公司治理、高管变更与盈余管理的关系研究
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摘要
随着我国证券市场的发展,上市公司的盈余管理问题越来越受到债权人、股东、证券监管部门及其他利益相关者的关注。本文首先对国内外的相关研究进行回顾、利用博弈论方法探讨了离职高管进行盈余管理的行为,对董事长和总经理离职变更诱发盈余管理进行了实证分析。在此基础上,进一步对比研究了股东治理差异、监事治理差异和独立董事治理差异的环境下,上市公司董事长和总经理变更前的盈余管理行为。
在已有研究的基础上,本文选取了2003-2008年沪、深两市的上市公司为研究对象,剔除ST、~*ST、新上市及数据不全的公司后,最后共得到4300个观测值。在研究方法上,选取分行业估计并且采用线下项目前总应计利润作为因变量估计特征参数的截面Jones模型来计量盈余管理,同时采用T检验、相关性分析及多元线性回归的方法,对公司治理结构、高管变更和盈余管理之间的关系进行实证分析。
研究结果显示:(1)为了离职时获得更多的报酬或更好的声誉,董事长在正常变更前一、两年有调增利润的行为,且变更前一年的调增现象比前两年要常见。也就是说在正常变更的情况下,即将离职的董事长一般会在离职前一年调增利润,进而为获得更高的离任薪酬和职业声誉创造条件。(2)本文的实证结果中没有证据显示总经理正常变更前存在显著的盈余管理行为,即使根据公司治理水平分组检验,结果仍不显著。说明我国上市公司形成的委托代理关系中,做为代理人这一层面,董事长才是实际的关键人物。(3)研究还发现完善的公司治理结构对董事长正常变更诱发的盈余管理行为能够起到有效的抑制作用。
最后根据本文的研究结果和结论,提出了提高公司内部治理水平和建立外部市场高管长期声誉机制具有紧迫性等建议。
With the development of China Stock market, issues on earning management have been paid more and more attention by creditors, stockholders, government stock supervision department and all the other earnings relevant groups. At first, this paper reviews relevant researches, and uses game analysis to study outgoing mamagement's earnings management, behavir and makes an empirical analysis on earnings management induced by top management turnover. On this basis, it makes a comparative study on the relationship between top management turnover and earning management in the different shareholders, supervisors, independent directors governance structure.
On the basis of former research, this paper selects companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2003-2008 as research object, and remove ST、*ST、new listed company and the companies in which data is incomplete. Then the sample is 4300. Regarding to research methods, earning management is estimated by a Jones Model with using the total accruals before below-the-line items as estimated characteristic parameters according to industry. This paper uses T Test, Correlate Analysis, and Liner Regression Analysis to make an empirical analysis on the relationship between the corporate governance, top management turnover and earnings management.
The result of research shows: (1) In order to receive larger bonus and career reputation, routine turnover of chairman increases discretionary accruals(DA), with the evidence being stronger on the final year than two years. That is, the outgoing chairman general will increase (DA) in the final year to create conditions for a higher salary or reputation. (2) There is no evidence which shows the manager increases DA before routine turnover. The results are still insignificant in the group testing according corporate governance. It notes that the chairman is the real key character as the agents in the principal-agent relationship in Chinese Listed Companies. (3) Perfectly governance mechanism can successfully mitigate the earning management caused by chairman turnover. Finally, according to this paper's findings and conclusions, it puts forward that optimizing governance mechanism and establishing long-term reputation mechanism in top management market is a matter of urgency.
在已有研究的基础上,本文选取了2003-2008年沪、深两市的上市公司为研究对象,剔除ST、~*ST、新上市及数据不全的公司后,最后共得到4300个观测值。在研究方法上,选取分行业估计并且采用线下项目前总应计利润作为因变量估计特征参数的截面Jones模型来计量盈余管理,同时采用T检验、相关性分析及多元线性回归的方法,对公司治理结构、高管变更和盈余管理之间的关系进行实证分析。
研究结果显示:(1)为了离职时获得更多的报酬或更好的声誉,董事长在正常变更前一、两年有调增利润的行为,且变更前一年的调增现象比前两年要常见。也就是说在正常变更的情况下,即将离职的董事长一般会在离职前一年调增利润,进而为获得更高的离任薪酬和职业声誉创造条件。(2)本文的实证结果中没有证据显示总经理正常变更前存在显著的盈余管理行为,即使根据公司治理水平分组检验,结果仍不显著。说明我国上市公司形成的委托代理关系中,做为代理人这一层面,董事长才是实际的关键人物。(3)研究还发现完善的公司治理结构对董事长正常变更诱发的盈余管理行为能够起到有效的抑制作用。
最后根据本文的研究结果和结论,提出了提高公司内部治理水平和建立外部市场高管长期声誉机制具有紧迫性等建议。
With the development of China Stock market, issues on earning management have been paid more and more attention by creditors, stockholders, government stock supervision department and all the other earnings relevant groups. At first, this paper reviews relevant researches, and uses game analysis to study outgoing mamagement's earnings management, behavir and makes an empirical analysis on earnings management induced by top management turnover. On this basis, it makes a comparative study on the relationship between top management turnover and earning management in the different shareholders, supervisors, independent directors governance structure.
On the basis of former research, this paper selects companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2003-2008 as research object, and remove ST、*ST、new listed company and the companies in which data is incomplete. Then the sample is 4300. Regarding to research methods, earning management is estimated by a Jones Model with using the total accruals before below-the-line items as estimated characteristic parameters according to industry. This paper uses T Test, Correlate Analysis, and Liner Regression Analysis to make an empirical analysis on the relationship between the corporate governance, top management turnover and earnings management.
The result of research shows: (1) In order to receive larger bonus and career reputation, routine turnover of chairman increases discretionary accruals(DA), with the evidence being stronger on the final year than two years. That is, the outgoing chairman general will increase (DA) in the final year to create conditions for a higher salary or reputation. (2) There is no evidence which shows the manager increases DA before routine turnover. The results are still insignificant in the group testing according corporate governance. It notes that the chairman is the real key character as the agents in the principal-agent relationship in Chinese Listed Companies. (3) Perfectly governance mechanism can successfully mitigate the earning management caused by chairman turnover. Finally, according to this paper's findings and conclusions, it puts forward that optimizing governance mechanism and establishing long-term reputation mechanism in top management market is a matter of urgency.
引文
[1]尤佳,丁丽芳.盈余管理与公司治理相关问题研究[J].机械管理开发,2004(2):47-48.
[2]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员变动:经营业绩的作用[J].会计研究.2002.9:31-40.
[3]庞金勇.上市公司高管变更与公司治理关系研究:(博士学位论文).山东:山东大学,2008.
[4]Leuz,Christian;Nanda,Dhananjay;Wysocki,Peter D..Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison[J],Jovrnal of Finacial Economics,2003,Vol.69 Issue 3,p505-527.
[5]Hart 0.,Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications[J],The Economic Journal,1995(105):678-689.
[6]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006(1):129-136.
[7]Beasley,Mark S.An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud[J],The accounting review,1996(10):443-465.
[8]Biao Xie,Wallace N.Davidson Ⅲ,Peter J.DaDalt:Earnings Management and Corporate Governance:the Role of the Board and the Audit Committee[J],Journal of Corporate Finance,2003(9):295-316.
[9]Yun W.Park,Hyun-Han Shin.Board composition and earnings management in Canada[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004(10):431-457.
[10]刘立国,杜荣.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2003(2):28-37.
[11]薛祖云,黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量-来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2004,(9):84-89.
[12]Dechow P,Sloan R G.Executive incentives and the horizon problem[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1991,14(5):51-89.
[13]Gibbons,R.& Murphy,K.Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,(100):468-506.
[14]Butler and Newman,Agency control mechanisms,effectiveness and decision making in an executive's final year with a firm[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1989,145:451-464.
[15]Murphy,K.and Zimmerman,J.Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics 1993(16):273-316.
[16]Miranda Lam Detzler and Susan M.Machuga.Earnings Management Surrounding Top Executive Turnover in Japanese Firms[J].Review of Pacic Basin Financial Markets and Policies.2002,5(3):343-371.
[17]Reitenga,A.,Tearney,M.,Mandatory CEO retirements,discretionary accruals,and corporate governance mechanisms[J],Journal of Accounting,Auditing and Finance,2003,18:255-280.
[18]赵震宇,杨之曙,白重恩.影响中国上市公司高管层变更的因素分析与实证检验[J].金融研究,2007(8):76-88.
[19]Kang,D.L.AND Sorensen,A.B.Ownership organization and firm performance:(Working paper).Harvard Business School,Harvard University,Cambridge,MA,1999.
[20]Willimson,O.Markets and hierarchies:analysis and antitrust implications.New York:Free Press,1975.
[21]Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R.Politicians and firms[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994(109):995-1025.
[22]Sternberg,E.Corporate governance:accountability in market place:(dissertation).Institute of Economic Affairs,London,1998.
[23]Keasey,K.,Thompson,S.and Wright,M.Corporate governance:economic,management and financial issues.New York:Oxford University Press,1997.
[24]John,K.and Senbet,I.Corporate governance and board effectiveness[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,1998,22:371-403.
[25]Denis,D.K.and McConnell,J.J.International corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):1-36.
[26]Gasaway,J.W.An agency theory based analysis of management ownership and firm financial performance in high technology firms:(dissertation).The Graduate Schooll-New Brunswick,Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey,2000.
[27]OECE.OECE principles of corporate governance.Paris:OECD,1999.
[28]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津:天津人民出版社,1994.
[29]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.充分信息和国有企业改革[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1997.
[30]张维迎.产权安排与企业内的权力斗争.经济研究,2000,6:41-50.
[31]李维安.公司治理[M].天津:南开大学出版社,2001.
[32]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2):81-91.
[33]亚当.斯密,国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下),北京:商务印书馆,1974.
[34]崔之九.美国二十九个州公司法变革的理论背景[J].经济研究,1996(4):35-60.
[35]聂德宗,公司法人治理结构的立法模式及发展趋势[J],法学评论,2000.6:33-40.
[36]张旭,当代公司治理结构演变的新趋势与我国的对策[J].经济纵横,1996(3):68-69.
[37]王承先.企业员工激励技术[M].广州:广东经济出版社,2002.
[38]黄群慧.企业家激励约束与国有企业改革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[39]李春琦.高层经理激励[M],上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[40]Euseneram Fama.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of political economy.1980(88):79.
[41]李春琦.国有企业经营者的声誉激励问题研究[J],财经研究,2002(12):50-55.
[42]Hart.O.and Moore,B.property rightsand the nature of ownership[J],Journal of Political Economy,Vol98,1990,P87.
[43]周其仁.“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”-“公有制经济”中企业家人力资本产权的案例研究[J].经济研究,1997(3):97.
[44]WilliamR.Scott著.陈汉文译.财务会计理论[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2000年.
[45]Sehipper.K.Earningsmanagement.AeeountingHorizons.1989,3.
[46]Paul.M,Healy and James.M.A review of the earnings management literature and setting[J].Accounting Horizons.1999(12):365-383.
[47]包世泽.考虑委托代理冲突的公司治理与盈余管理研究:(博士学位论文).辽宁:大连理工大学,2008.
[48]McNichols,M.,and Wilson,P.Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1988(26):1-31.
[49]Burgstahler,D.and Dichev,I.Incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses:evidence form quarterly earning:(Working paper).University of Washington,1998.
[50]傅蕴英.盈余管理与公司治理-基于审计意见的研究:(博士学位论文).四川:重庆大学,2004.
[51]夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2003,5(2):94-122.
[52]宁虎.治理结构对盈余管理影响及博弈分析[J].审计月刊,2008(8):46-47.
[53]魏明海.盈余管理基本理论及其研究述评[J].会计研究,2000,(2):37-42.
[54]蔡吉甫.盈余管理及其治理的博弈分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(1):51-55.
[55]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,1996.
[56]邓春华.基于博弈分析的盈余管理的问题研究[J].会计研究,2003(5):37-42.
[57]刘银国.基于博弈分析的上市公司监事会研究[J].管理世界,2004(6):144-146.
[2]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员变动:经营业绩的作用[J].会计研究.2002.9:31-40.
[3]庞金勇.上市公司高管变更与公司治理关系研究:(博士学位论文).山东:山东大学,2008.
[4]Leuz,Christian;Nanda,Dhananjay;Wysocki,Peter D..Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison[J],Jovrnal of Finacial Economics,2003,Vol.69 Issue 3,p505-527.
[5]Hart 0.,Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications[J],The Economic Journal,1995(105):678-689.
[6]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006(1):129-136.
[7]Beasley,Mark S.An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud[J],The accounting review,1996(10):443-465.
[8]Biao Xie,Wallace N.Davidson Ⅲ,Peter J.DaDalt:Earnings Management and Corporate Governance:the Role of the Board and the Audit Committee[J],Journal of Corporate Finance,2003(9):295-316.
[9]Yun W.Park,Hyun-Han Shin.Board composition and earnings management in Canada[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004(10):431-457.
[10]刘立国,杜荣.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2003(2):28-37.
[11]薛祖云,黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量-来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2004,(9):84-89.
[12]Dechow P,Sloan R G.Executive incentives and the horizon problem[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1991,14(5):51-89.
[13]Gibbons,R.& Murphy,K.Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,(100):468-506.
[14]Butler and Newman,Agency control mechanisms,effectiveness and decision making in an executive's final year with a firm[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1989,145:451-464.
[15]Murphy,K.and Zimmerman,J.Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics 1993(16):273-316.
[16]Miranda Lam Detzler and Susan M.Machuga.Earnings Management Surrounding Top Executive Turnover in Japanese Firms[J].Review of Pacic Basin Financial Markets and Policies.2002,5(3):343-371.
[17]Reitenga,A.,Tearney,M.,Mandatory CEO retirements,discretionary accruals,and corporate governance mechanisms[J],Journal of Accounting,Auditing and Finance,2003,18:255-280.
[18]赵震宇,杨之曙,白重恩.影响中国上市公司高管层变更的因素分析与实证检验[J].金融研究,2007(8):76-88.
[19]Kang,D.L.AND Sorensen,A.B.Ownership organization and firm performance:(Working paper).Harvard Business School,Harvard University,Cambridge,MA,1999.
[20]Willimson,O.Markets and hierarchies:analysis and antitrust implications.New York:Free Press,1975.
[21]Shleifer,A.and Vishny,R.Politicians and firms[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994(109):995-1025.
[22]Sternberg,E.Corporate governance:accountability in market place:(dissertation).Institute of Economic Affairs,London,1998.
[23]Keasey,K.,Thompson,S.and Wright,M.Corporate governance:economic,management and financial issues.New York:Oxford University Press,1997.
[24]John,K.and Senbet,I.Corporate governance and board effectiveness[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,1998,22:371-403.
[25]Denis,D.K.and McConnell,J.J.International corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):1-36.
[26]Gasaway,J.W.An agency theory based analysis of management ownership and firm financial performance in high technology firms:(dissertation).The Graduate Schooll-New Brunswick,Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey,2000.
[27]OECE.OECE principles of corporate governance.Paris:OECD,1999.
[28]吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津:天津人民出版社,1994.
[29]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.充分信息和国有企业改革[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1997.
[30]张维迎.产权安排与企业内的权力斗争.经济研究,2000,6:41-50.
[31]李维安.公司治理[M].天津:南开大学出版社,2001.
[32]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2):81-91.
[33]亚当.斯密,国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下),北京:商务印书馆,1974.
[34]崔之九.美国二十九个州公司法变革的理论背景[J].经济研究,1996(4):35-60.
[35]聂德宗,公司法人治理结构的立法模式及发展趋势[J],法学评论,2000.6:33-40.
[36]张旭,当代公司治理结构演变的新趋势与我国的对策[J].经济纵横,1996(3):68-69.
[37]王承先.企业员工激励技术[M].广州:广东经济出版社,2002.
[38]黄群慧.企业家激励约束与国有企业改革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[39]李春琦.高层经理激励[M],上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[40]Euseneram Fama.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of political economy.1980(88):79.
[41]李春琦.国有企业经营者的声誉激励问题研究[J],财经研究,2002(12):50-55.
[42]Hart.O.and Moore,B.property rightsand the nature of ownership[J],Journal of Political Economy,Vol98,1990,P87.
[43]周其仁.“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”-“公有制经济”中企业家人力资本产权的案例研究[J].经济研究,1997(3):97.
[44]WilliamR.Scott著.陈汉文译.财务会计理论[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2000年.
[45]Sehipper.K.Earningsmanagement.AeeountingHorizons.1989,3.
[46]Paul.M,Healy and James.M.A review of the earnings management literature and setting[J].Accounting Horizons.1999(12):365-383.
[47]包世泽.考虑委托代理冲突的公司治理与盈余管理研究:(博士学位论文).辽宁:大连理工大学,2008.
[48]McNichols,M.,and Wilson,P.Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1988(26):1-31.
[49]Burgstahler,D.and Dichev,I.Incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses:evidence form quarterly earning:(Working paper).University of Washington,1998.
[50]傅蕴英.盈余管理与公司治理-基于审计意见的研究:(博士学位论文).四川:重庆大学,2004.
[51]夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2003,5(2):94-122.
[52]宁虎.治理结构对盈余管理影响及博弈分析[J].审计月刊,2008(8):46-47.
[53]魏明海.盈余管理基本理论及其研究述评[J].会计研究,2000,(2):37-42.
[54]蔡吉甫.盈余管理及其治理的博弈分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(1):51-55.
[55]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,1996.
[56]邓春华.基于博弈分析的盈余管理的问题研究[J].会计研究,2003(5):37-42.
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