States Institute of Peace,Washington DC,November 1995).
15 主要是指完整的导弹系统和完整的次导弹系统。
16 Government of Canada,"Missile Technology Control Regime,"Background Paper, April 16,1987.
17 包括完整的火箭系统和次火箭系统。
18 导弹部件和相关技术。
19 Aaron Karp,The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East, p.15.
20 Dinshaw J. Mistry, International Cooperation in Arms Control:building Security Regimes to contain missile proliferation,M.I.A.,Columbia University, 1994.p.62.
21 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,"Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pd fs/mtcr.pdf.
22 Rachel Schmidt,U.S. export control policy and the missile technology control regime,Rand:1990.p.17.
23 U.S. Government,"Missile Technology Control Regime, Fact SheetTo Accompany Public Announcement,"April 16,1987.
24 Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby E Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz,Tracking Nuclear Proliferation:A Guide in Maps and Charts,Washington,D.C.,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1998,p.313.
25 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press,Seattle and London,2003.p.48.
26 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control,University of Washington Press, Seattle and London,2003.p.49.
27 Washington Post,April 6,1990.
28 "Fact Sheet:Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy,"The White House,Office of the Press Secretary, September 27,1993.
29 Federation of American Scientists Datebase,The Missile Technology Control Regime:An Information Paper,November 1997,http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/missiles/1997_plenary_info.html. July 2001.
30 例如批准加入MTCR的成员资格申请和附件变化等。
31 "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime Madrid,Spain,"12-16 September 2005,http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/madrid.html.
32 George Downs,Davis Rocke, and Peter Barsoom,"Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism,"International Organization,52,No.2 (Spring 1998),pp397-419.
33 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年第1版，第236页。
34 Robert Jervis,"Security Regimes,"in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca:Corell University Press,1982), pp.173-194.
35 Zachary Davis,"The Realist Nuclear Regime,"Security Studies 2,No.3/4(Spring/Summer 1993),pp.79-99.
36 以色列的经济规模虽然很小，但仍拥有强大的国防工业。巴西、印度、以色列和南非在若干军备工业和飞机制造方面也具有先进技术；韩国、阿根廷和台湾地区的生产水平属于中等； 埃及、朝鲜和巴基斯坦的导弹生产能力低。参阅：Robert Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems (Cambridge,Mass:Ballinger,1975),pp.183-200.
37 按照这些分类(从0到1的范围)，以下国家在关键技术上的掌握程度为：以色列(0.456)，印度(0.303)，韩国(0.232)，巴西(0.182)和南非(0.126)。参阅：James Sperling,David Louscher, and Michael Salomone,"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side:The Prospects for Weapons and Weapons Technology Diffusion and Control,"Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago,April 1997.
38 U.S. Department of Defense,The Military Critical Technologies List(Washington,D.C.:GPO,October 1992).
39 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,"Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),"http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/mtcr.pdf.
40 刘华秋主编：《军备控制与裁军手册》，国防工业出版社，2000年，第382页。
41 Jozef Goldblat,"Is there a future for the MTCR?"http://www.gipri.ch/spip/IMG/pdf/Is_there_a_future_for_the_MTCR.pdf.
42 具体经济依赖参数为：台湾地区(20％，19％)；韩国(12％，12％)；以色列(14％，15％)；埃及(11％，10％)；南非(3％，3.5％)；巴西(2％，2.4％)；阿根廷(1％，2％)：印度(1.3％，2.1％)；巴基斯坦(4.7％，3.8％)。这些数字对20世纪90年代的伊朗，朝鲜，利比亚，叙利亚和伊拉克来说，都在1％以下。一个地区国家的其他外部经济关系包括来自于国际组织的援助和外部的投资，这大约占它们GNP的3％。数据来自于：Stockholm Institute of Peace Research databank.
43 Zeev Maoz,"The Controversy Over the Democratic Peace:Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall,"International Security,Summer 1997,( 22,No.1),pp.162-198.
44 Aaron Karp,The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation to the Middle East(Boulder: Westview Press,1989),pp.13-15.
45 James Mann, About Face:A History of America "s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton,New York,NY, Alfred A.Knopf,1999, p.243.
46 United States Senate Committee on Government Affairs,The Proliferation Primer:A Majority Report of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services,Washington,D.C.,1998,p.98.
47 A. L.C. de Mestral,Extraterritorial Application of Export Control Legislation:Canada and the U.S.A,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,p.6.
48 "Arms Export Control Act(P.L.90-629)-Chapter 7:Control of Missiles and Missile Equipment or Technology,"http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/missiles/law 103.html, August 2002.
49 Aaron Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation to the Middle East, (Boulder: Westview Press,1989),p.15.
50 Hearings before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,1990.
51 Tammy Halevy,"Chinese Compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime:A Case Study,"August 31,1993. http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/browse/categoryid/2360/documentid/2360/history/3,2360.
52 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation, London and New York,2004.p.98.
53 "General Scowcroft on Chinese Satellite Launches,"Congressional Record,June 9,1998,p.1063. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998/h980609-prc.htm. June 2003.
54 "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),"http://www.nti.org/db/china/mtcrorg.htm.
55 Xinhua News Agency,"Comments on Missile Control,GATT, Korea,"FBISDaily Report:China,November 21,1991,p.1
56 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation,London and New York,2004.p.94.
57 James A. Baker Ⅲ, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace,New York,G.P.Putnam's Sons,1995,p.593.
58 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, London and New York,2004.p.99.
59 Arms Control Report, CD-Rom version,Section 706:MTCR,March 7,1992.
60 Arms Control Report,CD-Rom version,1992 Section 706:MTCR,January2001.
61 "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement of Missile Proliferation,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/mtcrusch.htm.
62 Victor Zaborsky,"Viewpoint:U.S.Missle Nonproliferation Strategy Toward The Nis and China:How Effective?"The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997.p.88.
63 Testimony of Robert J. Einhorn Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,and Federal Services Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 10 April 1997,http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ein0497.htm.
64 根据美国方面的说法，1994年至1995年间，中国的出售包括机床和导航系统；未来的出售包括回转仪，加速机和帮助伊朗建造“流星-3”和“流星-4”中程弹道导弹的试验设备。参阅：Shirley Kan, China's Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Current Policy Issues, CRS Issue Brief For Congress, Updated October 30,2001, Order 1B92056,http://www.fas.org/spp/starwards/crs1B92056.pdf. June 2002.
65 双方同意致力于促使《全面禁止核试验条约》尽早生效。双方还同意在联合国裁军谈判会议上寻求早日就“禁止生产用于核武器和其他核爆炸装置的裂变材料公约”开始正式谈判。中美两国重申双方不向未接受保障监督的核设施和核爆炸项目提供任何帮助的承诺。中国已对核和双用途材料及相关技术的出口实施控制，并将于1998年年中采取进一步措施加强对双用途材料的出口控制。美国将继续加强对核和双用途材料及相关技术的严格控制，作为《禁止化学武器公约》的创始缔约国，中美两国同意在多边框架内就执行该公约进行合作。双方认为，政府对与化学品有关的出口进行监督是重要的。
66 "Joint US-China Statement,"29 October 1997, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/uschst97.htm.
67 "White Paper on China's National Defense,Information Office of the State Council,People's Republic of China,July 1998 Beijing"(Chinese),http://www.nti.org/db/china/chindocs/zwpnatde.htm.
68 Central Intelligence Agency, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,"Washington,D.C.1999,p.5.
69 "People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Statement,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/prcmtcr.htm.November 21,2000,Beijing.
70 "Spokesman Refutes U.S. Allegations over Missiles,"The China Daily,24 November 2000,p.1.
71 Philip Saunders of the Monterey Institute of International Studies was quoted by Fox News on November 22,2000,http://www.foxnews.com/world/112200/china.sml.June 2002.
72 "Excerpts of State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher's Statement:Sanctions Waived for China But Not Weapons Recipients Pakistan and Iran,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/00112102.htm.21 November 2000.
73 Cox was quoted in a November 22, San Francisco Chronicle article which can be found at, http://www.sfgate/com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/11/12/MN52960.DTL.Aug ust 2002.
74 "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/cia0901.htm.
75 PRC FM Spokesman Opposes US Sanctions Against China,Xinhua,September 5,2001.
76 “外交部军控司长就导弹出口管制等进行吹风(全文)”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/PI-c/197055.htm.
77 “外交部军控司长就导弹出口管制等进行吹风(全文)”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/PI-c/197055.htm.
78 "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," http://www.nti.org/db/china/mtcrorg.htm.
79 Deborah Ozga,"A Chronology of the Missile Technology ControlRegime,"The Nonproliferation Review 1 (Winter 1994),p.79.
80 "India:Agni Ⅲ Reportedly Developed to Counter China,"Periscope Daily Defense News,January 21,2003.
81 H.E. Mr. Sha Zukang Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of the People's Republic of China,"Statement at the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/sha1097.htm,New York.14 October 1997.
82 该报告是作者2005年4月赴美国佐治亚大学访问时，为该大学“国际贸易与安全中心” (CITS)赠送。
83 Liu Huaqiu,Xiandai Junshi (Conmilit) (Beijing),11 November 1995,in "Analysis Of Nuclear Arms Control Policy,"FBIS-CHI-95-246,11 November 1995.
84 "Reaction to Missile Technology Sales,Sanctions,"FBIS-CHI, August 27,1993.p.1
85 中国外交部：“中国与多边防扩散出口控制机制”，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/jks/jkslc/fkswt/dbfks/t118828.htm.
86 Winston Lord and Joseph Nye,"Engagement with China Will Aid Regional Security,"Transeript on October11,USIA Wireless File,October 13,1995,p12.
87 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, London and New York,2004.p.109.
88 Tammy Halevy,"Chinese Compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime:A Case Study," http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/169/documentid/515/history/3,2360,652,169,515.
89 Phillip C. Saunders,"Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List,"Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Monterey Institute of International Studies,September 2002,http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/pdfs/prc_msl.pdf.
1 Mark Smith,"Efficiency and Inefficiency of the MTCR,"http://www.inesap.org/bulletin 19/bul19art22.htm.
2 Mark Smith, The MTCR and the Future of Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation, Disarmament Diplomacy,No 54 (February 2001),pp.19-25.
3 Mark Smith,"Missile Proliferation,Missile Defenses and Arms Control,"from Special Joint Series on Missile Issues,Center for Nonproliferation Studies Mountbatten,Centre for International Studies,"lnternational Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses,"Occasional Paper No.5,p.25.
4 Mark Smith,"Rules for the Road?The International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,"http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63op3.htm.
5 P·Litavrin,V·Lukiantsev,"The Hague Missile Code,"International affairs,Copyright(?)2003 EBSCO Publishing.
6 “中国的军控、裁军与防扩散努力”(全文)，2005年9月1日，http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2005-09/01/content_3429141_2.htm.
7 联合国裁军事务网站：“关于各国探测及使用外层空间包括月球与其他天体活动所应遵守原则的条约”，http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/t4.htm.
8 联合国裁军事务网站：“禁止在海床洋底及其底土安置核武器和其他大规模毁灭性武器条约”，http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/t6.htm.
9 "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime,"Noordwijk,the Netherlands October 11-15 1999.http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/noordwijk.html.
10 Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Appendix Ⅵ,"Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation(HCOC)."http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/icoc.pdf.
11 李书成：“防止弹道导弹扩散大会在巴黎开幕”，http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-02/09/content_31871.htm.
12 Alex Wagner,"States Meet to Discuss Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct,"Arms Control Today,March 2002,http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/mtcrmarch02.asp.
13 Pyotr Litavrin,Vitalii Lukiantsev,"The Hague Missile Code,"International affairs,Copyright(?)2003 EBSCO Publishing.
14 Alex Wagner,"States Hold Second Missile Code of Conduct Meeting,"Arms Control Today,Vol.32 No.6,July/August 2002.
15 Alex Wagner,"States Hold Second Missile Code of Conduct Meeting,"Arms Control Today,Vol.32 No.6,July/August 2002.
16 "International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,"http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/naruhodo/data/pdf/data8-1.pdf.
17 U.S. Department of State,Office of the Spokesman for Immediate Release, February 11, 2002,"U.S. Supports Universal Code Against Missile Proliferation,"http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-se1046.html.
18 Warren Ferster,"AsiaSat Discards Long March as Option,"Space News,24 May 1999,p.1
19 美国为解决该问题，提出并实施了两项措施：一是为有民用太空发射计划的国家提供空间发射。例如2000年，美国向朝鲜提出建议：如果朝方承诺放弃发展远程火箭，美国答应每年向其提供两至四枚卫星发射服务。二是允许一国在销毁进攻性弹道导弹和相关技术的前提下，可在加入MTCR的同时保留民用空间运载计划。巴西，乌克兰和韩国就在加入MTCR时保留了自己的空间运载计划。但另一些国家则认为空间运载火箭和弹道导弹技术是能够分开的，为和平目的进行合作是可行的。从现实来看，这个问题在准则中仍然没有获得解决，现有的大多数军控和防扩散协议在技术军用和民用方面也只能采取平衡战略。
20 Cole Bucy,"Iran and Brazil: Dangerous Precedents."http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue14/Vol3Issue14Bucy.html.
21 "The Foreign Ministry, Worldwide at your service,"http://cms.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=54&LNG=en&version=print.
22 The Dutch Foreign Ministry's web site: http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460166.
23 关于美国和俄罗斯对准则谈判的指示，请分别参阅：United States Memo,"Instructions for U.S delegation to international code of conduct negotiations,"Beijing,China,August 9,2002. http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/training/tsinghua/pdfs/memo_us.pdf;Delegation of the Russian Federation Internal Delegation Use Only Not to be shared with other delegations,"Instructions for Delegation of the Russian Federation to International Code of Conduct Negotiations," Beijing, China, August 9, 2002,http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/training/tsinghua/pdfs/memo_rus.pdf.
24 U.S. Depart of State,Office of the Spokesman for Immediate Release,"U.S. Supports Universal Code Against Missile Proliferation," February 11, 2002, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-se1046.html.
25 金师：“俄罗斯和欧洲国家在航天方面的合作”，http://www.cast.ac.cn/cbw/GJTK/200501/5.htm.
26 “伊朗与俄罗斯签署价值1.32亿美元卫星发射合同”，2005年1月31日，http://jczs.sina.com.cn/2005-01-31/1110263062.html.
27 Arthur S. Ding,"Viewpoint:China's Concerns about Theater Missile Defense:A Critique,"The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999.p.93.
28 "Proliferation Security Initiative,"Briefing NINFA 2005, Alfeite,13 de Abril de 2005.
29 20世纪60年代，津巴布韦非洲人民联盟和津巴布韦非洲民族联盟(简称民盟)先后成立，领导人民进行反对白人种族主义统治的武装斗争。1979年，沣巴布韦各派在英国主持下召开伦敦制宪会议。1980年2月底举行议会选举，穆加贝领导的民盟获胜。同年4月18日独立，定国名为沣巴布韦共和国。
30 “联合国安理会常任理事国‘否决权’的历史发展”，《学习时报》，2005年3月28，http://www.shm.com.cn/wangping/2005-09/28/content_968869.htm.
31 1966年联合国安理会《南罗得西亚局势问题》决议(S／RES／221，中文版)，http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/227/57/IMG/NR022757.pdf?OpenElement.
32 战后初期，美国迅速扩大在拉美的经济势力，同时积极组建美洲军事集团。1947年，美国在巴西里约热内卢召开了有19个拉美国家参加的“美洲大陆和平与安全会议”。会议按照美国务卿马歇尔的意图，订立了“美洲国家间互助条约”(Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)，简称里约条约(Rio Treaty)。条约旨在建立美洲国家集体防务体系，规定美洲国家实行联防，即当西半球任一国家受到侵犯时，则视为对全体美洲国家的武装进攻。这次会议虽不是以泛美联盟名义召开的，但里约条约已把所有拉美国家拴在美国的冷战战车上。同年加拿大外交部在一份报告中提出坚决反对加拿大加入泛美联盟的理由是，美国在泛美联盟中的势力太大，这个组织已经失去国际会议的意义，加拿大若再加入里约条约，就得被迫承担全美洲的防务义务。所以当1990年加拿大正式加入美洲国家组织时，特别提出的一个前提条件就是拒绝在里约条约上签字。这表明加拿大反对美国把其干涉美洲各国内政和外交活动加以合法化的立场。请参阅：杨令侠：“加拿大与泛美组织”，http://history.nankai.edu.cn/teach/list.asp?id=138.
33 Richard B Stebbins(ed)1963,"President Kennedy's Broadcast Report to the People,"(Doc 82,22 Oct 1962)Documents on American Foreign Relations 1962 (NY:Council on Foreign Relations 1963), pp.374-380.
34 Stebbins 1963,"Action by the American Governments: Resolution of the Council of the OAS,"(Doc 83, 23 Oct 1962),pp.380-383.
35 Stebbins 1963,"Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba: Presidential Proclamation 3504," (Doc 84 23 Oct 1962),pp.383-384
36 FRUS 1962-63, Doc 41,"Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National Security Council,"22 October 1962,p.152;Edward C Keefer et al eds, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963,Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996).
37 联合国安理会关于《伊拉克—科威特间局势》(S／RES／661)的第661号决议，http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/574/74/IMG/NR057474.pdf?OpenElement.
38 Nicole Woods,"Detail, Analysis, and Recommendation on the Policy of Economic Sanctions on Iraq,"http://home.mtholyoke.edu/～nmwoods/iraq.htm.
39 联合国安理会关于《伊拉克—科威特间局势》(S／RES／678)得第678号决议，http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/574/91/IMG/NR057491.pdf?OpenElement.
40 Commander Barry W. Coceano,U.S. Navy Atlantic Council Senior Fellow,"The Proliferation Security Initiative:Challenges and Perceptions,"http://www.acus.org/docs/0405-Proliferation_Security_Initiative_Challenges_Perceptions.pdf.
41 Dana Priest and Douglas Farah,"Iranian Force Has Long Ties to Al Qaeda,"The Washington Post, October 14, 2003, p. A17.
42 Commander Barry W. Coceano,U.S. Navy Atlantic Council Senior Fellow,"The Proliferation Security Initiative:Challenges and Perceptions," http://www.acus.org/docs/0405-Proliferation_Security_Initiative_Challenges_Perceptions.pdf.
43 U.S. Department of State ,"Patterns of Global Terrodsm-2000,"Apdl 30,2001, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2441.htm.
44 Joby Warrick,"Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear,"The Washington Post,December 7,2003,p. A1 & A28.
45 Chatham House,Independent Thinking on International Affairs,"The Proliferation Security Initiative:is it legal?"http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/il/ILP250205.pdf.
46 J. D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,"Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,"9 January 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html(14 August 2003).
47 "Interview with John Bolton,Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, on U.S. Arms Control," (14 August 2001), http://www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/ESDIBoltonUSArmsControlPolicyAugust14.html(15 August 2003).
48 "The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.
49 这里所有的引用均来自美国的“The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”和欧洲的“EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”两个文件，以下不再一一注明。
50 认为有效拦截是美国应对WMD及其运载工具的关键措施。在阻止WMD原料、技术和知识落到敌对国家和恐怖分子组织的斗争中，要提高美国军队、情报、技术和法律执行的能力。
51 与过去相比，今天的威胁更加多样化和更难以预测。对美国及其盟国充满敌意的国家会不择手段地获取WMD。为此，美国必须要采取新的威慑手段，这就是美国将采取压倒性的军事力量和使用所有可供选择的手段去反对WMD对美国及其盟国的攻击。
52 由于有时威慑会失效，使用WMD对军队和人民造成潜在破坏的后果的可能，美国的军事力量和民用机构要做好防御用WMD武装的敌手，包括在适宜的条件下使用先发制人的措施。这需要具备在WMD武器使用前的侦察和毁灭敌手WMD武器的能力
53 小布什政府判定全球进入“后扩散世界”，基于两个基本事实：一是恐怖分子已经掌握了使用WMD对美国及其盟国进行恐怖袭击的能力；二是以外交和多边机制为主要手段的传统防扩散体制已无力应对WMD扩散。因此，美国面临的最严重威胁莫过于对美国心怀敌意的国家掌握WMD能力和向恐怖分子扩散WMD能力。为此，美国政府把WMD的扩散者区分为“好扩散者”(盟国)和“坏扩散者”(“无赖国家”和恐怖分子)两类。以色列、巴基斯坦和印度是美国的反恐盟国，美国允许这些国家拥有WMD能力。即使美国知道巴基斯坦帮助伊朗、朝鲜和利比亚发展核武器，美国也能原谅，因为在美国的战略棋盘中，巴基斯坦帮助美国反恐高于一切。但对那些寻求和拥有核、化学和生物武器的非法体制(无赖国家)，美国一定要设法解除其WMD能力。因为“无赖国家带来了不同的挑战，不同的挑战则需要不同的战略。”美国决意改变过去过分依赖传统防扩散体制应对WMD威胁的能力，而主张对这些体制进行根本性的改革，逐渐增强反对WMD扩散的“牙齿”功能。为预防“无赖国家”获取核武器，布什要求监控贩卖核材料的黑市，建议修复传统核不扩散体制中允许非核国家有权从事民用核能计划的致命“枪眼”(loophole)。
54 Bolton,"Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States,"2 December 2003.
55 "The New Multilateralism," The Wall Street Journal, 8 January 2004.
56 Carla Anne Roberts, "The U.N.: Searching For Relevance,"The Wall Street Journal,21 October 2003.
57 “‘银河号’”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/HIAW/109186.htm.
58 "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," Washington, D.C., December 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMD Strategy.pdf (accessed January 30,2005).
59 Tony Karon,"Scud Seizure Raises Tricky Questions," Time.com,December 11,2002, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,398592,00.html.
60 Frederick Kirgis,"Boarding of North Korean Vessel on the High Seas,"The American Society of International Law, ASIL Insights, December 12, 2002, www.asil.org.
61 与过去相比，今天的威胁更加多样化和更难以预测。对美国及其盟国充满敌意的国家会不择手段地获取WMD。为此，美国必须要采取新的威慑手段，这就是美国将采取压倒性的军事力量和使用所有可供选择的手段去反对WMD对美国及其盟国的攻击。
62 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "U. S. Aides Remain Divided As They Weigh Korea Risks," New York Times, May 11, 2003.
63 Sharon SquassoniSpecialist in National DefenseForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)," Received through the CRS Web, Order Code RS21881January 14, 2005,http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS21881.pdf.
64 Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire, June 2, 2003.
65 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, 31 May 2003, http://www.usinfo.pl/bushvisit2003/wawel.htm.
66 "Prohferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Pnnciples, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 4 September, 2003. http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.
67 "Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Conclusions," Lisbon, 4-5 March 2004, http://www.mtcr.info/psi/meetings2d2d6.html.
68 U. S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation Washington, DC May 2005, "The Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions," http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/abr_und_r/psi/download/faq.pdf.
69 Global Security, Text: White House Statement,Fact Sheet on Proliferation Security Initiative, "September 5, 2003, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2003/usa-030905-usia01a.htm.
70 Bolton, "Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region, "http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37480.htm.
71 Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "U. S. Dep's of State Press Statement on Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement Signed with Liberia," No. 2004/153(Feb. 12, 2004 ), http://www.state.gov.
72 这11国分别是英国、澳大利亚、法国、德国、意大利、荷兰、波兰、葡萄牙、西班牙、日本和美国。
73 US Department of State International Information Program, 2 Sep, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/03090204.htm.
74 Paul O'Sullivan,"Chairman's Statement: From Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) meeting in Brisbane on 9-10 July 2003,"Policy Forum Online, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0336_Sullivan.html.
75 这里有必要强调的是，PSI的官方网站的图表中把巴黎会议划入了专家会议，但在具体的文字叙述中又将其视为是PSI的第三次全会，笔者估计为网站错误，在次更正。
76 安理会第1540(2004)号决议：《防止核生化武器扩散》，2004年4月28日安全理事会第4956次会议通过， http://www.un.org/chinese/aboutun/prinorgs/sc/sres/04/s1540.htm.
77 "China Open to Discussions on Arms Control Initiative," Agence France Presse,November 4, 2004, http://www.defensenews.corn/story.php?F=489173&C=asiapac(accessed January 30, 2005).
78 Oleg Shchedrov, "Russia Teams Up With Bush on WMDs,"The Moscow Times,June 1, 2004, p.2; "Russia joins alliance against banned arms,"The Straits Times (online edition),June 2,2004,httn://straitstimes.asia1 .com.sg/wodd/story/0.4386.254038.00.htm.
79 凌云：“美日法澳等国拟举行多国海上拦截演习”，2004年10月25日，http://army.news.tom.com/1019/1022/2004/10/25-54623.html.
80 章田：“日充当‘防扩散海上拦截演习’急先锋玄机解读”，《世界报》，2004年8月12日。
81 苏北：“东亚首次防违禁武器扩散演习，日本缘何充当急先锋”，《北京青年报》，2004年10月27日, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2004-10/27/content_2142762.htm.
82 "Germany Intercepts Suspect Nuclear-Related Shipment to N. Korea," Agence France Presse, April 26, 2003.
83 吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第94页。
84 布什政府提出的导弹防御计划是一个包括国家导弹防御系统和战区导弹防御系统，涵盖陆、海、空、天基武器系统及其部件的综合系统，不是小修小改ABM条约所能容纳的。因为要容纳布什政府导弹防御系统，修约必须触及ABM条约的核心条款和条约的宗旨，即修改后的ABM条约必须允许部署保护全境的导弹防御系统并为这种系统提供基础：必须允许部署两个或两个以上的拦截基地以及更多的拦截弹；必须允许部署陆基、海基、空基、乃至天基系统的导弹防御系统；必须允许美国将其非战略反导系统升级为具有反战略导弹的能力或将其纳入整个反导系统中；必须允许美国升级并充分利用其海内外的预警能力，等等。这样的修约与废约毫无二致。
85 "Russia Proposes Global Regime On Missile Proliferation," http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/ru3ma00.asp.
86 "Russia-U. S. Interaction in WMD Non-Proliferation,"http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/7/532.html.
87 "For the International Global Control System Experts Meeting Moscow,"March 16, 2000, http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm.
88 "Global Control System: Too Comprehensive?" http://12.150.189.35/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=674.
89 Concept of the Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology," http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/GSC_content.htm#concept.
90 "The Missile Launch Transparency Regime as a Component of the GCS Concept," http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm#missile.
91 俄罗斯外交部官员解释说该计划的停止是因为缺乏关于对可能损害的民事责任，以及特定的税收问题上缺乏协议。另一方面更严重但不明显的是，美国和俄罗斯都抵制对来自于第三世界潜在导弹威胁的共同威胁分析。美国中央情报局认为在2015年之前，所谓无赖国家对美国的导弹威胁不会变为现实，这种乐观的判断没有得到美国人的认可，但却与俄罗斯专家的观点相吻合。1998年7月，发表的拉姆斯菲尔德报告认为这种威胁在2005年之前可能就会变为现实。这种判断吻合了布什政府的战略理念，把拉氏报告的评估作为退出1972年ABM条约的证据，并竭尽全力发展部署反弹道导弹防御。
92 中国人大网：“关于登记射入外层空间物体的公约”，http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=2193&pdmc=rdgb.
93 "Security Assurances for the GCS Participating States Renouncing the possession of Missile Delivery Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction,"http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm#security.
94 "Incentive Measures with Regard to the GCS Participating States Renouncing the Possession of Missile Delivery Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction," http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm#incentive.
1 王明国：“国际机制对国家行为的影响—机制有效性的一种新的分析视角”，《世界经济与政治》，2003年6月，第47页。
2 Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of The Missile Technology Control Regime," The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994, p. 69.
3 "U. S. Efforts to control the Transfer of Nuclear Capable Missile Technology," General, Accounting Office Report, NSIAD-90-176, 6/90, pp. 113-126.
4 Jing-dong Yuan, "The MTCR and Missile Proliferation: Moving Toward the Next Phase," May 2000, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/MTCR_missile-e.PDF, p.8.
5 Dinshaw Mistry, "Beyond the MTCR: Building a Comprehensive Regime to Contain Ballistic Missile Proliferation," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4( Spring 2003), p122.
6 Brazil Table of Contents, "Brazil: The Space Program," http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-1826.html.
7 Wyn Q. Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR," The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996, p.86.
8 Boscov, Jayme and A. E Palmerio, "The Brazilian Satellite Launcher(VLS)," 2nd Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Montreal, Canada, October 5-11, 1991.
9 Robert Shuey, et al., "Missile Proliferation-Survey of Emerging Missile Forces," Congressional Research Service, 3 October, No. 88, p. 89.
10 Brazil Table of Contents, "Brazil-Missile Programs," http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:j0a8R2etRJgJ:www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query /r-1827.html+Brazil+Table+of+Contents+space+program&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=3.
11 Center for Defense Information, "National Briefings: Brazil," http://www.cdiss.org/brazil_b.htm.
12 Scott D. Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary Democracy," http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:SOSiPdr37n8J:lanic.utexas.edu/project/lasa95/tellefson.html+Brazil+and+Security&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=3.
13 王逸舟：“国际关系与国内体制一评‘民主和平论’”，http://fanleo.blogchina.com/210140.html.
14 Lefever, Emest W, Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U. S. Policy Dilemma. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979. p. 112.
15 Franko-Jones, Patrice, The Brazilian Defense Industry, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 98-99.
16 Franko-Jones, Patrice, The Brazilian Defense Industry, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p59.
17 Scott D. Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary Democracy," http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:SOSiPdr37n8J:lanic.utexas.edu/project/lasa95/tellefson.html+Brazil+and+Security&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=3.
18 巴西先后有两个核电站正式投入运营，第三个一直处于建设时期。当然，巴西发展核电的代价也是不菲的。巴西第一个核电厂Angra-Ⅰ的建设费用大约是20亿美元，直至1983年才投入商业运营。第二座核电站Angra-Ⅱ由于技术原因，建设周期长达二十多年，建设费用竞高达100亿美元!巴西的一位官员表示，在过去的15年里，第三座核电站Angra-Ⅲ的建设已花费了13亿美元，但是否建成现在仍然不甚清楚。
19 FAS, Intelligence Resource Program, "Brazil,'"http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/brazil.htm#N_1_.
20 FAS, Intelligence Resource Program, "Brazil," http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/brazil.htm#N_1_.
21 Wyn Q. Bowen,"Brazil's Accession to the MTCR,"The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996,p.87.
22 Bowen,Wyn and Andrew Koch,"Nonproliferation is embraced by Brazil,"Jane's Intelligence Review,June 1996,p.286.
23 李小军：“美国与巴西关系中的‘核因素’及其影响”，《国际论坛》，2004年第5期。
24 Ozga, D.A, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime,"Nonproliferation Review,Vol.1,2,Winter 1994.
25 Tollefson,Scot,Brazil, the United States and the Missile Technology Control Regime,NPS-56-90-OO6.Monterey, CA:Naval Postgraduate School,March 1990.
26 Bowen, Wyn Q,"Brazil's Accession to the MTCR,"Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1996,Volume 3,Number 3.
27 Freedman, Alan and Victor Mallet,"United States Seeks Full EC Membership of Missile Treaty,"Financial Times,September 23,1989.
28 Silverberg, David,"French Proposal May Violate Pact on Proliferation,"Defense News,July 17,1989.
29 Bowen,Wyn and Andrew Koch,"Nonproliferation is embraced by Brazil,"Jane's Intelligence Review,June 1996, p.284.
30 Bitencourt,"The Brazilian Defense Industry:Is the Dream Over?"In James Brown(ed.)Arms Control in a Muli-Polar World,Amsterdam:VU University Press,1996,p.256.
31 1990年寇松访问美国时，有媒体报道说巴西前“航空技术中心”(CAT)主任胡戈(Hugo Piva)正在帮助伊拉克发展弹道导弹。胡戈自1987年退休后正领导由23人组成的小组，致力于发展射程为1500公里的弹道导弹。该报道的曝光使寇松极为尴尬，因为他正在努力改善巴西在西方世界中的负面形象。寇松责成他的战略事务秘书要求胡戈作出合理解释。胡戈辩解说自己的活动是合法性的，因为他正在从事秘密工作。但胡戈愿意向美国驻巴西大使作出解释。鉴于此。外交部长建议总统成立一个跨部门委员会，专门研究出台新的出口控制法律，这表明巴西现存的立法体系不能阻止诸如胡戈这样的非法援助活动。
32 Fernando Henrique Cardoso,"Space for Peace Not War,"Defense News,September 18,1995,p.32.
33 Bowen,Wyn and Andrew Koch,"Nonproliferation is embraced by Brazil,"Jane's Intelligence review,June 1996,p.185.
34 Evan S. Medeiros,"Brazil Gains MTCR Membership,Space Program Remains Intact,"Arms Control Today,25 (November 1995), p.28
35 这七种常规武器是：战斗坦克，装甲战斗用车，大口径的炮兵系统，战斗机，攻击性直升机，战舰和导弹及其运载工具。
36 巴西多次卫星发射失败，根本原因在于技术问题，巴西没有获得能完成火箭惯性导航系统的技术。如果要使VLS成功发射，必须依赖MTCR成员国愿意向巴西提供必要的技术援助。
37 U.S. Department of State of the Spokesman,"U.S.-Brazil Space Cooperation Agreement,"For Immediate Release March 1,1996.
38 “空间扫描”，http://www.cast.ac.cn/cbw/GJTK/2000/200001/KJSM.HTM.
39 吴展：“核裁军的进展”，http://www.mgyj.com/american_studies/1992/third/third02.htm.
40 William Potter and Adam Stulberg,"The Soviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles,"Surviva132,No.6 (November/December 1990), p.546.
41 "Joint Statement Issued by Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,Moscow,"American Foreign Policy Current Documents,February 10,1990 (Washington DC:US Department of State,1991), p.369.
42 "Joint Statement Issued by Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Moscow,"American Foreign Policy Current Documents,February 10,1990 (Washington DC:US Department of State, 1991),p.73.
43 Scherr, ED.,"US,Russia Agree on MTCR Guidelines," http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/930716-295365.htm.
44 "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement of Missile Proliferation," http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/mtcrusch.htm.
45 中国国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措施”，http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN017705.pdf.
46 Robert Shuey, "Assessment of the Missile Technology Control Regime,"in Brauch et al.,eds,No.2,p.184.
47 Jing-dong Yuan,"The MTCR and Missile Proliferation: Moving Toward the Next Phase,"May 2000, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/MTCR_missile-e.PDF,pp.8-9.
48 叶竞康：“美国掌握英国核武器控制核潜艇”，《世界新闻报》，2005年11月9日。
49 "N. Korea military exports said to total $800 million,"The Daily Yomiuri(29 September 1999),p.8.
50 Dinshaw Mistry.Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Contro,2003.p.36.
51 Stephen Engelberg,"German Atomic Sale Challenged,"The New York Times (1 February 1989),p.A2
52 Shirley A. Kan,"China:Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy-Actions and Chronology,"http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/98-485.pdf.
53 例如核能是一种重要的能量来源；化学和生物技术能用于工业，制药和农业领域；火箭技术能被用作发射通讯卫星和遥感卫星。火箭技术，诸如化学制品(用作火箭推进剂)，电子学(用于火箭引导)，金属(用于机身和热防护)利机器工具(用于建造导弹)也有众多非军事的工业运用。
54 尹怀勤：“印度大力发展导弹核武器”，http://www.space.cetin.net.cn/docs/ht0104/ht010413.htm.
55 Gerald M. Steinberg with Aharon Etengoff, "Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Developments in the Middle East:2000-2001,"Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No.52.p.29.
56 U.S. Department of Defense,The Military Critical Technologies List,Washington,D.C.:GPO,October 1992.
57 James Sperling,David Louscher, and Michael Salomone,"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side:The Prospects for Weapons and Weapons Technology Diffusion and Control,"Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago,April 1997.
58 A. A. Pikayev, L.S.Spector, E.v.kirichenko, and R.Gibson, "Russia, the U.S and the Missile Technology Control Regime,"Adelphi Paper 317 (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies,March 1998),p.18.
59 Milhollin, Gary,"India's Missiles With a Little Help from Our Friends,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45(November 1989).
60 Whn Q. Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000,pp.26.
61 Rediff,"MTCR Delays India's Missile Program," http://www.rediff.com/news/apr/28MTCR.htm.
62 Mannshaiya, Habir K,"India's Prithvi Government Held Hostage to Its Own Missile,"International Defense Review,Strategic & Security Issues,Vol.28,No.8, August 1,1995,p.23.
63 陈仕军、熊鹰：“印度当前导弹发展状况”，http://bwl.jschina.com.cn/abroad/india/217.htm.
64 转引自：蓝建学：“印度大国梦中的中国情结”，《当代亚太》，2004年第12期，第37页。
65 转引自：钟有为：“试论印度的大国梦”，《安徽教育学院学报》，2003年9月第21卷，第5期，第29页。
66 Luis Bitencourt,Developing Countries and Missile Proliferation:The Case of Argentina, Brazil, and India,Washington, D.C.2001.p.226.
67 Seema Gahlaut,"India and the MTCR," appeared in The Hindu,on August 14,1999. http://www.indiagov.org/press/New_Delhi_Press/August_1999/India_MTCR_August_14_1999.htm.
68 The Economist, July 8,1995.
69 The Economist,December 23,1995.
70 2005年4月，笔者赴乔治亚大学访问时，格哈罗特教授在授课中曾详细阐述了她对印度与MTCR关系的看法。文中观点是作者的听课笔录。
71 "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime Madrid, Spain,"12-16 September 2005, http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/madrid.html.
72 关于MTCR的局限性和歧视性问题，作者曾请教清华大学国际问题研究所的李彬教授，他以通俗、风趣的语言解答了作者的一些疑问，文中的个别观点也吸收了李彬教授的观点，特 此表示感谢!
73 “多国签署第一个防止弹道导弹扩散准则”，http://gb2.chinabroadcast.cn/772/2002-11-26/89@121523.htm.
74 Aidan Harris,"International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation," BASIC NOTES,18 July 2002,http://www.basicintoorg/pubs/Notes/2002international_code.htm.
75 "International Response:Code of Conduct Ineffective,Experts Say,"by Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire,15 February 2002.
76 P·Litavrin, V·Lukiantsev,"The Hague Missile Code,"International affairs,Copyright(?)2003 EBSCO Publishing.
77 Mark Smith,"On Thin Ice: First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct,"Arms Control Today,July/August 2002.
78 Michael Richardson,"The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):An Assessment of its Strengths & Weaknesses,With Some Proposals for Shaping its Future,"http://www.iseas.edu.sg/tr32006.pdf.
79 Stephen G. Rademaker,"The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):A Record of Success,"Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation Washington, DC June 9, 2005. http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate060905.pdf.
80 Andrew Prosser, Herbert Scoville,"The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective," http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf.
81 United Nations Security Council,Note by the President of the Security Council, S/23500,31 January 1992.
82 U.S. Department of State:Fact Sheet,September 4,2003 (Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting, Paris,September 3-4)
83 联合国宪章第53条规定：“1、安全理事会对于职权内之执行行动，在适当情形下，应利用此项区域办法或区域机关。如无安全理事会之授权，不得以区域办法或由区域机关采取任何执行行动；但关于依第一百零七条之规定对付本条第二项所指之任何敌国之步骤，或在区域办法内所取防备此等国家再施其侵略政策之步骤，截止本组织经个关系政府之请求，对于此等国家之再次侵略，能担负防止责任时为止，不在此限。2、本条第一项所称敌国系指第二次世界大战中为本宪章任何签字国之敌国而言。”参阅：许光建主编：《联合国宪章诠释》，山西教育出版社，1999年4月第1版，第694页。
84 联合国安全理事会第1540(2004)号决议，2004年4月28日安全理事会第4956次会议通过，全文参见：http://www.un.org/chinese/aboutun/prinorgs/sc/sres/04/s1540.htm.
85 许光建主编：“联合国宪章诠释”，山西教育出版社，1999年4月第1版，第693—694页。
86 Andrew Prosser, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Peace Fello,"The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspectiv,"June 16,2004,http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf.
87 Financial Times,July 11,2003.
88 Michael Richardson, "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): An Assessment of its Strengths & Weaknesses,With Some Proposals for Shaping its Future," http://www.iseas.edu.sg/tr32006.pdf.
89 国务院新闻办公室：“张炎谈有关中国为何未参加防扩散安全倡议问题”，http://news.xinhuanet.corn/video/2005-09/01/content_3429111.htm.
90 Raja Mohan,"India and proliferation security," http://www.hinduonnet.com/2003/10/06/stories/2003100605081100.htm.
91 Reuters,"N.Korea warns UN over US pressure on S. Korea,"by Irwin Arieff 24 February 2006.
92 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland,31 May 2003,http://www.usinfo.pl/bushvisit2003/wawel.htm.
93 Andrew Prosser, Herbert Scoville,"The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective," http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf.
94 郭晓兵：“军控拦截’在珊瑚海”，《世界知识》，2003年第19期。
95 Rebecca Weiner,"Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Materiel," http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030716.htm.
96 Kralev, The Washington Times,June 17, 2003.
97 Rebecca Weiner,"Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Materiel," http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030716.htm.
98 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 19.
99 (1)对沿海国的主权、领土完整或政治独立进行任何武力威胁或使用武力，或以任何其他违反《联合国宪章》所体现的国际法原则的方式进行武力威胁或使用武力；(2)以任何种类的武器进行任何操练或演习；(3)任何目的在于搜集情报使沿海国的防务或安全受损害的行为；(4)任何目的在于影响沿海国防务或安全的宣传行为；(5)在船上起落或接载任何飞机：(6)在船上发射、降落或接载任何军事装置；(7)违反沿海国海关、财政、移民或卫生的法律和规章，上下任何商品、货币或人员；(8)违反本公约规定的任何故意和严重的污染行为；(9)任何捕鱼活动；(10)进行研究或测量活动；(11)任何目的在于干扰沿海国任何通讯系统或任何其他设施或设备的行为；(12)与通过没有直接关系的任何其他活动。
100 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 23.
101 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 37.
102 奥本海：《奥本海国际法》(上卷)，商务印书馆，1972年版，第101页。
103 Patricia LEWIS and Ramesh THAKUR,"Arms control, disarmament and the United Nations,"http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2016.pdf.
1 Aaron Karp,Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996),pp.139-141.
2 “警察巡逻”指的是对每一种导弹部件都要进行核查。“火警巡逻”指的是只对整件导弹进行核查。
3 Andrew Aldrin,"Technology Control Regimes and the Globalization of Space Industry,"Space Policy 14(1998),p.21.
[1] 刘华秋．军备控制与裁军手册[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，2000年．
[2] 何仁学、吴小平．铸剑为犁：21世纪的军备控制与裁军[M]，北京：中国青年出版社，1998．
[3] 希金斯、乐舍夫、乐雷行．飞鱼导弹秘闻[M]．南宁：广西民族出版社，1986年．
[4] 龚学军．从弓箭到导弹：武器发展史话[M]．北京：商务印书馆，1982年．
[5] 余超志．导弹概论[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，1982．
[6] 夏立平．亚太地区军备控制与裁军[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2002．
[7] 徐岩、李莉．天盾：美国导弹防御系统：TMD和NMD[M]．北京：解放军文艺出版社，2001．
[8] 吴莼思．威慑理论与导弹防御[M]．北京：长征出版社，2001年．
[9] 杨存堂．美苏冷战的一次极限：加勒比海导弹危机[M]．南宁：广西师范大学出版社，2002．
[10] 吴凤明．导弹：战争的革命．北京：海潮出版社，2001．
[11] 于川信．越洋杀手：战略导弹[M]．北京：军事科学出版社，2000．
[12] 刘桐林、倪永华、刘愔．高技术战争中的“撒手锏”：巡航导弹[M]．北京：解放军文艺出版社，2002．
[13] 孙家栋．导弹武器与航天器装备[M]．北京：原子能出版社，2003．
[14] 刘绍球．针尖对麦芒：导弹与反导弹[M]．长沙：国防科技大学出版社，2000．
[15] 戴隆淦．巡航导弹及其克星[M]．北京：兵器工业出版社，2003．
[16] 韩祖南．世界导弹博览[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，2001．
[17] 朱强国．美国战略导弹防御计划的动因[M]．北京：世界知识出版社，2004．
[18] 魏孔虎．会说话的“导弹”：导弹与战争[M]．长沙：湖南科学技术出版社，2005．
[19] 陈辉亭．飞鸣镝：中国地空导弹部队作战实录[M]．北京：解放军文艺出版社，2005．
[20] 李德福．千钧一发：古巴导弹危机纪实[M]．北京：世界知识出版社，1997．
[21] 张毅、杨辉耀、李俊莉．弹道导弹弹道学[M]．长沙：国防科技大学出版社，1999．
[22] 贾俊明、董学斌．倚天：共和国导弹核武器发展纪实[M]．北京：西苑出版社，1999．
[23] 何柱．火箭与导弹[M]．北京：科学出版社，1976．
[24] 朱明权．核扩散：危险与防止[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，1995．
[25] 杜祥琬编著．核军备控制的科学技术基础[G]．北京：国防工业出版社，1996．
[26] 美国军备控制协会．军备控制概论[M]．北京：军事科学出版社，1993．
[27] 张伟超．战神霹雳：导弹与核武器[M]．北京：长江文艺出版社，1999．
[28] 朱锋．弹道导弹防御计划与国际安全[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2001．
[29] 孙连山、杨晋辉编著．导弹防御系统[G]．北京：航空工业出版社，2005．
[30] 孙景文、李志民编著．导弹防御与空间对抗[G]．北京：原子能出版社，2004．
[31] 谢储生．新世纪的矛与盾：导弹及导弹战今昔[M]．福州：福建教育出版社，1995．
[32] 袁易．中国遵循国际弹道建制的解析[M]．台湾：五南图书出版公司，2004．
[33] 王杰、门洪华．国际机制论[M]．北京：新华出版社，2002．
[34] 门洪华．和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2002．
[35] 倪世雄：当代西方国际关系理论[M]，上海：复旦大学出版社，2001
[36] 刘杰．秩序重构：经济全球化时代的国际机制[M]．北京：高等教育出版社，上海社会科学院出版社，1999．
[37] 王逸舟．西方国际政治学：历史与理论[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1998．
[38] 金应忠、倪世雄．国际关系理论比较研究[M](修订本)，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2003．
[39] 樊勇明．西方国际政治经济学[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2001．
[40] 沈丁立、任晓主编．现实主义与美国外交政策[G]上海：上海三联书店，2004．
[41] 任晓、沈丁立主编．保守主义理念与美国的外交政策[G]，上海：上海三联书店，2003．
[42] 王逸舟．当代国际政治析论[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1995．
[43] 潘振强等主编．国际裁军与军备控制[G]．北京：国防大学出版社，1996．
[44] 苏长和．全球公共问题与国际合作：一种制度的分析[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2000．
[45] 秦亚青．霸权体系与国际冲突—美国在国际武装冲突中的支持行为(1945—1988)．上海：上海人民出版社，1999．
[46] (美)肯尼迪．十三天：古巴导弹危机回忆录[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1977．
[47] (美)林赛、奥汉隆．美国之盾．北京：新华出版社，2004．
[48] (俄)弗·谢·别洛乌斯．反导弹防御和21世纪的武器[M]．北京：东方出版社，2004．
[49] (英)加涅尔．导弹控制系统[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，1985．
[50] (美)罗伯特·基欧汉．霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争．苏长和、信强等译．上海：上海人民出版社，2001．
[51] 罗伯特·基欧汉、约瑟夫·奈．权力与相互依赖[M]．(第3版)，门洪华译，北 京：北京大学出版社，2002．
[52] (美)约翰·米尔斯海默．大国政治的悲剧．王义桅、唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003．
[53] 罗伯特·基欧汉编．新现实主义及其批判[G]．郭树勇译，北京：北京大学出版社，2002．
[54] (美)诺姆·乔姆斯基．新自由主义与全球秩序[M]．徐海铭、季海宏泽，南京：江苏人民出版社，2000．
[55] (美)亚历山大·温特．国际政治的社会理论[M]．秦亚青译，上海：上海世纪出版集团，2000．
[56] (美)肯尼思·W·汤普森．国际关系中的思想流派[M]．梅仁、王羽译，北京：北京大学出版社，2003．
[57] (美)鲍德温主编．新现实主义与新自由主义[G]．肖欢容译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2001．
[58] (美)詹姆斯·德·代元主编．国际关系理论批判[G]．秦治来译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2003．
[59] (美)肯尼思·华尔兹．国际政治理论[M]．信强译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003．
[60] (美)汉斯·摩根索．国家间的政治—为权力与和平而斗争[M]》(第五版修订本)．杨歧鸣、王燕生、赵归、林小云译，北京：商务印书馆，1993．
[61] (美)斯坦利·霍夫曼．当代国际关系理论[M]．林伟成、刘晓红、王建伟等译，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1990．
[61] (美)罗伯特·吉尔平．世界政治中的战争与变革[M]．北京：中国人民大学出版社，1994．
[62] (英)布赞、(丹麦)维夫、(丹麦)怀尔德主编．新安全论[G]．朱宁泽，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2003．
[63] (美)T．N．杜普伊．武器和战争的演变[M]．北京：军事科学出版社，1985．
[1] 夏立平．亚太地区弹道导弹及其技术的扩散和控制[J]．国际观察，2001，1．
[2] 高硕．试析中东弹道导弹的扩散[J]．阿拉伯世界，2003，3．
[3] 李小军．美国对南亚导弹扩散的安全评估与政策选择[J]．美国研究，2004，4．
[4] 李小军．“导弹技术控制制度”的困境及其出路：一种机制研究[J]，2005，3．
[5] 李小军．制度根基、制度缺陷与制度修复：对“导弹技术控制制度”的理论思考[J]．国际论坛，2005，1．
[6] 李小军．美国与巴西关系中的“核因素”及其影响[J]．国际论坛，2005，5．
[7] 李小军．欧美防扩散战略的分歧与合作[J]．外交评论，2005，6．
[8] 李小军．中东对全球防扩散体制的十大挑战[J]．阿拉伯世界，2005，2．
[9] 景南．巡航导弹的扩散问题[J]．中国航天，2000，8．
[10] 齐秀丽．美国与导弹技术控制体制[J]．唐山师范学院学报，2004，7．
[11] (澳大利亚)卡洛·科普．导弹技术扩散凸现防空重点，击败巡航导弹[J]．国际展望，2005，10．
[12] 赵青海．“防扩散安全倡议评析”[J]．国际问题研究，2004，6．
[13] 顾国良．美国“防扩散安全倡议”评析[J]．美国研究，2004，3．
[14] 王君．冷战后中国不扩散政策的转变及其原因分析[J]．太平洋学报，2002，4。
[15] 周宝根、李彬．军备控制中的非军事因素[J]．国际经济评论，2002，9．
[16] 刘金质．冷战后美国的防扩散政策[J]．国际政治研究，1998，1．
[17] 欧阳立平．反恐怖形势下的防扩散问题[J]．现代国际关系，2003，5．
[18] 王君．中国与多边出口控制机制关系之演变及原因探析[J]．辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2005，3．
[19] 陈继东．美国“9·11”事件后的全球军控与防扩散[J]．南亚研究季刊，2002，1．
[20] 周建设．美国新安全战略与国际军备控制[J]．求索，2002，5．
[21] 时殷弘．东亚军备控制和不扩散问题：现状与危险．战略与管理，2002，5．
[22] 卡内基国际和平基金会俄罗斯与欧亚项目报告．美俄核心安全问题—核安全、核不扩散和导弹防御[J]．国外社会科学文摘，2001，11．
[23] 夏立平．亚太地区禁止生物武器的进程[J]．国际观察，2001，6．
[24] 李彬．国际军备控制的现状与前景[J]．国际经济评论，2001，9-10．
[25] 叶如安．国际军备控制向何处去?[J]．国际问题研究，2002，7．
[26] 张业遂．国际安全形势与中国的军控制、裁军和防扩散[J]．求是杂志，2005，19．
[27] 王勇．美国放松高科技产品的出口控制及其对中美经贸关系的影响[J]．国际贸易问题，1996，7．
[28] 夏立平．外层空间军备控制的进展与障碍[J]．当代亚太，2002．6．
[29] 朱强国．美国退出《反导条约》的动因及潜藏的战略意图[J]．外交学院学报，2002，1．
[30] 周宝根、李彬．党派政治对冷战后美国军控政策的影响[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2002，4．
[31] 夏立平．国际军备控制理论的演变与建立有中国特色的军控理论[J]．国际政治研究，2002，2．
[32] 张涛华．不受控制的国际机制—国际机制的独立性研究[J]．河北理工学院学报 (社会科学版)，2004，2．
[33] 葛传红．对待国际机制的两种态度—关于“机制困境”的分析[J]．社会科学．2003，3．
[34] 门洪华．关于美国霸权的机制分析[J]．太平洋学报，2002，2．
[35] 门洪华．国际机制的有效性与局限性[J]．美国研究，2001，4．
[36] 王明国．国际机制对国家行为的影响—机制有效性的一种新的分析视角[J]．世界经济与政治，2003，6．
[37] 刘志云．国际机制理论与国际法的发展[J]．现代国际关系，2004，10．
[38] 门洪华．国际机制与美国霸权[J]．美国研究，2001，1．
[39] 门洪华．国际机制与中国的战略选择[J]．中国社会科学，2001，1．
[40] 韩俊艳、刘丰．国际机制中的国家参与问题析论[J]．华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2003，4．
[41] 杨光海、杨震．后冷战时代的美国霸权与国际安全机制—以安理会和北约为例[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2004，3．
[42] 刘宏松．机制合法性与国际机制的维持[J]．学术探索，2005，2．
[43] 张兴平．论国际机制安全[J]．甘肃社会科学，2004，6．
[44] 于营、林松．论全球化背景下的国际机制[J]．北华大学学报(社会科学版)，2005，2．
[45] 辛本健．美国霸权的“软肋”及其霸权护持战略[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，11．
[46] 王缉思．美国霸权与中国崛起[J]．外交评论，2005，5．
[47] 于营．权力、利益、观念—国际机制的三种理论范式分析[J]．长春大学学报，2005，2．
[48] 何杰．权力与制度—国际机制理论的现实主义分析[J]．欧洲研究，2003，4．
[49] 刘庆荣．以交易费用为视角考察国际机制的有效性[J]．学术探索，2004，7．
[50] 程新章．制度化霸权机制探析[J]．江苏社会科学，2004，6．
[51] 刘杰．中国参与国际机制的理论与实践[J]．毛泽东邓小平理论研究，2003，4．
[52] 张岚．从科索沃危机看当今国际安全机制的取向[J]．现代国际关系，1999，5．
[53] 刘青建．发展中国家成功改变国际制度的三个变量探析[J]．太平洋学报．2003，3．
[54] 葛腾飞．反恐怖斗争与新型国际安全机制的构建[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2002，1．
[55] 陈须隆．国际安全机制：定义与分类[J]．国际政治研究，2000，1．
[56] 丁松泉、张小敏．国际合作的新自由主义视角[J]．国际关系学院学报，2004，3．
[57] 简军波、丁冬汉．国际机制的功能与道义[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，3．
[58] (加拿大)江忆恩．简论国际机制对国家行为的影响[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，12．
[59] 门洪华．国际机制理论的批评与前瞻[J]．世界经济与政治，1999，11．
[60] 唐颖侠．国际法与国内法的关系及国际条约在中国国内法中的适用[J]．社会科学战线，2003，1．
[61] 史页、李超．战后国际安全观念和安全机制的演变[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2002，6．
[62] 高华．评介美国等西方学论国际组织[J]．世界经济与政治1997，7．
[63] 李钢．西方国际制度理论探析[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，2．
[64] 范菊华．论偏好和国际制度的关系[J]．现代国际关系，2003，8．
[65] 余敏友．论国际组织的地位与作用[J]．法学评论，1995，5．
[66] 门洪华．国际机制的合法性[J]．国际政治研究，2002，1．
[67] 乔卫兵．冷战后中国与国际机制的互动关系[J]．国际政治研究，2001，1．
[68] 胡慧敏．无政府状态下国际制度的效用[J]．国际论坛，2003，3．
[69] 陈须隆．核不扩散机制透析—国际安全机制的一个案例研究[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，8．
[70] 王学东．国家声誉与国际制度[J]．现代国际关系，2003，7．
[71] 郭树永．评“国际制度和平论”[J]．美国研究，2000，1．
[72] 李晓燕．试析国际制度的作用及其局限性[J]．国际关系学院学报，2003，6．
[73] 李晓燕．浅析国际制度的制约因素[J]．政法论丛，2004，2．
[74] 随新民．国际制度的合法性与有效性—新现实主义、新自由制度主义和建构主义三种范式比较[J]．学术探索，2004，6．
[75] 陈晓进．国际制度的概念辨析[J]．国际观察，2000，6．
[76] 田野．交易费用理论视野下的国际制度需求分析[J]．欧洲，2002，1．
[77] 张胜军．国际政治与国际组织的功能主义分析[J]．欧洲，1998，3．
[78] 周丕启．国际关系中的政治合法性[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，3．
[79] 胡伟．合法性问题研究：政治学研究的新视角[J]．政治学研究，1996，1．
[80] 王宏强．论政治合法性的三个层面[J]．济南市社会主义学院学报，2003，1．
[81] (法)让—马克·思古德．什么是政治的合法性?[J]．外国法译评，1997，2．
[82] 孙建光．西方政治合法性理论辨析[J]．求实，2004，2．
[83] 赵海立．政治合法性理论及其分析架构[J]．厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2004，5．
[84] 张连国．政治合法性探析[J]．理论与现代化，2004，4．
[85] 周丕启．政治合法性与国际稳定[J]．国际论坛，2001，10．
[86] 孙晓玲．“霸权稳定论”与中国新安全观：一种比较视角[J]．世界经济与政治2004，2．
[87] 樊勇明．霸权稳定论的理论与政策[J]．现代国际关系，2000，9．
[88] 秦亚青．新现实主义和新自由主义：从论争到趋同—第三次国际关系学理辩论的终结[J]．国际论坛2001，6．
[89] 范菊华．对建构主义的解析[J]．世界经济与政治，2003，7．
[90] 牛震．关于霸权稳定论及其评价[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，10．
[91] 肖欢容．国际关系理论中的理性主义论争[J]．世界经济与政治，2001，12．
[92] 秦亚青、(美)亚历山大·温特．建构主义的发展空间[J]，世界经济与政治，2005，1．
[93] 王义桅、唐小松．从霸权稳定论到单极稳定论[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，9．
[94] 倪世雄、许嘉．论冷战后新现实主义面临的挑战[J]．欧洲，1997，4．
[95] 周丕启．霸权稳定论：批判与修正[J]．太平洋学报，2005，1．
[96] 郭树永．评“霸权稳定论”[J]．欧洲，1997，6．
[97] 潘忠岐．制度与合作：新自由制度主义对新现实主义的批判与发展[J]．世界经济与政治，2004，7．
[98] 刘武通．从结构理论到反结构决定论——新现实主义与新自由主义理论评析[J]．欧洲，1999，9．
[99] 方长平、冯秀珍．国家利益研究的范式之争：新现实主义、新自由主义和建构主义[J]．国际论坛，2002，5．
[100] 刘永涛．西方新现实主义理论与建构主义批评[J]．世界经济与政治，1998，11．
[101] 陈东晓．试论国际制度的本质特征及其与美国霸权的互动关系[J]．国际政治研究，2004，3．
[102] 苏长和．重新定义国际制度[J]．欧洲，1999，6．
[103] 时殷弘、陈然然．论冷战思维[J]．世界经济与政治，2001，6．
[104] 沈丁立．博弈在拥核与弃核之间．文汇报[N]．2005，8(26)．
[105] 钟振明．多边主义合作：冷战后东盟安全战略新取向[J]．国际论坛，2000，12．
[106] 舒建中．鲁杰“多边主义”理论述评[J]．国际论坛，2005，1．
[107] 叶江．单边主义与多边主义的相互转换—试析多边主义在布什第二任期回归的可能[J]，2004，4．
[108] 倪峰．对多边主义理论构成的一些探索[J]．国际论坛，2004，11．
[109] 秦亚青．边主义研究：理论与方法[J]．世界经济与政治，2001，9．
[110] 朱锋．《导弹管制条例》利于中美关系发展．中国日报[N]，2002，8．
[1] Schmidt, Rachel., U.S. export control policy and the missile technology control regime. Santa Monica : Rand, 1990.
[2] Alexander A. Pikayev., Russia, the US and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.
[3] Mistry, Dinshaw., Containing Missile Proliferation : Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control. Seattle: University of Washington Press.2003.
[4] Almay Khalilzad.&n., The United States and WMD : Missile Proliferation in the Middle East : Rand,1996.
[5] Illiam C., The International missile bazaar : the new suppliers's network, edited by William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
[6] Marcy Agrnon., Arms proliferation policy: support to the Presidential Advisory Board, Santa Monica, CA : Rand,1996.
[7] Bailey, Kathleen & Robert Rudney. C, Proliferation and export controls. Lanham: University Press of America ;Fairfax, Va. : National Institute for Public Policy,1993.
[8] Jia, Hao, China's nuclear nonproliferation policy and international regime. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1999.
[9] Goldman, Charles A, Engaging China in the international export control process : options for U.S. policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND,1997.
[10] David Rubenson, Ann., The impact of missile proliferation on U.S. power projection capabilities. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation,1990.
[11] Cooper, David A., Competing Western strategies against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: comparing the United States to a close ally. Westport, Conn. : Praeger,2002.
[12] Armati, Istvan, Missile development and its impact on global security. New York : United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1999.
[13] Hamre, John J. Technology and security in the twenty-first century : U.S. military export control reform,2001.
[14] Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the threat of cruise missiles. Gormley. Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies,2001.
[15] Dando, Malcolm., Biological warfare in the 21st century: biotechnology and the proliferation of biological weapons, 1994.
[16] Bailey, Kathleen C, Proliferation and export controls.1993.
[17] Dianne E. Rennack., Nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile proliferation sanctions: selected current law. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Novinka Books, 2004.
[18] Karp, Aaron., Ballistic missile proliferation : the politics and technics. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996
[19] Carus, W. Seth. Cruise missile proliferation in the 1990s. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992.
[20] Trevor Findlay(ed). Chemical weapons & missile proliferation: with implications for the Asia/Pacific region. Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, Pub., 1991.
[21] Wyn Q. Bowen., The politics of ballistic missile nonproliferation. Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Macmillan Press Ltd. St. Martin's Press in association with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton.
[22] Genevieve J. Knezo., Federal security controls on scientific and technical information : history and current controversy. New York : Novinka Books, 2003.
[23] Claus Hofhansel., Commercial competition and national security: comparing U.S. and German export controlpolicies. Westport, Conn.: Praeger 1996.
[24] Douglas E. McDaniel., United States technology export control: an assessment. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1993.
[25] Burghart, Daniel L., Red microchip: technology transfer, export control, and economic restructuring in the Soviet Union. Aldershot, Hants : Dartmouth, 1992.
[26] Karl M. Meessen(ed). International law of export control : jurisdictional issues. London, Boston : Graham & Trotman,1992.
[27] John Heinz., U.S. strategic trade: an export control system for the 1990s. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1991.
[28] Tuan Yao Cheng., The U.S. politics of export control policy toward the People's Republic of China. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1990.
[29] A.L.C. de Mestral and T. Gruchalla-Wesierski., Extraterritorial application of export control legislation : Canada and the U.S,4. Dordrecht : Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1990.
[30] William J. Long., U.S. export control policy : executive autonomy vs. congressional reform. New York : Columbia University Press, 1989.
[31] Eckert, Theodore J., The transfer of U.S. technology to other countries : an analysis of export control policy and some recommendations. Princeton N.J. : Princeton University, 1981.
[32] U.S. Department of Commerce, Domestic and International Business Administration, Bureau of East-West Trade., Export administration. Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service, Inc., 1974.
[33] United States. Office of Export Control., A summary of U.S. Export control regulations. Washington : [s.n.], 1964.
[34] Berhanykun Andernicael and John Mathiason., Eliminating weapons of mass destruction : prospects for effective international verification. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
[35] Hamel-Green, Michael., Regional initiatives on nuclear-and WMD-free zones: cooperative approaches to arms control and non-proliferation. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2005.
[36] Hubbard, Christopher., Australian and US military cooperation: fighting common enemies. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgage, 2005.
[37] Mark A. Prelas, Michael S. Peck., Nonproliferation issues for weapons of mass destruction. Boca Raton, FL: Dekker/CRC Press, 2005.
[38] Vilmos Cserveny., Building a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East: global non-proliferation regimes and regional experiences. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2004.
[39] Wendy Frieman., China, arms control, and nonproliferation. London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.
[40] Leon T. Carter (editor)., Arms control and nonproliferation: issues and analyses. Huntington, NY : Nova Science Publishers, 2000.
[41] Joseph Cirincione (ed). Repairing the regime: preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. New York: Routledge, 2000.
[42] Keith R. Krause(ed). Culture and security: multilateralism, arms control, and security building. London, Portland, OR : F. Cass, 1999.
[43] Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning (ed). Missile defence: international, regional and national implications. London ; New York, N.Y. : Routledge, 2005.
[44] Owen L. Sirrs. Nasser and the missile age in the Middle East. New York : Routledge, 2005.
[45] Steven A. Hildreth (ed)., Missile defense: the current debate. New York : Novinka, 2004.
[46] Alice L. George., Awaiting Armageddon : how Americans faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
[47] Abraham Ben-Zvi., John F. Kennedy and the politics of arms sales to Israel. London; Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2002.
[48] Anthony H. Cordesman., Strategic threats and national missile defenses: defending the U.S. homeland. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.
[49] Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003.
[50] Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[51] Stephen D. Krasner., International Regimes, Cornell University Press,1983.
[52] Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder : Westview Press ,1989
[1] Chun Yong Taek, "Missile Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and Consequences of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Program", Rome Forum: Missile Threats and BMD. http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/NMD/chun.pdf.
[2] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)", Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. http://www.nti.org/e_research/o fficial_docs/inventory /pdfs/mtcr.pdf.
[3] "Missile Proliferation, 1995-1997", http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tracking_missile.pdf.
[4] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies., "International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses", Occasional Paper No.5. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op5/op5.pdf.
[5] Aidan Harris, "International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation", BASIC NOTES, 18 July 2002. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2002international_code.htm.
[6] The Center for International Trade and Security, "Counterterrorism and the Nonproliferation Regime", http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/monitor/monitor_win_2002.pdf.
[7] "China's Proliferation Practices and The Challenge of North Korea", http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/transcripts/05_03_10.pdf.
[8] Mohamed KADRY SAID, "Missile proliferation in the Middle East: a regional perspective", The Middle East, No.2, 2001.
[9] W. Seth Carus, "Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2000).
[10] CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web, Richard P. Cronin., "Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects", March 19, 2002. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf.
[11] Gerald Steinberg, "U.S. Responses to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1998).
[12] Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., "China's Missile Policy", June, 1998. http://www.strom.clemson.edu/opinion/whitehurst/chinamissile.pdf.
[13] Joseph Cirincione, "Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China", http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/NSA/cirincione.pdf.
[14] Michael D. Swaine with Loren H. Runyon, "Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia", NBR Analysis, http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/swainenbr.pdf.
[15] CRS Report for Congress, Christopher Bolkcom and Sharon Squassoni, "Cruise Missile Proliferation", Order Code RS21252July 3, 2002. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS21252.pdf.
[16] Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia", http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b/readings/sagan.pdf.
[17] NAEEM AHMAD SALIK, "Missile Issues in South Asia", The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002.
[18] Kent L. Biringer, "Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring in South Asia", http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMBiringer.pdf.
[19] Michael Kraig and James Henderson, Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, "US Strategies for Regional Security: South Asia", Convened at Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, Virginia October 25-27, 2001.
[20] Senate Foreign Relation's Committee, "The United States & South Asia: New Possibilities", January 28, 2004. http://www.senate.gov/～foreign/testimony/2004/WisnerTestimony040128.pdf
[21] House Of representatives, Subcommittee On Asia and The Pacific, Committee on International relations, "The U.S and South Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for American Policy", Thursday, March 20, 2003, Washington, DC.
[22] Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary Washington, DC. September 4, 2003. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles", http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/09_03_psi_brief.pdf.
[23] Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt, "Fighting proliferation—European perspectives", Chaillot Papers, December 2003. http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai66e.pdf.
[24] Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", July 14, 1999. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/deutch/11910book.pdf
[25] CRS Report for Congress , Jennifer K. Elsea, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft", October 1, 2003. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32097.pdf.
[26] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies., "Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects , Occasional Paper No. 7, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op7/op7.pdf.
[27] K. Alan Kronstadt, "Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia", October 17, 2003. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32115.pdf.
[28] Rajesh M. Basrur, "Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective", http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/SABMDBasrur.pdf.
[29] Peter D. Zimmerman, "Missile Defense and American SecurityA Sensible National Policy", Defense Working Paper No. 2. May 1996.
[30] "Pakistan and North Korea Dangerous counter-trades , Strategic Comments, Volume 8 Issue 9 November 2002. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/Pakistan-and-North-Korea.pdf.
[31] Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana, and Jurgen Scheffran., "A Comprehensive Missile Control Regime: It's Not too Soon", Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor April 2001.
[32] Jing-dong Yuan, "Strengthening China's Export Control System", October 4,2002. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/jdmemo.pdf.
[33] Sue Soo-ha Yang, "Legal Basis for State Interception of Shipments on High Seas: Legality of the Naval Interdiction under the "Proliferation Security Initiative", October 1, 2003. http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/MEMO_NK_interdiction.PDE
[34] Mutahir Ahmed, "Missile Defense and South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective", http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/SABMDMutahir.pdf.
[35] Akira Kurosaki, "Proposal for A Regional Missile Limitation Regime: An Alternative to Missile Defense in Northeast Asia", ISYP CONFERENCE "Advancing Human Security" Halifax, Nova Scotia July 15-17 2003. http://www.student-pugwash.org/halifax2003/papers/Kurosaki.pdf.
[36] Antonio Catalano di Melilli, "Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles" International Seminar-Santiago de Chile-October 26-27, 2004.
[37] Yun Duk-min, "North Korean Long-Range Missiles: Development, Deployment, and Proliferation", East Asian Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn 2004.
[38] Peter van Ham, "WMD Proliferation and Transatlantic Relations: Is a Joint Western Strategy Possible?" April 2004. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2004/20040400_cli_ess_vanham.pdf.
[39] Jozef Goldblat, "Is there a future for the MTCR?" http://www.gipri.ch/spip/IMG/pdf/Is_there_a_future_for_the_MTCR.pdf.
[40] Mark Smith, "Missing Piece and Gordian Knot: Missile Non-Proliferation", http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No27.pdf.
[41] Martha Clark, "A False Sense of Security: The Role of Missile Defenses in Counterproliferation Doctrine", http://www.psr.org/documents/psr_doc_0/program_4/full03.pdf.
[42] James Clay Moltz, ed., "New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security", Occasional Paper No. 12. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op12/op12.pdf.
[43] Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues", Updated April 5, 2005. http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2006/upl-meta-crs-8111/RL31555_2006Jan05.pdf?PHPSESSID=e03f04befb92745fc19eba73e7d385dc.
[44] James H. Hughes, "The Ballistic Missile Threat: Defense and Technology", The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, V.26, No. 1, Spring, 2001.
[45] Andrew Feickert, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries", Updated March 5, 2004. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31999.pdf.
[46] Mitch Kugler, "International Missile Defense Cooperation and the MTCR", http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Presentation030630%20Kugler%20Missile%20Defense%20Cooperation%20and%20MTCR%20TB.pdf.
[47] Kenneth G. Weiss, "The Limits of Diplomacy: Missile Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Defense", World Affairs, Vol. 163 No. 3 Winter 2001.
[48] Robert J. Einhorn, "Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs", http://www.uspid.org/sections/03_Conferences_Seminars/past_activities/none_cast01/pdf/cast2001%20-%20pr14%20-%20Einhorn.pdf.
[49] Stephen Blank, "Russia as Rogue Proliferator", Orbis, V.44 No.1.Winter 2000.
[50] Jon B. Wolfsthal, "Prospects for a US-DPRK Breakthrough on Missile Development", LNCV-Korean Peninsula: Enhancing Stability and International Dialogue, 1-2 June 2000, Roma. http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/corea/proc/045.pdf.
[51] Jim Walsh, "Russian and American Nonproliferation Policy: Success, Failure, and the Role of Cooperation", Occasional Paper 2004-01. June, 2004.
[52] Wyn Q. Bowen, "U.S. Policy On Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR'S First Decade (1987-1997)", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997.
[53] Yurie.Fedorov, "The Global Control System and the International Code of Conduct: Competition or Cooperation?" The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002.
[54] CRS Report for Congress , Sharon Squassoni, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)", June 7, 2005. http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RS21881.pdf.
[55] Henry Sokolski, "Space Technology Transfers and Missile Proliferation", http://www.npec-web.org/Testimonies/Testimony980410%20Space%20Technology%20Transfers%20and%20Missile%20Proliferation.pdf.
[56] Wyn Q. Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR", http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol03/33/bowen33.pdf
[57] Phillip C. Saunders, "Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List", September 6, 2002. http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/pdfs/prc_msl.pdf
[58] U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation, "The Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions", Washington, DC. May 2005. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/abr_und_r/psi/download/faq.pdf.
[59] Jing-Dong Yuan, "Recent Developments in China's Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002.
[60] Aaron Karp, "The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security", The Nonproliferation Review/F all-Winter 2000.
[61] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK", Occasional Paper No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf.
[62] Arvind Kumar, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia: Options for Stabilization ", February 2004. http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/links/cmc-papers/sand2004-0317.pdf.
[63] Evan S. Medeiros, "Chasing the Dragon Assessing China's System of Export Controls for WMD-Related Goods and Technologies", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG353.pdf.
[64] Victor Zaborsky, "Viewpoint: U.S Missile Nonproliferation Strategy Toward Thnis and China: How Effective?" The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997.
[65] George Abbey and Neal Lane, "United States Space Policy: Challenges and Opportunities", http://www.amacad.org/publications/spacePolicy.pdf.
[66] Randall S. Wood, Johns Hopkins SAIS, "Non-Proliferation Strategies for India and Pakistan in the Aftermath of the May 1998 Tests", December 2004. http://www.therandymon.com/papers/nonproliferation.pdf.
[67] Joseph Cirincione, "Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China", http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/NSA/cirincione.pdf.
[68] Hideshi Takesada, "North Korea's Missile Development: Implications for Neighboring Countries", LNCV-Korean Peninsula: Enhancing Stability and International Dialogue, 1-2 June 2000, Roma. http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/corea/proc/042.pdf.
[69] Eric A. Miller Willis A. Stanley, "The Future of Ballistic Missiles", October 2003. http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/futures.pdf.
[70] Nell Joeck, "The U.S.-India 'Global Partnership': The Impact on Nonproliferation", http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/joe102605.pdf.
[71] T.V. PAUL "Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power", The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003.
[72] Jing-Dong Yuan, "Chinese Responses to U. S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security", The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2003.
[73] Jing-Dong Yuan, Phillip C. Saunders, and Strphanie Lieggi, "Recent Developments in China's Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002.
[74] Henry Sokolski, "Viewpoint: Next Century Nonproliferation: Victory is Still Possible", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996.
[75] Joseph Cirincione, "Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat", The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000.
[76] Michael Barletta, ed., "After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation", Occasional Paper No. 8. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op8/op8.pdf.
[77] Victor Mizin, "Russia's Missile Industry and U.S Nonproliferation Options", The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1998.
[78] Kcn Conca, "Technology, the Military, and Democracy in Brazil", Journal of International Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1992).
[79] Raju G. C. Thomas, "U. S Transfers of 'Dual-Use' Technologies to India", Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 9 (Sep., 1990).
[80] Barry W. Coceano, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges and Perceptions", Occasional Paper, May 2004. http://www.acus.org/docs/0405-Proliferation_Security_Initiative_Challenges_Perceptions.pdf.
[81] "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Is it Legal? Are We more Security?" http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/il/ILP250205.pdf.
[82] "The Proliferation Security Initiative : The Legal Challenge", http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/09_03_psi_brief.pdf.
[83] Samuele. Logan, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges", http://www.law.fsu.edu/Journals/transnational/voll42/logan.pdf.
[84] Stephen G Rademaker, "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): A Record of Success", Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation Washington, DCJune 9, 2005.
[85] Herbert N. Warden IV, "Overcoming Challenges to the Proliferation Security Initiative ", http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/warden.pdf.
[86] Andrew C. Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005.
[87] Duncan L.Clarke, Robert J. Johnston, "U.S Dual-Use Exports to China, Chinese Behavior, and the Israel Factor: Effective Controls?" Asian Survey, Vol.39, No.2 (Mar.-Apr., 1999).
[88] Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World", International Security, Vol.9, No.3 (Winter, 1984-1985).
[89] Michael Byers, "Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative", The American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, No.3 (Jul., 2004).
[90] Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security, Vol.16,No.1 (Summer, 1991).
[91] Aluf Benn, "Slowing the missile race", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2002.
[92] Scott D.Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb", International Security, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter, 1996-1997).
[93] John H. Nuckolls, "Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism", Science, New Series, Vol.267, No.5201(Feb.24,1995).
[94] John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness", International Security, Vol.17, No.2 (Autumn,1992).
[95] Anupam Srivastave, "India's Growing Missile Ambitions: Assessing the Technical and Strategic Dimensions", Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No.2 (Mar.-Apr., 2000).
[96] Randall Forsberg, "Abolishing Ballistic Missiles: Pro and Cons", International Security, Vol.12, No.1 (Summer, 1987).
[97] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status", Updated February 10, 2005. http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/other_us/crs021005.pdf
[98] Sverre Lodgaard, "Making the Non-Proliferation Regime Universal," http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No7-Lodgaard%20Final.pdf.
[99] Eric Brahm,"lnternational Regimes", September 2005. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_regimes/.
[100] Milner, "International Regimes and World Politics:Comments on the Articles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jonsson," International Social Science Journal, 1993.
[101] Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world," International Organization 36, 2, Spring 1982.
[102] Krotochwil and Ruggie,"International Organization: A State of Art or an Art of State", International Organization, Vol. 40, 1986.
[103] Young, Oran R, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics 39, p. 10.
[104] Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization. 41. 1987.
[105] Robert Keohane,"International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?", Foreign Policy, Spring 1998.
[106] John Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, No.6 (Summer 1990).
[107] Seema Gahlaut and Gary K. Bertsch,"The War on Terrorism and the Nonproliferation Regime," Orbis, Summer 2004, Vol. 48 No.3.
Washington Post
New York Times
Jane's International Defense Review
Jane's Defense Weekly
The Washington Times
Jane's Defense Weekly
中国外交部：http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gjwt/cjjk/default.htm
中国商务部科技发展和技术贸易司：http://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/
导弹及其技术控制制度：http://www.mtcr.info/english/press.html
兰德公司：http://vivisimo.rand.org
军备控制协会：http://www.armscontrol.org
蒙特雷国际学院防扩散研究中心：http://cns.miis.edu
国际贸易与安全中心：http://www.uga.edu/cits/home/default.htm
斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所：http://www.sipri.org
2 Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation," International Security, Vol.18, No.1 (Summer, 1993), p.139.
3 1955至1957年间，以色列已开始酝酿核计划，并于1958年早期开始了核计划的基础设施建设，在内盖夫沙漠建立了核设施。自1969年起，在没有签署《核不扩散条约》的情况下，美国实际上已接受以色列的核国家地位。美国认为容忍以色列拥有核武器的道理与容忍英国和法国拥有核武器的道理是一样的，就是认为以色列不会对美国造成威胁。参阅：Avner Cohen, "Israel and the Evolution of U.S Nonproliferation Policy : The Critical Decade (1958-1968)," The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1998, p.1.;《以色列的核武库》，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/sjhll/450447.htm.
4 南非曾宣布己拥有核武器，但在西方国家的制裁和压力下，最后宣布拆除核技术和核弹，从而使南非成为第一个从有核转为无核状态的国家。
5 邹德浩、张晓春、金谷、青木等：“德媒体披露美国准备打伊朗，北约内部已在协调”，《环球时报》，2006年1月2日，第1版。
6 William B. Vogele, "Is the Future like the Past? Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.41, No.2 (Nov., 1997), p.320.
7 包括核武器、化学武器和生物武器。
8 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Security, Winter 1984/85(Vol.9, No.3), p.166.
9 联合国裁军事务部：“导弹” http:/Avww.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/missiles.htm.
10 Jon Wolfsthal, "Nuclear Weapons in the World," http://nst.pku.edu.cn/print.php?sid=6004.
11 《日内瓦公约》禁止在战争中使用窒息性、毒性或其他气体和细菌作战方法。
12 日本化学战罪行研究课题组：“日本化学战在中国犯下的滔天罪行”，《光明日报》，2005年9月28日，http://www.gmw.cn/content/2005-O9/28/content_307080.htm.
13 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Security, Winter 1984/85(Vol.9, No.3), p.169.
14 联合国裁军事务部网站：“生物武器”，http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/biological.htm.
15 国内对MTCR的翻译，计有：“国际导弹技术控制制度”，“导弹技术控制制度”，“导弹及其技术控制制度”，“国际导弹技术控制组织”“全球导弹技术控制机制”等。本文从中国外交部译法，称为“导弹及其技术控制制度”。见，“中国重申愿意加入导弹及其技术控制制度(MTCR)”，http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/gb/doc/2004-06/03/content_336265.htm.
16 因为准则出台的首次大会在海牙召开，有些文章把准则也称为“Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation，简写为HCOC”。中国外交部军控司时任司长沙祖康将其称为“防止弹道导弹扩散国际行为准则草案”。
17 有些中文文献将其翻译为“导弹与导弹技术防扩散的全球控制体系”，本文的翻译从沙祖康司长的说法。参阅：“沙祖康司长就NMD问题在“吹风会”上答记者问”，2001年3月14日，http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697073.htm.
18 Mark Smith, "Efficiency and Inefficiency of the MTCR," http://www.inesao.org/bulletin19/bul19art22.htm.
19 刘华秋主编：《军备控制与裁军手册》，国防工业出版社，2000年12月第1版，第386页。
20 他们的代表作分别是：Mistry, Dinshaw., Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control. Seattle: University of Washington Press.2003.; Karp, Aaron., Ballistic missile proliferation: the politics and technics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Wyn Q. Bowen, The politics of ballistic missile nonproliferation. Basingstoke, Hampshire,New York:Macmillan Press Ltd. St. Martin's Press in association with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton.; Jing-dong Yuan, "The MTCR and Missile Proliferation: Moving Toward the Next Phase", May 2000, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/MTCR missile-e.PDF.
21 中国国家图书馆，2005年2月25日查询结果，http://210.82.118.4:8080/F/2RUGANQ2DAFF7KQ2AGJDQ7BX39PYS3HGFHSJ8UD52M1RYN9GJ5-31501?func=find-m-results&set_number=001382.
22 例如Payne, Keith B., Missile defense in the 21st century: protection against limited threats including lessons from the Gulf War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Lindsay, James M., Defending America: the case for limited national missile defense, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
23 "Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," July 15, 1998. http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/BMThreat.html; Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001 .pdf.
24 例如Mohamed Kadry Said, "Missile proliferation in the Middle East: a regional perspective," http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art75.pdf;Robert D. Walpole, "The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to the United States Through 2015", http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2000/walpole_missile_092200.htm.
25 Hideshi Takesada, "North Korea's Missile Development: Implications for Neighboring Countries," http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/corea/proc/042.pdf;Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," Updated February 26, 2003. http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-rl31555.pdf.
26 沈教授对博士生的研究分工是：李小军：导弹扩散及其控制；吴莼思：导弹防御、威慑和国际安全；章节根：印度核威慑理论：郑飞：美国的全球核部署和核分享；李治军：美韩同盟与朝鲜核问题；赵建明：伊朗核问题：高奇琦：美韩核关系与朝鲜核认知。
27 朱锋：《弹道导弹防御计划与国际安全》，上海人民出版社，2001；吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年；朱强国：《美国战略导弹防御计划的动因》，世界知识出版社，2004年。
28 夏立平：“亚太地区弹道导弹及其技术的扩散和控制”，《国际观察》，2001年第1期。
29 高硕：“试析中尔弹道导弹的扩散”，《阿拉伯世界》，2003年第3期。
30 作者发表的与导弹扩散相关的文章计有：“制度根基、制度缺陷与制度修复：对‘导弹技术控制制度’的理论思考”，《国际论坛》2005年第1期；“美国与巴西关系中的‘核因素’及其影响”，《国际论坛》2005年第5期；“美国对南亚导弹扩散的安全评估与政策选择”，《美国研究》2004年第4期：“‘导弹技术控制制度’的困境及其出路：一种机制研究”，《国际政治研究》(季刊)2005年第3期；“欧美防扩散战略的分歧与合作”，《外交学院学报》2005年第6期，总第85期：“中东对全球防扩散体制的十大挑战”，《阿拉伯世界》2005年第2期。
31 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
32 阎学通、孙学峰：《国际关系研究实刚方法》，人民出版社，2001年9月第1版，第132页。
33 关于“technology denial”一词，国内有些学者将其翻译为“技术拒止”或“技术禁阻”。作者认为，MTCR的主要功效是通过从供应方对导弹技术的限制或禁运来延缓和终止导弹计划，故翻译为“技术阻禁”最贴近MTCR的功效。
1 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the Worm Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.57.
2 Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, "Editor's Introduction," ⅹⅱ,egime Theory and International Relations,Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003.
3 国外关于国际机制研究的突出成果是：Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997.从国内来看，北京大学王杰教授主编的《国际机制论》对国际机制理论做了系统介绍和梳理；复旦大学苏长和副教授著的《全球公共问题与国际合作：一种制度的分析》和中央党校门洪华博士著的《和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究》中，运用国际机制理论研究现实问题。苏长和与门洪华是国内目前研究国际制度问题最为活跃的两位青年学者。
4 Eric Brahm, "International Regimes,"September 2005, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_regimes/.
5 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年1月第1版，第2页。
6 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997,p. 1.
7 Helen Milner, "International Regimes and World Politics: Comments on the Articles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jonsson," International Social Science Journal, 1993,No.45, p. 494.
8 Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, "Editor's Introduction", ⅹⅱ., Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003.
9 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年1月第1版，第3页。
10 Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables," cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第1页。
11 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997,p.8.
12 Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.9.
13 Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world," cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第115页。
14 Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," International Organization 36,2,Spring 1982.
15 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power ,Boulder:Westview Press,1989,p4.
16 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder:Westview Press,1989,p3.
17 Stephen Krasner,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables,"cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第2页。
18 Krotochwil and Ruggie,"International Organization:A State of Art or an Art of State," International Organization,Vol.40,1986,p764.
19 Stephen Krasner,"Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables," International Organization,Vol.36,1982, p.186.
20 Robert Keohane,After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1984.
21 Young, Oran R, "International Regimes:Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics,No.39, p.106.
22 John J. Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International Institutions,"International Security,Vol.19.No.3,Winter 1994/1995, 0.337.
23 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海人民出版社，1998年4月第1版，第389页。
24 李钢：“西方国际制度理论探析”，《世界经济与政治》，2000年第2期。
25 梁守德、洪银娴：《国际政治学概论》，北京大学出版社，第244页。
26 国际政治秩序是在缺乏中央政府的情况下，基于领土主权国家之间相互作用的一种体系。世界秩序处理不同的问题领域，每个问题领域都要接受一个或多个机制的控制。例如集体安全问题就是由联合国框架来调节的。防扩散领域是通过《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT)，《化学武器公约》(CWC)，《生物武器公约》(BWC)和更广泛的“大规模杀伤性武器”(WMD)防扩散机制处理的。地区安全问题，是通过地区组织与联合国集体安全和维持和平结构来处理的。
27 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年1月第1版，第16页。
28 孙仲：“国际组织理论研究评析”，《浙江大学学报》(人文社会科学版)，2001年3月，第31卷第2期，第59页。
29 国际条约在国内法中如何实施是一个非常复杂的问题，通常包括“国际条约能否直接适用国内”和“国际条约与国内法发生冲突时如何解决”两个问题。国际条约在国内法中的适用，主要有个别转换(individual transformation)和自动纳入(automatic incorporating)两种模式。前者是指国际条约在国内法发生效力的前提，是国际条约在本质上是不能直接在国内适用的，必须由国家通过个别的立法来实施条约，这种立法活动可能是立法行为，也可能是国际条约颁布或其它宪法程序。后者是指国家一旦缔结或加入某一国际条约，该国际条约便自动地成为国内法的一部分，从而无需转化即可在国内法中直接适用。另一个重要问题，是当国际条约与国内法发生冲突时如何解决，实际上也就是国际条约与国内法的相互地位问题。国际法对此没有强制性的统一规定，各国在实践中也有不同的解决办法。但至少有一条原则已得到各国的普遍首肯，即国家不能以国内法为理由来违反或规避国家应尽的条约义务。因为条约一般一定需要被批准，而且通常不会得不到国家立法的赞成。形成对照的是，不以条约为核心的机制不要求国内的批准。
30 Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie,"International Organization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State,"International Organization,Vol. 40,No.4,1986,pp.763-771,772,774.
31 Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie ,"International Organization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State,"International Organization,Vol.40,No.4,1986.no.763-771.772.774.
32 约翰·鲁杰．主编、苏长和等译：《多边主义》，浙江人民出版社，2003，年2月第1版，第9页。
33 John G. Ruggie,"Multilateralism:The Anatomy of an Insti2tution,"in John G. Ruggie ed.Multilateralism Matters,pp. 12-13.
34 新现实主义是在“修正”传统现实主义和批判新自由主义的过程中逐渐发展起来的。华尔兹以新的理论贡献，确立了其在西方国际关系学中作为新现实主义开拓者的地位。新现实主义的基本理论主张是：国家作为国际社会中心角色的地位不可撼动；国际系统包括结构和过程两部分，“结构层次”分析非常重要，因为新现实主义提出体系结构的概念，就“划出了国际政治研究的领域，并使研究者能够看到体系的结构、结构内的变量，是如何影响互动的单元及其行为的。”国家仍然把权力视为目的和手段，国家的一切行动仍然重要是为追求经济和经济权力。
35 基欧汉的《新现实主义及其批评者》，构成了新现实主义和新自由主义争论的主要标志，该书对新现实主义和新自由主义的批评观点作出了最初的总结。
36 在过去的十多年时间里，新自由主义或基于利益的机制理论代表了研究国际机制的主流方法，影响巨大。该学派强调国际机制在帮助国家实现共同利益中扮演着重要角色。为了阐述自己的理论主张，新自由主义把国家描绘为只关心自己绝对收益的理性的自我主义者(egoists)。新自由主义主要是通过对关注信息和交易成本的制度经济学，来阐发观点的。新自由制度主义理论认为：国际机制是有影响和有弹性的。为了避免出现共同的最不满意的结果，机制将在具有自我利益的的国家，帮助协调其行为。如前所述，新现实主义和新自由主义都是理性主义者，都把国家视为具有自私利益和寻求自我目标的行为体。国际机制的建立，是国家根据偏好对自我利益盘算的结果。
37 长达半个多世纪的冷战对峙突然以和平方式结束，新现实主义者事前未能对其作出任何预测性研究，引来国际关系研究者的许多批评。在对主流国际关系理论进行深刻反思的基础上，建构主义研究取向应运而生。任何一项国际关系研究都试图通过建立一套理论概念，来确立其理论框架。建构主义者使用的是一组在意义上相互关联的概念，即“规范”、“认同”和“文化”。建构主义认为，规范是指对某个特定国家本体作出适当行为的集体期望，包括规则、标准、法律、习惯、习俗等。
38 从本体论而言，新现实主义和新自由制度主义均属理性主义。而建构主义是反理性主义的；从世界观而言，新现实主义和新自由制度主义都接受物质主义理念，不承认观念的实质性意义。建构主义虽不否认物质的客观存在，但反对把客观存在绝对化，认为权力分配的意义，在很大程度是由利益分配的意义建构的，利益的内容在很大程度上是由观念建构的；在认识论上，新现实主义和新自由制度主义都是科学实证主义的归纳式解释，而建构主义是科学实证主义的个性式解释；在方法论上，新现实主义和新自由制度主义是个体主义，建构主义是整体主义。
39 大卫·鲍德温：《新现实主义与新自由主义》，浙江人民出版社，2001年版，第152页。
40 [美]西摩·马丁·李普塞特，刘钢敏译：《政治人—政治的社会基础》，商务印书馆，1993年。
41 随新民：“国际制度的合法性与有效性—新现实主义、新自由制度主义和建构主义三种范式比较”，《学术探索》，2004年第6期，第72页。
42 Oran Young, "The Effectiveness of International Regimes," in Oran Young, Governance in World Affairs, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.112.
43 门洪华：《和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究》，上海人民出版社，2002年9月第1版，第96-97页。
44 现实主义强调冲突与战争，认为国家是追逐利益和权力的；自由主义则强调合作与稳定，认为国家是自律、自控和理性的。现实主义学派认为，国际制度并不能促使国家合作，而仅仅促使国家间的协调，因为“制度对国家行为的影响很小”，“不能减轻无政府状态对国家之间合作的抑制作用”。而且，“当无论是讨价还价力量的平衡，还是对国家利益的看法(或两者都包括在内)，在那些就制度进行谈判的国家之间发生变化以后，所有那些贴上制度标签被抬高了的国际安排，都很容易地走向倾覆”。制度，如果真正存在的话，也几乎很少或根本没有什么影响，它们只不过是权力政治的附带现象。新现实主义认为，基欧汉为了制度理论的完善淡化了权力的重要作用。现实主义正是抓住新自由制度主义淡化国家实力作用这一点，强调权力对合作的影响比制度对合作的影响更大。新自由主义学派认为绝对收益(absolute gains)是促使各国合作的重要因素，而现实主义学派关注的相对收益(relative Rains)，认为实力才是制度建立和延续的关键。华尔兹以新的理论贡献，确立了其在西方国 际关系学中作为新现实主义开拓者的地位。
45 本文虽然将把霸权稳定论作为新现实主义国际机制论的研究对象，但霸权稳定论并不是为了解释国际机制而专门设计和形成的。霸权稳定论最初来自于经济学家金德尔伯格(Charles Kindleberger)对20世纪20、30年代大萧条(the Great Depression)的研究，认为“要使世界经济稳定，需要一个稳定者，而且只能有一个稳定者(Stabilizer)。”从理论归属上来讲，霸权稳定论是现实主义理论的一个分支，与现实主义的理论主张完全一致。从20世纪70年代后期开始，莫德尔斯基和吉尔平将该理论扩展到军事、安全领域，对霸权国实力和稳定的国际秩序之间的关系作了最系统的理论分析和阐述。从功能来上看，它又常被用来解释为什么国际体系在一种体系下能正常运转，而在另外一种情况下国际合作却不能成功实现的问题。
46 Van Ham, "The lack of a Big Bully: Hegemonic Stability Theory and Regimes in the Study of International Relations,"Acta Politica 27,1992,pp.29-48.
47 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社出版，2001年5月第1版，第59页。
48 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.90.
49 Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 137-138.
50 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories oflnternational Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.90-91.
51 显然，强制性的霸权是基于权力，而仁慈性的霸权是基于利益。从理论归属上来看，前者属于新现实主义，后者属于新自由主义。此外，仁慈霸权中霸权国家容忍力量弱小的行为体的盘剥(exploitation)，这与国家难以容忍相对损失(relative losses)的现实主义原则是相悖的，这足以说明作为理性国际机制论的新现实主义和新自由主义之间的密切联系。
52 在理论层次上，有学者对霸权稳定论提出了直接批评。首先，国际机制真是一种公共产品吗?衡量公共产品的标准一是看其是否免费，二是看其是否向全体公众开放。从第一个标准而言，邓肯·斯奈德尔和拉塞特认为所谓公共产品是一种虚拟的存在，是霸权国家为追求自己利益而恣意玩弄的、毫无公共性的工具而已。就第二个标准而言，相当多的学者认为被视为国际公共产品的大多数具有分割性、竞争性和排他性的特征。正如克拉斯纳所认为的：国际政治中国家力量的分布决定状况决定着国际机制的形态。具体来说，实力强大的国家制定游戏规则，决定谁参加游戏并有能力变更游戏的结果。因此认为国际机制是公共产品的观点是不能成立的。
53 门洪华：《和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究》，上海人民出版社，2002年9月第1版，第47页。
54 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》(After Hegemony：Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy)，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社，2001年5月第1版。
55 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社出版，2001年5月第1版，第62页。
56 认为它们共同的瑕疵，在于把国家的认同和利益视为是外生给予(exogenously given)的，也就是在解释诸如国际机制这样的国际现象时，把认同和利益看作非理论化的初始条件。因此，新现实主义和新自由主义对国际机制的解释是不完全的(incomplete)。
57 这种知识的分布不但构成了认同，而且也塑造了国家行为体的偏好与感觉的选择。
58 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories oflinternational Regimes, Cambridge University Press,1997,p.136.
59 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International regimes,Cambridge University Press,1997,p.167-168.
60 Wendt,"The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,"International Organization,No. 41,1987,p.363.
61 Stephen Krasner (ed.)International Regimes,Cornell University Press,1983, p.62.
62 Robert Keohane,After Hegemony, Princeton University Press.1984,p.132.
63 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press.1984, p.26.
64 在国际机制对国家行为的影响上，有学者总结了四种理论解释视角：一、新自由主义—功 利主义(Neo-liberal-utilitarian approach)的观点认为，国家特别偏好未来竞争的确定性，并会相应计算它们的成本与收益。就对机制遵守的选择而言，国家会评估它们自己的成本收益分析与合作的稳定性，对它们目前的净价值作出结论，并相应调整自己的行为。二、纯粹制度主义者(Pure Institutionalism)主张，国家会不折不扣地执行遵守，因为机制要生存。制度会承担它们自己的权力，并将成员社会化而进入遵从的行为。此外，因为国家承担了过多的信息，它们一定会创造规则，去避免相互审视的必要。机制的规范和规则，有助于国家削减通过创立无可争辩的决策选择规则而形成的决策负担。三、从知识理论(theories of knowledge)的观点来看，机制为国家“学习”创立了一种框架。国家能“考察”它们关于成本与收益行为的假定，以及合作机制的充足性。四、复合制度理论(complex institutional theory)把机制嵌入规范和规则的一般框架。遵从之所以会出现，是因为高级规则的规范体系在发挥作用，就如强化特殊机制里遵从的证明结构一样。参阅：Harald Muller, "The International of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," Volker Rittberger(ed), Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press.Oxford 1993. pp.362-363.
65 [加拿大]江忆恩(Alastair Iain Johnston)：“简论国际机制对国家行为的影响”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第12期，第22页。
66 Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornel University Press, 1996, p.16.
67 关于国家声誉和国际制度的关系问题，请参阅：王学东：“国家声誉与国际制度”，《现代国际关系》，2003年第7期。
68 关于偏好和国际机制的关系问题，请参阅：范菊华：“论偏好与国际制度的关系”，《现代国际关系》，2003年第8期。
69 Erik Gartzke, "Preferences and the Democratic Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.2,2000, p.210.
70 韩俊艳、刘丰：“国际机制中的国家参与问题析论”，《华侨大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)，2003年第4期，第38页。
71 John J. Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security,Vol.19,1994/95,p.7.
72 Gneco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues,eds.by Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis,Harper Collins College Publishers,1996,4th ed.,p.76.
73 Susan Strange ,"Cave! Hic Dragones:a Critique of Regime Analysis,"in International Regimes,p.345.
74 Robert Keohane,"The Demand for International Regimes,"International Institutions and State Power, pp.110-111.
75 周否启：“霸权稳定论：批判与修正”，《太平洋学报》，2005年第1期，第19页。
76 Robert O. Keohane, "The demand for international regimes," International Organization 36,2, Spring 1982. cited in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes,北京大学出版社，2005年5月第1版，第141-171。
77 David A.Baldwen.Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate.New York:Columbia University Press,1993,p.274.
78 简军波、丁冬汉：“国际机制的功能与道义”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第16-17页。
79 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译，上海人民出版社，2001年5月第1版，第125-127页。
80 Robert Keohane,"International Institutions:Can Interdependence Work?"Foreign Policy,Spring 1998,pp.82-96.
81 Stephen Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983. pp.86-91.
82 Jacob Werksman,ed.,Greening International Institations,London:Earthscan Publications,1996.p.16.
83 倪世雄：《当代西方国际关系理论》，复旦大学出版社，2001年7月第1版，第375页。
84 王缉思：“美国霸权的逻辑”，《美国研究》，2003年第3期，第7页。
85 [美]罗伯特·基欧汉：《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》，苏长和、信强等译 上海人民出版社出版，2001年5月第1版，第43页。
86 Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages:American Politics and International Organizations,1919-1999 (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution,1999).
87 “隐性违规”是一种没有明文禁止的保全国家利益的作法，虽然并不违反国际机制的正式规定，但却违背了国际机制的目的和宗旨，使国际机制解决共同问题的效力遭到损害。参阅：刘宏松：“浅析国际机制中的隐性违规现象及其理论含义”，《欧洲研究》2005年第3期。
88 Mancur Olson,The Logic of CollectiveAction: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups(New York.'Schocken Books,1965),p.2.;George Downs, Davis Rocke,and Peter Barsoom,"Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism,"International Organization52,No.2 (Spring 1998), pp.397-419.
89 [英]迈克尔·H·莱斯诺夫：《二十世纪的的政治哲学家》，商务印书馆，2001年版，第25页。
90 薛民：“哈贝马斯科学技术社会功能理论评析”，《复旦学报》(社会科学版)，1994年第2期，第37页。
91 [德]哈贝马斯：《交往与社会进化》，重庆出版社，1989年版，第184～185页。
92 [法]让—马克·夸克，佟心平、王远飞译，《合法性与政治》，中央编译出版社，2002年5月第1版，第1-3页。
93 王宏强：“论政治合法性的三个层面”，《济南市社会主义学院学报》，2003年。
94 赵海立：“政治合法性理论及其分析架构”，《厦门大学学报》(哲学社会科学版)，2004年第5期。
95 周丕启：“国际关系中的政治合法性”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第11页。
96 周丕启：“国际关系中的政治合法性”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第14页。
97 [美]大卫·A·鲍德温(Baldwin D．A)主编，肖欢容译，《新现实主义和新自由主义》，浙江人民出版社，2001年5月第1版，第143-146。
98 战后美国与欧洲等西方国家达成制度性的“相互确保战略”，主要通过一整套国际制度，保证美国不会对其伙伴国(或承认美国霸权的国家)滥用其权力(包括压榨伙伴国或在危急时弃伙伴国于不顾)，从而换取西方盟国对其霸权战略的支持。
99 G. John Ikenberry ,"Institutions, Strategic Restraint,and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,"International Security,Vol.23,No.3 (Winter 1998/1999) ,pp.54-56.
100 张睿壮认为之所以使用“正当性”而不用“合法性”(英语中同为legitimacy)，是为了定性一种良性的霸权或霸权秩序，原因有二：一是国际政治中的所谓“合法”，当指合乎国际法规，而一个特定时代的国际法规即便不是由那个时代的霸权国家一手制定，也往往带有它的深深烙印，用霸权主宰下制定的法规来衡量霸权的“合法性”在很大程度上成了同义反复；二是仅仅“合法”的霸权不一定能被视为“良性”，因为“法规”的范围过窄，不能涵盖国际关系准则或国家行为规范的内容，况且“合法”的要求过低，不能满足国际社会对“世界领袖”的道义期待。
101 张睿壮：“美国霸权的正当性危机”，《国际问题论坛》，2004年夏季号，总第35期。
102 随新民：“国际制度的合法性与有效性—新现实主义、新自由制度主义和建构主义三种范式比较”，《学术探索》，2004年第6期，第71页。
103 郭树勇：“评‘国际制度和平论’”，《美国研究》，2000年第1期。
104 王逸舟：《西方国际政治学：历史与理论》，上海人民出版社，1998年4月出版，第417页。
105 Martha Finnemore et al, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization, Vol.52, No.4, 1998,pp.881.
106 简军波、丁冬汉：“国际机制的功能与道义”，《世界经济与政治》，2002年第3期，第20页。
107 大卫·A·鲍德威(DavidA．Baldwin)：《新现实主义和新自由主义》，肖欢容译，浙江人民出版社，2001年5月第1版，第144。
108 [德]尤尔根·哈贝马斯：《合法性危机》，(中国台北)时报出版公司，1994年版，第99页。
109 新现实主义曾在防扩散问题上强调过三个要点：其一，出口控制和防止技术方面扩散的合作，不同于国家安全问题(例如军事)上的合作。其二，权力和利益等现实主义原则是防扩散机制存在的根据。其三，大国或霸权国家在诸如防扩散机制之类的安全机制形成中扮演了 重要角色。但遗憾的是，新自由制度主义国际机制理论却没有涉足安全领域的问题。
110 与国际机制概念的命运一样，国际安全机制的概念也存分歧，没有形成统一定义。具体请参阅：陈须隆：“国际安全机制：定义与分类”，《国际政治研究》，2000年第1期。
111 Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes,"in Stephen Krasner, ed.,International Regimes (Ithaca: Corell University Press, 1982),pp.173-194.
112 Charles Lipson,"International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,"World Politics 37,No.1(October 1984), pp.1-23.
113 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, No.6 (Summer 1990):5-56.
114 Robert Jervis,"Security Regimes,"International Organization,36,2, Spring 1982, p.357.
115 Robert M. Crawford, Regime Theory in the Post-Cold War World: Rethinking Neoliberal roaches to International Relations,Dartmouth Publishing Company, pp.101-103.
116 Seema Gahlaut and Gary K. Bertsch,"The War on Terrorism and the Nonproliferation Regime," Orbis,Summer 2004,Vol.48,No.3,p.2
1 John Simpson,"Current Issues Concerning the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Ballistic Missile Defenses,"Occasional Papers Available From CNS, Monterey Institute of International Studies,March 2001.p.1.
2 [美]汉斯·摩根索：《国家与政治》，中国人民公安大学出版社，1990年版，第511页。转引自齐秀丽：“美国与导弹技术控制体制”，《唐山师范学院学报》，2004年7月，第26卷第4期，第75页。
3 德国火箭专家冯·布劳恩为研制V-2导弹立下了汗马功劳，战后布劳恩等100余名德国火箭专家和技术人员被美国虏走，为日后美国的导弹研制作出了重要贡献。V-2导弹总重约13吨，导弹全长14米，直径1.3米，最大射程100多千米。总体来说，V-2导弹精确度低，可靠性差，只有大约40％到达目标。具体请参阅：总装备部电子信息基础部编：《导弹武器与航天器装备》，原子能出版社，航空出版社，兵器工业出版社，2003年7月第1版。
4 George Lindsey,"Ballistic Missile Defense in the 1990s,"Canadian Defense Quarterly (September 1995)，pp．6-11．转引自：吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第70页。
5 Randall Forsberg,"Abolishing Ballistic Missiles:Pros and Cons,"International Security,Vol.12,No.1(Summer,1987),p.190.
6 吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第66页。
7 Henry Sokolski,"Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence," http://fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch16.htm.
8 中国外交部原军控司司长沙祖康在美国卡内基研讨会上的发言：“关于防扩散问题的一些看法”，2000年11月7日，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wzzt/2290/2294/t10505.htm.
9 “巴基斯坦‘核弹之父’卡迪尔汗副手供认核交易”，《解放军报》，2004年2月23日。
10 Whn Q. Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, Published in the United States of America, New York, 2000,p.16.
11 在一本名为“The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation”的专著中，论述美国扩散的篇幅，仅是中国、前苏联的三分之一。参阅：Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America, New York, 2000.pp.14-15.
12 西方学界和政界的主流观点是：中国、俄罗斯、朝鲜、伊朗、印度、巴基斯坦是世界导弹 扩散的主要来源地，以美国为首的西方企图通过机制规制、技术禁运、政治压力、反扩散等手段，逐步削减这些导弹扩散源。
13 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes and International Cooperation in Arms Control, p.41.
14 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000 (Washington, D.C.:February 2001).
15 国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措施”，2003年12月，http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/27/content_1469.htm.
16 国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措旖”，2003年12月，http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/27/content_1469.htm.
17 [印度]昌德拉斯卡兰：“‘周边看中国’之印度篇：三国鼎立一三种安全观的较量与冲突”，http://www.armystar.corn/new_page_1599.htm.
18 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措施”，2003年12月，http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/27/content_1469.htm.
19 新华网：“背景资料：美国核武器”，2005年2月9日，http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-02/09/content_2564003.htm.
20 "Chapter 7:Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist-Sponsoring States,"http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/ch7_02.htm.
21 典型例子是古巴导弹危机。苏联在美国家门口的“盟国”转移具有核打击能力的导弹。参阅：李德福：《干钧一发：古巴导弹危机纪实》，世界知识出版社，1997年。
22 艾森豪威尔政府提出“原子用于和平”(Atoms for Peace)的倡议计划，这种核与太空技术共享政策刺激了包括导弹在内的武器扩散。冷战时期，美国对盟国的导弹及其技术的扩散，被看作是加强西方阵营团结的粘合剂。在美国遏制共产主义政治影响的背景下，一些发展中国家从美国获得了有限的导弹体系。为遏制苏联影响，美国对位于共产主义集团边缘的盟国或有条约义务的国家提供了大量武器援助。1950和1958年间，美国提供的武器数量从1950年的5100万美元上升到1955年的2.56亿美元，1958年竟达到6.33亿美元。具体参阅：Wyn Q.Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, First published in the United Stated of America,2000.pp. 14-15.
23 Aaron Karp,The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East (New York:Institute for East-West Security Studies,1990).pp.382-390.
24 世界上许多导弹问世后，各国为了方便，往往给导弹取个有意思的名字。主要有：有些导弹以人类的形象命名。如美国的“民兵”、“和平卫士”、“侏儒”、“爱国者”、“斗牛士”；俄罗斯的“斗十”、“野人”、“飞毛腿”、英国的“独眼巨人”、“恶妇”；以色列的“哨兵”、“猎手”等。有些导弹以兵器、片j具命名。如美国的“捕鲸叉”、“长矛”、“军刀”、“战斧”；俄罗斯的“飞镖”、“警棍”、“塞子”、“锉子”；英国的“吹管”；中国的“红旗”等。有些导弹以鸟类的名字命名。如美国的“不死鸟”、“麻雀”、“百舌鸟”、“超猎鹰”、“那伐鹤”、“秃鹰”；法国的“猎鹰”；英国的“雷鸟”、“海鸥”、“海鹰”；意大利的“信天翁”；挪威的“企鹅”和阿根廷的“翠鸟”。有些导弹以某些蛇、虫的名字命名。如美国的“铜斑蛇”、“壁虎”、“龙”；德国的“毒蛇”；法国的“响尾蛇”；以色列的“怪蛇”；意大利的“蚊”；中国的“蚕”等。有些导弹是以鱼类的名字命名的。如俄罗斯的“鳟鱼”、“五鱼”、“甲鱼”；法国的“飞鱼”等。还有一些导弹以兽类的名字命名。如美国的“小猎犬”、“大猎犬”、“小斗犬”、“幼畜”、“蝙蝠”：俄罗斯的“黑牛”、“黑羚羊”；英国的“海猫”、“海狼”、“警犬”和德国的“大象”等。参阅：吴凤鸣著《导弹：战争的革命》，海潮出版社，2001年4月第1版，第19页。
25 Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows and Richard Fieldhouse,Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume Ⅴ: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder:Westview,1999), pp.100-117.
26 Aaron Karp,Ballistic Missile Proliferation:The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1996), p.139.
27 "Israel Seeks Pre-emptive Strike Capability,"Aviation Week and Space Technology,No.27 October 1975.
28 美国认为，在面对阿拉伯邻国的威胁时，作为盟国的美国有义务确保以色列的生存和安全。 除出口“长矛”导弹外，1969年至1975年间，美国还向以色列转让了高技术军事装备，例如F-4E幻影战斗机(phantom)，F-15A鹰式(eagle)战斗机等。此外，1974年，叙利亚、利比亚和埃及从苏联获得了射程为280公里的“飞毛腿-B”(Scud-B)后，为遏制苏联的渗透，美国也认为有必要给以色列出口“长矛”导弹。
29 "Israel Seeks Pre-emptive Strike Capability,"Aviation Week and Space Technology,27 October 1975.
30 Aaron Karp,"Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,"International Security,V.9,No.3 (Winter 1984/85),p176.
31 SIPRI Yearbooks 1979,1980,1981,1982,1983 and 1984 (London and Philadelphia:Taylor and Francis).
32 Zhubaozao,"US Missile Development Programs Harmful for Global Strategic Balance and Stability,"Xinhua January 13,2000,http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/000113-abmt-prc.htm.
33 其中韩国出资1963万美元，占总出资额的68.4％，台湾地区出资628万美元，占出资额的21.9％，阿联酋出资263.4万美元，占出资额的9.2％。另外，日本政府出资14.4万美元，占出资额的5％。
34 “美国将向亚洲出口战术‘鱼义’导弹，台湾将获5枚”，http://news.sol.sohu.com/92/19/news205271992.shtml.
35 "US may supply Taiwan with Aegis missile system,"PLA Daily,2004-02-18,http://english.pladaily.com.cn/english/pladaily/2004/02/18/20040218001018_TodayHeadlines.html.
36 吴惟：“美最新战机只给以色列”，http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/ztpd/2004-09/08/content_3792.htm.
37 “美国称2004年度有望实现首次出口爱国者3型导弹”，http://www.qzwb.com.cn/gb/content/2004-08/12/content_1325493.htm.
38 日本政府已提出购买9枚“标准3”导弹“布洛克1A”型导弹的要求，包括与之配套的9个MK21Mod2型贮运箱，对1套“宙斯盾”武器系统进行升级，使其具备弹道导弹防御能力。所有相关配套设备，例如垂直发射系统的ORDALT设备、贮运箱、配件、检修设备，以及美国政府和供应商的技术支持和其它后勤保障，估计总价值为7.25亿美元。日本打算用“标准”导弹取代目前日本海上自卫队舰队中老式或可靠性差的导弹，目前日本舰队弹药库中已贮存有“标准”导弹。参阅："Approval seen for US sale of SM-3 missile to Japan," http://www.forbes.com/business/manufacturing/newswire/2004/05/10/rtr1366206.html.
39 澳大利亚政府申请购买的SLAM-ER导弹系统包括260枚箱装的实战、遥感探测和系留空中训练导弹、保障设备、集成和验收支持、训练导弹、运载箱、备用和维修部件、导弹维护和试验设备、项目管理、出版物和技术文献、人员培训和培训设备、美国政府和承包商的技术与后勤人员服务，以及其他与项目支持相关的文件。参阅：刘晓燕：“美国将向澳大利亚出售SLAM-ER和JASSM导弹”，http://news.163.com/05/0421/23/1HTAOLOA0001123L.html.
40 澳大利亚政府申请购买的JASSMR导弹包括260枚箱装的AGM-158实战、遥感探测和系留空中训练导弹、保障设备、集成和验收支持、训练弹、运载箱、备用和维修部件、导弹维护和试验设备、防备装置、项目管理、出版物和技术文献、人员培训和培训设备、美国政府和承包商技术及后勤人员服务，以及其他与项目支持相关的条件。参阅："US proposes missile sale to Australia,"http://au.biz.yahoo.com/050414/19/43lt.html.
41 “爱国者”先进性能—3(PAC—3)导弹防御系统是美国战区导弹防御系统中低层点防御系统的一个重要组成部分，主要用于对高度在40公里以下的弹道导弹在飞行末端进行拦截以保护战役战术目标；PAC—3由四个基本部分组成：地基雷达，交战控制站，发射装置和拦截弹；它的弹头以“碰撞杀伤”方式取代PAC—2的“碎片杀伤”方式，因为拦截弹的动能比爆炸所产生碎片的能量高的多，这种高能量还能摧毁化学或生物武器，所以，PAC—3导弹的杀伤力更大，http://www.shiyanhospital.com/my/news/shownews.asp?id=2485.
42 中新网：“台湾三军导弹装备一览表”，2002年7月30日，http://mil.fjii.com/2002-07-30/lajldsm_550.htm.
43 "Taiwan:Missile Profile,"The Risk Report,Vol.4 ,No. 6 (November-December 1998),http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/taiwan/missiles.html.
44 阮次山：“美国出售导弹给台湾的意义”，《联合早报》，2000年4月10日，http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/sino_us/pages2/sino_us041000.html.
45 刘宏：“冷战后美国对台政策调整对两岸关系的影响”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/179294.htm.
46 雪莉A．卡恩：“美国对台军售现状及发展”，摘自美国会研究机构于2005年3月21日的一份题为《台湾：自1990年以来美国主要军售》研究报告，http://www.defence.org.cn/aspnet/usa-mil/News/Articles/15547.html.这里需要特别注意的是，原文把台湾地区称为“国家”，这是严重的政治错误，特此更正。
47 原载美国《国防新闻周刊》，中新网2月19日电：《台被美正式列为军售“盟国”，可优先获尖端武器》，2004年2月19日，http://news.sohu.com/2004/02/19/19/news219131903.shtml.
48 Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma (Random House,New York, 1984),p. 122.
49 这种现象在其他国家也存在，虽说数量没有苏联那样巨大。比如美国有500多枚退役的Sargent导弹，法国有42枚“普吕东”(Pluton)等。
50 Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000.p15.
51 A. Karp,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World,"in SIPRI Yearbook 1989:World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.294.
52 A. J. Pierre,The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1982 ),p.74
53 A. J. Pierre,The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1982 ),p.74
54 "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,"http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/cia/9-99CIA.pdf.
55 Andrei Kozyrev, "Nonproliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons:The Record,Challenges and Prospects,"International Affairs,11(November 1993),pp.3-12.
56 从经济因素看，通过对伊朗的导弹技术出口，俄罗斯企业可获取不菲的经济收入，因为俄罗斯政府极少给本国的航空企业下发定单，为了生存，这些企业不得不瞄准国外市场。从地缘因素看，保持与伊朗的友好关系，不但能遏制伊朗国内的伊斯兰极端主义势力，而且能共同反对土耳其在中亚的渗透。
57 Kenneth Katzman,"Iran:Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers,"Updated January 3,2003.http://www.iranwatch.org/goverument/US/Congress/CRS/us-crs-wmdsuppliers-010303.pdf
58 Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44 No. 1,Winter,2000,p.3.
59 Reuters,March 9,1998,online, http://biz.yahoo.com.
60 Kenneth Katzman,"Iran: Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers,"Updated January 3,2003.
61 Richard B. Stone,"Call your member of Congress to override Iran Missile Veto!"http://www.ou.org/public/actionalerts/1998/iranmissiles.htm.
62 ABC News,"Putin Defends Missile Sales toSyria," http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=711089.
63 顾亚美：“俄罗斯向伊朗出售武器引起美国不满”，《环球时报》，2005年12月5日。
64 "Russia Sells Iran 29 Anti-Missile systems," http://mmrs.fema.gov/news/threats/2005/nov/nthr2005-12-03.aspx.
65 关于所谓俄罗斯向中国扩散导弹技术的论述，请参阅：Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44,No.1,Winter,2000.p.4.
66 关于所谓俄罗斯向中国扩散导弹技术的论述，请参阅：Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44,No.1,Winter,2000.p.4.
67 关于所谓俄罗斯向中国扩散导弹技术的论述，请参阅：Stephen Blank,"Russia as Rogue Proliferator,"Orbis (philadelphia, Pa.),Vol.44,No.1,Winter,2000.p.4.
68 Bates Gill,"Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,"Middle East Review of International Affairs,Vol.2,No.2 (May 1998),p.58.
69 突出的文献有：Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000.pp.14-15;Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Contror, University of Washington Press,Seattle and London,2003.p.57-65;Shidey A.Kan,"China:Possible Missile Technology Transfers," New York,2003;Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation,First Published 2004 by Routledge Curzon,New York.pp.91-108. Edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry M.Wortzel,China's Growing Military Power:Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, September 2002.p.105-149;Shidey A. Kan,"China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:Policy Issues,"Updated April 5,2005,http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf;National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,"September 1999.
70 Mark Smith,"Missile Proliferation, Missile Defenses and Arms Control,"from Special Joint Series on Missile Issues,Center for Nonproliferation Studies Mountbatten,Centre for International Studies,"International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses,"Occasional Paper No.5,p.25.
71 在作者搜集的三十多本资料中，以“导弹扩散”冠名的中文专著尚未发现。现有的中文著作主要论述的是关于导弹基本知识、各国导弹发展概览和美国的导弹防御等方面的内容。
72 比如：《中国的防扩散政策和措施》(2003／12／03)，全文见：http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/jks/jksxwlb/t54977.htm;《2004年中国的国防》白皮书，全文请参阅：http://www.gmw.cn/content/node_4980.htm.
73 Mark A. Stokes, "Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses," from Edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry M.Wortzel, China's Growing Military Power:Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, September 2002.p.107.
74 Robert A. Manning,Ronald Montaperto,Brad Roberts Cochbairs,China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment,Printed in the United States of America,2000.P.18.
75 指基于摧毁民间目标如城市、工业、资源等的一种战略。参阅：陆谷孙主编：《英汉大词典》(未删节版)，上海译文出版社，1993年8月第1版，第389页。
76 Edited by Andrew Scobell and Larry M.Wortzel,China's Growing Military Power:Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities,September 2002.p.110.
77 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,"http://www.cia.gov/nichaDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
78 Kenneth G. Weiss,"The Limits of Diplomacy:Missile Proliferation,Diplomacy, and Defense,"World Affairs,Vol.163 No.3 ,Winter2001.p.110.
79 Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers:Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New Worm Order,p.114.
80 Arms Control Reporter,6-7 September 1988(602. B.152/1988).
81 西方认为，20世纪80年代晚期之前，中国武器出口的标准是意识形态考虑，主要把武器出口给发展中世界，诸如北越，朝鲜和巴基斯坦这样的革命政权和缓冲国(buffer state)。此后，中国军备扩散政策的意识形态考虑越米越少，因为资金缺乏对中国军队实现现代化形成了很大制约，于是只有通过武器出口才能换取军队现代化的资金来源。20世纪80年代早期，中国成立了许多国防工业公司。1982年至1989年间，中国成为世界第五大武器供应国，军火出口收入达130亿美元。中国也开始出口地对空导弹(SAMs)、反舰导弹、喷气轰炸机，潜艇和弹道导弹。两伊战争时期，中国是双方武器的重要供应者。在这种环境下，中国成为世界上重要的弹道导弹供应者。参阅：R. A Bitzinger, Chinese Arms Production and Sales to the Third Worm (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,1991),p.3;D.Silverberg,"Iran-Iraq War Gives a Boost in Effort to Enter the World's Weapons Market,"Defense News,13 June 1988,p.24.
82 西方学者认为，虽然中国向沙特出售导弹的主要动机是经济因素，但也具有微妙的政治战略动机。包括：中国希望沙特在牺牲台湾的基础上对中国进行外交承认：通过获得沙特的外交承认，中国能在抵消美国和苏联的基础上，扩大其在中东的影响。参阅：Y. Scichor, East Wind over Arabia:Origins and Implications of the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal (Berkeley:University of California,Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies,1989, pp.18-25).
83 Whn Q. Bowen,The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York, 2000,pp.16-18.
84 Bates Gill,"Two Steps Forward,One Step Back:The Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-Making in an Era of Reform,"Chapter 9 in David M. Lampton (ed.),The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform,1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001),p.266.
85 Bates Gill,"Chinese Arms Exports to kan,"Middle East Review oflnternationalAffairs Vol.2,No.2 (May 1998),p.55.
86 Wyn Q.Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation,1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Lawrence Freedman,2000.p.22.
87 Richard L. Russell, "China's WMD foot in the Greater Middle East's Door,"The Middle East Review of lnternational Affairs,Volume 9,No.3,September 2005. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jvgno3a6.html.
88 The Washington Times,21 November 1996.
89 The Washington Times, 10 September 1997.
90 The Washington Times,15 April 1999.
91 President George W. Bush, Report to Congress on the Emergency Regarding Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 18, 2002.
92 这五家中国公司是：淄博市化工设备厂——根据《防止向伊朗扩散法》，曾于2002年5月受到制裁；溧阳市云龙化工设备集团公司——根据《防止向伊朗扩散法》，曾于2002年1月和5月受到制裁：中国精密机械进出口公司——根据《防止向伊朗扩散法》，曾于2002年5月受到制裁，并曾于1991年受到与导弹有关的法规的制裁；中国北方工业公司——根据经修正的第12938号行政令，曾于2003年5月受到制裁；泰安市外贸总公司在2003年6月首次遭到制裁。请参阅：美国国务院国际信息局：“美国根据，<防止向伊朗扩散法>制裁中国和北韩公司(全文)”，http://bj2.netsh.com/bbs/90856/messazes/6324.html.
93 John Bolton,Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, "Coordinated Allied Approaches to China,"Tokyo,Japan, February 7,2005.
94 C-802是一个射程为120公里，负载量为165公斤弹头的次音速导弹。国际上没有禁止反舰导弹扩散的国际协议，C-802也没有包括在MTCR规制的范畴中。
95 The Washington Post,3 April 1999.
96 The Washington Time,21 January 2000.
97 Jane's Defense Weekly,18 August 2004.
98 The Washington Times,30 June 2000.
99 CIA.,"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD," http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/.
100 例如2003年9月19日美国国务院宣布，因中国向某国出售先进导弹技术，美国政府已批准对中国北方工业公司进行最严厉的经济制裁。美国官员估计，最新一波制裁可能导致北方公司失去多达一亿美元的对美贸易业绩。参阅：《香港商报》，2003年9月21日。
101 “国务院称不向出口导弹技术中国公司实施制裁”，http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/sino_us/pages2/sino_us080801a.html.
102 “外交部发言人就<华盛顿时报>称中国向外出口导弹部件发表谈话”，2001年8月9日，http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/gb/doc/2001-08/09/content_6537.htm.
103 Harry Harding, "China's Co-operative Behavior," Chapter 14 in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 386.
104 Robert E. Mullins, "The Dynamics of Chinese Missile Proliferation," Pacific Review Vol. 8, No. 1 (1991), p. 142-143.
105 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London ,2003, p.57.
106 Testimony of Dr. Gordon Oehler, Hearing on the Proliferation of Chinese Missiles, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Senate, 11 June 1998.
107 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (popularly known as the Rumsfeld Commission), report, July 15, 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm.
108 Richard L. Russell, "China's WMD foot in the Greater Middle East's Door," The Middle East Review of International Affairs,Volume 9,No.3,September 2005. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a6.html.
109 The Washington Post, 25 August 1996.
110 The Washington Times, 6 August 2001.
111 Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," Updated April 5, 2005. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf.
112 参阅：时殷弘、陈然然：“论冷战思维”，载《世界经济与政治》，2001年第6期，第4页。
113 "Chapter 7: Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist-Sponsoring States," http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/ch7_02.htm.
114 "Chapter 7:Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist-Sponsoring States," http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003 /reports/ch7_02.htm.
115 刘结一：“加强团结合作，共同应对挑战，国际防扩散展望与中国的政策”，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wzzt/2290/2294/t10520.htm.
116 本节部分内容已发表于：《美国研究》，2004年第4期，第86-102。
117 四大地区指的是欧洲、南亚、中东和朝鲜半岛。参阅：Michael Kraig and James Henderson,ed.,"US Strategies for Regional Security:South Asia,"Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference,Convened at Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton,Virginia October 25～27,2001,p. 1.
118 Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia," http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b/reading/sagan.pdf.
119Naeem Salik, "Missile Issues in South Asia," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 48.
120 B. Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia,"A paper presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall,Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003.p.12.
121 Sharon Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan," CRS Report RL31900, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL31900.pdf
122 Ben Shepard, "India and Pakistan: A Tale of Two Processes," Jane's Ballistic Missile Proliferation, March 2000, p. 11.
123 美国传统基金会亚洲研究中心高级政策分析员理查德费希尔核觉醒号令载[美]华盛顿时报1998年5月29日。转引自：夏立平：“亚太地区弹道导弹及其技术的扩散和控制”，载《国际观察》，2001年第1期，第16页。
124 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web,"Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,"October 17,2003.
125 "Agni:India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems, Federation of American Scientists," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/agni.htm.
126 "India:Agni Ⅲ Reportedly Developed to Counter China,"Periscope Daily Defense News, January 21, 2003.
127 "Prithvi-India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems,"Federation of American Scientists,June 19,2003.http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/prithvi.htm.
128 Zahid Hussain," Missile Tests Raise Indo-Pakistan Fears,"Times Online,March 27,2003, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-3-624736,00.html.
129 "Pnthvi-India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems,"http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/prithvi.htm.
130 邹强：“走向军事大国之路：印度导弹指向谁”，http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channe12/18/20000922/245431.html.
131 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web,"Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,"October 17, 2003.
132 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web,"Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,"October 17, 2003.
133 "Musharraf Says No Arms Race On Subcontinent,"Associated Press Newswire,(September 4,2003);"India Not In Arms Race: PM,"Hindustan Times,( October 13,2003).
134 U.S. Department of Defense,"Proliferation: Threat and Response,"2001.
135 Statement of George Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,"Woddwide Threats to National Security,"(February 6, 2002).
136 Edward Lace, "India and Pakistan Launch Test Missiles," Financial Times, (March 27, 2003).
137 Neil Joeck,Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York:Oxford University Press,1997).
138 U.S. Department of Defense,"Proliferation: Threat and Response,"1997.
139 Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne,eds.,"Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade,"The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia,(Washington,D.C.:Henry L.Stimson Center Report No.46, July 2002).
140 关于两派的争论，参阅：Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread ofNuclear Weapons:A Debate (New York: WW Norton & Co, 1995).
141 Madeleine K. Albright & Robin Cook,"A Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy for the 21st Century,"http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7D/NUCLEAR_NP_STRAT.PDF.
142 US DoD,op. cit. in note 63, pp. 45-49;Carnegie Endowment,op. cit. in note 61,pp. 305-312.
143 Robert Walpole,"National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs,"Testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,and Federal Services(September 21, 2000).
144 U.S. National Intelligence Council,"Global Trends 2015".A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts,"NIC 2000-2002 (December 2000),pp13.38-39.
145 “印度公司曾非法售伊大规模杀伤性武器原料”，http://news.shangdu.com/17/2003-01-21/20030121-160792-17.shtml.
146 White House Press Secretar, "A National Security Strategy for A New Century," (January 5, 2000),p.6.
147 "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Naval Interception Bush-Style,"August 25, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/program.
148 Jennifer K. Elsea, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft ," CRS Report RL32097, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32097.pdf.
149 Shirley A. Kan ,"China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues ,"CRS Report RL31555, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/17339.pdf.
150 Gregory Koblentz, "Viewpoint: Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix," The Nonproliferation Review(Spring-Summer 1997), p. 55.
151 Ramatanu Maitra, "An Arrow to Washington's Heart," Asia Times Online, (August 20,2002), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DH20Df08.html.
152 "Shishir Gupta, "India Hopes for Patriot Nod, Indian Express (May 23, 2003).
153 “印度海军将试验超音速巡航导弹”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/junshi/115847.html.
154 “巴基斯坦前总理披露巴导弹技术来自朝鲜”，http://news.eastday.com/eastday/news/news/node4941/node26108/userobject1ai377715.html.
155 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous counter-trades." Strategic Comments. Volume 8 Issue 9 November 2002.
156 孙玉庆：“英国官员称：在阿富汗发现基地组织生物武器实验室”，http://news.sohu.com/28/97/news148239728.shtml.
157 “9．11后接受专访，拉登称其持有核武器和化学武器”，http://news.tom.com/Archive/2001/11/10-23579.html.
158 David Albright, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein, "ISIS Issue Brief ecuring Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal: Principles for Assistance," October 4,2001.
159 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, "A Failure of Intelligence?" The New York Review of Books, December 20, 2001, pp. 76-80
160 Ibid.
161 Leitenberg, Milton."An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents," September 18, 2000, p. 18.
162 S.Gopal, "Nuclear Terrorism: Relevance and Prospects in South Asia", South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 359, October 11,2001.
163 C. Raja Mohan, "A Paradigm Shift Toward South Asia?" Washington Quarterly 26, 1, Winter 2002-2003.
164 "Pakistan: 'A Front-Line Ally' on Terrorism," LosAngeles Times, February 2, 2003.
165 Chun Yong Taek, "Missile Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and Consequences of theater Missile Defense (TMD) Program," Rome Forum: Missile Threats and BMD.p.13.
166 北京中朝友联国际经济文化交流中心网：“美国回应朝鲜试射导弹问题，称有能力对付核 武器”，http://www.xttzw.com/dprk/shownews.asp?newsid=16058.
167 U.S. National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," September 1999, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publication/nie/nie99msl.html, pp. 7-8.
168 "Statements by Col. Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko,"Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,U.S.Senate,October 21,1997.
169 ROK Ministry of National Defense,Defense White Paper 1996-1997 (Seoul: MND, 1997),pp. 96-97.
170 伊朗将为朝鲜的导弹发展提供必要的资金，而朝鲜将提供已开发出的导弹，并支持伊朗建立导弹生产基础。
171 Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 204-207.
172 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,"Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
173 因为伊朗和叙利亚努力从朝鲜购买中程弹道导弹，威胁到了以色列安全，以色列发起了与朝鲜的直接谈判。1992年11月，以色列外交部部长伊坦·边索(Eitain Bentsur)访问朝鲜，跟朝鲜官员谈判导弹出口问题。
174 Yun Duk-min,"US-North Korea Missile Talks," (in Korean)No.2000-46(Seoul:Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,2000).
175 "South Korea,"http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/skorea.htm.
176 鲁智：“韩国要让导弹打得更远”，http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/isslpdjs/2005-03/10/content_155534.htm.
177 1991年的海湾战争是中东安全环境的转折点。阿以冲突虽然重要，但已不是中东地区占主导地位的冲突。大规模杀伤性武器和弹道导弹扩散的重要性开始上升。海湾战争是导弹战的一次重要演示，表明了导弹在现代战争中的地位。1991年1月17日至2月26日，伊拉克向以色列和沙特发射了大约90枚经过改装的飞毛腿(Scud)弹道导弹，美国和英国对伊拉克总共发射了288枚“战斧”(Tomahawk)巡航导弹。
178 十大挑战是：抵制参与防扩散机制；蔑视防扩散机制的权威；获得防扩散机制禁止的WMD；公然使用防扩散机制禁止的WMD；滥用国际社会的默许和容忍；冷淡应对“防扩散安全倡议”；防扩散义务从属多重外交目标；WMD扩散竞赛侵蚀机制规制；中东强国对防扩散机制的“否决权”侵蚀；负面示范效应(Demonstration Effects)的无限放大。参阅：李小军：“中东对全球防扩散机制的十大挑战”，《阿拉伯世界》，2005年第2期。
179 Wyn O.Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, Lawrence Freedman, 2000.p.21.
180 Whn Q. Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation,1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000,p.21.
181 Mohamed KADRY SAID, "Missile proliferation in the Middle East:a regional perspective," The Middle East,2,2001. p.52.
182 "Germany locates Iraqi missile factory,"Jane's Defense Weekly,30 August 2000,p.8.
183 D. Lennox, 1998,"Iran Ballistic Missile Projects:Uncovering The Evidence,"Jane's Intelligence Review,June,pp.24-27.
184 Jing-dong Yuan,"Understanding Motivations For Proliferation:The Role of Confidence Building Measures,"http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/MTCR/page8-en.asp.
185 Scott D. Sagan,"Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?-Three Models in Search of a Bomb,"International Security, Vol.21,No.3 (Winter 1996/97),pp.54-86.
186 滕建群：“50年来印度核武器发展政策演变”，http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:-APdalKNSBIJ:iaps.cass.cn/Bak/nyyj/0002-1.htm+%E5%8D%B0%E5%BA%A6%E6%A0%B8%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95&h1=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=4.
187 Brahma Chellaney, "Non-proliferation: an Indian critique of U.S. export controls," ORBIS, Summer, 1994. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n3_v38/ai_15595403.
188 “延伸威慑”是美国在二战结束后奉行的军事战略和核战略指导方针的重要内容之一。它的基本含义是，向美国的盟国(包括其在亚太地区的盟国)提供核保护伞。在冷战时期，强调运用核武器威慑前苏联，不论前苏联对美国本土或盟国发动核或常规进攻，美国都准备以 核武器进行回击；在冷战后时期，坚持以核武器威慑对手或潜在对手，以慑止它们用核、生、化等大规模杀伤性武器攻击美国、海外美军和美国的盟国。参阅：夏立平：“国际军备控制理论研究与建立有中国特色的军控理论”，http://www.siis.org.cn/giwtlt/2002/02/1pxia.htm.
189 伊泰普大坝建在流经巴西和巴拉圭两国之间的巴拉那河上，由两国联合建造，耗资200亿美元。伊泰普大坝的修建，从20世纪70年代中期开始，直到1982年才竣工。大坝有60层高，坝后的水库沿河延伸达161千米。自1990年改进以后，伊泰普大坝是世界上最大的水电站，18台水轮机组发电量达1.26万兆瓦。伊泰普水电站生产的电能由巴西与巴拉圭两国分享。但是，巴拉圭只使用了发电量中极小的一部分。所以，巴拉圭将其份额中的大部分卖给了巴西。参阅：“世界著名水坝概览” http://xintv.xinhuanet.com/html/NEWS/SHEHUINEIKUIJING/2003/05/31/91741.html.
190 顾国良：“和平谈判是解决大规模杀伤性武器扩散的有效途径”， http://www.beijingreview.com.cn/2004-02/200402-world1.htm.
191 Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics among Nations:The Struggle for Power and Peace (6 thedition),New York:Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,1985, p.87.
192 滕建群：“50年来印度核武器发展政策演变”，http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:-APdalKNSBIJ:iaps.cass.cn/Bak/nyyj/0002-1.htm+%E5%8D%B0%E5%BA%A6%E6%A0%B8%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95&h1=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=4.
193 泽乌丁·萨达尔认为，在防扩散领域，美国的外交政策就是对那些发展核武器的国家进行批判、实行制裁并将它们妖魔化。因为巴基斯坦和印度展核武器，美国就对它们实行削弱性的制裁。因为北朝鲜拥有核武器库，美国就将之妖魔化。然而，美国的核武器储备却是世界上最大的，而且它也是世界上惟一一个曾经在战争中(在日本的广岛和长崎)使用过原子武器的国家。美国强迫其他国家签署和批准《全面禁止核试验条约》，而它自己却意孤行，拒绝在条约上签字。更有甚者，美国还拒绝放弃首先使用核武器，甚至还拒绝承诺保持克制、不对没有核能力的国家使用核武器。此外，美国还模糊了长期以来对于核武器和非核武器之间的界限，而且还扬言要对像地下掩体这样可以抵常规武器打击的目标使用核武器。美国还准备对像“非国家行为体”这样的非核武器目标使用核武器，也就是说要对使用生化武的恐怖主义组织使用核武器。美国强迫其他国家放弃核武器计划，但它自己却在继续进行着这一计划，开发和设计“小型核武器”，重新开始进行核试验。更坏的是，美国还恬不知耻地卢称，他们正在开发的新型核弹头实际上可以“减少间接损害”，即小型核武器可以减少常规武器所造成的平民伤亡(但这种说法和我们所了解的有关核武器的信息完全相反)，并希望以此来提自己的道德地位。美国制定了可以对七个国家—俄罗斯、中国、伊拉克、北朝鲜、伊朗、利比亚和叙利亚—在紧急情况下实行核打击的计划。参阅：泽乌丁·萨达尔梅尼尔·W．戴维斯，袁征、朱琳、付宇译：“美国是如何使用双重标准的”，《中外书摘》， http://www.ewen.cc/licai/bkview.aso?bkid=79772&cid=202308.
194 沈丁立：“发展核武器的权与责”，http://www.dfdaily.com/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=23620.
195 沈丁立：“博弈在拥核与弃核之间”，《文汇报》，2005年8月26日。
196 专家观点来自于：“核武器发展有‘动力’”，《世界知识》， http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2003-11/29/content_2767789.htm.
197 专家观点来自于：“核武器发展有‘动力’”，《世界知识》，http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2003-11/29/content_2767789.htm.
198 James Cotton,"North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Proliferation and Regional Security," Current Issues Brief 1 1999-2000,31 August 1999.http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/Pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib01.htm.
199 “美联社：布什引导印进核俱乐部，辛格称创造历史”，2006年3月3日，http://news.sohu.com/20060303/n242107998.shtml.
200 “美核政策搞双重标准，对印度和伊朗态度截然不同”，http://news.sohu.com/20060303/n242108562.shtml.
201 “美国会议员称美印达成核协议是‘历史性灾难’”，http://news.sohu.com/20060303/n242109159.shtml.
202 John R. Bolton,"Beyond the Axis of Evil:Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,"May 6, 2002. http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:W8VIkuZMAlUJ:www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm+WMD +proliferation+and+Axis+of+Evil&hl--zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=2.
203 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 201, "http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
204 Charles R. Smith,"New Missile Threat to Amedca,"Tuesday, Dec.3,2002. http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/12/2/214523.shtml.
205 “美国死咬伊拉克10年轰炸13轮”，《中国国防报》，2001年2月23日，http://news.sina.com.cn/w/192380.html.
206 B. Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards (Santa Monica:Rand Corporation,1993),p.2
207 TWhn O. Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation,1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000,p.25.
208 Arthur A. Stein,"Coordination and Collaboration:regimes in an anarchic world,"lnternational Organization 36,2,Spring 1982.
209 Janne E. Nolan,Trappings of Power:Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1991).
210 Aaron Karp,"Controlling Ballistic Missile Proliferation,"Survival 33 (November/December 1991),p.527.
211 吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第6页。
212 Rachel Schmidt, U.S Export Control Policy and The Missile Technology Control Regimes, January 1990.p.4.
213 jing-dong Yuan,"Understanding Motivations For Proliferation:The Role of Confidence Building Measures,"http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/MTCR/page8-en.asp.
214 Members of The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,"Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to assess the Ballistic missile threat to the United States,"July 15,1998, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/BMD/documents/Rumsfeld150798.pdf.
215 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,produced by the National Intelligence Council,"Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,"December 2001.http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf.
216 J. Mohan Malik,"India Goes Nuclear: Rationale,Benefits,Costs and Implications,"Contemporary Southeast Asia 20(2) (August 1998), pp.191-215.
217 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press,Seattle and London, 2003.p.82.
1 门洪华：“国际机制与美国霸权”，《美国研究》，2001年第1期。
2 David A. Cooper,"The United States and the Evolution of International Supply-Side Missile Non-Proliferation Controls,"p.15.cited in Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Mountbatten Centre for International Studie,"Missile Proliferation and Defences:Problems and Prospects,"Occasional Paper No. 7,http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op7/op7.pdf.
3 秦亚青：《霸权体系与国际冲突—美国在国际武装冲突中的支持行为(1945—1988)》，上海人民出版社，1999年8月第1版，第1页。
4 Joseph Nye,Bound to Lead:The Changing Nature of American Power, New York,1990,p.267.
5 Ronald Reagan,Nattonal Securtty Decision Dtrective 70:Nuclear Capable Missde Technology Transfer Policy,November 30,1982.
6 Richard Speier, The Missile Technology Control Regime:Case Study of a Multilateral Negotiation (Manuscript submitted to the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC,November 1995).
7 George Abbey and Neal Lane,"United States Space Policy:Challengesand Opportunities," http://www.amacad.org/publications/spacePolicy.pdf.
8 Gary Milhollin,"The Link Between Space Launch and Missile Technology,"March 16,2000,http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/speeches/2000/GM%20Hawaii%20speech.htm.
9 NSDM出台的直接诱因是尼克松政府决定向日本出售Delta太空发射装置，但遭到了国会的否决，理由是这种出售会伤害美国的技术安全。
10 Martin Navias,Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World (Adelphi Paper No.252,Summer 1990),p.49.
11 U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978(Washington DC:GPO,December 1980),p.21.
12 这次试验以失败告终。
13 这种限制被前面提到的NSDM187的限制更为严格。
14 Richard Speier, The Missile Technology Control Regime:Case Study of a Multilateral Negotiation (Manuscript submitted to the United States Institute of Peace,Washington DC,November 1995).
15 主要是指完整的导弹系统和完整的次导弹系统。
16 Government of Canada,"Missile Technology Control Regime,"Background Paper, April 16,1987.
17 包括完整的火箭系统和次火箭系统。
18 导弹部件和相关技术。
19 Aaron Karp,The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East, p.15.
20 Dinshaw J. Mistry, International Cooperation in Arms Control:building Security Regimes to contain missile proliferation,M.I.A.,Columbia University, 1994.p.62.
21 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,"Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pd fs/mtcr.pdf.
22 Rachel Schmidt,U.S. export control policy and the missile technology control regime,Rand:1990.p.17.
23 U.S. Government,"Missile Technology Control Regime, Fact SheetTo Accompany Public Announcement,"April 16,1987.
24 Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough with Toby E Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz,Tracking Nuclear Proliferation:A Guide in Maps and Charts,Washington,D.C.,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1998,p.313.
25 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press,Seattle and London,2003.p.48.
26 Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control,University of Washington Press, Seattle and London,2003.p.49.
27 Washington Post,April 6,1990.
28 "Fact Sheet:Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy,"The White House,Office of the Press Secretary, September 27,1993.
29 Federation of American Scientists Datebase,The Missile Technology Control Regime:An Information Paper,November 1997,http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/missiles/1997_plenary_info.html. July 2001.
30 例如批准加入MTCR的成员资格申请和附件变化等。
31 "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime Madrid,Spain,"12-16 September 2005,http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/madrid.html.
32 George Downs,Davis Rocke, and Peter Barsoom,"Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism,"International Organization,52,No.2 (Spring 1998),pp397-419.
33 王杰主编：《国际机制论》，新华出版社，2002年第1版，第236页。
34 Robert Jervis,"Security Regimes,"in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca:Corell University Press,1982), pp.173-194.
35 Zachary Davis,"The Realist Nuclear Regime,"Security Studies 2,No.3/4(Spring/Summer 1993),pp.79-99.
36 以色列的经济规模虽然很小，但仍拥有强大的国防工业。巴西、印度、以色列和南非在若干军备工业和飞机制造方面也具有先进技术；韩国、阿根廷和台湾地区的生产水平属于中等； 埃及、朝鲜和巴基斯坦的导弹生产能力低。参阅：Robert Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems (Cambridge,Mass:Ballinger,1975),pp.183-200.
37 按照这些分类(从0到1的范围)，以下国家在关键技术上的掌握程度为：以色列(0.456)，印度(0.303)，韩国(0.232)，巴西(0.182)和南非(0.126)。参阅：James Sperling,David Louscher, and Michael Salomone,"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side:The Prospects for Weapons and Weapons Technology Diffusion and Control,"Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago,April 1997.
38 U.S. Department of Defense,The Military Critical Technologies List(Washington,D.C.:GPO,October 1992).
39 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes,Center for Nonproliferation Studies,"Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),"http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/mtcr.pdf.
40 刘华秋主编：《军备控制与裁军手册》，国防工业出版社，2000年，第382页。
41 Jozef Goldblat,"Is there a future for the MTCR?"http://www.gipri.ch/spip/IMG/pdf/Is_there_a_future_for_the_MTCR.pdf.
42 具体经济依赖参数为：台湾地区(20％，19％)；韩国(12％，12％)；以色列(14％，15％)；埃及(11％，10％)；南非(3％，3.5％)；巴西(2％，2.4％)；阿根廷(1％，2％)：印度(1.3％，2.1％)；巴基斯坦(4.7％，3.8％)。这些数字对20世纪90年代的伊朗，朝鲜，利比亚，叙利亚和伊拉克来说，都在1％以下。一个地区国家的其他外部经济关系包括来自于国际组织的援助和外部的投资，这大约占它们GNP的3％。数据来自于：Stockholm Institute of Peace Research databank.
43 Zeev Maoz,"The Controversy Over the Democratic Peace:Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall,"International Security,Summer 1997,( 22,No.1),pp.162-198.
44 Aaron Karp,The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation to the Middle East(Boulder: Westview Press,1989),pp.13-15.
45 James Mann, About Face:A History of America "s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton,New York,NY, Alfred A.Knopf,1999, p.243.
46 United States Senate Committee on Government Affairs,The Proliferation Primer:A Majority Report of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services,Washington,D.C.,1998,p.98.
47 A. L.C. de Mestral,Extraterritorial Application of Export Control Legislation:Canada and the U.S.A,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,p.6.
48 "Arms Export Control Act(P.L.90-629)-Chapter 7:Control of Missiles and Missile Equipment or Technology,"http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/missiles/law 103.html, August 2002.
49 Aaron Karp, The United States and the Soviet Union and the Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation to the Middle East, (Boulder: Westview Press,1989),p.15.
50 Hearings before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,1990.
51 Tammy Halevy,"Chinese Compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime:A Case Study,"August 31,1993. http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/browse/categoryid/2360/documentid/2360/history/3,2360.
52 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation, London and New York,2004.p.98.
53 "General Scowcroft on Chinese Satellite Launches,"Congressional Record,June 9,1998,p.1063. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998/h980609-prc.htm. June 2003.
54 "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),"http://www.nti.org/db/china/mtcrorg.htm.
55 Xinhua News Agency,"Comments on Missile Control,GATT, Korea,"FBISDaily Report:China,November 21,1991,p.1
56 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation,London and New York,2004.p.94.
57 James A. Baker Ⅲ, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace,New York,G.P.Putnam's Sons,1995,p.593.
58 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, London and New York,2004.p.99.
59 Arms Control Report, CD-Rom version,Section 706:MTCR,March 7,1992.
60 Arms Control Report,CD-Rom version,1992 Section 706:MTCR,January2001.
61 "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement of Missile Proliferation,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/mtcrusch.htm.
62 Victor Zaborsky,"Viewpoint:U.S.Missle Nonproliferation Strategy Toward The Nis and China:How Effective?"The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997.p.88.
63 Testimony of Robert J. Einhorn Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,and Federal Services Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 10 April 1997,http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ein0497.htm.
64 根据美国方面的说法，1994年至1995年间，中国的出售包括机床和导航系统；未来的出售包括回转仪，加速机和帮助伊朗建造“流星-3”和“流星-4”中程弹道导弹的试验设备。参阅：Shirley Kan, China's Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Current Policy Issues, CRS Issue Brief For Congress, Updated October 30,2001, Order 1B92056,http://www.fas.org/spp/starwards/crs1B92056.pdf. June 2002.
65 双方同意致力于促使《全面禁止核试验条约》尽早生效。双方还同意在联合国裁军谈判会议上寻求早日就“禁止生产用于核武器和其他核爆炸装置的裂变材料公约”开始正式谈判。中美两国重申双方不向未接受保障监督的核设施和核爆炸项目提供任何帮助的承诺。中国已对核和双用途材料及相关技术的出口实施控制，并将于1998年年中采取进一步措施加强对双用途材料的出口控制。美国将继续加强对核和双用途材料及相关技术的严格控制，作为《禁止化学武器公约》的创始缔约国，中美两国同意在多边框架内就执行该公约进行合作。双方认为，政府对与化学品有关的出口进行监督是重要的。
66 "Joint US-China Statement,"29 October 1997, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/uschst97.htm.
67 "White Paper on China's National Defense,Information Office of the State Council,People's Republic of China,July 1998 Beijing"(Chinese),http://www.nti.org/db/china/chindocs/zwpnatde.htm.
68 Central Intelligence Agency, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015,"Washington,D.C.1999,p.5.
69 "People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Statement,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/prcmtcr.htm.November 21,2000,Beijing.
70 "Spokesman Refutes U.S. Allegations over Missiles,"The China Daily,24 November 2000,p.1.
71 Philip Saunders of the Monterey Institute of International Studies was quoted by Fox News on November 22,2000,http://www.foxnews.com/world/112200/china.sml.June 2002.
72 "Excerpts of State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher's Statement:Sanctions Waived for China But Not Weapons Recipients Pakistan and Iran,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/00112102.htm.21 November 2000.
73 Cox was quoted in a November 22, San Francisco Chronicle article which can be found at, http://www.sfgate/com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/11/12/MN52960.DTL.Aug ust 2002.
74 "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/cia0901.htm.
75 PRC FM Spokesman Opposes US Sanctions Against China,Xinhua,September 5,2001.
76 “外交部军控司长就导弹出口管制等进行吹风(全文)”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/PI-c/197055.htm.
77 “外交部军控司长就导弹出口管制等进行吹风(全文)”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/PI-c/197055.htm.
78 "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," http://www.nti.org/db/china/mtcrorg.htm.
79 Deborah Ozga,"A Chronology of the Missile Technology ControlRegime,"The Nonproliferation Review 1 (Winter 1994),p.79.
80 "India:Agni Ⅲ Reportedly Developed to Counter China,"Periscope Daily Defense News,January 21,2003.
81 H.E. Mr. Sha Zukang Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of the People's Republic of China,"Statement at the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,"http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/sha1097.htm,New York.14 October 1997.
82 该报告是作者2005年4月赴美国佐治亚大学访问时，为该大学“国际贸易与安全中心” (CITS)赠送。
83 Liu Huaqiu,Xiandai Junshi (Conmilit) (Beijing),11 November 1995,in "Analysis Of Nuclear Arms Control Policy,"FBIS-CHI-95-246,11 November 1995.
84 "Reaction to Missile Technology Sales,Sanctions,"FBIS-CHI, August 27,1993.p.1
85 中国外交部：“中国与多边防扩散出口控制机制”，http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/jks/jkslc/fkswt/dbfks/t118828.htm.
86 Winston Lord and Joseph Nye,"Engagement with China Will Aid Regional Security,"Transeript on October11,USIA Wireless File,October 13,1995,p12.
87 Wendy Frieman,China, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, London and New York,2004.p.109.
88 Tammy Halevy,"Chinese Compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime:A Case Study," http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/169/documentid/515/history/3,2360,652,169,515.
89 Phillip C. Saunders,"Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List,"Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Monterey Institute of International Studies,September 2002,http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/pdfs/prc_msl.pdf.
1 Mark Smith,"Efficiency and Inefficiency of the MTCR,"http://www.inesap.org/bulletin 19/bul19art22.htm.
2 Mark Smith, The MTCR and the Future of Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation, Disarmament Diplomacy,No 54 (February 2001),pp.19-25.
3 Mark Smith,"Missile Proliferation,Missile Defenses and Arms Control,"from Special Joint Series on Missile Issues,Center for Nonproliferation Studies Mountbatten,Centre for International Studies,"lnternational Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses,"Occasional Paper No.5,p.25.
4 Mark Smith,"Rules for the Road?The International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,"http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63op3.htm.
5 P·Litavrin,V·Lukiantsev,"The Hague Missile Code,"International affairs,Copyright(?)2003 EBSCO Publishing.
6 “中国的军控、裁军与防扩散努力”(全文)，2005年9月1日，http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2005-09/01/content_3429141_2.htm.
7 联合国裁军事务网站：“关于各国探测及使用外层空间包括月球与其他天体活动所应遵守原则的条约”，http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/t4.htm.
8 联合国裁军事务网站：“禁止在海床洋底及其底土安置核武器和其他大规模毁灭性武器条约”，http://www.un.org/chinese/peace/disarmament/t6.htm.
9 "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime,"Noordwijk,the Netherlands October 11-15 1999.http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/noordwijk.html.
10 Center for Nonproliferation Studies,Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Appendix Ⅵ,"Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation(HCOC)."http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/icoc.pdf.
11 李书成：“防止弹道导弹扩散大会在巴黎开幕”，http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-02/09/content_31871.htm.
12 Alex Wagner,"States Meet to Discuss Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct,"Arms Control Today,March 2002,http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/mtcrmarch02.asp.
13 Pyotr Litavrin,Vitalii Lukiantsev,"The Hague Missile Code,"International affairs,Copyright(?)2003 EBSCO Publishing.
14 Alex Wagner,"States Hold Second Missile Code of Conduct Meeting,"Arms Control Today,Vol.32 No.6,July/August 2002.
15 Alex Wagner,"States Hold Second Missile Code of Conduct Meeting,"Arms Control Today,Vol.32 No.6,July/August 2002.
16 "International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,"http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/naruhodo/data/pdf/data8-1.pdf.
17 U.S. Department of State,Office of the Spokesman for Immediate Release, February 11, 2002,"U.S. Supports Universal Code Against Missile Proliferation,"http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-se1046.html.
18 Warren Ferster,"AsiaSat Discards Long March as Option,"Space News,24 May 1999,p.1
19 美国为解决该问题，提出并实施了两项措施：一是为有民用太空发射计划的国家提供空间发射。例如2000年，美国向朝鲜提出建议：如果朝方承诺放弃发展远程火箭，美国答应每年向其提供两至四枚卫星发射服务。二是允许一国在销毁进攻性弹道导弹和相关技术的前提下，可在加入MTCR的同时保留民用空间运载计划。巴西，乌克兰和韩国就在加入MTCR时保留了自己的空间运载计划。但另一些国家则认为空间运载火箭和弹道导弹技术是能够分开的，为和平目的进行合作是可行的。从现实来看，这个问题在准则中仍然没有获得解决，现有的大多数军控和防扩散协议在技术军用和民用方面也只能采取平衡战略。
20 Cole Bucy,"Iran and Brazil: Dangerous Precedents."http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue14/Vol3Issue14Bucy.html.
21 "The Foreign Ministry, Worldwide at your service,"http://cms.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=54&LNG=en&version=print.
22 The Dutch Foreign Ministry's web site: http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460166.
23 关于美国和俄罗斯对准则谈判的指示，请分别参阅：United States Memo,"Instructions for U.S delegation to international code of conduct negotiations,"Beijing,China,August 9,2002. http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/training/tsinghua/pdfs/memo_us.pdf;Delegation of the Russian Federation Internal Delegation Use Only Not to be shared with other delegations,"Instructions for Delegation of the Russian Federation to International Code of Conduct Negotiations," Beijing, China, August 9, 2002,http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/training/tsinghua/pdfs/memo_rus.pdf.
24 U.S. Depart of State,Office of the Spokesman for Immediate Release,"U.S. Supports Universal Code Against Missile Proliferation," February 11, 2002, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-se1046.html.
25 金师：“俄罗斯和欧洲国家在航天方面的合作”，http://www.cast.ac.cn/cbw/GJTK/200501/5.htm.
26 “伊朗与俄罗斯签署价值1.32亿美元卫星发射合同”，2005年1月31日，http://jczs.sina.com.cn/2005-01-31/1110263062.html.
27 Arthur S. Ding,"Viewpoint:China's Concerns about Theater Missile Defense:A Critique,"The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999.p.93.
28 "Proliferation Security Initiative,"Briefing NINFA 2005, Alfeite,13 de Abril de 2005.
29 20世纪60年代，津巴布韦非洲人民联盟和津巴布韦非洲民族联盟(简称民盟)先后成立，领导人民进行反对白人种族主义统治的武装斗争。1979年，沣巴布韦各派在英国主持下召开伦敦制宪会议。1980年2月底举行议会选举，穆加贝领导的民盟获胜。同年4月18日独立，定国名为沣巴布韦共和国。
30 “联合国安理会常任理事国‘否决权’的历史发展”，《学习时报》，2005年3月28，http://www.shm.com.cn/wangping/2005-09/28/content_968869.htm.
31 1966年联合国安理会《南罗得西亚局势问题》决议(S／RES／221，中文版)，http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/227/57/IMG/NR022757.pdf?OpenElement.
32 战后初期，美国迅速扩大在拉美的经济势力，同时积极组建美洲军事集团。1947年，美国在巴西里约热内卢召开了有19个拉美国家参加的“美洲大陆和平与安全会议”。会议按照美国务卿马歇尔的意图，订立了“美洲国家间互助条约”(Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)，简称里约条约(Rio Treaty)。条约旨在建立美洲国家集体防务体系，规定美洲国家实行联防，即当西半球任一国家受到侵犯时，则视为对全体美洲国家的武装进攻。这次会议虽不是以泛美联盟名义召开的，但里约条约已把所有拉美国家拴在美国的冷战战车上。同年加拿大外交部在一份报告中提出坚决反对加拿大加入泛美联盟的理由是，美国在泛美联盟中的势力太大，这个组织已经失去国际会议的意义，加拿大若再加入里约条约，就得被迫承担全美洲的防务义务。所以当1990年加拿大正式加入美洲国家组织时，特别提出的一个前提条件就是拒绝在里约条约上签字。这表明加拿大反对美国把其干涉美洲各国内政和外交活动加以合法化的立场。请参阅：杨令侠：“加拿大与泛美组织”，http://history.nankai.edu.cn/teach/list.asp?id=138.
33 Richard B Stebbins(ed)1963,"President Kennedy's Broadcast Report to the People,"(Doc 82,22 Oct 1962)Documents on American Foreign Relations 1962 (NY:Council on Foreign Relations 1963), pp.374-380.
34 Stebbins 1963,"Action by the American Governments: Resolution of the Council of the OAS,"(Doc 83, 23 Oct 1962),pp.380-383.
35 Stebbins 1963,"Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba: Presidential Proclamation 3504," (Doc 84 23 Oct 1962),pp.383-384
36 FRUS 1962-63, Doc 41,"Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National Security Council,"22 October 1962,p.152;Edward C Keefer et al eds, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963,Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996).
37 联合国安理会关于《伊拉克—科威特间局势》(S／RES／661)的第661号决议，http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/574/74/IMG/NR057474.pdf?OpenElement.
38 Nicole Woods,"Detail, Analysis, and Recommendation on the Policy of Economic Sanctions on Iraq,"http://home.mtholyoke.edu/～nmwoods/iraq.htm.
39 联合国安理会关于《伊拉克—科威特间局势》(S／RES／678)得第678号决议，http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/574/91/IMG/NR057491.pdf?OpenElement.
40 Commander Barry W. Coceano,U.S. Navy Atlantic Council Senior Fellow,"The Proliferation Security Initiative:Challenges and Perceptions,"http://www.acus.org/docs/0405-Proliferation_Security_Initiative_Challenges_Perceptions.pdf.
41 Dana Priest and Douglas Farah,"Iranian Force Has Long Ties to Al Qaeda,"The Washington Post, October 14, 2003, p. A17.
42 Commander Barry W. Coceano,U.S. Navy Atlantic Council Senior Fellow,"The Proliferation Security Initiative:Challenges and Perceptions," http://www.acus.org/docs/0405-Proliferation_Security_Initiative_Challenges_Perceptions.pdf.
43 U.S. Department of State ,"Patterns of Global Terrodsm-2000,"Apdl 30,2001, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2441.htm.
44 Joby Warrick,"Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear,"The Washington Post,December 7,2003,p. A1 & A28.
45 Chatham House,Independent Thinking on International Affairs,"The Proliferation Security Initiative:is it legal?"http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/il/ILP250205.pdf.
46 J. D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,"Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,"9 January 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html(14 August 2003).
47 "Interview with John Bolton,Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, on U.S. Arms Control," (14 August 2001), http://www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/ESDIBoltonUSArmsControlPolicyAugust14.html(15 August 2003).
48 "The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.
49 这里所有的引用均来自美国的“The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”和欧洲的“EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”两个文件，以下不再一一注明。
50 认为有效拦截是美国应对WMD及其运载工具的关键措施。在阻止WMD原料、技术和知识落到敌对国家和恐怖分子组织的斗争中，要提高美国军队、情报、技术和法律执行的能力。
51 与过去相比，今天的威胁更加多样化和更难以预测。对美国及其盟国充满敌意的国家会不择手段地获取WMD。为此，美国必须要采取新的威慑手段，这就是美国将采取压倒性的军事力量和使用所有可供选择的手段去反对WMD对美国及其盟国的攻击。
52 由于有时威慑会失效，使用WMD对军队和人民造成潜在破坏的后果的可能，美国的军事力量和民用机构要做好防御用WMD武装的敌手，包括在适宜的条件下使用先发制人的措施。这需要具备在WMD武器使用前的侦察和毁灭敌手WMD武器的能力
53 小布什政府判定全球进入“后扩散世界”，基于两个基本事实：一是恐怖分子已经掌握了使用WMD对美国及其盟国进行恐怖袭击的能力；二是以外交和多边机制为主要手段的传统防扩散体制已无力应对WMD扩散。因此，美国面临的最严重威胁莫过于对美国心怀敌意的国家掌握WMD能力和向恐怖分子扩散WMD能力。为此，美国政府把WMD的扩散者区分为“好扩散者”(盟国)和“坏扩散者”(“无赖国家”和恐怖分子)两类。以色列、巴基斯坦和印度是美国的反恐盟国，美国允许这些国家拥有WMD能力。即使美国知道巴基斯坦帮助伊朗、朝鲜和利比亚发展核武器，美国也能原谅，因为在美国的战略棋盘中，巴基斯坦帮助美国反恐高于一切。但对那些寻求和拥有核、化学和生物武器的非法体制(无赖国家)，美国一定要设法解除其WMD能力。因为“无赖国家带来了不同的挑战，不同的挑战则需要不同的战略。”美国决意改变过去过分依赖传统防扩散体制应对WMD威胁的能力，而主张对这些体制进行根本性的改革，逐渐增强反对WMD扩散的“牙齿”功能。为预防“无赖国家”获取核武器，布什要求监控贩卖核材料的黑市，建议修复传统核不扩散体制中允许非核国家有权从事民用核能计划的致命“枪眼”(loophole)。
54 Bolton,"Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States,"2 December 2003.
55 "The New Multilateralism," The Wall Street Journal, 8 January 2004.
56 Carla Anne Roberts, "The U.N.: Searching For Relevance,"The Wall Street Journal,21 October 2003.
57 “‘银河号’”，http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/HIAW/109186.htm.
58 "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," Washington, D.C., December 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMD Strategy.pdf (accessed January 30,2005).
59 Tony Karon,"Scud Seizure Raises Tricky Questions," Time.com,December 11,2002, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,398592,00.html.
60 Frederick Kirgis,"Boarding of North Korean Vessel on the High Seas,"The American Society of International Law, ASIL Insights, December 12, 2002, www.asil.org.
61 与过去相比，今天的威胁更加多样化和更难以预测。对美国及其盟国充满敌意的国家会不择手段地获取WMD。为此，美国必须要采取新的威慑手段，这就是美国将采取压倒性的军事力量和使用所有可供选择的手段去反对WMD对美国及其盟国的攻击。
62 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "U. S. Aides Remain Divided As They Weigh Korea Risks," New York Times, May 11, 2003.
63 Sharon SquassoniSpecialist in National DefenseForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)," Received through the CRS Web, Order Code RS21881January 14, 2005,http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS21881.pdf.
64 Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire, June 2, 2003.
65 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, 31 May 2003, http://www.usinfo.pl/bushvisit2003/wawel.htm.
66 "Prohferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Pnnciples, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 4 September, 2003. http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.
67 "Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Conclusions," Lisbon, 4-5 March 2004, http://www.mtcr.info/psi/meetings2d2d6.html.
68 U. S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation Washington, DC May 2005, "The Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions," http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/abr_und_r/psi/download/faq.pdf.
69 Global Security, Text: White House Statement,Fact Sheet on Proliferation Security Initiative, "September 5, 2003, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2003/usa-030905-usia01a.htm.
70 Bolton, "Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region, "http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37480.htm.
71 Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "U. S. Dep's of State Press Statement on Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement Signed with Liberia," No. 2004/153(Feb. 12, 2004 ), http://www.state.gov.
72 这11国分别是英国、澳大利亚、法国、德国、意大利、荷兰、波兰、葡萄牙、西班牙、日本和美国。
73 US Department of State International Information Program, 2 Sep, 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/03090204.htm.
74 Paul O'Sullivan,"Chairman's Statement: From Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) meeting in Brisbane on 9-10 July 2003,"Policy Forum Online, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0336_Sullivan.html.
75 这里有必要强调的是，PSI的官方网站的图表中把巴黎会议划入了专家会议，但在具体的文字叙述中又将其视为是PSI的第三次全会，笔者估计为网站错误，在次更正。
76 安理会第1540(2004)号决议：《防止核生化武器扩散》，2004年4月28日安全理事会第4956次会议通过， http://www.un.org/chinese/aboutun/prinorgs/sc/sres/04/s1540.htm.
77 "China Open to Discussions on Arms Control Initiative," Agence France Presse,November 4, 2004, http://www.defensenews.corn/story.php?F=489173&C=asiapac(accessed January 30, 2005).
78 Oleg Shchedrov, "Russia Teams Up With Bush on WMDs,"The Moscow Times,June 1, 2004, p.2; "Russia joins alliance against banned arms,"The Straits Times (online edition),June 2,2004,httn://straitstimes.asia1 .com.sg/wodd/story/0.4386.254038.00.htm.
79 凌云：“美日法澳等国拟举行多国海上拦截演习”，2004年10月25日，http://army.news.tom.com/1019/1022/2004/10/25-54623.html.
80 章田：“日充当‘防扩散海上拦截演习’急先锋玄机解读”，《世界报》，2004年8月12日。
81 苏北：“东亚首次防违禁武器扩散演习，日本缘何充当急先锋”，《北京青年报》，2004年10月27日, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2004-10/27/content_2142762.htm.
82 "Germany Intercepts Suspect Nuclear-Related Shipment to N. Korea," Agence France Presse, April 26, 2003.
83 吴莼思：《威慑理论与导弹防御》，长征出版社，2001年11月第1版，第94页。
84 布什政府提出的导弹防御计划是一个包括国家导弹防御系统和战区导弹防御系统，涵盖陆、海、空、天基武器系统及其部件的综合系统，不是小修小改ABM条约所能容纳的。因为要容纳布什政府导弹防御系统，修约必须触及ABM条约的核心条款和条约的宗旨，即修改后的ABM条约必须允许部署保护全境的导弹防御系统并为这种系统提供基础：必须允许部署两个或两个以上的拦截基地以及更多的拦截弹；必须允许部署陆基、海基、空基、乃至天基系统的导弹防御系统；必须允许美国将其非战略反导系统升级为具有反战略导弹的能力或将其纳入整个反导系统中；必须允许美国升级并充分利用其海内外的预警能力，等等。这样的修约与废约毫无二致。
85 "Russia Proposes Global Regime On Missile Proliferation," http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/ru3ma00.asp.
86 "Russia-U. S. Interaction in WMD Non-Proliferation,"http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/7/532.html.
87 "For the International Global Control System Experts Meeting Moscow,"March 16, 2000, http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm.
88 "Global Control System: Too Comprehensive?" http://12.150.189.35/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=674.
89 Concept of the Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology," http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/GSC_content.htm#concept.
90 "The Missile Launch Transparency Regime as a Component of the GCS Concept," http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm#missile.
91 俄罗斯外交部官员解释说该计划的停止是因为缺乏关于对可能损害的民事责任，以及特定的税收问题上缺乏协议。另一方面更严重但不明显的是，美国和俄罗斯都抵制对来自于第三世界潜在导弹威胁的共同威胁分析。美国中央情报局认为在2015年之前，所谓无赖国家对美国的导弹威胁不会变为现实，这种乐观的判断没有得到美国人的认可，但却与俄罗斯专家的观点相吻合。1998年7月，发表的拉姆斯菲尔德报告认为这种威胁在2005年之前可能就会变为现实。这种判断吻合了布什政府的战略理念，把拉氏报告的评估作为退出1972年ABM条约的证据，并竭尽全力发展部署反弹道导弹防御。
92 中国人大网：“关于登记射入外层空间物体的公约”，http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=2193&pdmc=rdgb.
93 "Security Assurances for the GCS Participating States Renouncing the possession of Missile Delivery Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction,"http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm#security.
94 "Incentive Measures with Regard to the GCS Participating States Renouncing the Possession of Missile Delivery Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction," http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/gcs2000.htm#incentive.
1 王明国：“国际机制对国家行为的影响—机制有效性的一种新的分析视角”，《世界经济与政治》，2003年6月，第47页。
2 Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of The Missile Technology Control Regime," The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994, p. 69.
3 "U. S. Efforts to control the Transfer of Nuclear Capable Missile Technology," General, Accounting Office Report, NSIAD-90-176, 6/90, pp. 113-126.
4 Jing-dong Yuan, "The MTCR and Missile Proliferation: Moving Toward the Next Phase," May 2000, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/MTCR_missile-e.PDF, p.8.
5 Dinshaw Mistry, "Beyond the MTCR: Building a Comprehensive Regime to Contain Ballistic Missile Proliferation," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4( Spring 2003), p122.
6 Brazil Table of Contents, "Brazil: The Space Program," http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-1826.html.
7 Wyn Q. Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR," The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996, p.86.
8 Boscov, Jayme and A. E Palmerio, "The Brazilian Satellite Launcher(VLS)," 2nd Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Montreal, Canada, October 5-11, 1991.
9 Robert Shuey, et al., "Missile Proliferation-Survey of Emerging Missile Forces," Congressional Research Service, 3 October, No. 88, p. 89.
10 Brazil Table of Contents, "Brazil-Missile Programs," http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:j0a8R2etRJgJ:www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query /r-1827.html+Brazil+Table+of+Contents+space+program&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=3.
11 Center for Defense Information, "National Briefings: Brazil," http://www.cdiss.org/brazil_b.htm.
12 Scott D. Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary Democracy," http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:SOSiPdr37n8J:lanic.utexas.edu/project/lasa95/tellefson.html+Brazil+and+Security&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=3.
13 王逸舟：“国际关系与国内体制一评‘民主和平论’”，http://fanleo.blogchina.com/210140.html.
14 Lefever, Emest W, Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U. S. Policy Dilemma. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979. p. 112.
15 Franko-Jones, Patrice, The Brazilian Defense Industry, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 98-99.
16 Franko-Jones, Patrice, The Brazilian Defense Industry, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p59.
17 Scott D. Tollefson, "Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: The Myth of Tutelary Democracy," http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:SOSiPdr37n8J:lanic.utexas.edu/project/lasa95/tellefson.html+Brazil+and+Security&hl=zh-CN&ct=clnk&cd=3.
18 巴西先后有两个核电站正式投入运营，第三个一直处于建设时期。当然，巴西发展核电的代价也是不菲的。巴西第一个核电厂Angra-Ⅰ的建设费用大约是20亿美元，直至1983年才投入商业运营。第二座核电站Angra-Ⅱ由于技术原因，建设周期长达二十多年，建设费用竞高达100亿美元!巴西的一位官员表示，在过去的15年里，第三座核电站Angra-Ⅲ的建设已花费了13亿美元，但是否建成现在仍然不甚清楚。
19 FAS, Intelligence Resource Program, "Brazil,'"http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/brazil.htm#N_1_.
20 FAS, Intelligence Resource Program, "Brazil," http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/brazil.htm#N_1_.
21 Wyn Q. Bowen,"Brazil's Accession to the MTCR,"The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996,p.87.
22 Bowen,Wyn and Andrew Koch,"Nonproliferation is embraced by Brazil,"Jane's Intelligence Review,June 1996,p.286.
23 李小军：“美国与巴西关系中的‘核因素’及其影响”，《国际论坛》，2004年第5期。
24 Ozga, D.A, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime,"Nonproliferation Review,Vol.1,2,Winter 1994.
25 Tollefson,Scot,Brazil, the United States and the Missile Technology Control Regime,NPS-56-90-OO6.Monterey, CA:Naval Postgraduate School,March 1990.
26 Bowen, Wyn Q,"Brazil's Accession to the MTCR,"Nonproliferation Review,Spring-Summer 1996,Volume 3,Number 3.
27 Freedman, Alan and Victor Mallet,"United States Seeks Full EC Membership of Missile Treaty,"Financial Times,September 23,1989.
28 Silverberg, David,"French Proposal May Violate Pact on Proliferation,"Defense News,July 17,1989.
29 Bowen,Wyn and Andrew Koch,"Nonproliferation is embraced by Brazil,"Jane's Intelligence Review,June 1996, p.284.
30 Bitencourt,"The Brazilian Defense Industry:Is the Dream Over?"In James Brown(ed.)Arms Control in a Muli-Polar World,Amsterdam:VU University Press,1996,p.256.
31 1990年寇松访问美国时，有媒体报道说巴西前“航空技术中心”(CAT)主任胡戈(Hugo Piva)正在帮助伊拉克发展弹道导弹。胡戈自1987年退休后正领导由23人组成的小组，致力于发展射程为1500公里的弹道导弹。该报道的曝光使寇松极为尴尬，因为他正在努力改善巴西在西方世界中的负面形象。寇松责成他的战略事务秘书要求胡戈作出合理解释。胡戈辩解说自己的活动是合法性的，因为他正在从事秘密工作。但胡戈愿意向美国驻巴西大使作出解释。鉴于此。外交部长建议总统成立一个跨部门委员会，专门研究出台新的出口控制法律，这表明巴西现存的立法体系不能阻止诸如胡戈这样的非法援助活动。
32 Fernando Henrique Cardoso,"Space for Peace Not War,"Defense News,September 18,1995,p.32.
33 Bowen,Wyn and Andrew Koch,"Nonproliferation is embraced by Brazil,"Jane's Intelligence review,June 1996,p.185.
34 Evan S. Medeiros,"Brazil Gains MTCR Membership,Space Program Remains Intact,"Arms Control Today,25 (November 1995), p.28
35 这七种常规武器是：战斗坦克，装甲战斗用车，大口径的炮兵系统，战斗机，攻击性直升机，战舰和导弹及其运载工具。
36 巴西多次卫星发射失败，根本原因在于技术问题，巴西没有获得能完成火箭惯性导航系统的技术。如果要使VLS成功发射，必须依赖MTCR成员国愿意向巴西提供必要的技术援助。
37 U.S. Department of State of the Spokesman,"U.S.-Brazil Space Cooperation Agreement,"For Immediate Release March 1,1996.
38 “空间扫描”，http://www.cast.ac.cn/cbw/GJTK/2000/200001/KJSM.HTM.
39 吴展：“核裁军的进展”，http://www.mgyj.com/american_studies/1992/third/third02.htm.
40 William Potter and Adam Stulberg,"The Soviet Union and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles,"Surviva132,No.6 (November/December 1990), p.546.
41 "Joint Statement Issued by Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,Moscow,"American Foreign Policy Current Documents,February 10,1990 (Washington DC:US Department of State,1991), p.369.
42 "Joint Statement Issued by Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Moscow,"American Foreign Policy Current Documents,February 10,1990 (Washington DC:US Department of State, 1991),p.73.
43 Scherr, ED.,"US,Russia Agree on MTCR Guidelines," http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/news/930716-295365.htm.
44 "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement of Missile Proliferation," http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/mtcrusch.htm.
45 中国国务院新闻办公室：“中国的防扩散政策和措施”，http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN017705.pdf.
46 Robert Shuey, "Assessment of the Missile Technology Control Regime,"in Brauch et al.,eds,No.2,p.184.
47 Jing-dong Yuan,"The MTCR and Missile Proliferation: Moving Toward the Next Phase,"May 2000, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/MTCR_missile-e.PDF,pp.8-9.
48 叶竞康：“美国掌握英国核武器控制核潜艇”，《世界新闻报》，2005年11月9日。
49 "N. Korea military exports said to total $800 million,"The Daily Yomiuri(29 September 1999),p.8.
50 Dinshaw Mistry.Containing Missile Proliferation:Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Contro,2003.p.36.
51 Stephen Engelberg,"German Atomic Sale Challenged,"The New York Times (1 February 1989),p.A2
52 Shirley A. Kan,"China:Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy-Actions and Chronology,"http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/98-485.pdf.
53 例如核能是一种重要的能量来源；化学和生物技术能用于工业，制药和农业领域；火箭技术能被用作发射通讯卫星和遥感卫星。火箭技术，诸如化学制品(用作火箭推进剂)，电子学(用于火箭引导)，金属(用于机身和热防护)利机器工具(用于建造导弹)也有众多非军事的工业运用。
54 尹怀勤：“印度大力发展导弹核武器”，http://www.space.cetin.net.cn/docs/ht0104/ht010413.htm.
55 Gerald M. Steinberg with Aharon Etengoff, "Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Developments in the Middle East:2000-2001,"Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No.52.p.29.
56 U.S. Department of Defense,The Military Critical Technologies List,Washington,D.C.:GPO,October 1992.
57 James Sperling,David Louscher, and Michael Salomone,"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side:The Prospects for Weapons and Weapons Technology Diffusion and Control,"Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago,April 1997.
58 A. A. Pikayev, L.S.Spector, E.v.kirichenko, and R.Gibson, "Russia, the U.S and the Missile Technology Control Regime,"Adelphi Paper 317 (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies,March 1998),p.18.
59 Milhollin, Gary,"India's Missiles With a Little Help from Our Friends,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45(November 1989).
60 Whn Q. Bowen,"Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 1950-1989,"The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation,Published in the United States of America,New York,2000,pp.26.
61 Rediff,"MTCR Delays India's Missile Program," http://www.rediff.com/news/apr/28MTCR.htm.
62 Mannshaiya, Habir K,"India's Prithvi Government Held Hostage to Its Own Missile,"International Defense Review,Strategic & Security Issues,Vol.28,No.8, August 1,1995,p.23.
63 陈仕军、熊鹰：“印度当前导弹发展状况”，http://bwl.jschina.com.cn/abroad/india/217.htm.
64 转引自：蓝建学：“印度大国梦中的中国情结”，《当代亚太》，2004年第12期，第37页。
65 转引自：钟有为：“试论印度的大国梦”，《安徽教育学院学报》，2003年9月第21卷，第5期，第29页。
66 Luis Bitencourt,Developing Countries and Missile Proliferation:The Case of Argentina, Brazil, and India,Washington, D.C.2001.p.226.
67 Seema Gahlaut,"India and the MTCR," appeared in The Hindu,on August 14,1999. http://www.indiagov.org/press/New_Delhi_Press/August_1999/India_MTCR_August_14_1999.htm.
68 The Economist, July 8,1995.
69 The Economist,December 23,1995.
70 2005年4月，笔者赴乔治亚大学访问时，格哈罗特教授在授课中曾详细阐述了她对印度与MTCR关系的看法。文中观点是作者的听课笔录。
71 "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime Madrid, Spain,"12-16 September 2005, http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/madrid.html.
72 关于MTCR的局限性和歧视性问题，作者曾请教清华大学国际问题研究所的李彬教授，他以通俗、风趣的语言解答了作者的一些疑问，文中的个别观点也吸收了李彬教授的观点，特 此表示感谢!
73 “多国签署第一个防止弹道导弹扩散准则”，http://gb2.chinabroadcast.cn/772/2002-11-26/89@121523.htm.
74 Aidan Harris,"International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation," BASIC NOTES,18 July 2002,http://www.basicintoorg/pubs/Notes/2002international_code.htm.
75 "International Response:Code of Conduct Ineffective,Experts Say,"by Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire,15 February 2002.
76 P·Litavrin, V·Lukiantsev,"The Hague Missile Code,"International affairs,Copyright(?)2003 EBSCO Publishing.
77 Mark Smith,"On Thin Ice: First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct,"Arms Control Today,July/August 2002.
78 Michael Richardson,"The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):An Assessment of its Strengths & Weaknesses,With Some Proposals for Shaping its Future,"http://www.iseas.edu.sg/tr32006.pdf.
79 Stephen G. Rademaker,"The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):A Record of Success,"Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation Washington, DC June 9, 2005. http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/congress/senate060905.pdf.
80 Andrew Prosser, Herbert Scoville,"The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective," http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf.
81 United Nations Security Council,Note by the President of the Security Council, S/23500,31 January 1992.
82 U.S. Department of State:Fact Sheet,September 4,2003 (Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting, Paris,September 3-4)
83 联合国宪章第53条规定：“1、安全理事会对于职权内之执行行动，在适当情形下，应利用此项区域办法或区域机关。如无安全理事会之授权，不得以区域办法或由区域机关采取任何执行行动；但关于依第一百零七条之规定对付本条第二项所指之任何敌国之步骤，或在区域办法内所取防备此等国家再施其侵略政策之步骤，截止本组织经个关系政府之请求，对于此等国家之再次侵略，能担负防止责任时为止，不在此限。2、本条第一项所称敌国系指第二次世界大战中为本宪章任何签字国之敌国而言。”参阅：许光建主编：《联合国宪章诠释》，山西教育出版社，1999年4月第1版，第694页。
84 联合国安全理事会第1540(2004)号决议，2004年4月28日安全理事会第4956次会议通过，全文参见：http://www.un.org/chinese/aboutun/prinorgs/sc/sres/04/s1540.htm.
85 许光建主编：“联合国宪章诠释”，山西教育出版社，1999年4月第1版，第693—694页。
86 Andrew Prosser, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Peace Fello,"The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspectiv,"June 16,2004,http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf.
87 Financial Times,July 11,2003.
88 Michael Richardson, "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): An Assessment of its Strengths & Weaknesses,With Some Proposals for Shaping its Future," http://www.iseas.edu.sg/tr32006.pdf.
89 国务院新闻办公室：“张炎谈有关中国为何未参加防扩散安全倡议问题”，http://news.xinhuanet.corn/video/2005-09/01/content_3429111.htm.
90 Raja Mohan,"India and proliferation security," http://www.hinduonnet.com/2003/10/06/stories/2003100605081100.htm.
91 Reuters,"N.Korea warns UN over US pressure on S. Korea,"by Irwin Arieff 24 February 2006.
92 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland,31 May 2003,http://www.usinfo.pl/bushvisit2003/wawel.htm.
93 Andrew Prosser, Herbert Scoville,"The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective," http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf.
94 郭晓兵：“军控拦截’在珊瑚海”，《世界知识》，2003年第19期。
95 Rebecca Weiner,"Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Materiel," http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030716.htm.
96 Kralev, The Washington Times,June 17, 2003.
97 Rebecca Weiner,"Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Materiel," http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030716.htm.
98 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 19.
99 (1)对沿海国的主权、领土完整或政治独立进行任何武力威胁或使用武力，或以任何其他违反《联合国宪章》所体现的国际法原则的方式进行武力威胁或使用武力；(2)以任何种类的武器进行任何操练或演习；(3)任何目的在于搜集情报使沿海国的防务或安全受损害的行为；(4)任何目的在于影响沿海国防务或安全的宣传行为；(5)在船上起落或接载任何飞机：(6)在船上发射、降落或接载任何军事装置；(7)违反沿海国海关、财政、移民或卫生的法律和规章，上下任何商品、货币或人员；(8)违反本公约规定的任何故意和严重的污染行为；(9)任何捕鱼活动；(10)进行研究或测量活动；(11)任何目的在于干扰沿海国任何通讯系统或任何其他设施或设备的行为；(12)与通过没有直接关系的任何其他活动。
100 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 23.
101 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 37.
102 奥本海：《奥本海国际法》(上卷)，商务印书馆，1972年版，第101页。
103 Patricia LEWIS and Ramesh THAKUR,"Arms control, disarmament and the United Nations,"http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art2016.pdf.
1 Aaron Karp,Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996),pp.139-141.
2 “警察巡逻”指的是对每一种导弹部件都要进行核查。“火警巡逻”指的是只对整件导弹进行核查。
3 Andrew Aldrin,"Technology Control Regimes and the Globalization of Space Industry,"Space Policy 14(1998),p.21.
[1] 刘华秋．军备控制与裁军手册[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，2000年．
[2] 何仁学、吴小平．铸剑为犁：21世纪的军备控制与裁军[M]，北京：中国青年出版社，1998．
[3] 希金斯、乐舍夫、乐雷行．飞鱼导弹秘闻[M]．南宁：广西民族出版社，1986年．
[4] 龚学军．从弓箭到导弹：武器发展史话[M]．北京：商务印书馆，1982年．
[5] 余超志．导弹概论[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，1982．
[6] 夏立平．亚太地区军备控制与裁军[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2002．
[7] 徐岩、李莉．天盾：美国导弹防御系统：TMD和NMD[M]．北京：解放军文艺出版社，2001．
[8] 吴莼思．威慑理论与导弹防御[M]．北京：长征出版社，2001年．
[9] 杨存堂．美苏冷战的一次极限：加勒比海导弹危机[M]．南宁：广西师范大学出版社，2002．
[10] 吴凤明．导弹：战争的革命．北京：海潮出版社，2001．
[11] 于川信．越洋杀手：战略导弹[M]．北京：军事科学出版社，2000．
[12] 刘桐林、倪永华、刘愔．高技术战争中的“撒手锏”：巡航导弹[M]．北京：解放军文艺出版社，2002．
[13] 孙家栋．导弹武器与航天器装备[M]．北京：原子能出版社，2003．
[14] 刘绍球．针尖对麦芒：导弹与反导弹[M]．长沙：国防科技大学出版社，2000．
[15] 戴隆淦．巡航导弹及其克星[M]．北京：兵器工业出版社，2003．
[16] 韩祖南．世界导弹博览[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，2001．
[17] 朱强国．美国战略导弹防御计划的动因[M]．北京：世界知识出版社，2004．
[18] 魏孔虎．会说话的“导弹”：导弹与战争[M]．长沙：湖南科学技术出版社，2005．
[19] 陈辉亭．飞鸣镝：中国地空导弹部队作战实录[M]．北京：解放军文艺出版社，2005．
[20] 李德福．千钧一发：古巴导弹危机纪实[M]．北京：世界知识出版社，1997．
[21] 张毅、杨辉耀、李俊莉．弹道导弹弹道学[M]．长沙：国防科技大学出版社，1999．
[22] 贾俊明、董学斌．倚天：共和国导弹核武器发展纪实[M]．北京：西苑出版社，1999．
[23] 何柱．火箭与导弹[M]．北京：科学出版社，1976．
[24] 朱明权．核扩散：危险与防止[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，1995．
[25] 杜祥琬编著．核军备控制的科学技术基础[G]．北京：国防工业出版社，1996．
[26] 美国军备控制协会．军备控制概论[M]．北京：军事科学出版社，1993．
[27] 张伟超．战神霹雳：导弹与核武器[M]．北京：长江文艺出版社，1999．
[28] 朱锋．弹道导弹防御计划与国际安全[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2001．
[29] 孙连山、杨晋辉编著．导弹防御系统[G]．北京：航空工业出版社，2005．
[30] 孙景文、李志民编著．导弹防御与空间对抗[G]．北京：原子能出版社，2004．
[31] 谢储生．新世纪的矛与盾：导弹及导弹战今昔[M]．福州：福建教育出版社，1995．
[32] 袁易．中国遵循国际弹道建制的解析[M]．台湾：五南图书出版公司，2004．
[33] 王杰、门洪华．国际机制论[M]．北京：新华出版社，2002．
[34] 门洪华．和平的纬度：联合国集体安全机制研究[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2002．
[35] 倪世雄：当代西方国际关系理论[M]，上海：复旦大学出版社，2001
[36] 刘杰．秩序重构：经济全球化时代的国际机制[M]．北京：高等教育出版社，上海社会科学院出版社，1999．
[37] 王逸舟．西方国际政治学：历史与理论[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1998．
[38] 金应忠、倪世雄．国际关系理论比较研究[M](修订本)，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2003．
[39] 樊勇明．西方国际政治经济学[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2001．
[40] 沈丁立、任晓主编．现实主义与美国外交政策[G]上海：上海三联书店，2004．
[41] 任晓、沈丁立主编．保守主义理念与美国的外交政策[G]，上海：上海三联书店，2003．
[42] 王逸舟．当代国际政治析论[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1995．
[43] 潘振强等主编．国际裁军与军备控制[G]．北京：国防大学出版社，1996．
[44] 苏长和．全球公共问题与国际合作：一种制度的分析[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，2000．
[45] 秦亚青．霸权体系与国际冲突—美国在国际武装冲突中的支持行为(1945—1988)．上海：上海人民出版社，1999．
[46] (美)肯尼迪．十三天：古巴导弹危机回忆录[M]．上海：上海人民出版社，1977．
[47] (美)林赛、奥汉隆．美国之盾．北京：新华出版社，2004．
[48] (俄)弗·谢·别洛乌斯．反导弹防御和21世纪的武器[M]．北京：东方出版社，2004．
[49] (英)加涅尔．导弹控制系统[M]．北京：国防工业出版社，1985．
[50] (美)罗伯特·基欧汉．霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与纷争．苏长和、信强等译．上海：上海人民出版社，2001．
[51] 罗伯特·基欧汉、约瑟夫·奈．权力与相互依赖[M]．(第3版)，门洪华译，北 京：北京大学出版社，2002．
[52] (美)约翰·米尔斯海默．大国政治的悲剧．王义桅、唐小松译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003．
[53] 罗伯特·基欧汉编．新现实主义及其批判[G]．郭树勇译，北京：北京大学出版社，2002．
[54] (美)诺姆·乔姆斯基．新自由主义与全球秩序[M]．徐海铭、季海宏泽，南京：江苏人民出版社，2000．
[55] (美)亚历山大·温特．国际政治的社会理论[M]．秦亚青译，上海：上海世纪出版集团，2000．
[56] (美)肯尼思·W·汤普森．国际关系中的思想流派[M]．梅仁、王羽译，北京：北京大学出版社，2003．
[57] (美)鲍德温主编．新现实主义与新自由主义[G]．肖欢容译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2001．
[58] (美)詹姆斯·德·代元主编．国际关系理论批判[G]．秦治来译，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2003．
[59] (美)肯尼思·华尔兹．国际政治理论[M]．信强译，上海：上海人民出版社，2003．
[60] (美)汉斯·摩根索．国家间的政治—为权力与和平而斗争[M]》(第五版修订本)．杨歧鸣、王燕生、赵归、林小云译，北京：商务印书馆，1993．
[61] (美)斯坦利·霍夫曼．当代国际关系理论[M]．林伟成、刘晓红、王建伟等译，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1990．
[61] (美)罗伯特·吉尔平．世界政治中的战争与变革[M]．北京：中国人民大学出版社，1994．
[62] (英)布赞、(丹麦)维夫、(丹麦)怀尔德主编．新安全论[G]．朱宁泽，杭州：浙江人民出版社，2003．
[63] (美)T．N．杜普伊．武器和战争的演变[M]．北京：军事科学出版社，1985．
[1] 夏立平．亚太地区弹道导弹及其技术的扩散和控制[J]．国际观察，2001，1．
[2] 高硕．试析中东弹道导弹的扩散[J]．阿拉伯世界，2003，3．
[3] 李小军．美国对南亚导弹扩散的安全评估与政策选择[J]．美国研究，2004，4．
[4] 李小军．“导弹技术控制制度”的困境及其出路：一种机制研究[J]，2005，3．
[5] 李小军．制度根基、制度缺陷与制度修复：对“导弹技术控制制度”的理论思考[J]．国际论坛，2005，1．
[6] 李小军．美国与巴西关系中的“核因素”及其影响[J]．国际论坛，2005，5．
[7] 李小军．欧美防扩散战略的分歧与合作[J]．外交评论，2005，6．
[8] 李小军．中东对全球防扩散体制的十大挑战[J]．阿拉伯世界，2005，2．
[9] 景南．巡航导弹的扩散问题[J]．中国航天，2000，8．
[10] 齐秀丽．美国与导弹技术控制体制[J]．唐山师范学院学报，2004，7．
[11] (澳大利亚)卡洛·科普．导弹技术扩散凸现防空重点，击败巡航导弹[J]．国际展望，2005，10．
[12] 赵青海．“防扩散安全倡议评析”[J]．国际问题研究，2004，6．
[13] 顾国良．美国“防扩散安全倡议”评析[J]．美国研究，2004，3．
[14] 王君．冷战后中国不扩散政策的转变及其原因分析[J]．太平洋学报，2002，4。
[15] 周宝根、李彬．军备控制中的非军事因素[J]．国际经济评论，2002，9．
[16] 刘金质．冷战后美国的防扩散政策[J]．国际政治研究，1998，1．
[17] 欧阳立平．反恐怖形势下的防扩散问题[J]．现代国际关系，2003，5．
[18] 王君．中国与多边出口控制机制关系之演变及原因探析[J]．辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2005，3．
[19] 陈继东．美国“9·11”事件后的全球军控与防扩散[J]．南亚研究季刊，2002，1．
[20] 周建设．美国新安全战略与国际军备控制[J]．求索，2002，5．
[21] 时殷弘．东亚军备控制和不扩散问题：现状与危险．战略与管理，2002，5．
[22] 卡内基国际和平基金会俄罗斯与欧亚项目报告．美俄核心安全问题—核安全、核不扩散和导弹防御[J]．国外社会科学文摘，2001，11．
[23] 夏立平．亚太地区禁止生物武器的进程[J]．国际观察，2001，6．
[24] 李彬．国际军备控制的现状与前景[J]．国际经济评论，2001，9-10．
[25] 叶如安．国际军备控制向何处去?[J]．国际问题研究，2002，7．
[26] 张业遂．国际安全形势与中国的军控制、裁军和防扩散[J]．求是杂志，2005，19．
[27] 王勇．美国放松高科技产品的出口控制及其对中美经贸关系的影响[J]．国际贸易问题，1996，7．
[28] 夏立平．外层空间军备控制的进展与障碍[J]．当代亚太，2002．6．
[29] 朱强国．美国退出《反导条约》的动因及潜藏的战略意图[J]．外交学院学报，2002，1．
[30] 周宝根、李彬．党派政治对冷战后美国军控政策的影响[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2002，4．
[31] 夏立平．国际军备控制理论的演变与建立有中国特色的军控理论[J]．国际政治研究，2002，2．
[32] 张涛华．不受控制的国际机制—国际机制的独立性研究[J]．河北理工学院学报 (社会科学版)，2004，2．
[33] 葛传红．对待国际机制的两种态度—关于“机制困境”的分析[J]．社会科学．2003，3．
[34] 门洪华．关于美国霸权的机制分析[J]．太平洋学报，2002，2．
[35] 门洪华．国际机制的有效性与局限性[J]．美国研究，2001，4．
[36] 王明国．国际机制对国家行为的影响—机制有效性的一种新的分析视角[J]．世界经济与政治，2003，6．
[37] 刘志云．国际机制理论与国际法的发展[J]．现代国际关系，2004，10．
[38] 门洪华．国际机制与美国霸权[J]．美国研究，2001，1．
[39] 门洪华．国际机制与中国的战略选择[J]．中国社会科学，2001，1．
[40] 韩俊艳、刘丰．国际机制中的国家参与问题析论[J]．华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2003，4．
[41] 杨光海、杨震．后冷战时代的美国霸权与国际安全机制—以安理会和北约为例[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2004，3．
[42] 刘宏松．机制合法性与国际机制的维持[J]．学术探索，2005，2．
[43] 张兴平．论国际机制安全[J]．甘肃社会科学，2004，6．
[44] 于营、林松．论全球化背景下的国际机制[J]．北华大学学报(社会科学版)，2005，2．
[45] 辛本健．美国霸权的“软肋”及其霸权护持战略[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，11．
[46] 王缉思．美国霸权与中国崛起[J]．外交评论，2005，5．
[47] 于营．权力、利益、观念—国际机制的三种理论范式分析[J]．长春大学学报，2005，2．
[48] 何杰．权力与制度—国际机制理论的现实主义分析[J]．欧洲研究，2003，4．
[49] 刘庆荣．以交易费用为视角考察国际机制的有效性[J]．学术探索，2004，7．
[50] 程新章．制度化霸权机制探析[J]．江苏社会科学，2004，6．
[51] 刘杰．中国参与国际机制的理论与实践[J]．毛泽东邓小平理论研究，2003，4．
[52] 张岚．从科索沃危机看当今国际安全机制的取向[J]．现代国际关系，1999，5．
[53] 刘青建．发展中国家成功改变国际制度的三个变量探析[J]．太平洋学报．2003，3．
[54] 葛腾飞．反恐怖斗争与新型国际安全机制的构建[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2002，1．
[55] 陈须隆．国际安全机制：定义与分类[J]．国际政治研究，2000，1．
[56] 丁松泉、张小敏．国际合作的新自由主义视角[J]．国际关系学院学报，2004，3．
[57] 简军波、丁冬汉．国际机制的功能与道义[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，3．
[58] (加拿大)江忆恩．简论国际机制对国家行为的影响[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，12．
[59] 门洪华．国际机制理论的批评与前瞻[J]．世界经济与政治，1999，11．
[60] 唐颖侠．国际法与国内法的关系及国际条约在中国国内法中的适用[J]．社会科学战线，2003，1．
[61] 史页、李超．战后国际安全观念和安全机制的演变[J]．世界经济与政治论坛，2002，6．
[62] 高华．评介美国等西方学论国际组织[J]．世界经济与政治1997，7．
[63] 李钢．西方国际制度理论探析[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，2．
[64] 范菊华．论偏好和国际制度的关系[J]．现代国际关系，2003，8．
[65] 余敏友．论国际组织的地位与作用[J]．法学评论，1995，5．
[66] 门洪华．国际机制的合法性[J]．国际政治研究，2002，1．
[67] 乔卫兵．冷战后中国与国际机制的互动关系[J]．国际政治研究，2001，1．
[68] 胡慧敏．无政府状态下国际制度的效用[J]．国际论坛，2003，3．
[69] 陈须隆．核不扩散机制透析—国际安全机制的一个案例研究[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，8．
[70] 王学东．国家声誉与国际制度[J]．现代国际关系，2003，7．
[71] 郭树永．评“国际制度和平论”[J]．美国研究，2000，1．
[72] 李晓燕．试析国际制度的作用及其局限性[J]．国际关系学院学报，2003，6．
[73] 李晓燕．浅析国际制度的制约因素[J]．政法论丛，2004，2．
[74] 随新民．国际制度的合法性与有效性—新现实主义、新自由制度主义和建构主义三种范式比较[J]．学术探索，2004，6．
[75] 陈晓进．国际制度的概念辨析[J]．国际观察，2000，6．
[76] 田野．交易费用理论视野下的国际制度需求分析[J]．欧洲，2002，1．
[77] 张胜军．国际政治与国际组织的功能主义分析[J]．欧洲，1998，3．
[78] 周丕启．国际关系中的政治合法性[J]．世界经济与政治，2002，3．
[79] 胡伟．合法性问题研究：政治学研究的新视角[J]．政治学研究，1996，1．
[80] 王宏强．论政治合法性的三个层面[J]．济南市社会主义学院学报，2003，1．
[81] (法)让—马克·思古德．什么是政治的合法性?[J]．外国法译评，1997，2．
[82] 孙建光．西方政治合法性理论辨析[J]．求实，2004，2．
[83] 赵海立．政治合法性理论及其分析架构[J]．厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)，2004，5．
[84] 张连国．政治合法性探析[J]．理论与现代化，2004，4．
[85] 周丕启．政治合法性与国际稳定[J]．国际论坛，2001，10．
[86] 孙晓玲．“霸权稳定论”与中国新安全观：一种比较视角[J]．世界经济与政治2004，2．
[87] 樊勇明．霸权稳定论的理论与政策[J]．现代国际关系，2000，9．
[88] 秦亚青．新现实主义和新自由主义：从论争到趋同—第三次国际关系学理辩论的终结[J]．国际论坛2001，6．
[89] 范菊华．对建构主义的解析[J]．世界经济与政治，2003，7．
[90] 牛震．关于霸权稳定论及其评价[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，10．
[91] 肖欢容．国际关系理论中的理性主义论争[J]．世界经济与政治，2001，12．
[92] 秦亚青、(美)亚历山大·温特．建构主义的发展空间[J]，世界经济与政治，2005，1．
[93] 王义桅、唐小松．从霸权稳定论到单极稳定论[J]．世界经济与政治，2000，9．
[94] 倪世雄、许嘉．论冷战后新现实主义面临的挑战[J]．欧洲，1997，4．
[95] 周丕启．霸权稳定论：批判与修正[J]．太平洋学报，2005，1．
[96] 郭树永．评“霸权稳定论”[J]．欧洲，1997，6．
[97] 潘忠岐．制度与合作：新自由制度主义对新现实主义的批判与发展[J]．世界经济与政治，2004，7．
[98] 刘武通．从结构理论到反结构决定论——新现实主义与新自由主义理论评析[J]．欧洲，1999，9．
[99] 方长平、冯秀珍．国家利益研究的范式之争：新现实主义、新自由主义和建构主义[J]．国际论坛，2002，5．
[100] 刘永涛．西方新现实主义理论与建构主义批评[J]．世界经济与政治，1998，11．
[101] 陈东晓．试论国际制度的本质特征及其与美国霸权的互动关系[J]．国际政治研究，2004，3．
[102] 苏长和．重新定义国际制度[J]．欧洲，1999，6．
[103] 时殷弘、陈然然．论冷战思维[J]．世界经济与政治，2001，6．
[104] 沈丁立．博弈在拥核与弃核之间．文汇报[N]．2005，8(26)．
[105] 钟振明．多边主义合作：冷战后东盟安全战略新取向[J]．国际论坛，2000，12．
[106] 舒建中．鲁杰“多边主义”理论述评[J]．国际论坛，2005，1．
[107] 叶江．单边主义与多边主义的相互转换—试析多边主义在布什第二任期回归的可能[J]，2004，4．
[108] 倪峰．对多边主义理论构成的一些探索[J]．国际论坛，2004，11．
[109] 秦亚青．边主义研究：理论与方法[J]．世界经济与政治，2001，9．
[110] 朱锋．《导弹管制条例》利于中美关系发展．中国日报[N]，2002，8．
[1] Schmidt, Rachel., U.S. export control policy and the missile technology control regime. Santa Monica : Rand, 1990.
[2] Alexander A. Pikayev., Russia, the US and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.
[3] Mistry, Dinshaw., Containing Missile Proliferation : Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control. Seattle: University of Washington Press.2003.
[4] Almay Khalilzad.&n., The United States and WMD : Missile Proliferation in the Middle East : Rand,1996.
[5] Illiam C., The International missile bazaar : the new suppliers's network, edited by William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
[6] Marcy Agrnon., Arms proliferation policy: support to the Presidential Advisory Board, Santa Monica, CA : Rand,1996.
[7] Bailey, Kathleen & Robert Rudney. C, Proliferation and export controls. Lanham: University Press of America ;Fairfax, Va. : National Institute for Public Policy,1993.
[8] Jia, Hao, China's nuclear nonproliferation policy and international regime. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1999.
[9] Goldman, Charles A, Engaging China in the international export control process : options for U.S. policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND,1997.
[10] David Rubenson, Ann., The impact of missile proliferation on U.S. power projection capabilities. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation,1990.
[11] Cooper, David A., Competing Western strategies against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: comparing the United States to a close ally. Westport, Conn. : Praeger,2002.
[12] Armati, Istvan, Missile development and its impact on global security. New York : United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1999.
[13] Hamre, John J. Technology and security in the twenty-first century : U.S. military export control reform,2001.
[14] Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the threat of cruise missiles. Gormley. Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies,2001.
[15] Dando, Malcolm., Biological warfare in the 21st century: biotechnology and the proliferation of biological weapons, 1994.
[16] Bailey, Kathleen C, Proliferation and export controls.1993.
[17] Dianne E. Rennack., Nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile proliferation sanctions: selected current law. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Novinka Books, 2004.
[18] Karp, Aaron., Ballistic missile proliferation : the politics and technics. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996
[19] Carus, W. Seth. Cruise missile proliferation in the 1990s. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992.
[20] Trevor Findlay(ed). Chemical weapons & missile proliferation: with implications for the Asia/Pacific region. Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, Pub., 1991.
[21] Wyn Q. Bowen., The politics of ballistic missile nonproliferation. Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Macmillan Press Ltd. St. Martin's Press in association with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton.
[22] Genevieve J. Knezo., Federal security controls on scientific and technical information : history and current controversy. New York : Novinka Books, 2003.
[23] Claus Hofhansel., Commercial competition and national security: comparing U.S. and German export controlpolicies. Westport, Conn.: Praeger 1996.
[24] Douglas E. McDaniel., United States technology export control: an assessment. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1993.
[25] Burghart, Daniel L., Red microchip: technology transfer, export control, and economic restructuring in the Soviet Union. Aldershot, Hants : Dartmouth, 1992.
[26] Karl M. Meessen(ed). International law of export control : jurisdictional issues. London, Boston : Graham & Trotman,1992.
[27] John Heinz., U.S. strategic trade: an export control system for the 1990s. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1991.
[28] Tuan Yao Cheng., The U.S. politics of export control policy toward the People's Republic of China. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1990.
[29] A.L.C. de Mestral and T. Gruchalla-Wesierski., Extraterritorial application of export control legislation : Canada and the U.S,4. Dordrecht : Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1990.
[30] William J. Long., U.S. export control policy : executive autonomy vs. congressional reform. New York : Columbia University Press, 1989.
[31] Eckert, Theodore J., The transfer of U.S. technology to other countries : an analysis of export control policy and some recommendations. Princeton N.J. : Princeton University, 1981.
[32] U.S. Department of Commerce, Domestic and International Business Administration, Bureau of East-West Trade., Export administration. Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service, Inc., 1974.
[33] United States. Office of Export Control., A summary of U.S. Export control regulations. Washington : [s.n.], 1964.
[34] Berhanykun Andernicael and John Mathiason., Eliminating weapons of mass destruction : prospects for effective international verification. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
[35] Hamel-Green, Michael., Regional initiatives on nuclear-and WMD-free zones: cooperative approaches to arms control and non-proliferation. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2005.
[36] Hubbard, Christopher., Australian and US military cooperation: fighting common enemies. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgage, 2005.
[37] Mark A. Prelas, Michael S. Peck., Nonproliferation issues for weapons of mass destruction. Boca Raton, FL: Dekker/CRC Press, 2005.
[38] Vilmos Cserveny., Building a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East: global non-proliferation regimes and regional experiences. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2004.
[39] Wendy Frieman., China, arms control, and nonproliferation. London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.
[40] Leon T. Carter (editor)., Arms control and nonproliferation: issues and analyses. Huntington, NY : Nova Science Publishers, 2000.
[41] Joseph Cirincione (ed). Repairing the regime: preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. New York: Routledge, 2000.
[42] Keith R. Krause(ed). Culture and security: multilateralism, arms control, and security building. London, Portland, OR : F. Cass, 1999.
[43] Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning (ed). Missile defence: international, regional and national implications. London ; New York, N.Y. : Routledge, 2005.
[44] Owen L. Sirrs. Nasser and the missile age in the Middle East. New York : Routledge, 2005.
[45] Steven A. Hildreth (ed)., Missile defense: the current debate. New York : Novinka, 2004.
[46] Alice L. George., Awaiting Armageddon : how Americans faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
[47] Abraham Ben-Zvi., John F. Kennedy and the politics of arms sales to Israel. London; Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2002.
[48] Anthony H. Cordesman., Strategic threats and national missile defenses: defending the U.S. homeland. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.
[49] Volker Rittberger, Peter Mayer, Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 2003.
[50] Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, London: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[51] Stephen D. Krasner., International Regimes, Cornell University Press,1983.
[52] Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder : Westview Press ,1989
[1] Chun Yong Taek, "Missile Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and Consequences of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Program", Rome Forum: Missile Threats and BMD. http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/NMD/chun.pdf.
[2] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)", Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. http://www.nti.org/e_research/o fficial_docs/inventory /pdfs/mtcr.pdf.
[3] "Missile Proliferation, 1995-1997", http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tracking_missile.pdf.
[4] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies., "International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses", Occasional Paper No.5. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op5/op5.pdf.
[5] Aidan Harris, "International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation", BASIC NOTES, 18 July 2002. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2002international_code.htm.
[6] The Center for International Trade and Security, "Counterterrorism and the Nonproliferation Regime", http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/monitor/monitor_win_2002.pdf.
[7] "China's Proliferation Practices and The Challenge of North Korea", http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/transcripts/05_03_10.pdf.
[8] Mohamed KADRY SAID, "Missile proliferation in the Middle East: a regional perspective", The Middle East, No.2, 2001.
[9] W. Seth Carus, "Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2000).
[10] CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web, Richard P. Cronin., "Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects", March 19, 2002. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf.
[11] Gerald Steinberg, "U.S. Responses to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East", Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1998).
[12] Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., "China's Missile Policy", June, 1998. http://www.strom.clemson.edu/opinion/whitehurst/chinamissile.pdf.
[13] Joseph Cirincione, "Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China", http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/NSA/cirincione.pdf.
[14] Michael D. Swaine with Loren H. Runyon, "Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia", NBR Analysis, http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/swainenbr.pdf.
[15] CRS Report for Congress, Christopher Bolkcom and Sharon Squassoni, "Cruise Missile Proliferation", Order Code RS21252July 3, 2002. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS21252.pdf.
[16] Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia", http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci243b/readings/sagan.pdf.
[17] NAEEM AHMAD SALIK, "Missile Issues in South Asia", The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002.
[18] Kent L. Biringer, "Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring in South Asia", http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMBiringer.pdf.
[19] Michael Kraig and James Henderson, Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, "US Strategies for Regional Security: South Asia", Convened at Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, Virginia October 25-27, 2001.
[20] Senate Foreign Relation's Committee, "The United States & South Asia: New Possibilities", January 28, 2004. http://www.senate.gov/～foreign/testimony/2004/WisnerTestimony040128.pdf
[21] House Of representatives, Subcommittee On Asia and The Pacific, Committee on International relations, "The U.S and South Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for American Policy", Thursday, March 20, 2003, Washington, DC.
[22] Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary Washington, DC. September 4, 2003. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles", http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/09_03_psi_brief.pdf.
[23] Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt, "Fighting proliferation—European perspectives", Chaillot Papers, December 2003. http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai66e.pdf.
[24] Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", July 14, 1999. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/deutch/11910book.pdf
[25] CRS Report for Congress , Jennifer K. Elsea, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft", October 1, 2003. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32097.pdf.
[26] Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies., "Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects , Occasional Paper No. 7, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op7/op7.pdf.
[27] K. Alan Kronstadt, "Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia", October 17, 2003. http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32115.pdf.
[28] Rajesh M. Basrur, "Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective", http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/SABMDBasrur.pdf.
[29] Peter D. Zimmerman, "Missile Defense and American SecurityA Sensible National Policy", Defense Working Paper No. 2. May 1996.
[30] "Pakistan and North Korea Dangerous counter-trades , Strategic Comments, Volume 8 Issue 9 November 2002. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/Pakistan-and-North-Korea.pdf.
[31] Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana, and Jurgen Scheffran., "A Comprehensive Missile Control Regime: It's Not too Soon", Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor April 2001.
[32] Jing-dong Yuan, "Strengthening China's Export Control System", October 4,2002. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/jdmemo.pdf.
[33] Sue Soo-ha Yang, "Legal Basis for State Interception of Shipments on High Seas: Legality of the Naval Interdiction under the "Proliferation Security Initiative", October 1, 2003. http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/MEMO_NK_interdiction.PDE
[34] Mutahir Ahmed, "Missile Defense and South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective", http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/SABMDMutahir.pdf.
[35] Akira Kurosaki, "Proposal for A Regional Missile Limitation Regime: An Alternative to Missile Defense in Northeast Asia", ISYP CONFERENCE "Advancing Human Security" Halifax, Nova Scotia July 15-17 2003. http://www.student-pugwash.org/halifax2003/papers/Kurosaki.pdf.
[36] Antonio Catalano di Melilli, "Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles" International Seminar-Santiago de Chile-October 26-27, 2004.
[37] Yun Duk-min, "North Korean Long-Range Missiles: Development, Deployment, and Proliferation", East Asian Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn 2004.
[38] Peter van Ham, "WMD Proliferation and Transatlantic Relations: Is a Joint Western Strategy Possible?" April 2004. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2004/20040400_cli_ess_vanham.pdf.
[39] Jozef Goldblat, "Is there a future for the MTCR?" http://www.gipri.ch/spip/IMG/pdf/Is_there_a_future_for_the_MTCR.pdf.
[40] Mark Smith, "Missing Piece and Gordian Knot: Missile Non-Proliferation", http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No27.pdf.
[41] Martha Clark, "A False Sense of Security: The Role of Missile Defenses in Counterproliferation Doctrine", http://www.psr.org/documents/psr_doc_0/program_4/full03.pdf.
[42] James Clay Moltz, ed., "New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security", Occasional Paper No. 12. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op12/op12.pdf.
[43] Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues", Updated April 5, 2005. http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2006/upl-meta-crs-8111/RL31555_2006Jan05.pdf?PHPSESSID=e03f04befb92745fc19eba73e7d385dc.
[44] James H. Hughes, "The Ballistic Missile Threat: Defense and Technology", The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, V.26, No. 1, Spring, 2001.
[45] Andrew Feickert, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries", Updated March 5, 2004. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31999.pdf.
[46] Mitch Kugler, "International Missile Defense Cooperation and the MTCR", http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Presentation030630%20Kugler%20Missile%20Defense%20Cooperation%20and%20MTCR%20TB.pdf.
[47] Kenneth G. Weiss, "The Limits of Diplomacy: Missile Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Defense", World Affairs, Vol. 163 No. 3 Winter 2001.
[48] Robert J. Einhorn, "Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs", http://www.uspid.org/sections/03_Conferences_Seminars/past_activities/none_cast01/pdf/cast2001%20-%20pr14%20-%20Einhorn.pdf.
[49] Stephen Blank, "Russia as Rogue Proliferator", Orbis, V.44 No.1.Winter 2000.
[50] Jon B. Wolfsthal, "Prospects for a US-DPRK Breakthrough on Missile Development", LNCV-Korean Peninsula: Enhancing Stability and International Dialogue, 1-2 June 2000, Roma. http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/corea/proc/045.pdf.
[51] Jim Walsh, "Russian and American Nonproliferation Policy: Success, Failure, and the Role of Cooperation", Occasional Paper 2004-01. June, 2004.
[52] Wyn Q. Bowen, "U.S. Policy On Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The MTCR'S First Decade (1987-1997)", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997.
[53] Yurie.Fedorov, "The Global Control System and the International Code of Conduct: Competition or Cooperation?" The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002.
[54] CRS Report for Congress , Sharon Squassoni, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)", June 7, 2005. http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RS21881.pdf.
[55] Henry Sokolski, "Space Technology Transfers and Missile Proliferation", http://www.npec-web.org/Testimonies/Testimony980410%20Space%20Technology%20Transfers%20and%20Missile%20Proliferation.pdf.
[56] Wyn Q. Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR", http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol03/33/bowen33.pdf
[57] Phillip C. Saunders, "Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List", September 6, 2002. http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/pdfs/prc_msl.pdf
[58] U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation, "The Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions", Washington, DC. May 2005. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/abr_und_r/psi/download/faq.pdf.
[59] Jing-Dong Yuan, "Recent Developments in China's Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002.
[60] Aaron Karp, "The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security", The Nonproliferation Review/F all-Winter 2000.
[61] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK", Occasional Paper No. 2. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf.
[62] Arvind Kumar, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in Southern Asia: Options for Stabilization ", February 2004. http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/links/cmc-papers/sand2004-0317.pdf.
[63] Evan S. Medeiros, "Chasing the Dragon Assessing China's System of Export Controls for WMD-Related Goods and Technologies", http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG353.pdf.
[64] Victor Zaborsky, "Viewpoint: U.S Missile Nonproliferation Strategy Toward Thnis and China: How Effective?" The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997.
[65] George Abbey and Neal Lane, "United States Space Policy: Challenges and Opportunities", http://www.amacad.org/publications/spacePolicy.pdf.
[66] Randall S. Wood, Johns Hopkins SAIS, "Non-Proliferation Strategies for India and Pakistan in the Aftermath of the May 1998 Tests", December 2004. http://www.therandymon.com/papers/nonproliferation.pdf.
[67] Joseph Cirincione, "Indian Missile Deployments and the Reaction from China", http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/NSA/cirincione.pdf.
[68] Hideshi Takesada, "North Korea's Missile Development: Implications for Neighboring Countries", LNCV-Korean Peninsula: Enhancing Stability and International Dialogue, 1-2 June 2000, Roma. http://www.mi.infn.it/～landnet/corea/proc/042.pdf.
[69] Eric A. Miller Willis A. Stanley, "The Future of Ballistic Missiles", October 2003. http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/futures.pdf.
[70] Nell Joeck, "The U.S.-India 'Global Partnership': The Impact on Nonproliferation", http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/joe102605.pdf.
[71] T.V. PAUL "Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power", The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003.
[72] Jing-Dong Yuan, "Chinese Responses to U. S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security", The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2003.
[73] Jing-Dong Yuan, Phillip C. Saunders, and Strphanie Lieggi, "Recent Developments in China's Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002.
[74] Henry Sokolski, "Viewpoint: Next Century Nonproliferation: Victory is Still Possible", The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996.
[75] Joseph Cirincione, "Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat", The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000.
[76] Michael Barletta, ed., "After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation", Occasional Paper No. 8. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op8/op8.pdf.
[77] Victor Mizin, "Russia's Missile Industry and U.S Nonproliferation Options", The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1998.
[78] Kcn Conca, "Technology, the Military, and Democracy in Brazil", Journal of International Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1992).
[79] Raju G. C. Thomas, "U. S Transfers of 'Dual-Use' Technologies to India", Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 9 (Sep., 1990).
[80] Barry W. Coceano, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges and Perceptions", Occasional Paper, May 2004. http://www.acus.org/docs/0405-Proliferation_Security_Initiative_Challenges_Perceptions.pdf.
[81] "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Is it Legal? Are We more Security?" http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/il/ILP250205.pdf.
[82] "The Proliferation Security Initiative : The Legal Challenge", http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/09_03_psi_brief.pdf.
[83] Samuele. Logan, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges", http://www.law.fsu.edu/Journals/transnational/voll42/logan.pdf.
[84] Stephen G Rademaker, "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): A Record of Success", Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation Washington, DCJune 9, 2005.
[85] Herbert N. Warden IV, "Overcoming Challenges to the Proliferation Security Initiative ", http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/warden.pdf.
[86] Andrew C. Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005.
[87] Duncan L.Clarke, Robert J. Johnston, "U.S Dual-Use Exports to China, Chinese Behavior, and the Israel Factor: Effective Controls?" Asian Survey, Vol.39, No.2 (Mar.-Apr., 1999).
[88] Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World", International Security, Vol.9, No.3 (Winter, 1984-1985).
[89] Michael Byers, "Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative", The American Journal of International Law, Vol.98, No.3 (Jul., 2004).
[90] Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security, Vol.16,No.1 (Summer, 1991).
[91] Aluf Benn, "Slowing the missile race", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2002.
[92] Scott D.Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb", International Security, Vol.21, No.3 (Winter, 1996-1997).
[93] John H. Nuckolls, "Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism", Science, New Series, Vol.267, No.5201(Feb.24,1995).
[94] John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness", International Security, Vol.17, No.2 (Autumn,1992).
[95] Anupam Srivastave, "India's Growing Missile Ambitions: Assessing the Technical and Strategic Dimensions", Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No.2 (Mar.-Apr., 2000).
[96] Randall Forsberg, "Abolishing Ballistic Missiles: Pro and Cons", International Security, Vol.12, No.1 (Summer, 1987).
[97] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status", Updated February 10, 2005. http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/other_us/crs021005.pdf
[98] Sverre Lodgaard, "Making the Non-Proliferation Regime Universal," http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No7-Lodgaard%20Final.pdf.
[99] Eric Brahm,"lnternational Regimes", September 2005. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international_regimes/.
[100] Milner, "International Regimes and World Politics:Comments on the Articles by Smouts, de Senarclens and Jonsson," International Social Science Journal, 1993.
[101] Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world," International Organization 36, 2, Spring 1982.
[102] Krotochwil and Ruggie,"International Organization: A State of Art or an Art of State", International Organization, Vol. 40, 1986.
[103] Young, Oran R, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics 39, p. 10.
[104] Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization. 41. 1987.
[105] Robert Keohane,"International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?", Foreign Policy, Spring 1998.
[106] John Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, No.6 (Summer 1990).
[107] Seema Gahlaut and Gary K. Bertsch,"The War on Terrorism and the Nonproliferation Regime," Orbis, Summer 2004, Vol. 48 No.3.
Washington Post
New York Times
Jane's International Defense Review
Jane's Defense Weekly
The Washington Times
Jane's Defense Weekly
中国外交部：http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gjwt/cjjk/default.htm
中国商务部科技发展和技术贸易司：http://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/
导弹及其技术控制制度：http://www.mtcr.info/english/press.html
兰德公司：http://vivisimo.rand.org
军备控制协会：http://www.armscontrol.org
蒙特雷国际学院防扩散研究中心：http://cns.miis.edu
国际贸易与安全中心：http://www.uga.edu/cits/home/default.htm
斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所：http://www.sipri.org