公司治理与审计质量：经验证据
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摘要
本文借助新制度经济学的契约理论厘清了公司治理和独立审计产生的渊源,探讨了公司治理和独立审计之间的关系。然后,运用上市公司的大样本数据,分别检验了公司治理系统、公司治理子系统和董事会特征对审计质量的影响,以期从公司治理视角提出改进我国证券市场审计质量的措施建议。
首先,结合系统论和约束假说的观点,本文将是否双重上市作为公司治理系统质量的衡量标准,选择盈余管理作为审计质量的替代变量,研究公司治理系统对审计质量的影响。研究发现:公司治理系统越好,公司盈余管理的空间越小,审计质量越高。接着,采用主成份分析方法,从特征和运行角度构建了公司治理的四个子系统——所有权、董事会、监事会和外部治理机制,并分别以盈余管理和审计费用作为审计质量的替代变量,检验四个公司治理子系统对审计质量的影响。研究发现:监事会和外部治理机制并未发挥其应有的治理作用,所有权对审计费用具有增量效应,而董事会对盈余管理具有抑制作用。其次,鉴于审计服务合同一旦签订,审计结果将更多地取决于董事会的作用,而监管部门和实务界更多地关注外部审计师与客户的长期雇佣关系对审计质量的影响,因此,本文以外部审计师未发生变更的上市公司为研究对象,检验董事会特征对审计质量的影响。研究发现:董事会成员中领取报酬人员的比例和审计委员会的设立与审计质量显著性正相关,董事会会议次数与审计质量显著性负相关。未发现随着事务所任期的延长,审计师的行业专长得到加强或审计独立性受到损害,而是发现外部审计师会由于所审计客户重要性的增加而较容易丧失独立性向客户妥协。最后,基于实证结论的启示,本文认为,可以通过建立单层制的内部公司治理模式;完善审计市场;加强管理层和外部审计师的法律责任与惩罚机制等措施来改善公司治理,提高上市公司的审计质量。
本文的贡献在于:首次采用系统分析方法,逐层深入地研究了公司治理系统整体、公司治理子系统和董事会特征对审计质量的影响,丰富了审计质量方面的研究文献。
This paper discusses corporate governance and the origin of audit by the contract economics and the relation between corporate governance and audit in the view of accounting information and auditor independence. For improving audit quality, it focuses on the effect of the whole corporate governance system on audit quality, the relation between the corporate governance subsystem and audit quality, the correlation between the board characteristics and audit quality by positive analysis.
Firstly, according to system theory and bonding hypothesis, this paper uses cross-listed companies as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance and accounting accruals as a proxy for audit quality. It finds that higher quality of corporate governance results in less accounting accruals and higher audit quality. Secondly, the corporate governance system is divided by ownership, board, board of supervisors and exterior governance mechanism used by the principal component analysis. It uses accounting accruals and audit fee as proxies for audit quality. The research results as followed: (1) The board of supervisors and the exterior governance mechanism don't run well that they should be. (2) The additional effect of the ownership on the board decreases audit fees. (3) The board can improve audit quality. Thirdly, after signing the agreement of audit services, audit quality lies on the role of the board. Meanwhile, both the government and the investors pay more attention on the length association between an auditor and their clients. In order to test the effect of the board characteristics on audit quality, our sample chooses listed companies audited by the same audit firm in the event year. The main results as followed: (1) There is significantly positive association between the rate of board members who are rewarded and audit quality. (2) There is also significantly positive relationship between audit committee and audit quality. (3) The importance of the client erodes auditor independence, which in turn impairs auditor quality. Finally, according to mentioned above, there are some measures to improve audit quality that are the establishment of single board, setting up more competitive audit market, the establishment of legal duty of manager and auditor.
This paper uses contract economics as theory basis to discuss the association between corporate governance and auditing. For the first time, it adopts system analysis. This paper focuses on how the whole corporate governance system, the corporate governance subsystem and the board characteristics affect audit quality step by step. The research results enrich the empirical literatures.
首先,结合系统论和约束假说的观点,本文将是否双重上市作为公司治理系统质量的衡量标准,选择盈余管理作为审计质量的替代变量,研究公司治理系统对审计质量的影响。研究发现:公司治理系统越好,公司盈余管理的空间越小,审计质量越高。接着,采用主成份分析方法,从特征和运行角度构建了公司治理的四个子系统——所有权、董事会、监事会和外部治理机制,并分别以盈余管理和审计费用作为审计质量的替代变量,检验四个公司治理子系统对审计质量的影响。研究发现:监事会和外部治理机制并未发挥其应有的治理作用,所有权对审计费用具有增量效应,而董事会对盈余管理具有抑制作用。其次,鉴于审计服务合同一旦签订,审计结果将更多地取决于董事会的作用,而监管部门和实务界更多地关注外部审计师与客户的长期雇佣关系对审计质量的影响,因此,本文以外部审计师未发生变更的上市公司为研究对象,检验董事会特征对审计质量的影响。研究发现:董事会成员中领取报酬人员的比例和审计委员会的设立与审计质量显著性正相关,董事会会议次数与审计质量显著性负相关。未发现随着事务所任期的延长,审计师的行业专长得到加强或审计独立性受到损害,而是发现外部审计师会由于所审计客户重要性的增加而较容易丧失独立性向客户妥协。最后,基于实证结论的启示,本文认为,可以通过建立单层制的内部公司治理模式;完善审计市场;加强管理层和外部审计师的法律责任与惩罚机制等措施来改善公司治理,提高上市公司的审计质量。
本文的贡献在于:首次采用系统分析方法,逐层深入地研究了公司治理系统整体、公司治理子系统和董事会特征对审计质量的影响,丰富了审计质量方面的研究文献。
This paper discusses corporate governance and the origin of audit by the contract economics and the relation between corporate governance and audit in the view of accounting information and auditor independence. For improving audit quality, it focuses on the effect of the whole corporate governance system on audit quality, the relation between the corporate governance subsystem and audit quality, the correlation between the board characteristics and audit quality by positive analysis.
Firstly, according to system theory and bonding hypothesis, this paper uses cross-listed companies as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance and accounting accruals as a proxy for audit quality. It finds that higher quality of corporate governance results in less accounting accruals and higher audit quality. Secondly, the corporate governance system is divided by ownership, board, board of supervisors and exterior governance mechanism used by the principal component analysis. It uses accounting accruals and audit fee as proxies for audit quality. The research results as followed: (1) The board of supervisors and the exterior governance mechanism don't run well that they should be. (2) The additional effect of the ownership on the board decreases audit fees. (3) The board can improve audit quality. Thirdly, after signing the agreement of audit services, audit quality lies on the role of the board. Meanwhile, both the government and the investors pay more attention on the length association between an auditor and their clients. In order to test the effect of the board characteristics on audit quality, our sample chooses listed companies audited by the same audit firm in the event year. The main results as followed: (1) There is significantly positive association between the rate of board members who are rewarded and audit quality. (2) There is also significantly positive relationship between audit committee and audit quality. (3) The importance of the client erodes auditor independence, which in turn impairs auditor quality. Finally, according to mentioned above, there are some measures to improve audit quality that are the establishment of single board, setting up more competitive audit market, the establishment of legal duty of manager and auditor.
This paper uses contract economics as theory basis to discuss the association between corporate governance and auditing. For the first time, it adopts system analysis. This paper focuses on how the whole corporate governance system, the corporate governance subsystem and the board characteristics affect audit quality step by step. The research results enrich the empirical literatures.
引文
[1]袁小勇,虚假财务报告研究——识别·侦查·治理,经济管理出版社,2006,第6页。
[1]公司治理内涵的界定主要引自李维安:《公司治理学》,高等教育出版社,2005,第10-14页。
[1]中国注册会计师协会,2007,审计,经济科学出版社,5-6页。
[1]整理自严武,《公司股权结构与治理机制》,经济管理出版社,2004,第23-28页。
[1]张维迎,2005,产权、激励与公司治理,经济科学出版社,48-59页。 [93]财办字第5号);同年3月23日,审计署也会同证监会发布了《关于从事证券业务的审计师事务所资格确认有关问题的通知》([1993]81号)。
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