基于新制度经济学的反腐败问题研究
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摘要
腐败问题在我国已成为普遍关注的焦点社会问题。目前,对于腐败问题的新制度经济学分析尚处于起步阶段。文章在介绍选题背景及综述国内外学者对腐败的经济学相关研究及新制度经济学相关理论的基础上,介绍了对我国腐败问题的基本判断,总结了我国腐败问题的特点,分析了我国反腐倡廉建设的主流和趋势。
从新制度经济学的视角对我国的腐败成因进行了分析。从正式制度角度来看,产权制度不健全,激励主义的扭曲,机会机制的畸形发展,约束机构的软化,执行机制的低效,是腐败形成的重要原因。从非正式制度角度来看,崇尚权力的“官本位”传统,注重道德教化与忽视制度约束的文化传统、关系网盛行的现状与重视人伦关系的传统,是导致腐败的重要非制度因素。同时,在现在形势下,人们对物质的思想态度发生变化,政府官员的生活环境对他们的行为也有着显著的影响。按照新制度经济学的理论和分析方法,结合中国的反腐倡廉实践,建立了三个模型:“制度—腐败行为”模型、“清廉收益——腐败收益”效用最大化模型和反腐败制度有效性模型。通过“制度—腐败行为”模型,运用行为科学、新制度经济学理论与方法,按照“制度分析与行为分析”思路,得知制度与腐败行为的产生和腐败水平的高低有着必然联系,我国腐败水平较高的主要原因在于正式制度缺陷,尤其是激励因素不足;通过“清廉收益——腐败收益”效用最大化模型,主要探讨的是制度因素对腐败行为的影响方式和程度,分析得知:正式制度主要是通过影响腐败行为被发现的概率和惩罚的程度影响公职人员的腐败预期收益,从而改变预算线(以腐败和清廉为变量)的斜率,进一步改变效用最大化点。非正式制度通过传统文化、改变思想观念等因素影响公职人员的自身信念和信仰,从而改变了清廉的收益和腐败收益的边际替代率。通过反腐败制度有效性模型,分析得知:制度的有效性取决于六个因素:即制度制定、制度实体、制度执行、制度评估与反馈以及制度集合体之间的匹配性或配套程度,以及制度环境是否有利。
最后,文章根据制度分析的结果,从我国实际情况出发,提出了反腐败制度设计选择:充分发挥我国非政府组织在分权制衡和权力监督中的作用;深化经济、政治、法律等领域的改革,推进政府激励、惩处、约束、执行等机制的创新;加大反腐败的非正式制度供给,增强制度反腐综合效应;开拓前瞻性与国际化的视野,探索实施“廉洁岛”模式,学习借鉴香港、新加坡等地经验,加强国际联合,引入国际力量,开放机制反腐败。
The problem of corruption in our country has become a hot social issue of common concern. At present, the analysis of corruption from Neo-institutional Economics view is still in its infancy. On the basis of brief introduction of domestic and foreign theories on the research of corruption problem in economics view, this article made a basic judgment on China’s corruption problems, summed up the basic characteristics of China's corruption problems, analyzed the trend and mainstream of China's anti-corruption construction.
The causes of corruption in China were analyzed from the Neo-Institutional Economics perspective in this thesis. Incentive mechanism defects, abnormal development of the opportunism, softening of constraint institution, inefficient enforcement were the main causes of corruption from formal institutional view. Meanwhile, the traditions of official priority, the traditions of focusing on moral enlightenment and neglecting constraint institutions, the traditions of prevailing relationships network and emphasizing moral relationships were non-institutional factors leading to corruption from informal institutional view. At the same time, people's various thoughts towards materials and the changing living environment of government officials also had significant impacts on officials’acts.
In accordance with the Neo-Institutional Economics , combined with China's anti-corruption practices, this thesis tried to set up three models:‘institution - corruption acts’model,‘clean profits– corruption profits’utility maximization model and the anti-corruption institution’s effectiveness model. In the light of behavioral science and Neo-Institutional Economics theory, in‘institution analysis and behavior analysis’way,‘institution - corruption acts’model deduced that institution construction were intrinsically related to the occurrence and rate of corruption. China’s high rate of corruption was mainly due to the deficiencies of institution constraint and the lack of motivations.‘Clean profits– corruption profits’utility maximization model tried to explore affecting way and extent of institutions which were against corruption acts. The model deduced that the formal institution mainly effected the officials’expecting corruption profits by influencing the probability of corruption being found and the degree of punishment, thereby changing the slope of the budget line(as corruption and clean for the variables) to get the utility maximization point. In traditional culture and thinking style meanings, the informal institutions influenced the public officials’convictions and belief so as to change the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the clean profits and corruption profits. The anti-corruption institution’s effectiveness model analyzed that the effectiveness of institution depended on the following six factors: institution decision, institution entities, institution implementation, institution’s assessment and feedback, the degree of matching or complementary among institutions, and the institution implementation environment.
At the end of this thesis, it is suggested that we should let China's Non- Governmental Organizations play a better role in the separation and balance of power as well as power supervisory, deepen reforms in economic, political, legal and other fields, promote the mechanisms innovation of government incentives, punishment, constraint and implement, increase the building of anti-corruption institution to reduce corrupt happening source, explore the implementation of‘clean island’mode, learning from Hong Kong and Singapore experiences and strengthening international cooperation.
从新制度经济学的视角对我国的腐败成因进行了分析。从正式制度角度来看,产权制度不健全,激励主义的扭曲,机会机制的畸形发展,约束机构的软化,执行机制的低效,是腐败形成的重要原因。从非正式制度角度来看,崇尚权力的“官本位”传统,注重道德教化与忽视制度约束的文化传统、关系网盛行的现状与重视人伦关系的传统,是导致腐败的重要非制度因素。同时,在现在形势下,人们对物质的思想态度发生变化,政府官员的生活环境对他们的行为也有着显著的影响。按照新制度经济学的理论和分析方法,结合中国的反腐倡廉实践,建立了三个模型:“制度—腐败行为”模型、“清廉收益——腐败收益”效用最大化模型和反腐败制度有效性模型。通过“制度—腐败行为”模型,运用行为科学、新制度经济学理论与方法,按照“制度分析与行为分析”思路,得知制度与腐败行为的产生和腐败水平的高低有着必然联系,我国腐败水平较高的主要原因在于正式制度缺陷,尤其是激励因素不足;通过“清廉收益——腐败收益”效用最大化模型,主要探讨的是制度因素对腐败行为的影响方式和程度,分析得知:正式制度主要是通过影响腐败行为被发现的概率和惩罚的程度影响公职人员的腐败预期收益,从而改变预算线(以腐败和清廉为变量)的斜率,进一步改变效用最大化点。非正式制度通过传统文化、改变思想观念等因素影响公职人员的自身信念和信仰,从而改变了清廉的收益和腐败收益的边际替代率。通过反腐败制度有效性模型,分析得知:制度的有效性取决于六个因素:即制度制定、制度实体、制度执行、制度评估与反馈以及制度集合体之间的匹配性或配套程度,以及制度环境是否有利。
最后,文章根据制度分析的结果,从我国实际情况出发,提出了反腐败制度设计选择:充分发挥我国非政府组织在分权制衡和权力监督中的作用;深化经济、政治、法律等领域的改革,推进政府激励、惩处、约束、执行等机制的创新;加大反腐败的非正式制度供给,增强制度反腐综合效应;开拓前瞻性与国际化的视野,探索实施“廉洁岛”模式,学习借鉴香港、新加坡等地经验,加强国际联合,引入国际力量,开放机制反腐败。
The problem of corruption in our country has become a hot social issue of common concern. At present, the analysis of corruption from Neo-institutional Economics view is still in its infancy. On the basis of brief introduction of domestic and foreign theories on the research of corruption problem in economics view, this article made a basic judgment on China’s corruption problems, summed up the basic characteristics of China's corruption problems, analyzed the trend and mainstream of China's anti-corruption construction.
The causes of corruption in China were analyzed from the Neo-Institutional Economics perspective in this thesis. Incentive mechanism defects, abnormal development of the opportunism, softening of constraint institution, inefficient enforcement were the main causes of corruption from formal institutional view. Meanwhile, the traditions of official priority, the traditions of focusing on moral enlightenment and neglecting constraint institutions, the traditions of prevailing relationships network and emphasizing moral relationships were non-institutional factors leading to corruption from informal institutional view. At the same time, people's various thoughts towards materials and the changing living environment of government officials also had significant impacts on officials’acts.
In accordance with the Neo-Institutional Economics , combined with China's anti-corruption practices, this thesis tried to set up three models:‘institution - corruption acts’model,‘clean profits– corruption profits’utility maximization model and the anti-corruption institution’s effectiveness model. In the light of behavioral science and Neo-Institutional Economics theory, in‘institution analysis and behavior analysis’way,‘institution - corruption acts’model deduced that institution construction were intrinsically related to the occurrence and rate of corruption. China’s high rate of corruption was mainly due to the deficiencies of institution constraint and the lack of motivations.‘Clean profits– corruption profits’utility maximization model tried to explore affecting way and extent of institutions which were against corruption acts. The model deduced that the formal institution mainly effected the officials’expecting corruption profits by influencing the probability of corruption being found and the degree of punishment, thereby changing the slope of the budget line(as corruption and clean for the variables) to get the utility maximization point. In traditional culture and thinking style meanings, the informal institutions influenced the public officials’convictions and belief so as to change the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the clean profits and corruption profits. The anti-corruption institution’s effectiveness model analyzed that the effectiveness of institution depended on the following six factors: institution decision, institution entities, institution implementation, institution’s assessment and feedback, the degree of matching or complementary among institutions, and the institution implementation environment.
At the end of this thesis, it is suggested that we should let China's Non- Governmental Organizations play a better role in the separation and balance of power as well as power supervisory, deepen reforms in economic, political, legal and other fields, promote the mechanisms innovation of government incentives, punishment, constraint and implement, increase the building of anti-corruption institution to reduce corrupt happening source, explore the implementation of‘clean island’mode, learning from Hong Kong and Singapore experiences and strengthening international cooperation.
引文
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[27]何增科.新制度主义——经济学到政治学[M].北京:三联书店,1996:345-359
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[30]王礼鑫.公共权力,腐败的制度——行为分析模型[D]:[湖北大学硕士学位论文].武汉:湖北大学, 2002:15-17
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[2]李金芬,徐元康.新制度经济学的分析方法与中国经济研究[J].当代经济研究,2001,(7):40-43
[3] Becker. Gary. S..“Crime and punishment:An Economic Approach.”Journal of Political Economy, 1968,76:169-217
[4] Becker. Gary S.. and Georage J. Stiger.“Law Enforcement. Malfeasance. And the Compensation of Enforcers. Journal of Legal studies, 1974,(3):1-19
[5] Tanzi. Vito, and Hawid Daadj, 1997,“Corruption, Public Investmout, and Grouth, IMF paper Working Wp/97/139, Washing D.C. IMF, 1997
[6] Jean Tirole. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Massachuselts Instititute of Technology. 1988,32:76-77
[7]布坎南.寻利与寻租[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1993:113-114
[8] T.W.舒尔茨.制度与人的经济价值的不断提高[J].美国农业经济学,1968,50:67
[9]道格拉斯.C.诺斯.经济史中的结构与变迁.上海:上海三联出版社,1994:54-55
[10]郭大方.挑战腐败——兼论治腐机制的构建[M].北京:军事科学出版社,2001:156-157
[11] R.科斯,A.阿尔钦,D.诺斯等.财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海:三联书店出版社, 1991:12-16
[12]周业安.中国的经济转轨与中国的新制度经济学[J].经济研究资料,2000,10:3-14
[13] E.G.菲吕博腾,S.配杰威齐.产权与经济理论:近期文献的一个综述[M].上海:三联书店出版社,1991:231-232
[14]卢现祥.我国转型时期腐败问题的制度经济学思考[J].湖北行政学院学报, 2002,(1):9
[15]曾康霖.关注当代经济学研究的风景线_对新制度经济学的评价[J].理论研究, 2001,(4):1-6
[16]吴敬琏.我们需要的市场经济规则[J].南方周末,2003,(9):30
[17]华军.产权交易市场肩负的使命[J].纪检与监察,2003,(6):21
[18]何文等.国有资产流失的制度基础[J].战略与管理,1996,(2):33
[19]何清涟.现代的陷阱[M].北京:今日中国出版社,1998:4-5
[20] Herbert.A.Simon. Distraction in Today’s World of Organizations and Markets. Political Science [U.S.A], 2002,12:749-756
[21]孟德斯鸠.论法的精神(上)[M].北京:商务印书馆,1961:154-155
[22]宋全成.论孟德斯鸠与卢梭国家权力理论之分野[J].哲学与社会发展研究,2003,(1):60-64
[23]张玉华,温春玲.司法独立与审判委员会改革[J].改革内参, 2003,(8):29-33
[24]柯兰君.送礼与腐败——中国送礼形式与功能的转变[J].社会学研究,1993,(6):20
[25]施雪华.政府权能理论[M].浙江:浙江人民出版社,1998:304-309
[26]何显明.制度防范:反腐败的治本之道[J].中共浙江省委党校学报,2001,(6):78
[27]何增科.新制度主义——经济学到政治学[M].北京:三联书店,1996:345-359
[28]俞文剑.管理心理等(修订本).兰州:甘肃人民出版社,1989:54
[29]张宇燕.经济发展与制度选择——对制度的经济分析[M].北京:中国人民出版社,1992:252
[30]王礼鑫.公共权力,腐败的制度——行为分析模型[D]:[湖北大学硕士学位论文].武汉:湖北大学, 2002:15-17
[31]塞缪尔P亨延顿.变化社会中的政治秩序[M].王冠华等译.北京:三联书店,1989:54
[32]刘霞.风险决策:过程、心理与文化[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1998:24
[33]加里贝克尔.人类行为的经济分析[M].王业宇,陈琪译.上海:三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995:63
[34]吴小蕾.非正式制度制约腐败的经济学分析[J].宁夏社会科学,2002,(4):10-13
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