从国际公共产品的提供看大国软权力的获得
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摘要
本文分析了国家获得国际层面软权力的基本途径。本文认为国际公共产品是国际层面的软资源,国家通过提供国际公共产品可以获得其软权力价值。具体而言,国家可以通过“研发”国际公共产品或者“参加”国际公共产品的提供两种途径获取国际公共产品具有的软权力。本文主体部分采用了案例分析法——分别以美国建立关贸总协定和中国加入世界贸易组织两个具体案例为例分析了国家与国际公共产品之间软权力的互动关系。
本文共分四章。
第一章对全文关键概念进行了界定。本章从资源角度界定了权力的概念,从资源获取方式的角度区分了软权力和硬权力两个基本概念,并重点对软权力和国际公共产品之间的关系进行了分析和说明。通过对关键概念内涵的界定和其相互关系的分析得出结论:软资源是软权力的基础;国际公共产品是国际层面的软资源是国际软权力的来源和载体。
第二章是本文的基础理论部分,从软资源角度对国际公共产品的权力价值进行了具体分析。国际公共产品作为国际层面的软资源具有四种权力价值。第一,国际公共产品具有功效价值。功效性是任何人类劳动产品的天然属性,是国际公共产品工具价值和其他权力价值的基础。第二,国际公共产品具有合法性价值。公利和自愿是国际公共产品形成的基础,是国际合法性的基本来源。在国际无政府状态中,合法性既是国际公共产品产生的前提也是其存在的保证。第三,国际公共产品具有典型的制度权力性。制度和机制是公共活动能够有序和稳定进行的基本保障,国际公共产品作为多边的公利开放体系,其生产、供应和消费等各个环节的有序进行都必须有规则和制度的保障。国际公共产品内在的规则制度体系要求使其具有典型的制度权力性。第四,国际公共产品的价值具有累增性。国际公共产品本身的非竞争性和非排他性使其具有内在的无限市场性,即其体系内成员数量可以无限增加,其体系自身的成长进一步增强了使其合法性和制度权力性,从而导致国际公共产品本身作为国际软资源价值的增加。价值累增是国际公共产品的公共性在其价值维度的具体体现。功效价值、合法性价值、制度权力价值和累增性价值是国际公共产品作为国际软资源的基本价值体现,是国际层面软权力的重要来源。
第三章和第四章是案例分析部分,分别以美国建立关税贸易总协定和中国加入世界贸易组织为例分析了国家如何通过“研发”和“参加”两种途径获得国际公共产品中的软权力价值。
第三章以美国建立关贸总协定为例分析了国家获得国际层面软权力的第一种途径:通过“研发”国际公共产品获得国际层面软权力。规则是重要的权力资源,谁是规则的制定者谁就是权力的获得者。美国凭借其强大的国家实力成为关贸总协定的总设计师,在塑造关贸总协定规则体系的过程中获取了作为国际公共产品的关贸总协定的软权力资源,在国际层面获得了国家权力的增长并实现了国家利益。
第四章以中国参加世界贸易组织为例分析了国家获得国际层面软权力的第二种途径:通过“参加”国际公共产品的提供获得国际层面软权力。国际公共产品作为开放的国际公利体系,任何国家都可以选择主动参加其中,即国际公共产品的非排他性和非竞争性决定了任何国家都可以通过主动加入国际公共产品体系来分享其软权力价值。作为世界贸易组织后期的加入者,中国虽然无法象“研发者”一样获得该体系的规则制定权力,但通过“参加”其中成为其内部一员一样可以获得该体系的软权力价值,实现本国权力的增加和国家利益的实现。
通过以上分析本文得出两个结论:第一,国际公共产品是国际层面的具有软权力价值的重要国际性权力资源;第二,国家可以通过“研发”和“参加”国际公共产品的提供在国际层面获取软权力。
This dissertation explores the relationship between sovereign power of states and collective power of international public goods (IPG). It takes WTO and GATT as the representative cases of international public goods and United States and China respectively as the representative cases of sovereign states.
Structurally, this dissertation has four chapters.
Chapter I is introduction to basic concepts. This dissertation defines power from the perspective of resource. Power simply is the process and ability of obtaining target resource by means of employing means resource. Since the way of using resource is different, power can be classified into soft power and hard power. With resource being the prerequisite of power, soft resource is the prerequisite of soft power. The international public goods, soft resource on the international level, has soft power values from which states can abstain or share by means of inventing new or contributing to already born international public goods.
Chapter II is the theoretical foundation of the whole dissertation. This chapter makes a detailed analysis of the values of international public goods (IPG). Being soft resource on the international level, IPG has four soft power values. Firstly, IPG has utility values. Being man-made products, its man-madeness is the result of need-satisfaction motivation, therefore“usefulness”being a born feature of any man-made products, is the basic soft power value of IPG. Second, IPG has legitimacy value. Being formed by voluntary cooperations, voluntariness and public availability constitutes the foundation of IPG legitimacy, which is the moral base of IPG’s collective power and guarantees its valid being in international anarchy. Third, IPG has institutional value. Rules means power and rule makers are certainly power holders. With unrivaled state power as safeguard, USA became the general designer of General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) who actualize his national interest under the protection and authorization of GATT’s power. Fourthly, IPG has accumulative power. With non-exclusiveness and non-competitiveness being its defining features, IPG is an open system which can grow unlimitedly in size and significance. The growing of membership will not devalue IPG, instead, its value will grow since more users means more legitimacy and authority.
Chapter III and IV are case studies, which studies the two ways of acquiring international soft power ---- inventing a new IPG or taking part in the provision of an already existed one.
Chapter III studies how the United States acquires international soft power by means of inventing GATT. Rule-setting is soft power. Being inventor of GATT, US has the advantage of setting rules according to his own interest and preference. When these rules become part of the institution which are to be observed by all IPG members, US interest are internationally realized and guaranteed.
Chapter IV is the study of how China acquires international soft power by means of joining in the provision and consumption of World Trade Organization (WTO). Though not being able to enjoy the privilege of rule-setting, by making use of well-established rule system of WTO, China can also benefit from the collective power of IPG.
In conclusion, either by means of inventing a new IPG or joining in the provision of an established IPG, sovereign states can always benefit from taking part in the public collective power of IPG.
本文共分四章。
第一章对全文关键概念进行了界定。本章从资源角度界定了权力的概念,从资源获取方式的角度区分了软权力和硬权力两个基本概念,并重点对软权力和国际公共产品之间的关系进行了分析和说明。通过对关键概念内涵的界定和其相互关系的分析得出结论:软资源是软权力的基础;国际公共产品是国际层面的软资源是国际软权力的来源和载体。
第二章是本文的基础理论部分,从软资源角度对国际公共产品的权力价值进行了具体分析。国际公共产品作为国际层面的软资源具有四种权力价值。第一,国际公共产品具有功效价值。功效性是任何人类劳动产品的天然属性,是国际公共产品工具价值和其他权力价值的基础。第二,国际公共产品具有合法性价值。公利和自愿是国际公共产品形成的基础,是国际合法性的基本来源。在国际无政府状态中,合法性既是国际公共产品产生的前提也是其存在的保证。第三,国际公共产品具有典型的制度权力性。制度和机制是公共活动能够有序和稳定进行的基本保障,国际公共产品作为多边的公利开放体系,其生产、供应和消费等各个环节的有序进行都必须有规则和制度的保障。国际公共产品内在的规则制度体系要求使其具有典型的制度权力性。第四,国际公共产品的价值具有累增性。国际公共产品本身的非竞争性和非排他性使其具有内在的无限市场性,即其体系内成员数量可以无限增加,其体系自身的成长进一步增强了使其合法性和制度权力性,从而导致国际公共产品本身作为国际软资源价值的增加。价值累增是国际公共产品的公共性在其价值维度的具体体现。功效价值、合法性价值、制度权力价值和累增性价值是国际公共产品作为国际软资源的基本价值体现,是国际层面软权力的重要来源。
第三章和第四章是案例分析部分,分别以美国建立关税贸易总协定和中国加入世界贸易组织为例分析了国家如何通过“研发”和“参加”两种途径获得国际公共产品中的软权力价值。
第三章以美国建立关贸总协定为例分析了国家获得国际层面软权力的第一种途径:通过“研发”国际公共产品获得国际层面软权力。规则是重要的权力资源,谁是规则的制定者谁就是权力的获得者。美国凭借其强大的国家实力成为关贸总协定的总设计师,在塑造关贸总协定规则体系的过程中获取了作为国际公共产品的关贸总协定的软权力资源,在国际层面获得了国家权力的增长并实现了国家利益。
第四章以中国参加世界贸易组织为例分析了国家获得国际层面软权力的第二种途径:通过“参加”国际公共产品的提供获得国际层面软权力。国际公共产品作为开放的国际公利体系,任何国家都可以选择主动参加其中,即国际公共产品的非排他性和非竞争性决定了任何国家都可以通过主动加入国际公共产品体系来分享其软权力价值。作为世界贸易组织后期的加入者,中国虽然无法象“研发者”一样获得该体系的规则制定权力,但通过“参加”其中成为其内部一员一样可以获得该体系的软权力价值,实现本国权力的增加和国家利益的实现。
通过以上分析本文得出两个结论:第一,国际公共产品是国际层面的具有软权力价值的重要国际性权力资源;第二,国家可以通过“研发”和“参加”国际公共产品的提供在国际层面获取软权力。
This dissertation explores the relationship between sovereign power of states and collective power of international public goods (IPG). It takes WTO and GATT as the representative cases of international public goods and United States and China respectively as the representative cases of sovereign states.
Structurally, this dissertation has four chapters.
Chapter I is introduction to basic concepts. This dissertation defines power from the perspective of resource. Power simply is the process and ability of obtaining target resource by means of employing means resource. Since the way of using resource is different, power can be classified into soft power and hard power. With resource being the prerequisite of power, soft resource is the prerequisite of soft power. The international public goods, soft resource on the international level, has soft power values from which states can abstain or share by means of inventing new or contributing to already born international public goods.
Chapter II is the theoretical foundation of the whole dissertation. This chapter makes a detailed analysis of the values of international public goods (IPG). Being soft resource on the international level, IPG has four soft power values. Firstly, IPG has utility values. Being man-made products, its man-madeness is the result of need-satisfaction motivation, therefore“usefulness”being a born feature of any man-made products, is the basic soft power value of IPG. Second, IPG has legitimacy value. Being formed by voluntary cooperations, voluntariness and public availability constitutes the foundation of IPG legitimacy, which is the moral base of IPG’s collective power and guarantees its valid being in international anarchy. Third, IPG has institutional value. Rules means power and rule makers are certainly power holders. With unrivaled state power as safeguard, USA became the general designer of General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) who actualize his national interest under the protection and authorization of GATT’s power. Fourthly, IPG has accumulative power. With non-exclusiveness and non-competitiveness being its defining features, IPG is an open system which can grow unlimitedly in size and significance. The growing of membership will not devalue IPG, instead, its value will grow since more users means more legitimacy and authority.
Chapter III and IV are case studies, which studies the two ways of acquiring international soft power ---- inventing a new IPG or taking part in the provision of an already existed one.
Chapter III studies how the United States acquires international soft power by means of inventing GATT. Rule-setting is soft power. Being inventor of GATT, US has the advantage of setting rules according to his own interest and preference. When these rules become part of the institution which are to be observed by all IPG members, US interest are internationally realized and guaranteed.
Chapter IV is the study of how China acquires international soft power by means of joining in the provision and consumption of World Trade Organization (WTO). Though not being able to enjoy the privilege of rule-setting, by making use of well-established rule system of WTO, China can also benefit from the collective power of IPG.
In conclusion, either by means of inventing a new IPG or joining in the provision of an established IPG, sovereign states can always benefit from taking part in the public collective power of IPG.
引文
1 Inge Kaul et al, eds., Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2 Robert Keohane,After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984).
3 Joseph Nye, S., Jr.,“Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,”Political Science Quarterly, 119, 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 255-270.
1 Olga Memedovic et al,, eds., Public Goods for Economic Development (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2008), p. 1.
2 Inge kaul, p. 340.
3 Olga Memedovic, p. 1.
4 Ibid.
1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of World Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1991). Softpower有不同的译法:“软实力”、“软国力”、“软权力”、“柔性力量”、“软权力”在不同的论文和著作中都出现过。本文主要在国际层面讨论国家之间的权力互动关系,所以采用“软权力”一词。
2具体参见刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月第9卷第3期,第38-43页;郑永年、张驰:《国际政治中的软权力以及对中国软权力的观察》,载《世界政治与经济》2007年第7期,第6-12页。
3 Sheng Ding, Soft Power and the Rise of China: An Assessment of China's Soft Power in Its Modernization Process. (Ph.D., Rutgers The State University of New Jersey-Newark, 2006).
1详见Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of World Power.
2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
3 Niall Ferguson在“Power”一文中评论“软权力的问题就是它太软了。”载于Foreign Policy, No. 134 (Jan.- Feb., 2003), pp.18-22+24。
4首次提出这个概念的不是奈,而是苏珊娜·诺塞尔(Nossel Suzanne)在2004年3-4月号的Foreign Affairs(Vol.
83 Issue 2, pp.131-142.)上发表的文章中提出的,题目就是Smart Power。但与软权力的概念一样,是奈使这个新的概念为众人所知。
5约瑟夫·奈关于“软权力”理论的发展线索:在1990年的《注定领导》一书中首次提出了软权力概念;在2004年的《软权力——世界政坛制胜之道》一书中系统阐述了软权力的资源和效果测量;在2006年和2008年的“Recovering American leadership”和“Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”二篇文章中重点讨论了如何将软权力资源转化为实际影响力。
1“the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”,具体见Joseph Nye Jr.“Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,”Political Science Quarterly, 119(2) (2004), pp. 255-270.
2约瑟夫·奈:《软权力:世界政坛制胜之道》,北京大学出版社,2005年版。
3布兰德利·沃麦克:《“软权力”评析》,载《吉林大学社会科学学报》2006年9月,第66-71页。
4讨论软权力概念的论文数量很多,有代表性的有刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月9卷第3期,第38-43页;季玲、陈士平:《国际政治的变迁与软权力理论》,载《外交评论》,2007年第6期,第97-104页;郑永年、张驰:《国际政治中的软权力以及对中国软权力的观察》,载《世界政治与经济》2007年第7期,第6-12页;阎学通、徐进:《中美软实力比较》,载《现代国际关系》2008年第1期,第24-29页;唐慧云:《国内学术界中国软实力研究现状述评》,载《国际关系学院学报》2008年第3期,第18-23页。
1刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月9卷第3期,第38-43页。
2阎学通、徐进:《中美软实力比较》,载《现代国际关系》2008年第1期,第24-29页。
3引自郑永年、张驰:《国际政治中的软权力以及对中国软权力的观察》,载《世界政治与经济》2007年第7期,第6-12页。此三种力量的分类与奈的“硬权力”(hard power)“软权力”(soft power)及后期提出的“巧权力”(smart power)有相似之处。
4皋艳:《世纪之交的中国文化软权力建设》南京航空航天大学2004年硕士研究生学位论文,第3页,转引自刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月第9卷第3期,第38-43页。
5俞新天:《软实力建设与中国对外战略》,载《国际问题研究》2008年第2期,第15-20页。
1宋效峰:《试析中国和平崛起中的软权力因素》,载《兰州学刊》2005年第3期,第19-22页。
2刘德斌:《“软权力说”的由来与发展》,载《吉林大学社会科学学报》2004年第4期,第55-62页。
3见俞新天:《软实力建设与中国对外战略》,载《国际问题研究》2008年第2期,第15-20页;倪世雄:《当代西方国际关系理论》,复旦大学出版社,2001年版,第392-394页。
4参见吴建民:《文化是软实力核心文化外交要润物细无声》,载《人民日报》2007-8-17;参见康晓光:《软权力建设与儒家文化复兴》,载《天涯》, 2007(1).
5参见阎学通:“文化资源需要政治运用”,环球时报网站,http://www.huanqiu.com/www/column/yanxuetong/2007-11/21720.html,登录于2009年2月11日。
6阎学通在2007年5月22日《环球时报》上发表了《软实力的核心是政治实力》一文后,引起了陆钢、吴旭、郭之纯等人就软权力核心问题的讨论(具体参见《环球时报》1429、1439、1445、1465期11版)。
1参见Ding Sheng, Soft Power and the Rise of China: An Assessment of China's Soft Power in Its Modernization Process (Ph.D., Rutgers The State University of New Jersey– Newark,2006);胡鞍钢:《中国传媒迅速崛起的实证分析》,载《战略与管理》2004年第2期,第24-34页。
2 James B. Steinberg,“Real Leaders Do Soft Power: Learning the Lessons of Iraq,”The Washington Quarterly, (spring 2008), pp.155-164.
3 Joshua Kurlantzick,Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
4 Takeshi Matsuda, Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
5 Aandrei P. Tsygankov,“If Not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin’s Foreign Policy,”Europe-Asia Studies, (Vol. 58, No. 7, Nov. 2006), pp.1079-1099.
1 Seong-Hun Yuna, Jeong-Nam Kimb,“Soft power: From Ethnic Attraction to National Attraction in Sociological Globalism,”International Journal of Intercultural Relations, (2008:32), pp. 565–577.
2 Richard Rose,“Political Communication in a European Public Space: Language, the Internet and Understanding as Soft Power,”JCMS (Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008), pp. 451–475.
3 Meghnad Desai在Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Kaul Inge et al, eds.)第一章中具体论述了公共产品的发展历程。
1 Paul A. Samuelson,,“The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (4): (1954), pp.387–389.
2 Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
3 Jack Hirshleifer,“From Weakest-link to Best-shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,”Public Choice 41: (1983), pp. 371–386.
1 Oliver Morrissey, Dirk Willem te Velde, and Adrian Hewitt,“Defining International Public Goods: Conceptual Issues,”International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement and Financing, Ferroni Marco & Mody Ashoka, eds., (Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p.35.
2国际公共产品有不同的提法,最为常见的为international public goods。另外还有transnational和public goods的提高。虽然内涵范围和侧重有所不同,但研究方法基本相同,本文统一为国际公共产品,以下不再单独说明。
3 Inge Kaul, p. 95.
1 Olga Memedovic et al, eds., Public Goods for Economic Development (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2008), p.22.
2 Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
4 Stephen D. Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,”International Regimes, ed., Stephen D. Krasner, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 13.
1 Robert Keohane,After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984).
2 Carla Norrlof, America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 31.
3 David A. Deese, p. 15.
4 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 189.
1 Barrett Scott, Why Cooperate: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
2 Sandler Todd, Global Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3具体见Kaul Inge et al, eds., Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4 Katharina Holzinger, Transnational Common Goods: Strategic Constellations, Collective Action Problems, and Multi-level Provision (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 37.
1 Joseph Nye Jr. S. & Donahue D. John, eds., Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.7. (introduction).
1 Anthony T. Cobb,“An episodic model of power: Toward an integration of theory and research,”The Academy of Management Review, 9(3), (1984), pp. 482-493.
2高尚涛:《权力与规范》,外交学院2006届博士研究生学位论文,第26页;专门讨论权力的比较有代表性的著作有:Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950); Robert A. Dahl,“The Concept of Power,”Behavioral Science (1957): pp. 201-215; Roderick Bell, et al., eds., Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1969); David V. J. Bell, Power, Influence and Authority: An Essay in Political Linguistics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Dennis Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (New York: Harper, 1979); David Baldwin,“Power and Social Exchange,”American Political Science Review, 72 (1978): pp.1229-42; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol.I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
3汉斯·摩根索:《国家间政治:寻求权力与和平的斗争》,北京:北京大学出版社,2004年版,第32页。
4 Norman Uphoff,“Distinguishing Power, Authority & Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at His word by Using Resources-Exchange aanalysis,”Polity, Vol. 22, No. 2 (winter, 1989), pp. 295-322.
1 Immanuel Wallerstein,“The Interstate Structure of the Modem World-System,”International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds., Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.
171-85.
2亚历山大·温特:《国际政治的社会理论》(秦亚青译),上海:上海人民出版社,2000年版,第383页。
1在萨缪尔森之前已经有学者提出了公共产品的概念。“公共产品”一词最早由瑞典人林达尔在1919其博士论文《公平税收》中首次正式提出,具体可见Lindahl, Erik [1919],“Just taxation—A positive solution”, in Musgrave, R. A.; Peacock, A. T., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, (London: Macmillan, 1958).
2 Paul A Samuelson,,“The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics,36 (4): (1954), pp.387–389.
1亚历山大·温特:《国际政治的社会理论》(秦亚青译),上海人民出版社,2008年版。
1 Katharina Holzinger, Transnational Common Goods: Strategic Constellations, Collective Action Problems, and
1 Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza,“Advancing the Concept of Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization eds., Kaul Inge et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.81.
1 Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza,“Advancing the Concept of Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Kaul Inge et al., p. 102.
1 Inge Kaul and Katell Le Goulven,“Institutional Options for Producing Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Kaul Inge et al., p. 371.
1 Inge Kaul and Katell Le Goulven,“Institutional Options for Producing Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Kaul Inge et al., p. 371.
1 Cecilia Albin,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods:
1 Robert Keohane O. and Joseph Nye S. Jr,“Introduction”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Joseph Nye Jr. S. & John Donahue D. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), (introduction), p. 20.
2 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 27.
3 Meghnad Desai,“Public Goods: A Historical Perspective,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization eds., Inge Kaul et al, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 67.
4 Ibid.
5 Abraham Harold Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1954).
1 Cary Coglianese,“The Design of Institutions”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Joseph Nye Jr. S. & John Donahue D. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 307.
2 Ibid. p. 28.
3 Robert Powell,“Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,”American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, Dec., 1991, pp. 1303–1320.
1 Moravcsik Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1998), p. 376.
2也有学者从分层经济理论、组织理论和公司结构理论等角度论证了国际公共产品的效率性。详见Helen Milner“The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory,”Review of International Studies 17: (1991), pp.67–85.
3 Brown et al.,“NGOs and Multisectoral Relations,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Nye. p. 275.
1 John Howard Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of Interntional Economic Relations (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1997), p. 153.
2 Dani Rodric,“Economic Globalization,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Nye, p. 357.
1 Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, eds., Legitimacy in International Law (New York: Springer, 2008), p.6.
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 6.
3 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds. Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 46.
4 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 6.
5 Ibid. p. 47.
6 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 38.
1 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 38.
2 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 33.
3详见Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 6
1 Barrett Scott, Why Cooperate: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), (Introduction), p. 11.
2 Buchanan & Keohane,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 32.
3 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 6.
4 Inge Kaul eds., p. 266.
5 Bodansky,“The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker,p. 313.
1 Pippa Noriss,“Cosmopolitan Citizen,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds, Joseph Nye Jr. S. & John Donahue D., p. 167.
2详见本章第四小节关于国际公共产品增值价值的论述。
1 Buchanan & Keohane,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker,p. 59.
2 Bodansky Daniel,“The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 311.
3 Cary Coglianese,“The Design of International Institutions,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds., Nye & Donahue, p. 312;关于“具体合法性”和“扩散性合法性”具体还可见James Gibson,“Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance,”Law and Society Review, vol. 23 (August 1989), p. 469; Tom Tyler and Kenneth Rasinski,“Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson,”Law and Society Review, vol. 25 (August 1991), pp. 621; James Gibson,“Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality,”Law and Society Review, vol. 25 (August 1991), p. 631.
1在美国霸权下建立的世界银行、国际货币基金组织和关贸总协定(世界贸易组织)等都是经济领域的国际公共产品,虽然在一定程度上实现了国际公利但每个产品都有其不公平和不合理之处。国际货币基金组织已经在特殊提款权的配额分配方面进行了改革。
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 63.
3 Lloyd Gruber, p. 62.
1美国获得10 billion中的2.9 billion,英国是美国配额的一半,苏联比英国要少些,中国则更少。关于具体配额制定的过程可见Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul p. 227.
1 Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul, p. 230.
2 Inge Kaul and Katell Le Goulven,“Financing Global Public Goods: A New Frontier of Public Finance,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul p. 351.
3 Ibid. p. 350.
1 Albin Cecilia,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul, p. 271.
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 37.
3具体可见David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,”Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 3 (Fall 1987), p. 243.
4 Daniel Bodansky,“The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 310.
5 Alain Pellet,“Legitimacy of Legislative and Executive Actions of International Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum, p.31.
1 Albin Cecilia,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Inge Kaul eds., p. 270.
2具体参见Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Inge Kaul eds., p. 231.
1 Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Inge Kaul eds., p. 231.
1 Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 259.
1 Moe, Terry M., and Michael Caldwell,“The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems,”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 50: (1994) pp. 171–95.
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 83.
3 Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of Interntional Economic Relations, p. 136.
1 Todd Sandler, p. 95.
2 Ibid.
3 Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 226–227.
2 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker R?ben, p. 16.
1关于从GATT到WTO中从权力导向到规则导向的研究可参考郭薇,翁杰:《从权力导向型向规则导向型的嬗变——试析G ATT/WT O争端解决机制的演进和整合》,载《西南民族大学学报》(人文社科版)2005年第8期,第73-78页。
2 Jackson, The World Trading System, p. 125.
3 Ibid.
1 Keohane & Robert,“Introduction,”Goverance in A Globalizing World, eds. Nye & Donahue, p. 9.
2 Todd Sandler, p. 10.
1 Neal M. Rosendore,“Social and Cultural Globalization,”Goverance in A Globalizing World, eds. Nye & Donahue, p. 114.
2 Scott Barett, p. 160.
3 G. John Ikenbury, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capabilities of the American Government (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 194-195.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, Power and Governance of Global Trade: from the GATT to the WTO (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 58.
1 Robert Keohane,“Comment: Norms, institutions, and cooperation,”International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology: Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, eds. Maskus E. Keith & Reichman Jeromeh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 67.
2 Ibid.
3 Frederick Schauer,“Legal Transplantation,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds.Nye & Donahue, p. 262.
4 Ibid. p. 261.
1具体过程的分析可见Soo Yeon Kim, pp.76-84.
651 Frederick Schauer,“Legal Transplantation,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds., Nye & Donahue, p. 258. 2 Ibid. p. 259.
1 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”eds., Nye & Donahue, Governance in a Globalizing World, p. 36
1劳埃德·格鲁伯从博弈论的角度得出了同样的结论,详见Lloyd Gruber, p. 47。
1 Ibid. p. 122.
2 Ibid.
3 Rohter Larry,“Backlash from NAFTA Batters Economies of the Caribbean,”New York Times, (January 30, 1997), A1.
4关于北美自由贸易协定对世界经济模式的影响可参考Lloyd Gruber,“NAFTA and Beyond: Is Free Trade Contagious?”, pp. 122-167.
1 Alexander Wendt,“Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design,”International Organization, Vol.55, No.4 (2001), pp. 1019-1049.
1 Robert O. Keohane,“The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-77,”eds. Ole R. Holsti et al, Changes in the Internatinoal System (Boulder: Westview, 1980)
2尽管Hull在1944年11月就已退休没能亲自参加GATT的成立,但其担任美国国务卿期间对美国外交政策的影响奠定了美国制定GATT时的基本立场和原则。
3 Dam Kenneth W. The GATT: LawandInternationalEconomicOrganization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p.12转引自Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 10.
1 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.2 5.
2 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Vol. 2 (London and New York: Macmillan,1948), pp. 81-84转引自Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 9.
1 Arthur A. Stein,‘‘The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,’’International Organization, 38: (1984), pp. 355–386.
2虽然1995年1月1日以后关贸总协定(GATT)被世界贸易组织(WTO)取代,但其宗旨、原则和制度框架等都被世界贸易组织承袭下来,是具有更高国际法法律效力和权威性的关贸总协定的升级版产品,而且世界贸易组织也是美国霸权主导下的产物,所以这里把二者放在一起分析。
3量表及具体分析见附录。
4此测量中的自变量是WTO的正式成员国(主权国家)身份(具体为“既定成员”、“先期加入者”和“后来者”,“工业化国家”和“非工业化国家”)。他变量是两个国家之间的进出口贸易额。(A国从B国的进口贸易额及B国从A国的进口贸易额)。贸易额的具体数值根据IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics基础上换算成的美元)。数据的有效时间是1948到2004年间的贸易额。
5之所以以1995年为界把后来加入GATT(WTO)体系的发展中国家划分为“先期加入者”和“后来者”是因为在乌拉圭回合谈判(1986-1994年)期间和WTO成立的第一年(1995年)间加入GATT或WTO的国家
1 John Jackson, p. 118.
2 Ibid. p. 126.
3具体见Soo Yeon Kim的分析, p. 88.
4 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 88.
5 John Gerard Ruggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, International Regimes ed., Stephen D. Krasner, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 210.
1 Cautam Sen,“The US and the GATT/WTO System,”US Hegemony and International Organizations: the United States and Multilateral Institutions, eds., Rosemary Foot et al., p. 122.
2 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 26.
3 Douglas A. Irwin et al, p. 188.
4 Carla Norrlof, America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). p. 3, (introduction).
5 Carla Norrlof, p. 5.
1 Soo Yeon Kim在Power and the Governance of Global Trade: from GATT to the WTO一书中对GATT的利益的不均衡分配做了详细的量化研究,得出的结论是工业化国家比发展中国家从GATT中获得了更大的收益,而美国、英国、德国、法国、加拿大等五个最主要的工业国(都是欧美国家和美国的盟友)从GATT中获益最大。
2 John Gerard Ruggie,“Internatinoal Regime, Transactions and Change,”International Regime, ed., Stephen D. Krasner, p. 214.
3 John Jackson, p. 118.
4 Ibid. p. 120.
5 Ibid. p. 258.
1 Krasner, preface, International Regime, ed., Stephen Krasner, p. vii.
2 Gautam Sen,“The US and the GATT/WTO System,”US Hegemony and International Organizations: the United States and Multilateral Institutions,eds., Rosemary Foot et al, p. 116.
3 Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 23.
4 Carla Norrlof, p. 97.
1 Stephan Haggard,“The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,”International Organization, Vo.42, No.1, pp. 91-119.
2具体见Rhodes Carolyn, Reciprocity, U.S. Trade Policy, and the GATT Regime (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
3 John Jackson, p. 37.
4 Putnam, R. D.“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”International Organization, Vol. 3, No.3, (1988), pp. 427-460.
5 GATT文本中并没有明确规定“主要供应商”原则是关税谈判的基本方法,但在第二十八条中规定了它是关
1 Soo Yeon Kim对GATT(WTO)各主要参与国的贸易情况进行了定量分析,得出此结论。
2 Carla Norrlof, p. 35.
1 Douglas A. Irwing, p. 82.
2 Ibid. p. 179.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 69.
2关于各国具体对美国提出农业免责的提案的具体言论详见Soo Yeon Kim, p. 69.
1吴瑞、姚家儒:《论WTO规则与美国反倾销法的趋同及冲突—从反垄断法到贸易保护主义的最新发展》,载《法治研究》2008年第10期,第23-27页。
2关于美国的反倾销法如何影响了WTO的相关立法,详见徐淑萍:《GATT/ WTO反倾销规则的相互影响》,载《法律科学》2001年第1期(总第108期),第124-128页。
1朱庆华、唐宇:《中国反倾销措施实证分析》,载《山东财政学院学报》2004年第6期,第79-84页。
2 Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1965), p. 95,间接引自Soo Yeon Kim, p. 62.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 62.
2关于item-by-item和across-the-board liner cut的降税原则在GATT成立之初美英之间就存在严重分歧。具体论述可见Douglas A. Irwin et al, The Genesis of the GATT.
3 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 62.
1 John Jackson, p. 341.
1 John Jackson, p. 158.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 33.
2 Ibid. p. 28.
3 Ruggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change,”International Regime, ed., Krasner, p. 209.
4 Carla Norrlof, p. 58.
5 Ibid.
6 Paul Samuelson, Economics (New York: McGraw Hill, 11th ed., 1980), p. 651.
1 Herbert Feis,“The Geneva Proposals for an Internatial Trade Charter,”International Organization Vol.2. No.1, (1948), pp. 39-52.
2 Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals For Action, (Geneva: GATT, 1985), p. 23.转引自John Jackson, p. 11.
3 John Jackson, p. 31.
1具体见Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher,“The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers,”International Regime, ed. Krasner, p. 274.
2 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 76.
3 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 76.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 76.
2 Ibid.
1 Hui Feng, Politics of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Dragon Goes Global (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 69.
1孙振宇:《世界多边贸易体制与中国入世十周年——在庆祝中国国际贸易学会成立三十周年大会上发表的主旨演讲》(专稿)载于《对外经贸实务》2011年第10期。
1中国加入国际机制的历程可以参见江忆生:《简论国际机制对国家行为的影响》,载《世界经济与政治》2002年第12期,第21-27页。
2 John Jackson, p. 346.
1 Song Liang,“The State of the Chinese Economy,”China and the World Trading System: Entering the New Millennium, eds. Deborah Z. Cass et al, p. 88.
1 Sharif Bhuiyan, National Law in WTO Law: Effectiveness and Good Governance in World Trading System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 6.
2 Qingjiang Kong, p. 61.
1 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective”, Legitimacy in International Law eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker R?ben, p. 12.
2 Marc Lanteigne, introduction.
3 Mark Lanteigne, introduction.
1纪文化:《加入WTO十周年:中国参与争端解决机制的宏观问题和应对之策概析》,载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2011年5月第18卷第3期,第18-24页。
2龚柏华:《中国入世十年主动参与WTO争端解决机制实践述评》,载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2011年9月第18卷第5期,第9-18页。
1陈德铭:《深入贯彻党的十七大精神,全面开创商务工作新局面。》,载《国际商报》2008年1月21日A7版。
2龚柏华:《中国入世十年主动参与WTO争端解决机制实践述评》,载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2011年
9月第18卷第5期,第9-18页。
3 Olga Memedovic et al, eds., Public Goods for Economic Development (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2008), p. 73.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 120.
2 John H. Jackson,“The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO,”The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization,eds., Cass Deborah Z., et al, p. 24.
3刘国远:《世贸组织官员:中国对世界经济增长贡献重大》,www.stockstar.com 2007-10-31 http://finance.stockstar.com/JL2007103100201805.shtml登录于2001年9月20日。
4 Elena Ianchovichina and Will Martin“Trade Policy Reform and China’s WTO Accession,”The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization,eds., Cass Deborah Z., et al, p. 97.
1 Albin Cecilia,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization eds., Inge Kaul, p. 271.
2 Merilee. S. Grindle,“The Developing World,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds., Nye & Donahue p.190.
3 Olga Memedovic et al, eds., p. 58.
4 Ibid. p. 64.
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3 Joseph Nye, S., Jr.,“Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,”Political Science Quarterly, 119, 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 255-270.
1 Olga Memedovic et al,, eds., Public Goods for Economic Development (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2008), p. 1.
2 Inge kaul, p. 340.
3 Olga Memedovic, p. 1.
4 Ibid.
1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of World Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1991). Softpower有不同的译法:“软实力”、“软国力”、“软权力”、“柔性力量”、“软权力”在不同的论文和著作中都出现过。本文主要在国际层面讨论国家之间的权力互动关系,所以采用“软权力”一词。
2具体参见刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月第9卷第3期,第38-43页;郑永年、张驰:《国际政治中的软权力以及对中国软权力的观察》,载《世界政治与经济》2007年第7期,第6-12页。
3 Sheng Ding, Soft Power and the Rise of China: An Assessment of China's Soft Power in Its Modernization Process. (Ph.D., Rutgers The State University of New Jersey-Newark, 2006).
1详见Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of World Power.
2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
3 Niall Ferguson在“Power”一文中评论“软权力的问题就是它太软了。”载于Foreign Policy, No. 134 (Jan.- Feb., 2003), pp.18-22+24。
4首次提出这个概念的不是奈,而是苏珊娜·诺塞尔(Nossel Suzanne)在2004年3-4月号的Foreign Affairs(Vol.
83 Issue 2, pp.131-142.)上发表的文章中提出的,题目就是Smart Power。但与软权力的概念一样,是奈使这个新的概念为众人所知。
5约瑟夫·奈关于“软权力”理论的发展线索:在1990年的《注定领导》一书中首次提出了软权力概念;在2004年的《软权力——世界政坛制胜之道》一书中系统阐述了软权力的资源和效果测量;在2006年和2008年的“Recovering American leadership”和“Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”二篇文章中重点讨论了如何将软权力资源转化为实际影响力。
1“the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”,具体见Joseph Nye Jr.“Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,”Political Science Quarterly, 119(2) (2004), pp. 255-270.
2约瑟夫·奈:《软权力:世界政坛制胜之道》,北京大学出版社,2005年版。
3布兰德利·沃麦克:《“软权力”评析》,载《吉林大学社会科学学报》2006年9月,第66-71页。
4讨论软权力概念的论文数量很多,有代表性的有刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月9卷第3期,第38-43页;季玲、陈士平:《国际政治的变迁与软权力理论》,载《外交评论》,2007年第6期,第97-104页;郑永年、张驰:《国际政治中的软权力以及对中国软权力的观察》,载《世界政治与经济》2007年第7期,第6-12页;阎学通、徐进:《中美软实力比较》,载《现代国际关系》2008年第1期,第24-29页;唐慧云:《国内学术界中国软实力研究现状述评》,载《国际关系学院学报》2008年第3期,第18-23页。
1刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月9卷第3期,第38-43页。
2阎学通、徐进:《中美软实力比较》,载《现代国际关系》2008年第1期,第24-29页。
3引自郑永年、张驰:《国际政治中的软权力以及对中国软权力的观察》,载《世界政治与经济》2007年第7期,第6-12页。此三种力量的分类与奈的“硬权力”(hard power)“软权力”(soft power)及后期提出的“巧权力”(smart power)有相似之处。
4皋艳:《世纪之交的中国文化软权力建设》南京航空航天大学2004年硕士研究生学位论文,第3页,转引自刘庆、王利涛:《近年国内软权力理论研究综述》,载《国际论坛》2007年5月第9卷第3期,第38-43页。
5俞新天:《软实力建设与中国对外战略》,载《国际问题研究》2008年第2期,第15-20页。
1宋效峰:《试析中国和平崛起中的软权力因素》,载《兰州学刊》2005年第3期,第19-22页。
2刘德斌:《“软权力说”的由来与发展》,载《吉林大学社会科学学报》2004年第4期,第55-62页。
3见俞新天:《软实力建设与中国对外战略》,载《国际问题研究》2008年第2期,第15-20页;倪世雄:《当代西方国际关系理论》,复旦大学出版社,2001年版,第392-394页。
4参见吴建民:《文化是软实力核心文化外交要润物细无声》,载《人民日报》2007-8-17;参见康晓光:《软权力建设与儒家文化复兴》,载《天涯》, 2007(1).
5参见阎学通:“文化资源需要政治运用”,环球时报网站,http://www.huanqiu.com/www/column/yanxuetong/2007-11/21720.html,登录于2009年2月11日。
6阎学通在2007年5月22日《环球时报》上发表了《软实力的核心是政治实力》一文后,引起了陆钢、吴旭、郭之纯等人就软权力核心问题的讨论(具体参见《环球时报》1429、1439、1445、1465期11版)。
1参见Ding Sheng, Soft Power and the Rise of China: An Assessment of China's Soft Power in Its Modernization Process (Ph.D., Rutgers The State University of New Jersey– Newark,2006);胡鞍钢:《中国传媒迅速崛起的实证分析》,载《战略与管理》2004年第2期,第24-34页。
2 James B. Steinberg,“Real Leaders Do Soft Power: Learning the Lessons of Iraq,”The Washington Quarterly, (spring 2008), pp.155-164.
3 Joshua Kurlantzick,Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
4 Takeshi Matsuda, Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
5 Aandrei P. Tsygankov,“If Not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin’s Foreign Policy,”Europe-Asia Studies, (Vol. 58, No. 7, Nov. 2006), pp.1079-1099.
1 Seong-Hun Yuna, Jeong-Nam Kimb,“Soft power: From Ethnic Attraction to National Attraction in Sociological Globalism,”International Journal of Intercultural Relations, (2008:32), pp. 565–577.
2 Richard Rose,“Political Communication in a European Public Space: Language, the Internet and Understanding as Soft Power,”JCMS (Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008), pp. 451–475.
3 Meghnad Desai在Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Kaul Inge et al, eds.)第一章中具体论述了公共产品的发展历程。
1 Paul A. Samuelson,,“The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (4): (1954), pp.387–389.
2 Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
3 Jack Hirshleifer,“From Weakest-link to Best-shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,”Public Choice 41: (1983), pp. 371–386.
1 Oliver Morrissey, Dirk Willem te Velde, and Adrian Hewitt,“Defining International Public Goods: Conceptual Issues,”International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement and Financing, Ferroni Marco & Mody Ashoka, eds., (Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p.35.
2国际公共产品有不同的提法,最为常见的为international public goods。另外还有transnational和public goods的提高。虽然内涵范围和侧重有所不同,但研究方法基本相同,本文统一为国际公共产品,以下不再单独说明。
3 Inge Kaul, p. 95.
1 Olga Memedovic et al, eds., Public Goods for Economic Development (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2008), p.22.
2 Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
4 Stephen D. Krasner,“Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,”International Regimes, ed., Stephen D. Krasner, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 13.
1 Robert Keohane,After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984).
2 Carla Norrlof, America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 31.
3 David A. Deese, p. 15.
4 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 189.
1 Barrett Scott, Why Cooperate: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
2 Sandler Todd, Global Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3具体见Kaul Inge et al, eds., Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4 Katharina Holzinger, Transnational Common Goods: Strategic Constellations, Collective Action Problems, and Multi-level Provision (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 37.
1 Joseph Nye Jr. S. & Donahue D. John, eds., Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.7. (introduction).
1 Anthony T. Cobb,“An episodic model of power: Toward an integration of theory and research,”The Academy of Management Review, 9(3), (1984), pp. 482-493.
2高尚涛:《权力与规范》,外交学院2006届博士研究生学位论文,第26页;专门讨论权力的比较有代表性的著作有:Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950); Robert A. Dahl,“The Concept of Power,”Behavioral Science (1957): pp. 201-215; Roderick Bell, et al., eds., Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1969); David V. J. Bell, Power, Influence and Authority: An Essay in Political Linguistics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Dennis Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (New York: Harper, 1979); David Baldwin,“Power and Social Exchange,”American Political Science Review, 72 (1978): pp.1229-42; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol.I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
3汉斯·摩根索:《国家间政治:寻求权力与和平的斗争》,北京:北京大学出版社,2004年版,第32页。
4 Norman Uphoff,“Distinguishing Power, Authority & Legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at His word by Using Resources-Exchange aanalysis,”Polity, Vol. 22, No. 2 (winter, 1989), pp. 295-322.
1 Immanuel Wallerstein,“The Interstate Structure of the Modem World-System,”International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds., Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.
171-85.
2亚历山大·温特:《国际政治的社会理论》(秦亚青译),上海:上海人民出版社,2000年版,第383页。
1在萨缪尔森之前已经有学者提出了公共产品的概念。“公共产品”一词最早由瑞典人林达尔在1919其博士论文《公平税收》中首次正式提出,具体可见Lindahl, Erik [1919],“Just taxation—A positive solution”, in Musgrave, R. A.; Peacock, A. T., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, (London: Macmillan, 1958).
2 Paul A Samuelson,,“The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics,36 (4): (1954), pp.387–389.
1亚历山大·温特:《国际政治的社会理论》(秦亚青译),上海人民出版社,2008年版。
1 Katharina Holzinger, Transnational Common Goods: Strategic Constellations, Collective Action Problems, and
1 Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza,“Advancing the Concept of Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization eds., Kaul Inge et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.81.
1 Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza,“Advancing the Concept of Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Kaul Inge et al., p. 102.
1 Inge Kaul and Katell Le Goulven,“Institutional Options for Producing Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Kaul Inge et al., p. 371.
1 Inge Kaul and Katell Le Goulven,“Institutional Options for Producing Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Kaul Inge et al., p. 371.
1 Cecilia Albin,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods:
1 Robert Keohane O. and Joseph Nye S. Jr,“Introduction”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Joseph Nye Jr. S. & John Donahue D. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), (introduction), p. 20.
2 Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 27.
3 Meghnad Desai,“Public Goods: A Historical Perspective,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization eds., Inge Kaul et al, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 67.
4 Ibid.
5 Abraham Harold Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1954).
1 Cary Coglianese,“The Design of Institutions”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Joseph Nye Jr. S. & John Donahue D. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 307.
2 Ibid. p. 28.
3 Robert Powell,“Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,”American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, Dec., 1991, pp. 1303–1320.
1 Moravcsik Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1998), p. 376.
2也有学者从分层经济理论、组织理论和公司结构理论等角度论证了国际公共产品的效率性。详见Helen Milner“The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory,”Review of International Studies 17: (1991), pp.67–85.
3 Brown et al.,“NGOs and Multisectoral Relations,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Nye. p. 275.
1 John Howard Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of Interntional Economic Relations (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1997), p. 153.
2 Dani Rodric,“Economic Globalization,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds. Nye, p. 357.
1 Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, eds., Legitimacy in International Law (New York: Springer, 2008), p.6.
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 6.
3 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds. Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 46.
4 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 6.
5 Ibid. p. 47.
6 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 38.
1 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 38.
2 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 33.
3详见Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 6
1 Barrett Scott, Why Cooperate: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), (Introduction), p. 11.
2 Buchanan & Keohane,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 32.
3 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 6.
4 Inge Kaul eds., p. 266.
5 Bodansky,“The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker,p. 313.
1 Pippa Noriss,“Cosmopolitan Citizen,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds, Joseph Nye Jr. S. & John Donahue D., p. 167.
2详见本章第四小节关于国际公共产品增值价值的论述。
1 Buchanan & Keohane,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker,p. 59.
2 Bodansky Daniel,“The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 311.
3 Cary Coglianese,“The Design of International Institutions,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds., Nye & Donahue, p. 312;关于“具体合法性”和“扩散性合法性”具体还可见James Gibson,“Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance,”Law and Society Review, vol. 23 (August 1989), p. 469; Tom Tyler and Kenneth Rasinski,“Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson,”Law and Society Review, vol. 25 (August 1991), pp. 621; James Gibson,“Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality,”Law and Society Review, vol. 25 (August 1991), p. 631.
1在美国霸权下建立的世界银行、国际货币基金组织和关贸总协定(世界贸易组织)等都是经济领域的国际公共产品,虽然在一定程度上实现了国际公利但每个产品都有其不公平和不合理之处。国际货币基金组织已经在特殊提款权的配额分配方面进行了改革。
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 63.
3 Lloyd Gruber, p. 62.
1美国获得10 billion中的2.9 billion,英国是美国配额的一半,苏联比英国要少些,中国则更少。关于具体配额制定的过程可见Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul p. 227.
1 Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul, p. 230.
2 Inge Kaul and Katell Le Goulven,“Financing Global Public Goods: A New Frontier of Public Finance,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul p. 351.
3 Ibid. p. 350.
1 Albin Cecilia,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, eds., Inge Kaul, p. 271.
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 37.
3具体可见David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast,“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,”Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 3 (Fall 1987), p. 243.
4 Daniel Bodansky,“The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and R?ben Volker, p. 310.
5 Alain Pellet,“Legitimacy of Legislative and Executive Actions of International Institutions,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum, p.31.
1 Albin Cecilia,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Inge Kaul eds., p. 270.
2具体参见Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Inge Kaul eds., p. 231.
1 Ariel Buira,“The Governance of the International Monetary Fund,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, Inge Kaul eds., p. 231.
1 Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 259.
1 Moe, Terry M., and Michael Caldwell,“The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems,”Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 50: (1994) pp. 171–95.
2 Lloyd Gruber, p. 83.
3 Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of Interntional Economic Relations, p. 136.
1 Todd Sandler, p. 95.
2 Ibid.
3 Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 226–227.
2 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective,”Legitimacy in International Law, eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker R?ben, p. 16.
1关于从GATT到WTO中从权力导向到规则导向的研究可参考郭薇,翁杰:《从权力导向型向规则导向型的嬗变——试析G ATT/WT O争端解决机制的演进和整合》,载《西南民族大学学报》(人文社科版)2005年第8期,第73-78页。
2 Jackson, The World Trading System, p. 125.
3 Ibid.
1 Keohane & Robert,“Introduction,”Goverance in A Globalizing World, eds. Nye & Donahue, p. 9.
2 Todd Sandler, p. 10.
1 Neal M. Rosendore,“Social and Cultural Globalization,”Goverance in A Globalizing World, eds. Nye & Donahue, p. 114.
2 Scott Barett, p. 160.
3 G. John Ikenbury, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capabilities of the American Government (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 194-195.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, Power and Governance of Global Trade: from the GATT to the WTO (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 58.
1 Robert Keohane,“Comment: Norms, institutions, and cooperation,”International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology: Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, eds. Maskus E. Keith & Reichman Jeromeh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 67.
2 Ibid.
3 Frederick Schauer,“Legal Transplantation,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds.Nye & Donahue, p. 262.
4 Ibid. p. 261.
1具体过程的分析可见Soo Yeon Kim, pp.76-84.
651 Frederick Schauer,“Legal Transplantation,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds., Nye & Donahue, p. 258. 2 Ibid. p. 259.
1 Buchanan & Keohane,“The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,”eds., Nye & Donahue, Governance in a Globalizing World, p. 36
1劳埃德·格鲁伯从博弈论的角度得出了同样的结论,详见Lloyd Gruber, p. 47。
1 Ibid. p. 122.
2 Ibid.
3 Rohter Larry,“Backlash from NAFTA Batters Economies of the Caribbean,”New York Times, (January 30, 1997), A1.
4关于北美自由贸易协定对世界经济模式的影响可参考Lloyd Gruber,“NAFTA and Beyond: Is Free Trade Contagious?”, pp. 122-167.
1 Alexander Wendt,“Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design,”International Organization, Vol.55, No.4 (2001), pp. 1019-1049.
1 Robert O. Keohane,“The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-77,”eds. Ole R. Holsti et al, Changes in the Internatinoal System (Boulder: Westview, 1980)
2尽管Hull在1944年11月就已退休没能亲自参加GATT的成立,但其担任美国国务卿期间对美国外交政策的影响奠定了美国制定GATT时的基本立场和原则。
3 Dam Kenneth W. The GATT: LawandInternationalEconomicOrganization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p.12转引自Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 10.
1 Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.2 5.
2 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Vol. 2 (London and New York: Macmillan,1948), pp. 81-84转引自Douglas A. Irwin, Petros C. Mavroidis, Alan O Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 9.
1 Arthur A. Stein,‘‘The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,’’International Organization, 38: (1984), pp. 355–386.
2虽然1995年1月1日以后关贸总协定(GATT)被世界贸易组织(WTO)取代,但其宗旨、原则和制度框架等都被世界贸易组织承袭下来,是具有更高国际法法律效力和权威性的关贸总协定的升级版产品,而且世界贸易组织也是美国霸权主导下的产物,所以这里把二者放在一起分析。
3量表及具体分析见附录。
4此测量中的自变量是WTO的正式成员国(主权国家)身份(具体为“既定成员”、“先期加入者”和“后来者”,“工业化国家”和“非工业化国家”)。他变量是两个国家之间的进出口贸易额。(A国从B国的进口贸易额及B国从A国的进口贸易额)。贸易额的具体数值根据IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics基础上换算成的美元)。数据的有效时间是1948到2004年间的贸易额。
5之所以以1995年为界把后来加入GATT(WTO)体系的发展中国家划分为“先期加入者”和“后来者”是因为在乌拉圭回合谈判(1986-1994年)期间和WTO成立的第一年(1995年)间加入GATT或WTO的国家
1 John Jackson, p. 118.
2 Ibid. p. 126.
3具体见Soo Yeon Kim的分析, p. 88.
4 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 88.
5 John Gerard Ruggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, International Regimes ed., Stephen D. Krasner, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 210.
1 Cautam Sen,“The US and the GATT/WTO System,”US Hegemony and International Organizations: the United States and Multilateral Institutions, eds., Rosemary Foot et al., p. 122.
2 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 26.
3 Douglas A. Irwin et al, p. 188.
4 Carla Norrlof, America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). p. 3, (introduction).
5 Carla Norrlof, p. 5.
1 Soo Yeon Kim在Power and the Governance of Global Trade: from GATT to the WTO一书中对GATT的利益的不均衡分配做了详细的量化研究,得出的结论是工业化国家比发展中国家从GATT中获得了更大的收益,而美国、英国、德国、法国、加拿大等五个最主要的工业国(都是欧美国家和美国的盟友)从GATT中获益最大。
2 John Gerard Ruggie,“Internatinoal Regime, Transactions and Change,”International Regime, ed., Stephen D. Krasner, p. 214.
3 John Jackson, p. 118.
4 Ibid. p. 120.
5 Ibid. p. 258.
1 Krasner, preface, International Regime, ed., Stephen Krasner, p. vii.
2 Gautam Sen,“The US and the GATT/WTO System,”US Hegemony and International Organizations: the United States and Multilateral Institutions,eds., Rosemary Foot et al, p. 116.
3 Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 23.
4 Carla Norrlof, p. 97.
1 Stephan Haggard,“The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,”International Organization, Vo.42, No.1, pp. 91-119.
2具体见Rhodes Carolyn, Reciprocity, U.S. Trade Policy, and the GATT Regime (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
3 John Jackson, p. 37.
4 Putnam, R. D.“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”International Organization, Vol. 3, No.3, (1988), pp. 427-460.
5 GATT文本中并没有明确规定“主要供应商”原则是关税谈判的基本方法,但在第二十八条中规定了它是关
1 Soo Yeon Kim对GATT(WTO)各主要参与国的贸易情况进行了定量分析,得出此结论。
2 Carla Norrlof, p. 35.
1 Douglas A. Irwing, p. 82.
2 Ibid. p. 179.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 69.
2关于各国具体对美国提出农业免责的提案的具体言论详见Soo Yeon Kim, p. 69.
1吴瑞、姚家儒:《论WTO规则与美国反倾销法的趋同及冲突—从反垄断法到贸易保护主义的最新发展》,载《法治研究》2008年第10期,第23-27页。
2关于美国的反倾销法如何影响了WTO的相关立法,详见徐淑萍:《GATT/ WTO反倾销规则的相互影响》,载《法律科学》2001年第1期(总第108期),第124-128页。
1朱庆华、唐宇:《中国反倾销措施实证分析》,载《山东财政学院学报》2004年第6期,第79-84页。
2 Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1965), p. 95,间接引自Soo Yeon Kim, p. 62.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 62.
2关于item-by-item和across-the-board liner cut的降税原则在GATT成立之初美英之间就存在严重分歧。具体论述可见Douglas A. Irwin et al, The Genesis of the GATT.
3 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 62.
1 John Jackson, p. 341.
1 John Jackson, p. 158.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 33.
2 Ibid. p. 28.
3 Ruggie,“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change,”International Regime, ed., Krasner, p. 209.
4 Carla Norrlof, p. 58.
5 Ibid.
6 Paul Samuelson, Economics (New York: McGraw Hill, 11th ed., 1980), p. 651.
1 Herbert Feis,“The Geneva Proposals for an Internatial Trade Charter,”International Organization Vol.2. No.1, (1948), pp. 39-52.
2 Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals For Action, (Geneva: GATT, 1985), p. 23.转引自John Jackson, p. 11.
3 John Jackson, p. 31.
1具体见Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher,“The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers,”International Regime, ed. Krasner, p. 274.
2 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 76.
3 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 76.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 76.
2 Ibid.
1 Hui Feng, Politics of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Dragon Goes Global (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 69.
1孙振宇:《世界多边贸易体制与中国入世十周年——在庆祝中国国际贸易学会成立三十周年大会上发表的主旨演讲》(专稿)载于《对外经贸实务》2011年第10期。
1中国加入国际机制的历程可以参见江忆生:《简论国际机制对国家行为的影响》,载《世界经济与政治》2002年第12期,第21-27页。
2 John Jackson, p. 346.
1 Song Liang,“The State of the Chinese Economy,”China and the World Trading System: Entering the New Millennium, eds. Deborah Z. Cass et al, p. 88.
1 Sharif Bhuiyan, National Law in WTO Law: Effectiveness and Good Governance in World Trading System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 6.
2 Qingjiang Kong, p. 61.
1 Wolfrum,“Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective”, Legitimacy in International Law eds., Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker R?ben, p. 12.
2 Marc Lanteigne, introduction.
3 Mark Lanteigne, introduction.
1纪文化:《加入WTO十周年:中国参与争端解决机制的宏观问题和应对之策概析》,载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2011年5月第18卷第3期,第18-24页。
2龚柏华:《中国入世十年主动参与WTO争端解决机制实践述评》,载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2011年9月第18卷第5期,第9-18页。
1陈德铭:《深入贯彻党的十七大精神,全面开创商务工作新局面。》,载《国际商报》2008年1月21日A7版。
2龚柏华:《中国入世十年主动参与WTO争端解决机制实践述评》,载《世界贸易组织动态与研究》2011年
9月第18卷第5期,第9-18页。
3 Olga Memedovic et al, eds., Public Goods for Economic Development (Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2008), p. 73.
1 Soo Yeon Kim, p. 120.
2 John H. Jackson,“The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO,”The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization,eds., Cass Deborah Z., et al, p. 24.
3刘国远:《世贸组织官员:中国对世界经济增长贡献重大》,www.stockstar.com 2007-10-31 http://finance.stockstar.com/JL2007103100201805.shtml登录于2001年9月20日。
4 Elena Ianchovichina and Will Martin“Trade Policy Reform and China’s WTO Accession,”The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization,eds., Cass Deborah Z., et al, p. 97.
1 Albin Cecilia,“Getting to Fairness: Negotiations Over Global Public Goods,”Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization eds., Inge Kaul, p. 271.
2 Merilee. S. Grindle,“The Developing World,”Governance in a Globalizing World, eds., Nye & Donahue p.190.
3 Olga Memedovic et al, eds., p. 58.
4 Ibid. p. 64.
【德】施托尔、朔尔科普夫:《WTO——世界贸易制度和世界贸易法》(南京大学中德法学研究所译),北京:法律出版社,2004年版。
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