债务期限结构对企业投资影响的实证研究
|
摘要
负债融资与投资支出的关系研究,是财务领域的一个基本问题。现代资本结构理论认为负债融资对企业投资行为的影响有正负两方面效应:其正面效应表现在负债具有治理机制作用,能减少企业过度投资行为;其负面效应为股东-债权人冲突导致了资产替代和投资不足的非有效投资行为。但以往大部分研究均把负债看成是同质的,事实上不同期限的负债的代理成本存在着差异,对投资行为的影响也是不同的。在资本市场不完善的条件下,债务期限结构对企业投资行为的影响表现在以下方面:第一,缩短债务期限可以减少股东-债权人冲突引起的资产替代和投资不足问题;第二,缩短债务期限可以抑制股东-经理冲突引发的过度投资问题。对于上述理论观点,国内外学者的实证研究结论并不一致,进一步研究这一问题对于规范企业的投融资行为既有理论价值又有实践意义。
本文在回顾国内外相关研究文献的基础上,在研究设计上进行了改进:利用深、沪两市2000-2006年251家制造业企业的1757组样本数据,在控制了影响投资的资本结构、现金流量和成长机会等因素的基础上,研究债务期限结构与企业投资行为的关系。实证结果表明:首先,在总体上两者显著负相关;其次,为观测成长机会对债务期限结构与投资相关关系的影响,按企业成长性进行样本分组,结果发现在高成长性的样本组债务期限结构与投资之间的相关关系不显著,而在低成长性的样本组两者表现出显著的负相关;再次,为验证我国上市公司独特的股权结构对债务期限结构与投资行为之间关系的影响,按国有股控股率的高低进行样本分组,结果发现,在高国有股控股率的样本组中,二者的相关性不显著,而在低国有股控股率的企业中二者显著负相关;最后,从公司治理的角度,研究管理者持股对债务期限结构与投资间关系的影响,发现管理者持股与未持股的企业中二者的相关关系并没有显著性差异。上述研究结果说明,我国上市公司债务期限结构与企业投资行为负相关,是由债务期限抑制了股东-管理者之间的利益冲突引发的过度投资行为而引起的。股东-债权人冲突引起的代理成本并不明显,上市公司并没有利用债务期限结构来解决投资不足问题。另外,国有股控股率高的企业债务期限的治理作用失灵,债务期限结构并没有起到抑制过度投资或投资不足的作用。同时,我国的经理人持股没有起到缓解过度投资问题的激励约束作用。
最后本文根据实证分析的结果,提出了相应的规范上市公司投融资行为的政策建议。
A fundamental issue in finance is whether leverage affects investment policies. The theory of capital structure shows that the impact of debt financing on firm investment has both negative effect and positive effect. The positive effect means that leverage is one mechanism for overcoming the over-investment problem where the conflict is between the shareholders and managers. The negative impact is that the conflict between stockholders (managers) and bondholders due to debt can lead to potential asset substitution and under-investment problem. But in fact, the agency cost arising from short-term debt is not the same as it arising from long-term debt. In a world with incomplete markets the reasons of debt maturity structure fluctuating the scale of investment of the company are: (1) shortening the debt maturity can reduce asset substitution and insufficient investment which is leaded by the conflict between shareholders and creditors; (2) shortening the debt maturity can restrain the excessive investment which is leaded by the conflict between shareholders and managers.
However,there are different empirical research conclusions. Clarifying this point is important for choosing a firm's finance and investment policies. This paper reviews the main previous researches and improves the research design. Based on 251 manufacturing listed companies’data from 2000 to 2006,the essay researches on the relationship between leverage and investment after controlling for the variables that influence a firm’s investment such as cash, captical structure, and growth opportunity. The study shows that: First of all, we find a remarkable negative relationship between debt maturity structure and investment on the whole. Secondly, when divide the sample into two groups based on the growth opportunities. We find the negative relationship holds for low growth firms. In contrast, the correlation between debt maturity structure and investment is not significant for high growth firms. In order to validate the impact of the unique ownership structure on the relationship between debt maturity structure and investment behavior, we divide the sample into two groups based on the state stake ratio, we find the negative relation between debt maturity structure and investment holds for low state stake ratio firms, but not for high state stake ratio firms. Finally, from the perspective of corporate governance, we divide the sample into two groups based on manager stake ratio, we find the relationship between debt maturity structure and firm's investment has no significant difference. The study shows that the negative relationship between debt maturity structure and investment of Chinese listed companies due to debt maturity can reduce the over-investment problem arising from stockholder-manager conflicts. The agency cost arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts is not obvious. Listed companies do not use debt maturity structure to solve the problem of under-investment. In addition, in high state stake ratio firms, debt maturity does not reduce the problem of under-investment and over-investment. The study also finds that, managerial stock ownership does not play an effective role in reducing the over-investment problem.
Finally, according to the empirical analysis of our study, the paper offers some related propositions to supervise the finance and investment behavior of listed companies.
本文在回顾国内外相关研究文献的基础上,在研究设计上进行了改进:利用深、沪两市2000-2006年251家制造业企业的1757组样本数据,在控制了影响投资的资本结构、现金流量和成长机会等因素的基础上,研究债务期限结构与企业投资行为的关系。实证结果表明:首先,在总体上两者显著负相关;其次,为观测成长机会对债务期限结构与投资相关关系的影响,按企业成长性进行样本分组,结果发现在高成长性的样本组债务期限结构与投资之间的相关关系不显著,而在低成长性的样本组两者表现出显著的负相关;再次,为验证我国上市公司独特的股权结构对债务期限结构与投资行为之间关系的影响,按国有股控股率的高低进行样本分组,结果发现,在高国有股控股率的样本组中,二者的相关性不显著,而在低国有股控股率的企业中二者显著负相关;最后,从公司治理的角度,研究管理者持股对债务期限结构与投资间关系的影响,发现管理者持股与未持股的企业中二者的相关关系并没有显著性差异。上述研究结果说明,我国上市公司债务期限结构与企业投资行为负相关,是由债务期限抑制了股东-管理者之间的利益冲突引发的过度投资行为而引起的。股东-债权人冲突引起的代理成本并不明显,上市公司并没有利用债务期限结构来解决投资不足问题。另外,国有股控股率高的企业债务期限的治理作用失灵,债务期限结构并没有起到抑制过度投资或投资不足的作用。同时,我国的经理人持股没有起到缓解过度投资问题的激励约束作用。
最后本文根据实证分析的结果,提出了相应的规范上市公司投融资行为的政策建议。
A fundamental issue in finance is whether leverage affects investment policies. The theory of capital structure shows that the impact of debt financing on firm investment has both negative effect and positive effect. The positive effect means that leverage is one mechanism for overcoming the over-investment problem where the conflict is between the shareholders and managers. The negative impact is that the conflict between stockholders (managers) and bondholders due to debt can lead to potential asset substitution and under-investment problem. But in fact, the agency cost arising from short-term debt is not the same as it arising from long-term debt. In a world with incomplete markets the reasons of debt maturity structure fluctuating the scale of investment of the company are: (1) shortening the debt maturity can reduce asset substitution and insufficient investment which is leaded by the conflict between shareholders and creditors; (2) shortening the debt maturity can restrain the excessive investment which is leaded by the conflict between shareholders and managers.
However,there are different empirical research conclusions. Clarifying this point is important for choosing a firm's finance and investment policies. This paper reviews the main previous researches and improves the research design. Based on 251 manufacturing listed companies’data from 2000 to 2006,the essay researches on the relationship between leverage and investment after controlling for the variables that influence a firm’s investment such as cash, captical structure, and growth opportunity. The study shows that: First of all, we find a remarkable negative relationship between debt maturity structure and investment on the whole. Secondly, when divide the sample into two groups based on the growth opportunities. We find the negative relationship holds for low growth firms. In contrast, the correlation between debt maturity structure and investment is not significant for high growth firms. In order to validate the impact of the unique ownership structure on the relationship between debt maturity structure and investment behavior, we divide the sample into two groups based on the state stake ratio, we find the negative relation between debt maturity structure and investment holds for low state stake ratio firms, but not for high state stake ratio firms. Finally, from the perspective of corporate governance, we divide the sample into two groups based on manager stake ratio, we find the relationship between debt maturity structure and firm's investment has no significant difference. The study shows that the negative relationship between debt maturity structure and investment of Chinese listed companies due to debt maturity can reduce the over-investment problem arising from stockholder-manager conflicts. The agency cost arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts is not obvious. Listed companies do not use debt maturity structure to solve the problem of under-investment. In addition, in high state stake ratio firms, debt maturity does not reduce the problem of under-investment and over-investment. The study also finds that, managerial stock ownership does not play an effective role in reducing the over-investment problem.
Finally, according to the empirical analysis of our study, the paper offers some related propositions to supervise the finance and investment behavior of listed companies.
引文
郭蓉蓉.2006.负债融资与投资支出关系的实证研究——以制造业上市企业为例[D].浙江:浙江大学管理学院.
韩德宗,向凯.2003.我国上市公司债权融资结构的实证研究——以医药、生物制品行业为例[J].经济科学,2:68-75.
胡爱军,熊正德,谢赤.2006.债务期限结构影响因素分析及实证检验[J].统计与决策, 6:96-99.
李珣、周颖.2009.债务期限结构对企业投资行为影响的实证研究[J].8:76-79.
刘清江.2009.公司债务融资与银行债务治理效应的实证分析[J].开放导报,5:93-97.
刘新.2008.债务期限结构对公司投资的影响[J].重庆工学院学报(社会科学), 2:40-43.
陆正飞,韩霞,常琦.2006.公司长期负债与投资行为关系研究——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界, 1:120-128.
闵亮、沈悦.2009.我国上市公司成长性对债务融资影响的实证研究[J].现代管理科学,6:22-24.
童盼.2005.负债期限结构与企业投资规模——来自中国A股上市公司的经验研究[J].经济科学, 5:93-101.
王艳辉,杨帆.2007.债务结构对上市公司过度投资约束的实证研究[J].现代管理科学, 3: 110-111.
王治,周宏琦.2007.负债、负债结构与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].海南大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2:169-175.
肖作平.2005.上市公司债务期限结构影响因素分析[J].证券市场导报,3:51-57.
肖作平.2005.对我国上市公司债务期限结构影响因素的分析[J].经济科学,3:80-89.
肖作平.2007.债务期限和资本结构的联合影响因素:一个结构方程模型[J].数理统计与管理, 3: 543-549.
徐卫红.2009.我国上市公司债务融资期限结构与公司业绩关系的实证研究——基于制造业与商品流通业的对比分析[J].特区经济,9:100-102.
杨兴全.2007.债务融资、债务期限与企业的成长性——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].河北经贸大学学报, 4:51-57.
杨胜刚,何靖.2007.中国上市公司债务期限结构影响因素的实证研究[J].经济评论, 5: 87-93.
袁卫秋.2005.我国上市公司的债务期限结构——基于权衡思想的实证研究[J].会计研究, 12:53-58.
袁卫秋.2006.债务期限结构的权衡思想的实证检验[J].商业经济与管理,2006, 2:71-76.
周立.2002.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,8.
朱磊.2008.负债期限结构对企业投资行为影响的实证研究[J].软科学,7: 128-133.
朱磊、潘爱玲.2009.负债对企业非效率投资行为影响的实证研究——来自中国制造业上市公司的面板数据[J].经济与管理研究,2:52-59.
朱优红.2007.企业成长性、负债融资与投资行为研究[D].北京:北京工商大学.
Aivazian, V. A.,Ge, Y., Qiu, J.P.2005.Debt maturity structure and firm investment[J].Financial Management,4:107-119.
Antoniou,,A., Gnney, Y., Paudyal,K. T.2002.The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure . Working Paper University of Durham.
Barclay, M.J., Smith,Jr. 1995.The maturity structure of corporate debt[J].Journal of Finance,2:609-631.
Barnea, A.,Haugen, R. A., Senbet, L.W. 1980.A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure And Call Provisions in the Agency Theory Framework [J].Journal of Finance,5: 1223-1234.
Billett, M. T., King, T.H. D.,Mauer, D. C.2007.Growth opportunities and the choice of leverage,debt maturity, and covenants[J].Journal of Finance,2:697-730.
Cai, K.L.,Fairchild,R.,Guney, Y.2008.Debt maturity structure of Chinese companies [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,3:268-297.
Childs, P.D., Mauer,D.C.,Ott, S.H.2005.Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions : The effects of agency conflicts[J] . Journal of Financial Economics, 3:667-690.
Clark,J.M.1917,Business Aceeleration and the Law of Demand[J].Journal of Political economy,3.
Datta,S.,Datta,A.,Raman,K.2005.Managerial Stock Ownership and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt[J] . The Jornal of Finance , 5 :2333-2350.
Deesomsak,R., Paudyal, K., Pescetto, G. 2009.Debt maturity structure and the 1997 Asian financial crisis [J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 1: 26-42.
Elyasiani, E., Lin, G.,Liang, T.2002.The Determinants of Debt Maturity at Issuance: A system-Based Model[J].The Journal of Finance,4:351-378.
Guedes, J., Opler,T. 1996.The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues[J]. Journal of Finance,5:1809-1833.
Goyal,V.K., Lehn, K.,Racic,S.2002.Growth opportunities and corporate debt policy:the case of the U.S. defense industry[J] .Journal of Financial Economics, 1: 35-59.
Hart, O., Moore, J. 1995.Debt and seniority: an analysis of hard claims in constraining Management [J].American Economic Review,3:567-585.
Highfield, M. J.2008.On the Maturity of Incremental Corporate Debt Issues[J]. Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting,2:45-67.
Hubbard,R.G.1998.Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment[J].Journalof Economic Literature,1:193-255.
Iannariello,M.P., Morsy, H., Terada-Hagiwara, A. 2007.Role of Debt Maturity on Firms’Fixed Assets During Sudden Stop Episodes:Evidence from Thailand [J].Journal of Applied Economics, 2:309-335.
Jensen,M. C., Meckling W. H.1976.Theory of the firm: managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 4:305-360.
Jensen , M . C . 1986 . Agency cost of free cash flow , corporate finance , and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,2:323-329.
Johnson,S.A. 2003.Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on Leverage[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,1:209-236.
Jorgenson,D.W. 1963.Capital theory and investment behavior[J].A merican Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 53.
Marchica,M.T.2005.Debt Maturity and the Characteristics of Ownership Structure:An Empirical Investigation of UK Firms[J].University of York Working Papers,29.
Mauer,D .C.,Ott, S.H. 1998."Agency Costs, Investment Policy and Optimal Capital Structure:The Effect of Growth Options,"in M. J. Brennan and L. Trigeorgis (eds.) Project Flexibility,Agency, and Competition:New Developments in the Theory and Application of Real Options.Oxford University Press, London.
Mitchell, K. 1993.The debt maturity choice: an empirical investigation [J].Journal of Financial Research,16: 309-320.
Myers , S . C . 1977 . Determinants of corporate borrowing[J] . Journal of Financial Economics,2:147-175.
Ozkan,A. 2000.An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure[J]. European Financial Management, 2:197-212.
Parrino, R., Weisbach, M. S. 1999.Measuring Investment Distortions Arising from Stock holder-bondholder Conflicts [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 53:3-42.
Scherr,F. C., Hulburt, H. M. 2001.The Debt Maturity Structure of Small Firms[J].Financial Management, 1:85-111.
Stephen Bond and Costas Meghir. 1994.Financial Constrainis and Companyinvestment [J].Fiscal Studies, 15.
Stohs,M. H.,Mauer, D. C. 1996.The determinants of corporate debt maturity structure[J].Journal of Business, 3: 279-312.
Tobin,J.1969.A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory [J].Journal of Money,,Credit, and Banking, l.
韩德宗,向凯.2003.我国上市公司债权融资结构的实证研究——以医药、生物制品行业为例[J].经济科学,2:68-75.
胡爱军,熊正德,谢赤.2006.债务期限结构影响因素分析及实证检验[J].统计与决策, 6:96-99.
李珣、周颖.2009.债务期限结构对企业投资行为影响的实证研究[J].8:76-79.
刘清江.2009.公司债务融资与银行债务治理效应的实证分析[J].开放导报,5:93-97.
刘新.2008.债务期限结构对公司投资的影响[J].重庆工学院学报(社会科学), 2:40-43.
陆正飞,韩霞,常琦.2006.公司长期负债与投资行为关系研究——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界, 1:120-128.
闵亮、沈悦.2009.我国上市公司成长性对债务融资影响的实证研究[J].现代管理科学,6:22-24.
童盼.2005.负债期限结构与企业投资规模——来自中国A股上市公司的经验研究[J].经济科学, 5:93-101.
王艳辉,杨帆.2007.债务结构对上市公司过度投资约束的实证研究[J].现代管理科学, 3: 110-111.
王治,周宏琦.2007.负债、负债结构与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].海南大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2:169-175.
肖作平.2005.上市公司债务期限结构影响因素分析[J].证券市场导报,3:51-57.
肖作平.2005.对我国上市公司债务期限结构影响因素的分析[J].经济科学,3:80-89.
肖作平.2007.债务期限和资本结构的联合影响因素:一个结构方程模型[J].数理统计与管理, 3: 543-549.
徐卫红.2009.我国上市公司债务融资期限结构与公司业绩关系的实证研究——基于制造业与商品流通业的对比分析[J].特区经济,9:100-102.
杨兴全.2007.债务融资、债务期限与企业的成长性——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].河北经贸大学学报, 4:51-57.
杨胜刚,何靖.2007.中国上市公司债务期限结构影响因素的实证研究[J].经济评论, 5: 87-93.
袁卫秋.2005.我国上市公司的债务期限结构——基于权衡思想的实证研究[J].会计研究, 12:53-58.
袁卫秋.2006.债务期限结构的权衡思想的实证检验[J].商业经济与管理,2006, 2:71-76.
周立.2002.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,8.
朱磊.2008.负债期限结构对企业投资行为影响的实证研究[J].软科学,7: 128-133.
朱磊、潘爱玲.2009.负债对企业非效率投资行为影响的实证研究——来自中国制造业上市公司的面板数据[J].经济与管理研究,2:52-59.
朱优红.2007.企业成长性、负债融资与投资行为研究[D].北京:北京工商大学.
Aivazian, V. A.,Ge, Y., Qiu, J.P.2005.Debt maturity structure and firm investment[J].Financial Management,4:107-119.
Antoniou,,A., Gnney, Y., Paudyal,K. T.2002.The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure . Working Paper University of Durham.
Barclay, M.J., Smith,Jr. 1995.The maturity structure of corporate debt[J].Journal of Finance,2:609-631.
Barnea, A.,Haugen, R. A., Senbet, L.W. 1980.A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure And Call Provisions in the Agency Theory Framework [J].Journal of Finance,5: 1223-1234.
Billett, M. T., King, T.H. D.,Mauer, D. C.2007.Growth opportunities and the choice of leverage,debt maturity, and covenants[J].Journal of Finance,2:697-730.
Cai, K.L.,Fairchild,R.,Guney, Y.2008.Debt maturity structure of Chinese companies [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,3:268-297.
Childs, P.D., Mauer,D.C.,Ott, S.H.2005.Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions : The effects of agency conflicts[J] . Journal of Financial Economics, 3:667-690.
Clark,J.M.1917,Business Aceeleration and the Law of Demand[J].Journal of Political economy,3.
Datta,S.,Datta,A.,Raman,K.2005.Managerial Stock Ownership and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt[J] . The Jornal of Finance , 5 :2333-2350.
Deesomsak,R., Paudyal, K., Pescetto, G. 2009.Debt maturity structure and the 1997 Asian financial crisis [J].Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 1: 26-42.
Elyasiani, E., Lin, G.,Liang, T.2002.The Determinants of Debt Maturity at Issuance: A system-Based Model[J].The Journal of Finance,4:351-378.
Guedes, J., Opler,T. 1996.The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues[J]. Journal of Finance,5:1809-1833.
Goyal,V.K., Lehn, K.,Racic,S.2002.Growth opportunities and corporate debt policy:the case of the U.S. defense industry[J] .Journal of Financial Economics, 1: 35-59.
Hart, O., Moore, J. 1995.Debt and seniority: an analysis of hard claims in constraining Management [J].American Economic Review,3:567-585.
Highfield, M. J.2008.On the Maturity of Incremental Corporate Debt Issues[J]. Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting,2:45-67.
Hubbard,R.G.1998.Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment[J].Journalof Economic Literature,1:193-255.
Iannariello,M.P., Morsy, H., Terada-Hagiwara, A. 2007.Role of Debt Maturity on Firms’Fixed Assets During Sudden Stop Episodes:Evidence from Thailand [J].Journal of Applied Economics, 2:309-335.
Jensen,M. C., Meckling W. H.1976.Theory of the firm: managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 4:305-360.
Jensen , M . C . 1986 . Agency cost of free cash flow , corporate finance , and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,2:323-329.
Johnson,S.A. 2003.Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on Leverage[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,1:209-236.
Jorgenson,D.W. 1963.Capital theory and investment behavior[J].A merican Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 53.
Marchica,M.T.2005.Debt Maturity and the Characteristics of Ownership Structure:An Empirical Investigation of UK Firms[J].University of York Working Papers,29.
Mauer,D .C.,Ott, S.H. 1998."Agency Costs, Investment Policy and Optimal Capital Structure:The Effect of Growth Options,"in M. J. Brennan and L. Trigeorgis (eds.) Project Flexibility,Agency, and Competition:New Developments in the Theory and Application of Real Options.Oxford University Press, London.
Mitchell, K. 1993.The debt maturity choice: an empirical investigation [J].Journal of Financial Research,16: 309-320.
Myers , S . C . 1977 . Determinants of corporate borrowing[J] . Journal of Financial Economics,2:147-175.
Ozkan,A. 2000.An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure[J]. European Financial Management, 2:197-212.
Parrino, R., Weisbach, M. S. 1999.Measuring Investment Distortions Arising from Stock holder-bondholder Conflicts [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 53:3-42.
Scherr,F. C., Hulburt, H. M. 2001.The Debt Maturity Structure of Small Firms[J].Financial Management, 1:85-111.
Stephen Bond and Costas Meghir. 1994.Financial Constrainis and Companyinvestment [J].Fiscal Studies, 15.
Stohs,M. H.,Mauer, D. C. 1996.The determinants of corporate debt maturity structure[J].Journal of Business, 3: 279-312.
Tobin,J.1969.A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory [J].Journal of Money,,Credit, and Banking, l.