基于链与链竞争的纵向研发联盟与收入共享合同研究
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摘要
随着全球经济的发展，越来越多的企业开始注重于发展他们的核心业务职能，而将非核心职能外包，逐步演变成供应链的格局。供应链节点企业必须积极协调合作以确保他们的供应链能够高效运转，获取整体竞争优势。在链与链竞争环境下，供应链的纵向运作机制会对自身供应链以及竞争对手供应链的系统绩效产生影响，进而影响到各节点企业的盈利状况。因此，研究纵向协调合作的占优性条件以及设计机制可以为竞争供应链各节点企业提供有力的理论支撑和决策依据。
应用博弈论的思想和方法构建了链与链竞争模型，基于供应链系统绩效占优和节点企业同时实现Pareto绩效改进的角度，研究竞争供应链的纵向研发联盟与收入共享合同。主要研究内容包含：竞争供应链的成本节约型纵向研发联盟与收入共享/利润分享合同选择策略；有偿延保服务下竞争供应链的纵向渠道结构选择策略与收入共享合同设计机制，不确定环境下竞争供应链的收入共享合同选择策略。
首先，研究了竞争供应链基于收入共享/利润分享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟结构选择策略，重点揭示了竞争、研发效率和溢出效应对竞争供应链纵向结构选择博弈演化均衡的影响。其研究内容主要分为以下三个部分：
第一、针对上游供应商主导型链与链价格竞争模型，识别基于收入共享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度达到最低水平范围，或者产品竞争强度达到次低水平范围且研发效率较高时，纵向研发联盟结构链与链竞争成为占优均衡，实现所有制造商和供应商绩效的Pareto改进。
第二、基于下游制造商主导型链与链价格竞争模型，识别基于利润分享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度达到最低水平范围，或者产品竞争强度达到次低水平范围且研发效率较高时，纵向研发联盟结构链与链竞争成为占优均衡，实现所有制造商和供应商绩效的Pareto改进；制造商凭借其领导地位获取了较高的系统利润分享份额。
第三、构建下游制造商主导型链与链价格竞争模型，研发具有技术溢出效应，识别基于利润分享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度达到最低水平范围，或者产品竞争强度达到次低水平范围且技术溢出水平较高，或者产品竞争强度达到较高水平范围同时技术溢出水平较高但尚未接近完全技术溢出时，纵向研发联盟结构链与链竞争成为占优均衡，实现所有制造商和供应商绩效的Pareto改进。
其次，研究了制造商提供有偿延保服务时竞争供应链的纵向渠道结构选择策略，揭示了竞争与延保期对竞争供应链纵向渠道结构选择博弈演化均衡的影响，分析了收入共享合同的占优性条件和设计机制。具体研究内容为：
构建上游制造商提供有偿延保服务的链与链价格竞争模型，基于供应链系统绩效占优的角度考察中心化与分散化两种纵向渠道结构选择策略，识别了不同延保期和竞争状态下竞争供应链纵向渠道结构的选择和演化均衡。研究表明：当产品竞争强度较低时，两条分散化结构竞争供应链均有动机实施协调的收入共享合同以获取节点企业的绩效改进。
最后，研究了不确定环境下竞争供应链的收入共享合同选择策略，揭示了竞争与供应风险对竞争供应链纵向合同选择博弈演化均衡的影响。所做研究主要包含两个方面：
第一、针对多源风险环境下单个供应链的产能决策和订货决策问题，通过构建制造商与零售商在不同成本风险和需求风险环境下产能与订货两阶段动态决策模型，揭示了多源不确定风险与供应链运作绩效的关系、风险源的影响条件和影响强度，最后通过数值分析得到比较直观的结论和管理启示。
第二、将寡头垄断供应链模型扩展至竞争供应链模型，基于供应不确定构建链与链数量竞争模型，识别收入共享合同的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度较低，或者产品竞争强度和供应风险都比较高时，两条供应链同时实施收入共享合同的链与链竞争结构成为占优均衡，实现所有零售商和供应商绩效Pareto改进。
As the global economy develops, more and more companies have started toconcentrate on their core business and capabilities, and outsourced non-core functions toothers. Consequently, the paradigm of supply chain has come into being. In order togain competition edge, component companies in a supply chain have to work activelyand intelligently to make sure their supply chain is working effectively and efficiently.Under the chain to chain competition environment, the operation mechanism for eachsupply chain will impact on the performance of the supply chain itself as well as that ofthe competing supply chain, which leads the vertical operation mechanism to impact onthe payoffs of the component companies. As a result, the dominant conditions and thedesign mechanisms for each competing supply chain’s vertical coordinating cooperationcan provide supports both on theory and decisions to the component companies.
The chain to chain competition model is proposed by Game theory, and the verticalR&D alliance as well as the revenue-sharing contract for chain to chain competition isexplored, aiming at maximizing the chain-wide profit by which both the manufacturerand supplier can be better off. Specially, this thesis is composed of three individual parts:Cost-reducing vertical R&D alliances with revenue-sharing/profit-sharing contracts forcompeting supply chains; vertical channel structure choices and revenue-sharingcontracts for competing supply chains with pay-needed extended warranty services ofmanufacturers; revenue-sharing contracts for competing supply chains under uncertaintyenvironment.
First of all, it is studied that the design and the choice for cost-reducing verticalR&D alliance with revenue-sharing/profit-sharing contract, and it is analyzed that theimpacts of the competition, R&D efficiency and technology spillover on evolutionequilibrium of vertical structure choice game between two competing supply chains.The first contents of this thesis are divided into three parts as follows:
(1) Setting focus on chain to chain price competition model in which the upstreamfirms are leaders, the design and the evolution of cost-reducing vertical R&D alliancewith revenue-sharing contract are identified. The results suggest that if product competition intensity is in the lowest range, or product competition intensity is in thelower range and R&D efficiency is higher, chain to chain competition based on verticalalliances will be the dominant equilibrium, which can improve all the performances ofthe suppliers and manufacturers.
(2) Setting focus on the chain to chain price competition model in which thedownstream manufactures are leaders, the design and the evolution of cost-reducingvertical R&D alliance with profit-sharing contract are identified. The results suggestthat if product competition intensity is in the range of lowest level, or productcompetition intensity is in the range of lower level as well as R&D efficiency is higher,chain to chain competition based on vertical alliances will be the dominant equilibrium,which can achieve the Pareto improvement of performances for all the suppliers andmanufacturers. The manufacturers obtain more supply chain profits by their positions ofthe leadership.
(3) Based on the chain to chain price competition model in which the downstreammanufactures are leaders, it is further supposed that there exists technology spillover forR&D. The design and the evolution of cost-reducing vertical R&D alliance withprofit-sharing contract are identified. The results suggest that with least intensivecompetition or less intensive competition together with higher spillover or moreintensive competition together with higher spillover instead of perfect spillover, bothtwo supply chains will form alliances with profit-sharing contracts by which all themanufacturers and suppliers can be better off.
Secondly, supposing that the manufacturers provide pay-needed extended warrantyservices, the choices for vertical channel structures of two competing supply chains areanalyzed. It is further revealed that the impacts of the extended warranty period lengthand the competition on evolution equilibrium of vertical channel structure choice gamebetween two competing supply chains, and the dominant condition as well as the designfor revenue-sharing contract. The main studying contents of this part are listed asfollows:
By constructing a chain to chain price competition model in which the upstreammanufacturers provide pay-needed extended warranty services, the dominant verticalchannel structure choice strategies that can achieve performance improvement of thesupply chain are identified. The vertical channel structure evolution equilibria with different lengths of extended warranty period and competition status are also revealed.It is implicated that if product competition intensity is lower, the two decentralizedsupply chains both have motivations to conduct revenue-sharing sharing contract, bywhich both component companies can be better off.
Finally, the choices for vertical revenue-sharing contract of competing supplychains under uncertainty environment are explored, and the interactions of competitionand the supply risk on evolution equilibrium of the vertical contract choice gamebetween two supply chains are revealed. There are two contents for this part:
(1) Focusing on capacity decision and order decision of supply chain undermulti-risk environment, by constructing a two-stage dynamic model under which themanufacturer and the retailer should make decision under different cost risks anddemand risk environment, the relation of the supply chain operational performance andthe multi-risk, the conditions under which the risks will impact the operationalperformance as well as the intensity of the impact are all revealed. At last, theintuitionistic conclusions and managerial enlightenment are obtained by numericalanalysis.
(2) Expanding the study from oligopoly supply chain to two competing supplychains, a chain to chain quantity competition model based on supply uncertainty ofsuppliers is constructed, by which the design and the evolution of revenue-sharingcontract are identified. The results suggest that with lower product competition orhigher product competition together with higher supply risk, chain to chain competitionbased on revenue-sharing contract will be the dominant equilibrium, which can improveall the performances of the suppliers and retailers.
应用博弈论的思想和方法构建了链与链竞争模型，基于供应链系统绩效占优和节点企业同时实现Pareto绩效改进的角度，研究竞争供应链的纵向研发联盟与收入共享合同。主要研究内容包含：竞争供应链的成本节约型纵向研发联盟与收入共享/利润分享合同选择策略；有偿延保服务下竞争供应链的纵向渠道结构选择策略与收入共享合同设计机制，不确定环境下竞争供应链的收入共享合同选择策略。
首先，研究了竞争供应链基于收入共享/利润分享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟结构选择策略，重点揭示了竞争、研发效率和溢出效应对竞争供应链纵向结构选择博弈演化均衡的影响。其研究内容主要分为以下三个部分：
第一、针对上游供应商主导型链与链价格竞争模型，识别基于收入共享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度达到最低水平范围，或者产品竞争强度达到次低水平范围且研发效率较高时，纵向研发联盟结构链与链竞争成为占优均衡，实现所有制造商和供应商绩效的Pareto改进。
第二、基于下游制造商主导型链与链价格竞争模型，识别基于利润分享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度达到最低水平范围，或者产品竞争强度达到次低水平范围且研发效率较高时，纵向研发联盟结构链与链竞争成为占优均衡，实现所有制造商和供应商绩效的Pareto改进；制造商凭借其领导地位获取了较高的系统利润分享份额。
第三、构建下游制造商主导型链与链价格竞争模型，研发具有技术溢出效应，识别基于利润分享合同的成本节约型纵向研发联盟的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度达到最低水平范围，或者产品竞争强度达到次低水平范围且技术溢出水平较高，或者产品竞争强度达到较高水平范围同时技术溢出水平较高但尚未接近完全技术溢出时，纵向研发联盟结构链与链竞争成为占优均衡，实现所有制造商和供应商绩效的Pareto改进。
其次，研究了制造商提供有偿延保服务时竞争供应链的纵向渠道结构选择策略，揭示了竞争与延保期对竞争供应链纵向渠道结构选择博弈演化均衡的影响，分析了收入共享合同的占优性条件和设计机制。具体研究内容为：
构建上游制造商提供有偿延保服务的链与链价格竞争模型，基于供应链系统绩效占优的角度考察中心化与分散化两种纵向渠道结构选择策略，识别了不同延保期和竞争状态下竞争供应链纵向渠道结构的选择和演化均衡。研究表明：当产品竞争强度较低时，两条分散化结构竞争供应链均有动机实施协调的收入共享合同以获取节点企业的绩效改进。
最后，研究了不确定环境下竞争供应链的收入共享合同选择策略，揭示了竞争与供应风险对竞争供应链纵向合同选择博弈演化均衡的影响。所做研究主要包含两个方面：
第一、针对多源风险环境下单个供应链的产能决策和订货决策问题，通过构建制造商与零售商在不同成本风险和需求风险环境下产能与订货两阶段动态决策模型，揭示了多源不确定风险与供应链运作绩效的关系、风险源的影响条件和影响强度，最后通过数值分析得到比较直观的结论和管理启示。
第二、将寡头垄断供应链模型扩展至竞争供应链模型，基于供应不确定构建链与链数量竞争模型，识别收入共享合同的设计和演化机制。研究表明：当产品竞争强度较低，或者产品竞争强度和供应风险都比较高时，两条供应链同时实施收入共享合同的链与链竞争结构成为占优均衡，实现所有零售商和供应商绩效Pareto改进。
As the global economy develops, more and more companies have started toconcentrate on their core business and capabilities, and outsourced non-core functions toothers. Consequently, the paradigm of supply chain has come into being. In order togain competition edge, component companies in a supply chain have to work activelyand intelligently to make sure their supply chain is working effectively and efficiently.Under the chain to chain competition environment, the operation mechanism for eachsupply chain will impact on the performance of the supply chain itself as well as that ofthe competing supply chain, which leads the vertical operation mechanism to impact onthe payoffs of the component companies. As a result, the dominant conditions and thedesign mechanisms for each competing supply chain’s vertical coordinating cooperationcan provide supports both on theory and decisions to the component companies.
The chain to chain competition model is proposed by Game theory, and the verticalR&D alliance as well as the revenue-sharing contract for chain to chain competition isexplored, aiming at maximizing the chain-wide profit by which both the manufacturerand supplier can be better off. Specially, this thesis is composed of three individual parts:Cost-reducing vertical R&D alliances with revenue-sharing/profit-sharing contracts forcompeting supply chains; vertical channel structure choices and revenue-sharingcontracts for competing supply chains with pay-needed extended warranty services ofmanufacturers; revenue-sharing contracts for competing supply chains under uncertaintyenvironment.
First of all, it is studied that the design and the choice for cost-reducing verticalR&D alliance with revenue-sharing/profit-sharing contract, and it is analyzed that theimpacts of the competition, R&D efficiency and technology spillover on evolutionequilibrium of vertical structure choice game between two competing supply chains.The first contents of this thesis are divided into three parts as follows:
(1) Setting focus on chain to chain price competition model in which the upstreamfirms are leaders, the design and the evolution of cost-reducing vertical R&D alliancewith revenue-sharing contract are identified. The results suggest that if product competition intensity is in the lowest range, or product competition intensity is in thelower range and R&D efficiency is higher, chain to chain competition based on verticalalliances will be the dominant equilibrium, which can improve all the performances ofthe suppliers and manufacturers.
(2) Setting focus on the chain to chain price competition model in which thedownstream manufactures are leaders, the design and the evolution of cost-reducingvertical R&D alliance with profit-sharing contract are identified. The results suggestthat if product competition intensity is in the range of lowest level, or productcompetition intensity is in the range of lower level as well as R&D efficiency is higher,chain to chain competition based on vertical alliances will be the dominant equilibrium,which can achieve the Pareto improvement of performances for all the suppliers andmanufacturers. The manufacturers obtain more supply chain profits by their positions ofthe leadership.
(3) Based on the chain to chain price competition model in which the downstreammanufactures are leaders, it is further supposed that there exists technology spillover forR&D. The design and the evolution of cost-reducing vertical R&D alliance withprofit-sharing contract are identified. The results suggest that with least intensivecompetition or less intensive competition together with higher spillover or moreintensive competition together with higher spillover instead of perfect spillover, bothtwo supply chains will form alliances with profit-sharing contracts by which all themanufacturers and suppliers can be better off.
Secondly, supposing that the manufacturers provide pay-needed extended warrantyservices, the choices for vertical channel structures of two competing supply chains areanalyzed. It is further revealed that the impacts of the extended warranty period lengthand the competition on evolution equilibrium of vertical channel structure choice gamebetween two competing supply chains, and the dominant condition as well as the designfor revenue-sharing contract. The main studying contents of this part are listed asfollows:
By constructing a chain to chain price competition model in which the upstreammanufacturers provide pay-needed extended warranty services, the dominant verticalchannel structure choice strategies that can achieve performance improvement of thesupply chain are identified. The vertical channel structure evolution equilibria with different lengths of extended warranty period and competition status are also revealed.It is implicated that if product competition intensity is lower, the two decentralizedsupply chains both have motivations to conduct revenue-sharing sharing contract, bywhich both component companies can be better off.
Finally, the choices for vertical revenue-sharing contract of competing supplychains under uncertainty environment are explored, and the interactions of competitionand the supply risk on evolution equilibrium of the vertical contract choice gamebetween two supply chains are revealed. There are two contents for this part:
(1) Focusing on capacity decision and order decision of supply chain undermulti-risk environment, by constructing a two-stage dynamic model under which themanufacturer and the retailer should make decision under different cost risks anddemand risk environment, the relation of the supply chain operational performance andthe multi-risk, the conditions under which the risks will impact the operationalperformance as well as the intensity of the impact are all revealed. At last, theintuitionistic conclusions and managerial enlightenment are obtained by numericalanalysis.
(2) Expanding the study from oligopoly supply chain to two competing supplychains, a chain to chain quantity competition model based on supply uncertainty ofsuppliers is constructed, by which the design and the evolution of revenue-sharingcontract are identified. The results suggest that with lower product competition orhigher product competition together with higher supply risk, chain to chain competitionbased on revenue-sharing contract will be the dominant equilibrium, which can improveall the performances of the suppliers and retailers.
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