股权分置改革对我国上市公司绩效影响的实证研究
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摘要
股权分置改革成功与否直接关系到我国资本市场的完善和经济的发展。在对股权分置改革的相关文献的研究中发现,针对股权分置改革后我国上市公司业绩变化的研究较少。因此,本文将从股权分置改革对我国上市公司业绩的影响这个方面来衡量股权分置改革是否成功。本文将使用2005年年底之前已经完成股权分置改革,并且拥有从2003年至2008年六个年度完整财务报告和财务数据的172家上市公司为样本,从上市公司经营绩效和市场绩效两个方面考察股权分置改革对上市公司业绩的影响。在研究股权分置改革后上市公司经营业绩变化方面,建立了多元回归模型。实证研究结果表明,股权分置改革之后,我国上市公司的治理结构得到了明显的改善,并对上市公司经营业绩产生了显著的正向影响。在研究股权分置改革后上市公司市场绩效方面,本文采用事件研究法研究上市公司的市场绩效。研究结果表明股改方案的公布对我国证券投资者来说确实是一个利好消息,但是随着时间的流逝,股改方案公布这一事件对股票市场的影响逐渐消失。另外,本文也得出了在股权分置改革完成的当年股改的效应并未完全显现的结论。
In the nineties of last century, China started building the securities market because of the demand for investment and financing. However, the economic environment was dominated by a planned economy which made china’s securities market began with the defects tradable. With the beginning of stock market established, Chinese listed companies on public offered stock and non-tradable shares into tradable shares. It was not fair to the situation which was with the shares of different weights and different price. This situation had created a significant impact on the development of China’s securities market, and produced a series of serious problems. For example, market supply and demand imbalances, shareholder conflict of interest, controlling rigidity and securities market to enhance the functional efficiency of resource allocation can not fully play the role of itself. To solve these problems, on April 29, 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "listed companies tradable on the pilot reform issues related to notice", officially opened the prelude to the split share structure reform. The purpose is to address the transfer of non-tradable shares and listed problems, achieve Circulating Shares. Tradable share reform will promote securities market system and improve the environment for Corporate Governance, conducive to the real stock market supply and demand and pricing mechanisms. help improve the investment and financing environment, help improve the product structure of China's securities market, increase varieties investment, promote rational allocation of resources of capital market.
In view of this, the paper performance in-depth study on share reform of listed companies, I hope this analysis can effect the split share reform to make the right evaluation, so as to further development of China's capital market experience to provide useful support. As well as the relevant departments in the future development of securities markets in some of the policy issues and help provide a useful reference.
This paper studies two aspects of the split share reform on the performance of listed companies. First, multiple regression model of the share reform of listed companies, the impact of performance. Descriptive statistical analysis, t test described the split share structure reform of listed companies in China after the change in operating performance. The empirical results show that, In addition to representatives of company performance variables return on equity roe in the share reform there was no significant change, other representatives of the corporate performance of the variable, The total return on assets roa, the company earnings per share eps and long-term performance on behalf of Tobin's q has a significant change. The empirical results indicate that, split share reform has changed the ownership structure of listed companies, Board Structure Board of Supervisors, and influenced the corporate governance variables. Then the operating performance of listed companies had a significant positive impact.
Secondly, use the event study method to study the market reaction of split share structure reform of listed companies. Select two events to study. Select the first event day is that the share reform program announced on. Study the share reform program announced this event on the Chinese Stock Market. The study found that on the day of publication in the share reform program, China's securities markets had a huge wave, stock price jumped highly, and abnormal returns is significantly positive. However, the day after release share reform program, abnormal returns have fallen sharply, fallen below zero. Although the cumulative abnormal returns CAR remained at zero or above, but this is because of the high jump result in significantly at the first day. This shows that although the share reform program of public investors in China's securities market is good news, due to the incomplete share reform program and some of the price mechanism of unequal, caused the mechanism distortion of investor expectations, thus abnormal returns decreased significantly. Since then, the paper has published annual reports on selected days for the incident, The empirical results show that the annual reports within 30 days, cumulative abnormal returns are significantly negative, and this cumulative abnormal returns are significantly positive contrary to the assumption, a more reasonable explanation is that China's capital market is imperfections, share reform program of the price mechanism is not fair, mechanism of the stock market is expected to cause a certain impact. All above make investors lack of confidence in the stock market. resulting in a negative cumulative abnormal returns. After the split share structure reform of the cumulative abnormal market returns and unexpected earnings CAR between UE.
Through empirical research, this paper reached the following conclusions: Tradable share reform in China's securities market is a great changes in system. The reform to the current situation should be smooth in general. Share reform improve the company's governance structure, change the ownership structure and size of board of the directors, improve business performance, improve the pricing function of the asset markets, make investors have a positive expected. so as to create a good environment for investment and financing has laid a good foundation in china's capital market, get ready for the allocation of resources for capital market. However, the ongoing split share reform, also had some ups and downs, This shows that the split share reform in China there are still some shortcomings. For example, capital market pricing mechanism is not perfect, securities investors expectations too high, share reform program of the price is injustice. These require the Commission and the relevant departments to further strengthen the share reform program design and supervision, strength the governance structure reform of listed companies, to make split share reform program of truly fair, just and open.
In the nineties of last century, China started building the securities market because of the demand for investment and financing. However, the economic environment was dominated by a planned economy which made china’s securities market began with the defects tradable. With the beginning of stock market established, Chinese listed companies on public offered stock and non-tradable shares into tradable shares. It was not fair to the situation which was with the shares of different weights and different price. This situation had created a significant impact on the development of China’s securities market, and produced a series of serious problems. For example, market supply and demand imbalances, shareholder conflict of interest, controlling rigidity and securities market to enhance the functional efficiency of resource allocation can not fully play the role of itself. To solve these problems, on April 29, 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "listed companies tradable on the pilot reform issues related to notice", officially opened the prelude to the split share structure reform. The purpose is to address the transfer of non-tradable shares and listed problems, achieve Circulating Shares. Tradable share reform will promote securities market system and improve the environment for Corporate Governance, conducive to the real stock market supply and demand and pricing mechanisms. help improve the investment and financing environment, help improve the product structure of China's securities market, increase varieties investment, promote rational allocation of resources of capital market.
In view of this, the paper performance in-depth study on share reform of listed companies, I hope this analysis can effect the split share reform to make the right evaluation, so as to further development of China's capital market experience to provide useful support. As well as the relevant departments in the future development of securities markets in some of the policy issues and help provide a useful reference.
This paper studies two aspects of the split share reform on the performance of listed companies. First, multiple regression model of the share reform of listed companies, the impact of performance. Descriptive statistical analysis, t test described the split share structure reform of listed companies in China after the change in operating performance. The empirical results show that, In addition to representatives of company performance variables return on equity roe in the share reform there was no significant change, other representatives of the corporate performance of the variable, The total return on assets roa, the company earnings per share eps and long-term performance on behalf of Tobin's q has a significant change. The empirical results indicate that, split share reform has changed the ownership structure of listed companies, Board Structure Board of Supervisors, and influenced the corporate governance variables. Then the operating performance of listed companies had a significant positive impact.
Secondly, use the event study method to study the market reaction of split share structure reform of listed companies. Select two events to study. Select the first event day is that the share reform program announced on. Study the share reform program announced this event on the Chinese Stock Market. The study found that on the day of publication in the share reform program, China's securities markets had a huge wave, stock price jumped highly, and abnormal returns is significantly positive. However, the day after release share reform program, abnormal returns have fallen sharply, fallen below zero. Although the cumulative abnormal returns CAR remained at zero or above, but this is because of the high jump result in significantly at the first day. This shows that although the share reform program of public investors in China's securities market is good news, due to the incomplete share reform program and some of the price mechanism of unequal, caused the mechanism distortion of investor expectations, thus abnormal returns decreased significantly. Since then, the paper has published annual reports on selected days for the incident, The empirical results show that the annual reports within 30 days, cumulative abnormal returns are significantly negative, and this cumulative abnormal returns are significantly positive contrary to the assumption, a more reasonable explanation is that China's capital market is imperfections, share reform program of the price mechanism is not fair, mechanism of the stock market is expected to cause a certain impact. All above make investors lack of confidence in the stock market. resulting in a negative cumulative abnormal returns. After the split share structure reform of the cumulative abnormal market returns and unexpected earnings CAR between UE.
Through empirical research, this paper reached the following conclusions: Tradable share reform in China's securities market is a great changes in system. The reform to the current situation should be smooth in general. Share reform improve the company's governance structure, change the ownership structure and size of board of the directors, improve business performance, improve the pricing function of the asset markets, make investors have a positive expected. so as to create a good environment for investment and financing has laid a good foundation in china's capital market, get ready for the allocation of resources for capital market. However, the ongoing split share reform, also had some ups and downs, This shows that the split share reform in China there are still some shortcomings. For example, capital market pricing mechanism is not perfect, securities investors expectations too high, share reform program of the price is injustice. These require the Commission and the relevant departments to further strengthen the share reform program design and supervision, strength the governance structure reform of listed companies, to make split share reform program of truly fair, just and open.
引文
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[9]丁守海.股权改革的三阶段托宾Q效应.南开经济研究.2006.5。
[10]丁志国,苏治,杜晓宇.股权分置改革均衡对价.中国工业经济.2006.2。
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[19]黎璞,陈晓红,刘剑锋.对股权分置改革的事件法研究.系统工程.2006.7。
[20]李琪琦.对股权分置改革市场效应的探讨.贵州财经学院学报.2006.1。
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[25]陆宇建,张继袖.股权分置、控股股东流通权利与公司盈余质量.山西财经大学学报.2009.4。
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