中国上市公司机构投资者的股东积极主义行为研究
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摘要
在过去三十年中,全球主要资本市场的机构投资者获得了迅猛的发展,同时随着原有对机构投资者持股限制的法律、法规的变迁,机构投资者已经取代了个人投资者成为资本市场主要的投资主体,并且彻底的改变了公司的股权结构。随着机构投资者持股规模的扩大、持股比例的提高,其在公司中地位与作用不断上升,深入分析机构投资者在公司治理和公司财务政策的作用与影响,日益成为理论界和实务界迫切关注的重要课题。
在我国机构投资者发展历程中,我们不难发现我国机构投资者的高速发展得益于政府监管部门对于发展机构投资者的积极态度。针对中国证券市场上,大股东频频掏空上市公司,侵害中小股东利益的情况,管理层对机构投资者寄予厚望。2006年证监会公布的《中国上市公司治理准则》第十一条规定:“机构投资者应在公司董事选任、经营者激励与监督、重大事项决策等方面发挥作用。”近年来我国的机构投资者是否对上市公司治理机制的完善和上市公司财务决策行为产生直接或间接的积极影响?如果发挥了积极作用,具体表现在那些方面?若是没有发挥积极作用,是受到那些因素的制约?本文在系统地分析发达国家机构股东积极主义的兴起与演变,并对其经济根源进行了剖析的基础上,结合在我国特殊的制度背景和环境下上市公司大股东基于自身利益考虑而采取的股利、再融资政策,考察机构投资者的股东积极主义行为是否发挥。同时以中国上市公司特有的股权分置这一难得纯净事件检验机构投资者的积极作用,并对其有效性进行考察。全文共分为九章,各章的主要内容如下:
第一章为导论,主要对论文进行简要介绍,具体包括研究的背景与问题的提出、研究的框架与主要内容以及研究的改进与创新。
第二章为文献综述,首先对股东积极主义的内涵做了解释,阐释了美国股东积极主义的形成与发展,随后对机构投资者股东积极主义相关领域的文献作较为全面的梳理,最后对机构投资者股东积极主义的有效性研究作系统的回顾、整理与归纳。
第三章对机构投资者股东积极主义的机理做了相关分析,首先介绍了机构投资者积极行为的方式和方法,接着概括了影响股东积极主义的相关因素,最后构建了机构投资者股东积极主义行为的理论模型。
第四章为中国证券市场的相关制度背景分析。首先介绍了中国证券市场上市公司治理所存在的问题,然后对国内各类机构投资者的发展历程、目前现状介绍,最后结合具体的机构投资者股东积极主义行为进行深入的案例分析。
第五章实证分析了机构投资者股东积极行为与上市公司股利政策之间的关系。针对我国特殊的股权结构制度背景下,现金股利政策的两种理论观点——“自由现金流假说”和“利益输送假说”以及在我国资本市场上呈现的“异常分红“现象,实证检验了我国机构投资者是否能够发挥积极的监督治理作用。
第六章实证分析了机构投资者在分类表决制度下,上市公司再融资表决事件是否发挥积极作用;以2001—2004年进行增发、配股再融资的A股上市公司为研究对象,检验了机构投资者持股公司再融资宣告日的市场反应和再融资实施后的长期绩效,考察机构投资者在公司再融资事件上是否维护了中小股东的利益,是否对公司再融资实施后进行监督治理。
第七章以我国上市公司股权分置改革为背景,从股改公司对价支付水平、股改方案修改后前后对价支付差异和流通股股东在股改过程的财富增值三个角度研究了机构投资者在股改过程中所扮演的角色。
第八章从经营绩效和市场表现两个角度考察机构投资者持股与公司绩效之间的关系,在研究过程中考虑了机构投资者持股与公司绩效之间可能的内生性。
第九章是对论文研究成果的总结,包括研究结论与启示、研究的局限性和进一步研究的方向。
本文得到如下研究结果:
第一、针对我国特殊的股权结构制度背景下,现金股利的发放的“自由现金流假说”和“利益输送”假说,研究发现:机构投资者的持股比例不会对上市公司的股利政策产生影响,但是机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司发生“异常分红”的可能性越小。
第二、在分类表决制度下,机构投资者的持股比例与再融资否决结果显著正相关,同时机构投资者持股公司再融资的短期市场表现较好,在实施股权再融资后机构投资者一直长期持有的公司长期经营业绩和市场表现较好。
第三、从股改公司对价支付水平、股改方案修改后前后对价支付差异和流通股股东在股改过程的财富增值三个角度研究发现:机构投资者在股改过程中并没有通过其自身具备的谈判优势而发挥积极作用,反而从另一角度证实了机构投资者与上市公司之间的战略合作假说。
第四、机构投资者持股与上市公司绩效之间的关系发现,机构投资者在选择投资于盈利能力强的公司的同时也对上市公司的业绩产生了积极的促进作用。
Over the past 30 years, the world's major capital markets institutional investors has been rapid development .As the original shareholding limit laws and regulations on institutional investors have been changed, institutional investors have replaced the individual investors as the main capital market investors, and completely change the company's shareholding structure. With institutional investors holding the expansion of the scale, raising the proportion of shares held, and its status and role in the company rising, In-depth analysis of institutional investors's role and influence in corporate governance and corporate financial policy have become an important issue to the theoretical and the practice circle.
In the course of development of China's institutional investors, we can easily find the rapidly development of Chinese institutional investors benefit from the government regulatory authoritie's positive attitude. In Chinese securities market, in the situation of the controlling shareholders of listed companies frequently tunneling the company, and against the interests of small shareholders, the government has high expectations on the institutional investors. In 2006, CRSC published governance guidelines of the listed companies in China, in article 11 states: "institutional investors should play an active role on the company directors elected, encourage and supervise company excutive, and other major decision-making." In recent years whether the institutional investors have a direct or indirect positive impactd on the mechanisms governance of listed companies and the financial decision-making behavior of the listed companies? If playing an active role, then in what aspects? If not, then constraint to what factors? On the basis of systematic analysis the rise,the evolution and the economic the root of institutional shareholder activism in the developed countries , in the context of our special circumstances of controlling shareholders of listed companies in their own interests to consider and adopt the dividend, refinancing policies, This paper study whether institutional investors play a active role . At the same time China's listed companies' Non-tradable Share Reform is the rare purity test events to the study of the institutional shareholder activism and its effectiveness. The full text is divided into nine chapters, major elements of each chapter as follow:
Chapter 1 is an introduction. It includes such contents as research background, issues under research, research framework, major research contents, improvement and innovations of this paper.
Chapter 2 is the literature review. First, review the concept of the shareholder activism and the formation and development of shareholder activism in United States. Second, review the literature of institutional shareholders activism.Finaly, summarized the effectiveness of the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 3 analysis the mechanism of institutional shareholder activism.First, describe the ways and means used by institutional investors, then summarizes the positive factors impact on institutional shareholders activism.Finaly, building an institutional shareholders activism theoretical model.
Chapter 4 introduces the background of Chinese securities market. First, list the existence of corporate governance issues on Chinese stock markets. Second, instroudce the development and the present situation about the various types of domestic institutional investors. Finaly, uses case study methold analysis the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 5 investigates the relation between the institutional investors and listed companie's dividend policies.Based on the special shareholding structure system background, in the view of the cash dividend policy of two theoretical viewpoints - "free cash flow hypothesis" and the "transfer of benefits hypothesis," as well as "abnormal dividend" phenomenon, this paper empirically test the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 6 investigates institutional shareholders activism.during the vote in the classification system.Useing the 2001-2004 refinancing listed company , compares the different stock market responses and the long-term effect after refinancing of different institutional investors holding to empirically test whether institutional investors play a play an active role during company refinancing
Chapter 7 use the listed companies in China Non-tradable share reform as the background, from three perspectives: the price level of payed by the company, the price difference after programe revised and the wealth value-added in the process of non-tradable share reform to emperical test the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 8 from operating performance and market performance perspective investigates the relationship between institutional investors holding and the company's performance .In the course of the study considered the possible endogenous between, institutional investor's holdings and corporate performance.
Chapter 9 sums up the research findings of this paper, including its research conclusions and lessons, research limitations and the direction of further research.
The main findings of the paper on the performance of diversification are followings:
First, Based on the special shareholding structure system background, in the view of the cash dividend policy of two theoretical viewpoints - "free cash flow hypothesis" and the "transfer of benefits hypothesis", institutional investor have no effect on company payout policy. However, according the "abnormal dividend" phenomenon, the higher institutional investor's holdings the lower probability of "abnormal dividend"
Second, in the vote classification system, the higher institutional investor's holdings the lower probabilities of company refinancing programe pass. The stock market responses and the long-term effect of refinancing company are better when institutional investor's holdings
Thirdly, Institutional investor does not play a play an active role during Non-tradable share reform.
Finaly, Institutional investors invest in the company which profitabilityis high, but at the same time had a positive role in promoting company performance.
在我国机构投资者发展历程中,我们不难发现我国机构投资者的高速发展得益于政府监管部门对于发展机构投资者的积极态度。针对中国证券市场上,大股东频频掏空上市公司,侵害中小股东利益的情况,管理层对机构投资者寄予厚望。2006年证监会公布的《中国上市公司治理准则》第十一条规定:“机构投资者应在公司董事选任、经营者激励与监督、重大事项决策等方面发挥作用。”近年来我国的机构投资者是否对上市公司治理机制的完善和上市公司财务决策行为产生直接或间接的积极影响?如果发挥了积极作用,具体表现在那些方面?若是没有发挥积极作用,是受到那些因素的制约?本文在系统地分析发达国家机构股东积极主义的兴起与演变,并对其经济根源进行了剖析的基础上,结合在我国特殊的制度背景和环境下上市公司大股东基于自身利益考虑而采取的股利、再融资政策,考察机构投资者的股东积极主义行为是否发挥。同时以中国上市公司特有的股权分置这一难得纯净事件检验机构投资者的积极作用,并对其有效性进行考察。全文共分为九章,各章的主要内容如下:
第一章为导论,主要对论文进行简要介绍,具体包括研究的背景与问题的提出、研究的框架与主要内容以及研究的改进与创新。
第二章为文献综述,首先对股东积极主义的内涵做了解释,阐释了美国股东积极主义的形成与发展,随后对机构投资者股东积极主义相关领域的文献作较为全面的梳理,最后对机构投资者股东积极主义的有效性研究作系统的回顾、整理与归纳。
第三章对机构投资者股东积极主义的机理做了相关分析,首先介绍了机构投资者积极行为的方式和方法,接着概括了影响股东积极主义的相关因素,最后构建了机构投资者股东积极主义行为的理论模型。
第四章为中国证券市场的相关制度背景分析。首先介绍了中国证券市场上市公司治理所存在的问题,然后对国内各类机构投资者的发展历程、目前现状介绍,最后结合具体的机构投资者股东积极主义行为进行深入的案例分析。
第五章实证分析了机构投资者股东积极行为与上市公司股利政策之间的关系。针对我国特殊的股权结构制度背景下,现金股利政策的两种理论观点——“自由现金流假说”和“利益输送假说”以及在我国资本市场上呈现的“异常分红“现象,实证检验了我国机构投资者是否能够发挥积极的监督治理作用。
第六章实证分析了机构投资者在分类表决制度下,上市公司再融资表决事件是否发挥积极作用;以2001—2004年进行增发、配股再融资的A股上市公司为研究对象,检验了机构投资者持股公司再融资宣告日的市场反应和再融资实施后的长期绩效,考察机构投资者在公司再融资事件上是否维护了中小股东的利益,是否对公司再融资实施后进行监督治理。
第七章以我国上市公司股权分置改革为背景,从股改公司对价支付水平、股改方案修改后前后对价支付差异和流通股股东在股改过程的财富增值三个角度研究了机构投资者在股改过程中所扮演的角色。
第八章从经营绩效和市场表现两个角度考察机构投资者持股与公司绩效之间的关系,在研究过程中考虑了机构投资者持股与公司绩效之间可能的内生性。
第九章是对论文研究成果的总结,包括研究结论与启示、研究的局限性和进一步研究的方向。
本文得到如下研究结果:
第一、针对我国特殊的股权结构制度背景下,现金股利的发放的“自由现金流假说”和“利益输送”假说,研究发现:机构投资者的持股比例不会对上市公司的股利政策产生影响,但是机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司发生“异常分红”的可能性越小。
第二、在分类表决制度下,机构投资者的持股比例与再融资否决结果显著正相关,同时机构投资者持股公司再融资的短期市场表现较好,在实施股权再融资后机构投资者一直长期持有的公司长期经营业绩和市场表现较好。
第三、从股改公司对价支付水平、股改方案修改后前后对价支付差异和流通股股东在股改过程的财富增值三个角度研究发现:机构投资者在股改过程中并没有通过其自身具备的谈判优势而发挥积极作用,反而从另一角度证实了机构投资者与上市公司之间的战略合作假说。
第四、机构投资者持股与上市公司绩效之间的关系发现,机构投资者在选择投资于盈利能力强的公司的同时也对上市公司的业绩产生了积极的促进作用。
Over the past 30 years, the world's major capital markets institutional investors has been rapid development .As the original shareholding limit laws and regulations on institutional investors have been changed, institutional investors have replaced the individual investors as the main capital market investors, and completely change the company's shareholding structure. With institutional investors holding the expansion of the scale, raising the proportion of shares held, and its status and role in the company rising, In-depth analysis of institutional investors's role and influence in corporate governance and corporate financial policy have become an important issue to the theoretical and the practice circle.
In the course of development of China's institutional investors, we can easily find the rapidly development of Chinese institutional investors benefit from the government regulatory authoritie's positive attitude. In Chinese securities market, in the situation of the controlling shareholders of listed companies frequently tunneling the company, and against the interests of small shareholders, the government has high expectations on the institutional investors. In 2006, CRSC published governance guidelines of the listed companies in China, in article 11 states: "institutional investors should play an active role on the company directors elected, encourage and supervise company excutive, and other major decision-making." In recent years whether the institutional investors have a direct or indirect positive impactd on the mechanisms governance of listed companies and the financial decision-making behavior of the listed companies? If playing an active role, then in what aspects? If not, then constraint to what factors? On the basis of systematic analysis the rise,the evolution and the economic the root of institutional shareholder activism in the developed countries , in the context of our special circumstances of controlling shareholders of listed companies in their own interests to consider and adopt the dividend, refinancing policies, This paper study whether institutional investors play a active role . At the same time China's listed companies' Non-tradable Share Reform is the rare purity test events to the study of the institutional shareholder activism and its effectiveness. The full text is divided into nine chapters, major elements of each chapter as follow:
Chapter 1 is an introduction. It includes such contents as research background, issues under research, research framework, major research contents, improvement and innovations of this paper.
Chapter 2 is the literature review. First, review the concept of the shareholder activism and the formation and development of shareholder activism in United States. Second, review the literature of institutional shareholders activism.Finaly, summarized the effectiveness of the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 3 analysis the mechanism of institutional shareholder activism.First, describe the ways and means used by institutional investors, then summarizes the positive factors impact on institutional shareholders activism.Finaly, building an institutional shareholders activism theoretical model.
Chapter 4 introduces the background of Chinese securities market. First, list the existence of corporate governance issues on Chinese stock markets. Second, instroudce the development and the present situation about the various types of domestic institutional investors. Finaly, uses case study methold analysis the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 5 investigates the relation between the institutional investors and listed companie's dividend policies.Based on the special shareholding structure system background, in the view of the cash dividend policy of two theoretical viewpoints - "free cash flow hypothesis" and the "transfer of benefits hypothesis," as well as "abnormal dividend" phenomenon, this paper empirically test the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 6 investigates institutional shareholders activism.during the vote in the classification system.Useing the 2001-2004 refinancing listed company , compares the different stock market responses and the long-term effect after refinancing of different institutional investors holding to empirically test whether institutional investors play a play an active role during company refinancing
Chapter 7 use the listed companies in China Non-tradable share reform as the background, from three perspectives: the price level of payed by the company, the price difference after programe revised and the wealth value-added in the process of non-tradable share reform to emperical test the institutional shareholders activism.
Chapter 8 from operating performance and market performance perspective investigates the relationship between institutional investors holding and the company's performance .In the course of the study considered the possible endogenous between, institutional investor's holdings and corporate performance.
Chapter 9 sums up the research findings of this paper, including its research conclusions and lessons, research limitations and the direction of further research.
The main findings of the paper on the performance of diversification are followings:
First, Based on the special shareholding structure system background, in the view of the cash dividend policy of two theoretical viewpoints - "free cash flow hypothesis" and the "transfer of benefits hypothesis", institutional investor have no effect on company payout policy. However, according the "abnormal dividend" phenomenon, the higher institutional investor's holdings the lower probability of "abnormal dividend"
Second, in the vote classification system, the higher institutional investor's holdings the lower probabilities of company refinancing programe pass. The stock market responses and the long-term effect of refinancing company are better when institutional investor's holdings
Thirdly, Institutional investor does not play a play an active role during Non-tradable share reform.
Finaly, Institutional investors invest in the company which profitabilityis high, but at the same time had a positive role in promoting company performance.
引文
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