合作研发中的钳制问题研究
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摘要
企业的研发活动是一项重要的社会经济活动,是提升企业竞争力的重要手段,是国民经济发展的基本动力。由于受到自身规模、资金等条件的限制,不少企业与其它企业或组织合作,进行合作研发,共担风险、共享收益。合作研发已经成为企业研发活动的一种重要形式。合作研发投入的专用性资产一旦投入很难改作其他用途,因此存在着被缔约后的机会主义行为侵害的可能即存在被钳制的危险。投资方预料到专用性资产可能被对方钳制时,就可能会产生专用性资产投资不足的问题,这就是钳制问题.
本文以产权理论、声誉理论、契约理论和博弈论等为基础,研究了合作研发过程中的钳制问题。文章分析了合作研发钳制问题的表现形式,从资产专用性、契约不完全性、机会主义行为及专有性的角度分析了钳制问题产生的原因和作用机理。对不同类型的合作研发进行了博弈分析。最后,从产权配置、契约的设计、声誉机制和组织结构等方面提出解决钳制问题的建议与对策。本文以合作研发中的钳制问题为主线,建立了一个具有实践意义和理论意义的企业合作研发中的钳制问题的分析框架。
R&D has always been a very important social activity. It is an important way for enterprises to enforce their competitive capability and the essential dynamic behind the development of national economics. More and more enterprises seek R&D collaboration with other companies or research organizations, in purpose of share risk and benefits. The cooperators invest specific capital in cooperative R&D, but because of the difficulty to change use, specific capital has a possibility to be held-up. When the investor anticipates that he can’t get whole return from his specific investment, he will not invest efficiently. That is the holdup problem.
In this article“Property Rights Theory”,“Reputation Theory”,“Contract Theory”and“Game Theory”is employed to discuss hold-up problems in cooperative R&D. The article analyses the causation and the mechanism of the hold-up problems from the angle of asset specificity, incompleteness of contract and opportunism. Then this article analyses various type of hold-up problems in cooperative R&D by game theory. At the ending, it gives some useful measures and advice to solve hold-up problems in cooperative R&D, such as redistributing property rights, designing contract, reputation mechanism, cooperation constructing, etc. This article has set up a research model of academic and practice sense.
本文以产权理论、声誉理论、契约理论和博弈论等为基础,研究了合作研发过程中的钳制问题。文章分析了合作研发钳制问题的表现形式,从资产专用性、契约不完全性、机会主义行为及专有性的角度分析了钳制问题产生的原因和作用机理。对不同类型的合作研发进行了博弈分析。最后,从产权配置、契约的设计、声誉机制和组织结构等方面提出解决钳制问题的建议与对策。本文以合作研发中的钳制问题为主线,建立了一个具有实践意义和理论意义的企业合作研发中的钳制问题的分析框架。
R&D has always been a very important social activity. It is an important way for enterprises to enforce their competitive capability and the essential dynamic behind the development of national economics. More and more enterprises seek R&D collaboration with other companies or research organizations, in purpose of share risk and benefits. The cooperators invest specific capital in cooperative R&D, but because of the difficulty to change use, specific capital has a possibility to be held-up. When the investor anticipates that he can’t get whole return from his specific investment, he will not invest efficiently. That is the holdup problem.
In this article“Property Rights Theory”,“Reputation Theory”,“Contract Theory”and“Game Theory”is employed to discuss hold-up problems in cooperative R&D. The article analyses the causation and the mechanism of the hold-up problems from the angle of asset specificity, incompleteness of contract and opportunism. Then this article analyses various type of hold-up problems in cooperative R&D by game theory. At the ending, it gives some useful measures and advice to solve hold-up problems in cooperative R&D, such as redistributing property rights, designing contract, reputation mechanism, cooperation constructing, etc. This article has set up a research model of academic and practice sense.
引文
【1】盛洪:《现代制度经济学》,[M]北京大学出版社2000年3月第一版.
【2】易余胤、肖条军、盛昭瀚,合作研发中机会主义行为的演化博弈分析[J]管理科学学报,2005年8月第8卷第4期
【3】陈建华,研发策略之经济分析,博士论文,2003
【4】郭继强,专用性资产特性、组织剩余分享与企业制度[J]经济学家,2005年第6期
【5】邹璇,不确定条件下区域间合作研发与独立研发的策略选择,[J]重庆工商大学学报,2004年第6期
【6】肖余军等,纵向型企业集团R&D及其经济增长的博弈分析,[J]管理科学学报,2002年8月,Vol 5,No.4.
【7】杨瑞龙、杨其静,专用性、专有性与企业制度[J]经济研究,2001年第3期
【8】罗炜,唐文虎,大学-企业合作创新的博弈分析,[J]系统工程,2002年1月,Vol 20,No.1,28-31
【9】方世建,郑南磊,技术交易中的逆向选择问题研究[J]研究与发展管理,2001年12月
【10】徐飞、何伟,民营高科技企业信息不对称情况下合作研发博弈分析[J]上海管理科学,2004年第2期
【11】花永剑,中小企业研发困境的博弈分析[J]经济与管理,2005年12月第l9卷第l2期
【12】李勇等,供应链中制造商一供应商合作研发博弈模型,[J]系统工程学报2005年2月第20卷第1期
【13】周青,曾德明,企业协作研发网络化的博弈分析[J]商业研究2006年第1期
【14】马雷.中国科大硕士论文,2002.
【15】张维迎,企业的企业家契约理论[M]上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995
【16】威廉姆森,治理机制[Ml.中译本,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001.
【17】威廉姆森,生产的纵向一体化:市场失灵的考察.陈郁编.企业制度与市场组织—交易费用经济学文选[M].中译木,上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996:1-23.
【18】哈特著,费方域译《企业、合同与财务结构》,[M]上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998
【19】谢识予:《经济博弈论》(第二版),[M]复旦大学出版社,2002年版.
【20】方世建,基于知识专有性的治理结构重构[J]经济学家,2006年第3期
【21】N¨oldeke, G., and K. M. Schmidt (1995):“Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem,”Rand Journal of Economics, 26, 163-179.
【22】Pitchford, R., and C. Snyder (2001):“A Non-Contractual Solution to the Hold-Up Problem Involving Gradual Investment,”mimeo, George Washington University.
【23】Vladimir Smirnov, Andrew Wait:“Timing of investments, holdup and total welfare”International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004) 413– 425.
【24】Randolph Sloof, Joep Sonnemans, Hessel Oosterbeek:“Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle”European Economic Review 48 (2004) 1399– 1410.
【25】Gonzalo Olcina, Concepción Pe?arrubia :“Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences”Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol. 54 (2004) 111–132.
【26】James Bessen (2004):“Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information”Economics Letters 82 (2004) 321–32
【27】Klein, B., Crawford, R., and A. Alchian (1978):“Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,and the Competitive Contracting Process,”Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326.
【28】Abraham L. Wickelgren:“Innovation, market structure and the holdup problem: investment incentives and coordination”,International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004) 693– 713.
【29】Hart, O., and Moore, 1990,“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”J. Political Economy, vol. 98, 1119-1158.
【30】MacLeod, W.B. and J. Malcomson (1993):“Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts,”American Economic Review, 83, 811-837.
【31】Che, Y.-K., and J. S′akovics (2001):“A Dynamic Theory of Holdup,”SSRI Working Paper 2001-25 (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/archive/wp2001-25.pdf), University of Wisconsin;and Economics Dicussion Paper 01-05, University of Edinburgh.
【32】Che, Y.-K., and J. S′akovics (2003):“Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem in Dynamic Relationships,”mimeo., University of Wisconsin.
【33】Grossman, S., and O. Hart (1986):“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Lateral and Vertical Integration,”Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.
【34】Gul, F. (2001):“Unobservable investment and the hold-up problem,”conometrica, 69,343-376.
【35】Edlin, A.S. and S. Reichelstein (1996):“Holdups, Standard Breach remedies and Optimal Investment,”American Economic Review, 86, 478-501.
【36】Felli, L., and K. Roberts (2000):“Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?,”mimeo.
【37】Hart, O.D. (1995). Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press; Oxford.
【38】Hart, O.D., and J. Moore (1990):“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-1158.
【2】易余胤、肖条军、盛昭瀚,合作研发中机会主义行为的演化博弈分析[J]管理科学学报,2005年8月第8卷第4期
【3】陈建华,研发策略之经济分析,博士论文,2003
【4】郭继强,专用性资产特性、组织剩余分享与企业制度[J]经济学家,2005年第6期
【5】邹璇,不确定条件下区域间合作研发与独立研发的策略选择,[J]重庆工商大学学报,2004年第6期
【6】肖余军等,纵向型企业集团R&D及其经济增长的博弈分析,[J]管理科学学报,2002年8月,Vol 5,No.4.
【7】杨瑞龙、杨其静,专用性、专有性与企业制度[J]经济研究,2001年第3期
【8】罗炜,唐文虎,大学-企业合作创新的博弈分析,[J]系统工程,2002年1月,Vol 20,No.1,28-31
【9】方世建,郑南磊,技术交易中的逆向选择问题研究[J]研究与发展管理,2001年12月
【10】徐飞、何伟,民营高科技企业信息不对称情况下合作研发博弈分析[J]上海管理科学,2004年第2期
【11】花永剑,中小企业研发困境的博弈分析[J]经济与管理,2005年12月第l9卷第l2期
【12】李勇等,供应链中制造商一供应商合作研发博弈模型,[J]系统工程学报2005年2月第20卷第1期
【13】周青,曾德明,企业协作研发网络化的博弈分析[J]商业研究2006年第1期
【14】马雷.中国科大硕士论文,2002.
【15】张维迎,企业的企业家契约理论[M]上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995
【16】威廉姆森,治理机制[Ml.中译本,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001.
【17】威廉姆森,生产的纵向一体化:市场失灵的考察.陈郁编.企业制度与市场组织—交易费用经济学文选[M].中译木,上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996:1-23.
【18】哈特著,费方域译《企业、合同与财务结构》,[M]上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998
【19】谢识予:《经济博弈论》(第二版),[M]复旦大学出版社,2002年版.
【20】方世建,基于知识专有性的治理结构重构[J]经济学家,2006年第3期
【21】N¨oldeke, G., and K. M. Schmidt (1995):“Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem,”Rand Journal of Economics, 26, 163-179.
【22】Pitchford, R., and C. Snyder (2001):“A Non-Contractual Solution to the Hold-Up Problem Involving Gradual Investment,”mimeo, George Washington University.
【23】Vladimir Smirnov, Andrew Wait:“Timing of investments, holdup and total welfare”International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004) 413– 425.
【24】Randolph Sloof, Joep Sonnemans, Hessel Oosterbeek:“Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle”European Economic Review 48 (2004) 1399– 1410.
【25】Gonzalo Olcina, Concepción Pe?arrubia :“Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences”Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol. 54 (2004) 111–132.
【26】James Bessen (2004):“Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information”Economics Letters 82 (2004) 321–32
【27】Klein, B., Crawford, R., and A. Alchian (1978):“Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,and the Competitive Contracting Process,”Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326.
【28】Abraham L. Wickelgren:“Innovation, market structure and the holdup problem: investment incentives and coordination”,International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004) 693– 713.
【29】Hart, O., and Moore, 1990,“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”J. Political Economy, vol. 98, 1119-1158.
【30】MacLeod, W.B. and J. Malcomson (1993):“Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts,”American Economic Review, 83, 811-837.
【31】Che, Y.-K., and J. S′akovics (2001):“A Dynamic Theory of Holdup,”SSRI Working Paper 2001-25 (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/archive/wp2001-25.pdf), University of Wisconsin;and Economics Dicussion Paper 01-05, University of Edinburgh.
【32】Che, Y.-K., and J. S′akovics (2003):“Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem in Dynamic Relationships,”mimeo., University of Wisconsin.
【33】Grossman, S., and O. Hart (1986):“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Lateral and Vertical Integration,”Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.
【34】Gul, F. (2001):“Unobservable investment and the hold-up problem,”conometrica, 69,343-376.
【35】Edlin, A.S. and S. Reichelstein (1996):“Holdups, Standard Breach remedies and Optimal Investment,”American Economic Review, 86, 478-501.
【36】Felli, L., and K. Roberts (2000):“Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?,”mimeo.
【37】Hart, O.D. (1995). Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press; Oxford.
【38】Hart, O.D., and J. Moore (1990):“Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-1158.